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




# THE IMAGE OF GOD







# THE IMAGE OF GOD

THE DOCTRINE OF ST. AUGUSTINE  
AND ITS INFLUENCE

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TO MY  
MOTHER AND FATHER





## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Our century has been witness to a marvelous swelling of scholarly interest in patristic theology and to the "re-discovery" of the riches in the teaching of the Fathers of the Church. Literally thousands of monographs have been the fruit of this prodigious patristic research since the turn of the century. There is scarcely an aspect of the thought of the Fathers which has been neglected in this modern venture, and most certainly the central theme of Christian anthropology could not be overlooked. Centerpiece of Christian teaching about man is the doctrine of the divine image, and among the Fathers this doctrine reaches a height never surpassed. The basis of their whole anthropology was derived from Genesis: "And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness." St. Gregory of Nyssa remarks that man "is second to none of the wonders of the world . . . because none have been made in the likeness of God except that creature which is man." His fellow Cappadocian, St. Gregory Nazianzen, is not to be outdone, and he observes that "God builds the palace [the world] and then installs the king [man] within it." The mighty voice of the great Augustine joins in this patristic chorus with these words: "Man's truest honor is the image and likeness of God." East and West vie with one another in extolling man's possession of the divine image and likeness.

Patristic scholars have not been unaware of the significance of the doctrine of the image for the Fathers, and a number

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of treatises on this theme have appeared within the last decade or so. Almost invariably the teaching of the Greek Fathers has been the object of concentration. To cite only the more important Fathers, recent studies have been made of the doctrine of the image as it appears in the writings of St. Irenaeus, Origen, St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and St. John Damascene. The teaching of the Latin Fathers about the divine image in man has not attracted as much recent interest as the teaching of their eastern counterparts, and, in particular, the doctrine of St. Augustine, the greatest of the Fathers, has been somewhat slighted.

This is not to deny that the doctrine of St. Augustine as a whole has received merited attention from patristic theologians. Hundreds of valuable works concerned with the thought of the African Father have appeared since the turn of the century, and new periodicals and publications are being devoted to the study of his writings. Yet, to our knowledge, there is no recent monograph which treats exclusively and systematically of the doctrine of the image as it appears in the writings of St. Augustine.\* The augustinian doctrine does appear in many works, but ordinarily in summary or outline fashion. Such an approach to the central theme of Christian and augustinian anthropology is warranted, perhaps, by the special purposes of these various works, but it does little justice to the doctrine of the image.

It may be that a general assumption regarding the augustinian teaching about the divine image underlies this approach: the augustinian doctrine has been adequately treated in the past, and is widely known. Moreover, were not the great scholastics the heirs to the augustinian deposit in the Middle Ages, and are not we their cultural descendants? In this view—and it is largely true—the common teaching of theologians about the

\*Attention should be called to a recent anthology of augustinian texts concerning the divine image in man, which appeared during the writing of this study. Cf. J. Heijke, *St. Augustine's Comments on "Imago Dei"* (exclusive of the *De Trinitate*), *Classical Folia*, Suppl. III, 1960.

image in man has augustinian roots. But what are the augustinian roots? This question deserves a detailed answer, and not simply a passing reference to some shopworn augustinian texts. Furthermore, the doctrine of St. Augustine merits study in itself and for itself as part of the general renascence of augustinian studies. The doctrine of the image is the cornerstone of augustinian anthropology.

It is true, however, that the state of this doctrine in the writings of Augustine gives pause to detailed examination. The sheer volume of Augustine's literary output does not invite any thorough investigation of the great doctrinal themes, and the doctrine of the image is no exception. His teaching about the image does not appear in systematic fashion in any one treatise, but is scattered throughout his letters, his sermons, the exegetical and polemical works, the *Confessions*, the *City of God*, and in the *De Trinitate*, the principal source of his teaching, it is almost inextricably bound up with the trinitarian doctrine. Add to this the difficulty encountered in interpreting the thought of Augustine, the rhetorical expression, the manifest development, the richness and complexity of his teaching—to say nothing of a lack of precision in terms and distinctions, or of the difference in philosophical instrument and point of view. All combine to place a great obstacle to an authentic interpretation of the thought of Augustine. In the face of difficulties of such magnitude our purpose must correspondingly be modest and clearly defined.

It is not our purpose to sound the depths of the augustinian doctrine of the image, nor to investigate every avenue of thought which leads to or away from this complex doctrine; such an ambitious undertaking is for those more qualified. It is our first and principal aim to formulate and present what can be called a systematized introduction to the augustinian teaching about the image of the Trinity in man; we believe that the fundamental augustinian logic offers opportunity for such an approach. The explication of the trinitarian facet of the divine image in man

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is the fruit of the genius of the bishop of Hippo, and it is this teaching which we intend to examine most closely and to synthesize as far as possible. Clearly much reliance on the conclusions of the augustinian scholars is necessary, yet the text itself is always the point of departure. At the same time, in accord with the historical and critical method, we shall attempt to clothe this teaching with some of its historical dimensions, thereby giving more substance and reality to the thought of Augustine. Finally, we intend, in accord with the same method, and where systematic presentation permits, to lose nothing of the flavor of the augustinian rhetoric and dialectic by allowing him to speak in his own words and order.

The second part of this study has for its aim the investigation of the originality of the African Father of the Church with regard to the doctrine of the trinitarian image, and especially an estimation of the influence of this augustinian teaching on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose teaching is common today. The originality of Augustine will be shown by a general survey of the patristic teaching about the image of the Trinity in man. The influence of the augustinian doctrine on the teaching of Aquinas will be given close examination through a presentation of the thomistic teaching in a chronological mode. The teaching of St. Thomas as it chronologically appears and develops in his major works will be compared with the augustinian teaching, and influences noted, where possible.

The major purposes and goals of this study dictate the outline to be followed in the presentation of matter. Since the principal purpose is the systematic presentation of the augustinian doctrine about the image of the divine Trinity in man, this will constitute the first part of the study. A consideration of the originality and influence of this augustinian doctrine will constitute its second part. The realization of the goal of the first part demands that the order there follow the order of the doctrine itself generally. Chapter One then will treat of the augustinian notion and concept of image, which is prefaced by a discussion of



the same concept as it appears in the thought of Plotinus. An understanding of the dynamic plotinian concept of image sheds much light on the nature of the complex augustinian notion of image. Chapter Two progresses to the discussion of the imaging of the one God by man as it is found in the works of Augustine, and it is here, happily, that consideration of the chronological development in Augustine's thought and the demands of logic coincide. The doctrine of the image from the earlier works of the African bishop is devoted exclusively to the reflection of the divine nature in man, while the trinitarian aspect of the image appears only in the more mature works. Chapter Three is devoted to a brief discussion of the trinitarian reflections found everywhere in creation by the African Father. When these trinitarian reflections attain to the psychological level in man, as they do only later in the thought of Augustine, then the bishop's own order, the platonic dialectic from the *De Trinitate*, is closely followed. The dialectic from the *De Trinitate* is continued in Chapter Four where the augustinian trinitarian images are given, and this is the principal chapter of the study. The following of the order of the *De Trinitate*, the chief source of the augustinian doctrine about the image of the Trinity in man, is required, if an authentic interpretation of Augustine's thought is the goal. However, various summations and syntheses of the augustinian trinitaries are given in Chapter Four to make the doctrine more intelligible and compact. It is true that Augustine himself only hints at the possibility of such syntheses, yet it should be recalled that the *De Trinitate* had not been completed nor edited and revised by Augustine before the major part was surreptitiously published.

The Second Part of this study consists in two chapters of unequal length and importance. Chapter Five investigates the teaching of the other Fathers of the Church with regard to the trinitarian image in man. From this survey of patristic thought the originality of the augustinian doctrine becomes manifest. The final chapter, Chapter Six, considers the influence

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of the augustinian doctrine on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, which is prefaced by a brief history of the transmission of this teaching to the high Middle Ages. The doctrine of Aquinas is historically considered, that is, as it chronologically develops in his major works. By such a procedure both the enduring influence of the augustinian deposit and the contributions and originality of the Angelic Doctor should become clear.

In sum, the augustinian interpretation of the words from Genesis, "And God said, Let us make man to our image and likeness," is presented in orderly fashion in the first part of this treatise with due emphasis on historical factors. The second part of this study first compares the augustinian doctrine with that of the other Fathers, and here the originality of Augustine can be seen, and then with the teaching of St. Thomas, and here the influence of Augustine is apparent. The study will be terminated by an epilogue in which the fortunes of the trinitarian image after the time of St. Thomas are traced in survey fashion down to the present.

\* \* \* \* \*

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PART ONE: THE IMAGE  
OF THE TRINITY IN MAN





## CHAPTER ONE:

# THE GENERAL NOTION OF IMAGE

Among the many writings which St. Augustine has bequeathed to his intellectual heirs, one cannot find any lengthy or developed treatment of the concept of image. Characteristically, he treats of this notion briefly in a number of passages to be found in different works, and the results are not especially illuminating, but rather, we might say, disappointing.<sup>1</sup> A method other than simple reliance upon these passages must be utilized if a full appreciation of the complexity of the augustinian concept of image is desired. Fortunately, an anthology of the texts treating of the divine image in man from Augustine's writings is available. An analysis of these texts reveals certain constant associations which have not been discussed by our author in his abbreviated and more formal treatment of the notion of image.<sup>2</sup>

It would be unrealistic in the extreme to suppose that Augustine was the first to make such associations with the concept of image; he has not appeared on the intellectual scene without forebears. He drank deeply from the philosophical and theological currents of his day, and remained profoundly influenced by the best of these. The map of his intellectual journeyings, the stops he made enroute, are too well known for any detailed repetition here. Each of the pauses in this intellectual journey

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had its part to play in the formation of Augustine's mind, and in his concept of image, but it is sufficient for our purpose if we are aware that the term of this wandering was neo-platonism.<sup>3</sup>

Laboring under the burden of an incipient scepticism, which had followed closely upon his rejection of manichaeian materialism, Augustine turns to the preaching of the bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose. There he discovers a spiritual interpretation of the Old Testament—in particular of the image text from Genesis—which laid to rest forever the difficulties he had had with the Bible during his manichaeian period.<sup>4</sup> There, too, among Ambrose, Simplician, Theodore and others, he was introduced to neo-platonism and its Christian interpretation as given by such men. In this circle it was quite natural to pass from the *Enneads* of Plotinus to the Prologue of St. John, or to the Epistles of St. Paul.<sup>5</sup>

At this time Augustine read some works of Plotinus (and Porphyry), which were easily available to him in the translations of M. Victorinus, an African rhetorician and convert like Augustine.<sup>6</sup> In his first completed work Augustine manifests his then enthusiastic attitude toward neo-platonism in these words, "After I had read only a few books of Plotinus . . . I compared them as well as I could with the authority of those who had given us the tradition of the sacred mysteries, and I was so inflamed that I would have broken away from all anchors."<sup>7</sup> This was the decisive event which gave new direction to his whole intellectual development, and all of his conceptual difficulties were now overcome. Before his serious study of the Scriptures, before his baptism and more thorough instruction by Ambrose, in a word, before his intimate acquaintance with Christian teaching, Augustine has found philosophical inspiration in the *Enneads* of Plotinus.<sup>8</sup>

There also he discovers a notion and a doctrine of the divine image in man. Though harboring grave errors, this teaching nevertheless, decades later, remains in the marvelous memory of the aging bishop of Hippo as he writes his *City of God*.<sup>9</sup>

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It is not a new discovery that Augustine has transplanted the plotinian man into a Christian world. The plotinian "man-god" may suffer in the transplantation, indeed, lose much of his "divinity," yet the augustinian man will bear many features of this "amphibian hovering between two worlds."<sup>10</sup> Can Plotinus' notion of the divine image, central as it is in his teaching, be without a resounding echo in the thought of Augustine? This concept, and this teaching, may well have to undergo profound alterations in the gradually developing thought of the African Father of the Church under the stimulus of Christian tradition, especially that of Ambrose; yet a large residue of this thought will endure.

A short resumé of the concept of the divine image from the teaching of Plotinus should reveal some of its more pronounced features, and give us a glimpse into the fruitful hellenistic concept to which Augustine had been introduced as a young professor of rhetoric at Milan.

### THE NOTION OF IMAGE IN THE ENNEADS

In the teaching of the *Enneads* the concept of image is almost inextricably bound up with the cosmogony, the psychology (or "metapsychology" as it has been fittingly labelled), and with the mysticism so characteristic of the philosophical system of Plotinus.<sup>11</sup> It has been said that in the system of the neo-platonist the notion of image and likeness play such a profound role that together they embrace "the totality of the material, psychic, and intellectual universe."<sup>12</sup> This facet of the plotinian concept of the divine image as an all-pervading theme will find its parallel in the teaching of Augustine, as we shall see.

According to Plotinus every being proceeds more or less immediately from a single principle as its source which is called the One.<sup>13</sup> This process involves a double aspect, that of *prodos* and that of *epistrophe*. The aspect of *prodos* is the actual emanation or separation of the being from the One. The aspect of *epistrophe* is the return or the recoil of the being toward

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its principle.<sup>14</sup> Every being is constituted and given its place in the universe by this "centrifugal and centripetal dynamism."<sup>15</sup>

The Divine Mind (the *nous*) proceeds immediately from the One as an image of it. The *nous* is quite a good copy, yet still inferior to the One. The Divine Mind turns again to its begetter, the One, and contemplates it, and in so doing attains to full resemblance or likeness, and is thereby constituted as the Divine Mind. As a result of this "vision" and concomitant likeness, the Divine Mind in turn emanates the Universal Soul (the *psyche*) from itself, thus imitating the One.<sup>16</sup> Soul, the third hypostasis, is an image of the Divine Mind, though inferior to it. Soul in its turn takes its fullness, is constituted in being, by looking back to its source, the Divine Mind. In this contemplation it attains full likeness, and then generates its image by adopting a downward movement. The same process as this is found by Plotinus to exist in a gradually diminishing way at all levels of being.

This process has been described as the four moments of the psychic life. The first moment is always the genesis of the image, the first element of likeness. The second moment is that of conversion to the principle, a conversion in the "ontological" order, the second element of similitude. Contemplation which is a pure tendency toward the One, more or less immediate, is the third element in this process. The last factor is the unconscious generation of an inferior image, and this is always described as an illumination.<sup>17</sup>

The last of the emanations is Matter (the *hyle*), and it too is something of an image of its engendering principle, but pale and faint to an extreme.<sup>18</sup> At this level, on the very edges of being, the return or recoil is very attenuated; Matter returns only to its proximate principle, the individual soul.<sup>19</sup>

From this brief exposition of the emanation theory of Plotinus we can perceive some rather definite characteristics of his notion of an image. An image depends upon, and accompanies, some emanation or generation from a higher principle. Every image



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is like its model and principle, but always inferior to it; an image is always a degraded copy.<sup>20</sup> An image has impressed in it, together with likeness to its principle, a tendency to return to the principle and model; an image is always turned toward its model.<sup>21</sup> In fact, by this return upon its principle the image attains full likeness, the fullest possible to it, and then imitates its model by engendering a copy of itself. The latter process is always conceived of as being some sort of illuminative operation.<sup>22</sup> At the farthest provinces of being, that is, at the level of matter, the dynamic return is almost totally lacking, and, granted that images are always degradations, it is better described as only a trace, rather than as an image, of the Supreme.<sup>23</sup>

### THE NOTION OF IMAGE AND THE "PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES"

Having made his decision to enter the Church, Augustine retires from teaching and withdraws to a country place at Cassiciacum. There he spends the few months which had to pass before he might receive baptism on the following Easter from the hands of Ambrose in Milan. Together with his mother, his son, a few friends and pupils, he occupies himself with prayer, study, and silence. It is from this period that we have those writings which are called the "philosophical dialogues." Usually associated with this group of augustinian writings is the *De Immortalitate Animae*, composed at Milan shortly before his baptism.<sup>24</sup>

In this body of writings we find only one explicit reference to the image text from Genesis, and little apparent use is made of it.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand many texts can be cited to show the influence of Plotinus' concept of the divine image upon Augustine during this period.<sup>26</sup> In confirmation of this influence (and that of Cicero) we can refer to Augustine's use of the term "divine" with regard to man. This term will appear rarely, if at all, in his later writings, but now it is used abundantly. Augustine talks of the "divine mind dwelling in mortals"; he refers to the "divine faculty," to "that part of the mind which

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is divine";<sup>27</sup> he warns that "man will not be divine unless he turns aside from the mortal element";<sup>28</sup> he speaks of the soul "returning, as it were, to the region of its origin."<sup>29</sup> It is only gradually that the young Augustine comes to realize that some things in neo-platonism could not be reconciled with Christianity. But at this time he is an enthusiastic adherent of the system, and the similarity between the general teaching of the *Enneads* and that of the philosophical dialogues is indisputable.<sup>30</sup>

What is to be said of the concept of image used by the young convert in these early works? We do not find a notion of image developed as such in his earliest writings, it is true, but without doubt there is one in outline at least. The whole tenor of these early works reveals a pattern modelled on the "return" of the plotinian "divine-man" to its origins. In one passage from these writings Augustine does analyze in descriptive fashion the various kinds of likenesses and resemblances to be found in things. Here also appears most of the elements which he will use later in combination for his explicit and total concept of the divine image.

The very context in which this descriptive analysis occurs is markedly platonic (and plotinian) in outlook, and associated with the notion of image. It was Plato who first used the concept of image to depreciate the world of sense-knowledge, and to distinguish it sharply from the world of ideas. In the work of Augustine in which the analysis under consideration appears (the *Soliloquies*), there is similarly a strong tendency to deny certitude to sense-knowledge, a tendency which finds its complement in the concept of image underlying the thought of Augustine in this period.<sup>31</sup>

At the outset of this discussion Augustine distinguishes between classes of resemblances on the basis of equality. Some things are equal to others in every respect, such as twins or impressions from the same signet ring, and so are thoroughly alike. Yet most resemblances are not of this kind; most resemblances are not equal to the thing they model, rather they

are inferior to it. The point is then made, and emphasized, that in the class of inferior resemblances the inferior is related to the superior as being like to it, but there is no question of the exemplar-superior imaging the image. "The resemblance is said to exist in inferior things when we say that something which is inferior is similar to a superior thing. For who would look in a mirror and rightly say that he resembles that thing instead of saying that it resembles him?"

Within this class of inferior resemblances there is some production, or fashioning, involved. "Furthermore, these resemblances which appear in things we see are portrayed and fashioned, some by nature, others by living things." Augustine then explains what he means by resemblances produced by nature. "Nature produces inferior resemblances by begetting them, or reflecting them." Examples of the first type of natural resemblances are "offspring born like to their parents," and examples of the reflection type are "resemblances produced in mirrors." The distinction between likenesses produced by nature and by living things is justified in the view of Augustine, for "even though it is men who produce most of the mirrors, they do not form the images which are reflected therein." The final class of inferior resemblances, those effected by living things, are "in pictures and various productions of this kind."<sup>32</sup>

The following points can be discerned in this passage from the *Soliloquies*: the examples used later by Augustine for different types of images are here found only in the inferior class of resemblances, and not in the class where equality obtains. Is this not to associate inferiority, an essential characteristic of the plotinian notion of image, with his own notion? As a consequence of this lack of equality between the superior-model and its likeness the latter can truly be said to resemble the superior, but it is only a one-way relation and predication, another plotinian insight.<sup>33</sup> The inferior resemblance is not only related to its superior model by way of likeness, but also by reason of some production or fashioning on the part of the

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superior, a fundamental plotinian association with the notion of image.

A final and important feature of the plotinian concept has not yet appeared, and it is the dynamic tendency of the inferior image to become more fully like to its superior by some return upon this model-principle. This characteristic is suggested, we believe, by some later remarks of the young convert about the same topic. Here the platonic depreciation of sense-knowledge, and its association with the notion of image, plainly appears.

A. . . . I am waiting to hear about that class of which you spoke, that is, the kind which *tends to be*, but is not.

R. . . . they are the same things which we talked about before. Does it not seem to you that your image in a mirror *desires*, so to speak *to be* you, and yet is false because it is not [you]?

A. Truly that seems to be so.

R. Do not all pictures and representations and all things of that sort made by artisans *strive to be* that in whose likeness they are made?

A. I entirely agree.<sup>34</sup>

The tendency to become like the exemplar, even to "become" it, is in that class of resemblances which Augustine labels as inferior. He speaks here in a lifelike fashion of these inanimate images, but he is aware that the dynamic tendency is rather blunted in such things, for the resemblance is "all the more imperfect the less life-like it is."<sup>35</sup>

So many similarities exist between the developed notion of image used by Augustine later, and the class of resemblances he now calls inferior ("deterior"), that this early analysis appears to be equivalently a description of his notion of image at this time. Many points of contact can be observed between the plotinian notion of image and Augustine's early analysis. This fact confirms the view that Plotinus's concept of image and its realization in man has an important role to play in the thought of Augustine. It will not be surprising then to find some themes associated with the divine image in man by



the bishop of Hippo, which are to be found originally in the *Enneads* of Plotinus.<sup>36</sup> This is not to deny that the teaching of the Christian community will exercise a decisive and corrective influence on the developing notion of the divine image in the teaching of Augustine, so that this developed concept, found in the later writings, will manifest decided contrasts with the plotinian and neo-platonic concept.<sup>37</sup>

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Augustine is at great pains in most of the abbreviated analyses of the concept of image which he gives to point out that there is a necessary connection between the concept of image and that of likeness. This observation is made when he is commenting on the image text from Genesis, "Let us make man to our image and likeness."<sup>38</sup> The two notions are connected, in Augustine's view, in the sense that wherever there is an image, by that very fact there is also a likeness, as every image is necessarily a likeness also. "It is the customary thing to seek for the relation between image and likeness," Augustine remarks in one of his last works, and his solution is, "the only relation that I can see is that he [Moses] wished to signify the very same reality by these two words."<sup>39</sup>

Not content to permit his thought to rest purely on his own insights Augustine searches for scriptural confirmation. He finds some support, he believes, in the Old Testament, where "it is universally commanded in the decalogue that no likeness is to be made, nor is there any mention of image, for if no likeness is made, without doubt no image is made; since if it is an image, it is also a likeness."<sup>40</sup> More explicit confirmation from Sacred Scripture is found by Augustine in some words of St. James, who says, referring to man's gift of speech, "by it we bless God and by it we curse men who are made to the likeness of God."<sup>41</sup>

We may, perhaps, wonder at the emphasis given to this point by Augustine, for the point itself seems obvious. From



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the viewpoint of image, and taken in themselves, the concepts of image and likeness are inescapably joined, it is true; yet the text from Genesis does use the two terms as if one alone were not sufficient, and it uses only the term of image when it speaks of the actual creation of man, which gives the impression that the likeness of God is somehow a different thing. This usage led some of the Fathers to detect a difference between the two terms. Following the lead of St. Irenaeus, some of the early eastern writers will reserve the term of the image for natural endowments, and that of likeness for supernatural gifts.<sup>42</sup> This opinion will find supporters later among the medievalists for whom likeness then becomes a technical term referring to the gifts of grace.<sup>43</sup> Two great contemporaries of Augustine, St. Cyril of Alexandria and St. Ambrose, are in agreement with his exegesis of the terms "image and likeness,"<sup>44</sup> but St. Jerome sees some distinction here, and M. Victorinus will say that the likeness is achieved only at the resurrection.<sup>45</sup> It is the latter opinion, that of M. Victorinus, which Augustine is most expressly rejecting.

However, Augustine does use the term of likeness alone very frequently to depict the growing resemblance of man to God. Man is an imperfect image, and so is capable of growth in resemblance or likeness to God. Augustine remarks that "he is not created equal . . . but approaches him [God] by a sort of likeness. For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from him is by unlikeness."<sup>46</sup> The *full* likeness, that is the fullest possible to a creature, is reserved by Augustine for the state of glory and the resurrection, as the inspired writings plainly teach.<sup>47</sup>

The latter uses of the term likeness suggest that the notion of image and likeness, though inseparably united from the viewpoint of image, are not co-extensive, and this is Augustine's view. He now finds another distinction between image and likeness. There may be likenesses which do not involve the notion of image in any way. Image and likeness must be dis-

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tinguished, for not every likeness is an image, though every image must be a likeness.<sup>48</sup> In this situation likeness is the broader term including image within its greater extension as a kind of species of likeness.

On the basis of the platonic notions of participation in the divine ideas, and the concomitant factor of imitation, Augustine will see a likeness to God in every department and category of nature, though not an image.<sup>49</sup> According to our author the universe of creatures is organized after the model of the divine ideas which are in the mind of God.<sup>50</sup> A relation of resemblance exists between the world and God which is fundamental. The hierarchy of essences existing in the universe is founded on different possible participations of being, and each of these finds a corresponding idea in the mind of God.<sup>51</sup> All beings imitate these divine ideas, and so each creature is like God to a certain degree.

The common note of likeness to God among creatures should itself be a participation, and in view of Augustine it is.<sup>52</sup> All things participate in resemblance to God because they participate in the Idea of Resemblance or Likeness itself, which is to be identified with the perfect Likeness and Image of God, the Son. In this way every creature resembles God, but no one of them is the Likeness itself; only the Word of God is the perfect imitation of the Father.

Wherefore the Likeness of God through whom all things were made, properly is called the Likeness, for he is not like God by some participation in likeness, but is himself the first Likeness, by participation in which those things which God has made through him are alike.<sup>53</sup>

The relation of resemblance or likeness between the universe of creatures and God is fundamental; without this relation the universe would cease to be intelligible, indeed even cease to exist.

Other things can be said to be like that One insofar as they have being, for to that degree they are also true; but that

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One is the Likeness itself and Truth. For as those things which are true are true by reason of truth, so all things that are alike are like by reason of likeness. And therefore truth is the form of all things which are true as likeness is the form of all things that are alike. Accordingly, things are true insofar as they have being, and have being insofar as they are like to the source of all unity, that is the Form of all things that have being which is the supreme Likeness of the Principle, and also Truth, for it is without any unlikeness.<sup>54</sup>

By reason of the participation in the very Likeness of God, the *Logos* through whom all things were made, Augustine sees imitation in every creature, not only in the order of truth and being, but also in the order of unity and beauty. The prime exemplar for many of the transcendental properties of each being can be seen in the relation of the Word to the Father, Augustine believes.<sup>55</sup> Later we shall see that all of the intra-trinitarian relations have some role of exemplarity to fulfill with regard to the constitution of each creature.

Another factor which repeatedly occurs in the augustinian analyses of the notion of image is the imperfection and lack of equality possible to an image. Revealing something of his neo-platonic formation, Augustine often asserts that equality with the exemplar is not necessarily connected with the imaging of it.<sup>56</sup> "Where there is an image there is not always equality . . . as in the image of a man in a mirror . . . for many things are lacking to this image which do exist in that thing from which it is expressed."<sup>57</sup> To say this is not to affirm the view that equality with an exemplar and the imaging of the exemplar are mutually exclusive notes, and here Augustine decisively breaks with the plotinian concept of image. "There can be some images in which there is equality."<sup>58</sup> Christian teaching has given decisive direction to the augustinian concept of image here, for it teaches that the perfect Image of the Father is the Word, who is equal in every respect to him.<sup>59</sup>

The thought of Augustine is not based purely on the teaching of St. Paul and that of Christian tradition, but on the insight

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that the best images will have some sort of equality with their model. In the *Soliloquies*, as we have seen, Augustine had classified images in a mirror and in the offspring of a parent as resemblances inferior to their model. Now he distinguishes between these two types of images on the basis of equality with their model. "The image in your child is different from that in a mirror; in the child there is an image according to an equality of substance, in the mirror it is very far from your substance; nevertheless it is something of an image of yourself, though not according to equality of substance as in your child."<sup>60</sup>

In another of his works Augustine will distinguish the image in a human son from the Image in the Divine Son on the basis of time and eternity. "Even time was no impediment to equality" between the Father and Son, as it is between parent and human offspring.<sup>61</sup> This is, of course, not the only difference between the types of equality to be found in the image in a human son and that in the Divine Son. The Son of God "is in no manner unequal, but corresponding to identity" with the Father.<sup>62</sup> An important difference can be seen here between Augustine and Plotinus. The latter conceives of the Divine Mind as being eternally engendered by the One, yet still inferior to this Principle.<sup>63</sup> Augustine finds great similarity between the plotinian concept of the *nous* and the Christian concept of the *Logos*, but equality between the *nous* and the One is something he could not find.

Neither likeness nor equality are to be identified with the notion of image, though some equality with the model is to be found in the better images, and some likeness accompanies every image. Even if equality and likeness are to be found together, as in the case of two things alike in every respect, there is not necessarily an image. Things can be similar to one another, and to the point of full equality, but if one does not derive its similarity from the other, there is no imaging involved.



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Every image is similar to the thing whose image it is; but not everything which is similar to something is also the image of that thing; as in the case of a mirror or a picture, because they are images they are also similar; however, if the one is not born from the other, then it cannot be called an image of that other. For it is then an image when it is expressed from the other.<sup>64</sup>

Augustine makes use of the rather inelegant example of eggs to illustrate his point. It is conceivable that eggs from different birds (or even from the same bird) have the same shape, color, size, etc., but there is no imaging here, as one is not "expressed" from the other. An image necessarily demands a relation of origin between the image and its exemplar-principle. This relation of origin is designated by various terms, but Augustine's favored descriptions are those of "generation" and "expression." Such expressions indicate that the relation of origin implies more than pure exemplarity. Ordinarily it would seem to include something of efficient causality, though this would not be verified in the case of that Image who is the Son of God. The exemplar must also be some sort of principle of origin for the image, and the likeness derived must result from this origin. The element of origin, so vitally important to the augustinian notion of image, has its evident counterpart in the teaching of Plotinus, though there is some difference, as the One is considered to be the cause of the *nous*.<sup>65</sup>

Is then every likeness generated by another by that very fact an image of its generator? An emphatic negative is the answer of Augustine to this question, and particularly with respect to the imaging of God. "Not every thing which is in some way like God in creatures is also to be called his image, but only that to which he alone is superior; namely, that which has been expressed from him, and between which thing and himself no other nature has been interposed."<sup>66</sup> The latter expression, *nulla natura interposita* (or, in another form, *nulla natura interjecta*) is used by Augustine so often in association with the image of God in man that it is almost the equivalent expression.<sup>67</sup>



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This expression means that no other nature stands between God and his image in the hierarchy of beings. It means that man is "near" God, not in distance, but in likeness. It can also mean that no other nature can come between the image and its God in an interfering sort of way. None of these meanings exhaust the significance of this note which differentiates an image of God from all other likenesses to him.<sup>68</sup> The fuller significance of this expression for Augustine will become clear as we proceed with the inquiry.

The partial meaning of the augustinian criterion of proximity in nature to God is pointed out in the following passage:

Things can be said to be like God in many ways; some according to virtue and a wisdom which is created, for in him is virtue and wisdom which is uncreated; others insofar as they live only, for in him is primal life and in the highest way; others insofar as they exist, for he exists primally and in the highest way. And so because they only exist, having neither life nor wisdom, they are not perfectly but only minimally to his likeness; for they are good in their own order, while he is the good above all and from whom all good things proceed. Those things which live and are not wise, these participate a little more in likeness. For that which lives also exists, but that which exists does not also live. But truly those who are wise are so proximate to him in likeness that there is nothing in creatures which is nearer. For that which participates in wisdom both lives and exists.<sup>69</sup>

The creature which images God is that creature which participates not only in being and life, but in wisdom too; that is the creature who is capable of such a participation. The image of God must have a nearness in nature to God, but it is not Augustine's view that this be conceived statically as the highest rung on the ladder of created being only. The image must tend toward God, and immediately. Inherent in the augustinian concept of image is a dynamic note of tendency toward the exemplar-principle, but this aspect is so intimately bound up

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with Augustine's notion of creation that we shall have to describe the latter first.

As we have seen, Plotinus distinguishes a moment of emanation (*prodos*), and a moment of return (*epistrophe*) in the beings which issue from the One, more or less immediately. Into this context the bishop of Hippo inserts the Christian notion of creation. Augustine maintains an element of *materia* or *informitas*, the tendency toward non-being, and an element of *informatio* or *formitas*, a conversion toward the creator who confers all form. Both of these elements of creation are simultaneous in the order of time, though not in the order of nature.<sup>70</sup> This combination of tendencies is not only in the origin of creatures, but in their very being as well: the one a separation or removal from God and a tendency toward non-being; the other adherence to God or participation in being.

Because of this conversion and formation every creature exists, but it is not the same for all beings. All creatures are made through the Word of God, but not all are made *ad ipsum*.

. . . to the very Likeness of God, not all things are made, but only the rational substance; wherefore all things are through him, but not all things are to him; for there is no nature interposed, which the human mind does not perceive except when most pure and happy by adhering to nothing save Truth itself, which is called the Likeness, the Image, and the Wisdom of the Father.<sup>71</sup>

The spiritual creature (and the rational mind) exists by means of an entirely spiritual conversion, which apparently includes knowledge. "To become for this [the spiritual] creature is to know the Word of God through whom it was made."<sup>72</sup> The conversion of the spiritual creature terminates immediately at God through the knowledge of him.

The corporeal creature has a two-fold aspect to its origin from God also, but it is notably different from that of the spiritual creature; neither the separation nor the conversion is immediate. The separation of the spiritual creature is immediate

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in the sense that it is created immediately in itself without any intervening element. On the other hand the corporeal creature is created first in angelic knowledge, and only later appears in itself by reason of the *rationes seminales*.<sup>73</sup> The conversion of these lower creatures is also mediate, for their being is directed first toward the spiritual creature, and it is only through the latter that they tend toward God. Corporeal things do tend toward that principle of unity which is God, and in doing so imitate him, but they are unable to achieve any remarkable degree of unity or likeness because of their inanimate nature.

If material things deceive insofar as they do not attain to that unity which they are constrained to imitate, we naturally approve them, for that is the principle from which all unity derives, and to resemble which all things strive, since we naturally disapprove all that departs from unity and tends toward an unlikeness to it. . . .<sup>74</sup>

The spiritual creature which Augustine had described as *ad ipsum* (the Word) he now identifies with the image of God. Other creatures which do not have this immediate type of reference to God because of their lower nature he will later call "vestiges" of God.

But before him [the Father] is the form of all things [the Son] . . . so that all other things which are, insofar as they have being are similar to that form, and are made through that form. Some of these are so made through that form that they are also according to that form, as every rational and intellectual creature made to the image and likeness of God. Other things are made through that first form, but are not according to it.<sup>75</sup>

The creature which images God must issue immediately from him, and tend immediately toward him as term, and this is what Augustine means by the expression *nulla natura interjecta*. On the other hand, material things neither issue immediately from God (in the sense explained), nor tend immediately to him, because there is a *natura interjecta*.<sup>76</sup> These lesser like-

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nesses are called vestiges or traces of God by Augustine, but not images.<sup>77</sup> Even the actions of man, the image of God among creatures, appear to be classified only as vestiges of God when their object is not God, but corporeal things.<sup>78</sup>

In this view Augustine has followed the pattern of the plotinian cosmogony and its cycle of *exitus* and *reditus*, though not in a slavish fashion. The "emanationism" of Plotinus is modified considerably by the Christian concept of free creation to be found in Augustine. The augustinian descriptive expression of *nulla natura interjecta* finds a limited parallel also in the thought of Plotinus. The latter reserves this description for the *nous*, and in speaking of the individual soul he will say that there "is not much in between," for in his view the soul tends first toward the Divine Mind (the *nous*), and then toward the One.<sup>79</sup> The augustinian description of corporeal things as vestiges finds its counterpart in the plotinian conception of matter as only a trace of the One.

The dynamic and immediate tendency toward the exemplar-principle, realizable in a true sense in the image only, gives rise to the question of the "real presence" of the exemplar to the image. The image must be actually capable of the "return" upon its exemplar-principle, which means that the exemplar must be present as the term of activity, and not simply as a principle of origin. The problem would not be conceived in quite this way by Augustine, for he would think of it more in terms of the image's presence with the exemplar. Yet he constantly associates the presence of God with the activity of the image.<sup>80</sup> There is no difficulty with this relation, for God is everywhere present. For Plotinus there is even less difficulty with the presence of the exemplar, given the pantheistic tendencies latent in his thought. More characteristic of the neo-platonist is the principle that images have reality only insofar as they have contact with the intelligible ideas in the divine mind, and this view finds some parallel in the thought of Augustine.<sup>81</sup>



It would seem that the concept of image used by Augustine demands the presence of God, not simply as a principle of origin—much less would this demand be satisfied by the “intentional” presence of God in the image itself—but requires the enduring presence of the exemplar as the term of the dynamic activity found in an image.

We will now summarize in an abstract way the concept of image which Augustine uses.<sup>82</sup> It is essentially a complex relation to another. There must be a relation of likeness to another, though equality is not required here except in the best images. There must be a relation of origin between the image and the imaged, and the likeness must be derived by reason of this origin. The likeness involved must at least be founded in a nature which is most proximate to that of the exemplar. This proximity means not only closeness in nature, but also an immediate relation to the exemplar as term of the innate and dynamic tendency in the image. The presence of the exemplar is demanded then on two counts: the relation of origin, and the relation of term. In the realization of this tendency toward the exemplar the likeness radically implicated in the nature of the image receives its full expression.

This concept is fulfilled among creatures only in the rational or intellectual creature. For Augustine, the concept of image synthesizes in a practical fashion all of the relations of God to man: efficient, exemplary, and final causality. The divine image in man, without doubt, is imperfect and far from that Image who is born of the Father. Nevertheless the bishop of Hippo will not agree with some of his elders in the patristic tradition who are of the opinion that man is only “to the image” of God.<sup>83</sup> His authority for this position is St. Paul, whose words explicitly affirm that man is an image of God.<sup>84</sup> The expression in Genesis “to our image and likeness” is to be understood, not as denying Paul’s words, but rather as pointing up the imperfection of this created image, and the tendency toward the exemplar.

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Because that image of God was not made completely equal to him, not being born of him, but rather created by him, to signify this he is the image in such a way so as to be "to the image," that is, he is not made equal by parity, but approaches to him by a sort of likeness. . . . For there are some who make this distinction, that is they will not have man to be the image, but "to the image," and the Son alone to be the Image. But the apostle refutes them saying, "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, inasmuch as he is the image and glory of God" (1 Cor. 11:7). He did not say "to the image" but "image."<sup>85</sup>

The perfect realization of the concept of image, when it is purged of all subordinationism, is to be found only in the perfect Image of the Father, who is the divine Son. For he is "like the Father in all respects . . . because he is from him . . . perfectly fulfilling the unity from which he is. . . ." and, without any subordination, perfectly oriented toward the Father by "adhering to him."<sup>86</sup>

### THE IMAGE AS SIGN

Nowhere, to our knowledge, does Augustine speak explicitly of the functional aspect of an image, that is, of the image as a sign, but there is superabundant evidence of his usage of the image in man for such purposes. It is not surprising that Augustine does not develop this point to any length, as it is the very nature of an image to be a sign of the imaged.

In one of his earlier works Augustine does treat of the nature of a sign, and there, perhaps, we can find some hints as to what his opinion would be of the representational value of an image. "A sign is a thing . . . which causes by itself something other to enter our thoughts," he remarks, or, it is something "which causes something else to be recognized." Proceeding to distinguish between natural and conventional signs (the latter being his principal concern here), he then defines a natural sign in these words, "Natural signs are those which, independently of any purpose or desire of being a sign of anything except themselves, cause something else to be recog-



nized."<sup>87</sup> In the category of natural signs he places "the footprints of a passing animal."

On the basis of his distinctions, and usage, it seems that the inferior likenesses to God which Augustine calls *vestigia Dei* would also belong in the category of natural signs. These vestiges, being natural representations of God in some fashion, should cause us to recognize something of God's presence, as the footprints reveal the presence of an animal. Augustine speaks in this way himself, "Wherever you turn you encounter the footprints of God made upon his work. It is by these that God speaks to you. . . ."<sup>88</sup> Nevertheless, this is not the more characteristically augustinian method of arriving at some knowledge of God.

The decided preference is to use the soul or mind in man, the site of the divine image, as the point of departure for knowledge of God.<sup>89</sup> If the muted likenesses found in the vestiges of God betray his presence, how much more so the brilliant reflections to be found in that creature dignified with the divine image. Invariably Augustine turns to his soul as the springboard for knowledge of God.<sup>90</sup> Often the term of this "introspection" is a negative knowledge of God, a knowledge of "what God is not."<sup>91</sup> Yet God is not beyond all knowledge for Augustine, as he is for Plotinus. Burdened by the lack of a formal notion of analogy, the African bishop is reluctant to translate creaturely perfections to the divine order.<sup>92</sup> Despite his hesitations, Augustine can say to his readers that they have "seen many truths," after involved examinations for likenesses to God in the depths of his soul.<sup>93</sup> Surely there is some affirmative knowledge of God here.<sup>94</sup>

What we have seen thus far of Augustine's procedure with respect to the representational value of an image can be categorized as the use of the image as an instrumental sign. A property of this type of sign is a process of deduction in the sense that conclusions about the nature of the exemplar are gathered through a reasoning process.<sup>95</sup>

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Another usage of the divine image in man is to be found in the writings of Augustine, and it has perceptible neo-platonic roots. The knowledge of God attained in this way is achieved through the image in man precisely "as an image," that is as a highly polished mirror would reflect its image.<sup>96</sup> We shall return to this point in the following chapter, but at present we can say that here we seem to be at the summit of the knowledge of God in this life, at least in ordinary circumstances.<sup>97</sup> This is not "face to face" vision, yet the definite impression is given by Augustine that God can be "seen" or "touched" through the divine image in man. The image seems to become almost transparent, and reasoning or illation appears to be absent.<sup>98</sup> Perhaps this is because Augustine is drawing upon his "mystical experience," and generously judges his readers as capable of joining with him in this "vision." In any event Augustine here is speaking of the image formally as image, and seemingly of the image as a formal sign in some way.<sup>99</sup>

Some of the distinctions we have used in these brief remarks about the image as sign do not appear explicitly in the writings of Augustine, nor does he dwell on the notion of sign as a facet of the image. It is only from his usage that such distinctions arise, and the representational value of the image is gathered.

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One of the greatest achievements in the history of thought, the "shifting of the intellectual center of gravity from the East to the West," is to be laid at the door of Augustine's genius. In the concept of image used by him something of this process can be seen. For all of platonic thought the image has a dynamic character, and tends to rejoin its model and exemplar. The term of this movement is resemblance or likeness. The beginning of the assimilation of platonic thought to biblical themes is to be seen in Philo at Alexandria. Origen will blend the platonic notions with Christian thought, and the blending will reappear in brilliant fashion in the Cappadocian, St. Gregory of Nyssa. Such a fusion of biblical and platonic themes is

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relatively simple, though not without danger, for the Greek Fathers, who read the Scriptures in the Septuagint Greek. There the terms *eikwn* and *homoiwsis*, pregnant with meaning for the East, appear.<sup>100</sup>

The situation is not that simple for Augustine, yet his task is rendered much easier by the synthesis of neo-platonic and Christian elements prevalent in the western community of Milan in his time. Among the group from whom he imbibes the Christian tradition, the passing from the Scriptures to neo-platonic writings and back was the custom. Following in these footsteps, Augustine forms his own original synthesis, and brings the hellenistic currents into the mainstream of western thought, where it remains to be transmitted to the Middle Ages. In the augustinian concept of image the beginnings of this process can be seen.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Cf., e.g., *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 74 (PL 40:85-86); *De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 57 (PL 34:242, CSEL 28, 1:497); *QQ. In Hept.*, V, 4 (PL 34:749-750, CSEL 23, 2:371); *De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 61-62 (PL 34:244-245, CSEL 28, 1:501).

Throughout this study the Maurist edition of the Benedictine Fathers, which has been incorporated into the Migne edition of the Fathers (indicated by PL) has been used for St. Augustine, unless otherwise noted. Few, if any, discrepancies from the more critical editions of the works of Augustine will be found in it. However, to satisfy the requirements of scholarship new editions are added to that of the Migne: the Viennese corpus of the Latin Fathers (indicated by CSEL), and the Turnhout Latin series (indicated by CC,SL), whenever available. It had been our original intention to consult the Corpus of Berlin, and other more critical editions, when referring to the Greek Fathers. This has not been possible to us, and so the Migne edition is used almost exclusively for the Greek Fathers (indicated by PG), though care is taken to assure the use of authentic works.

<sup>2</sup>See J. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine" (exclus. of the *De Trinitate*), *Folia*, X (1956), 3-11. During the writing of this work an anthology of texts collected by the same author has become available to us, and has proven most useful, though again the *De Trinitate* which is the principal source for Augustine's doctrine of the trinitarian image was not included. See *idem.*, *St. Augustine's Comments on "Imago Dei," Classical Folia*, Supplement III, April, 1960.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *Conf.*, VII, 20 (PL 32:746-747, CSEL 33:165); H. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique*, (Editions de Boccard, Paris: 1958). 4th ed., 161-186; H. Somers, "Image de Dieu et Illumination divine — Sources Historiques et Elaboration Augustinienne," *Augustinus Magister, (Etudes Augustiniennes)*, Paris: 1954), I, 450-462.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. *Conf.* VI, 4 (PL 32:722, CSEL 33:118); C. C. Martindale, "St. Augustine's Life and Character," *A Monument to St. Augustine* (Meridian Books, New York: 1957), 93-94. The latter is a re-print of an original publication by Sheed and Ward, London, 1930.

Augustine has this to say about his association with St. Ambrose at this time. "And I heard him [Ambrose] every Sunday rightly preaching the word of truth to the people, and I became more and more certain that all the knots of cunning calumny, which those deceivers of ours had concocted against the divine books, could be dissolved. But there also I learned that the phrase 'man made by you to your image' was not understood by your spiritual children . . . so that they believed and thought of you as bounded by the form of a human body, although I had not even the slightest or most shadowy suspicion as to how a spiritual substance might be, yet I was ashamed though joyful too that I had been barking for so many years, not against the Catholic faith, but against figments of carnal imagination. I had been rash and impious in that I spoke in accusation against those things which I ought to have learned by inquiry. But . . . you are wholly everywhere and yet nowhere in place, nor are you of bodily form, though you made man to your image, and behold he is in place from head to foot." *Conf.*, VI, 3 (PL 32:721, CSEL 33:117).



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<sup>5</sup>See H. Marrou, *St. Augustine and His Influence Through the Ages*, (Longmans, London: 1957), P. H. Scott translator, 28-29; *Conf.* VII, 9 (PL 32:740, CSEL 33:154).

<sup>6</sup>Cf. *Conf.* VIII, 2 (PL 32:750, CSEL 33:171).

<sup>7</sup>Cf. *De Beata Vita*, I, 4 (PL 32:961, CSEL 63:92). There is a variant reading involved here, as some manuscripts read "Plotinus," whereas others read "Plato." The majority of modern authors endorse the reading of "Plotinus." Cf. P. Henry, *Plotin et L'Occident*, (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Louvain: 1934), 78-94; *idem*, "Augustine and Plotinus," *Journal of Theological Studies*, 38 (1937), 1-23.

<sup>8</sup>Cf. *Conf.* VII, 20 (PL 32:747, CSEL 33:165), "In quos [libros platonicos] me propterea, priusquam Scripturas suas considerarem, credo voluisti incurrere. . . ." During the period under consideration Augustine writes in his *Contra Acad.* III, 20, 43 (PL 32:457, CSEL 63:80), ". . . apud platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido." The term "platonists" in the writings of Augustine is usually taken to refer to the neo-platonists, as he shows no great acquaintance with the works of Plato; see S. Grabowski, *The All-Present God, A Study in St. Augustine*, (Herder, St. Louis: 1954), 11. Augustine's baptism and more thorough instruction in the mysteries by Ambrose takes place at Milan in the year 387; cf. *Conf.* IX, 6 (PL 32:769, CSEL 33:207).

<sup>9</sup>Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, IX, 17 (PL 41:271, CC,SL 48:265), where Augustine cites from the *Enneads* of Plotinus with reference to the likeness of God in man.

<sup>10</sup>See A. Pegis, "The Mind of St. Augustine," *Mediaeval Studies*, VI (1944), 48; E. Gilson, *Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Augustin*, (Libraire J. Vrin, Paris: 1949), 3rd ed., 141-147; S. Grabowski, *The Church, An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine*, (Herder, St. Louis: 1957), 300.

<sup>11</sup>See P. Henry, "Plotinus' Place in the History of Thought," *Plotinus, The Enneads* (Pantheon Books, New York: 1957), translation by S. MacKenna, 2nd rev. ed., xxxiii-li. It is this translation of Plotinus that will be referred to throughout this study.

<sup>12</sup>See P. Aubin, "L'Image dans l'oeuvre de Plotin," *Recherches des Sciences Religieuses*, XL1 (1953), 372.

<sup>13</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, V, 2, 1, *transl. cit.*, 380.

<sup>14</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, V, 1, 3, *transl. cit.*, 371.

<sup>15</sup>See J. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine," 5; A. Armstrong, "Platonism as a Vital Force," *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, VI (1945), 61 f.

<sup>16</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, V, 2, 1, *transl. cit.*, 380.

<sup>17</sup>See P. Aubin, "L'Image dans l'oeuvre de Plotin," 362-364.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, VI, 3, 7, *transl. cit.*, 497.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 4, 15; VI, 3, 7, *transl. cit.*, 116, 497-498.

<sup>20</sup>See P. Aubin, *op. cit.*, 352-353.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, V, 3, 8; *transl. cit.*, 389; P. Aubin, *op. cit.*, 369.

<sup>22</sup>See P. Aubin, *op. cit.*, 353-354.

<sup>23</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, I, 6, 8, *transl. cit.*, 363.



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<sup>24</sup>Cf. B. Altaner, *Patrology*, transl. H. Graef, (Herder, Freiburg: 1960), 501-502; F. Cayre, *Manual of Patrology*, (Desclee and Co., Paris: 1935), 640-643 (I).

<sup>25</sup>Cf. *Solil.* I, 1, 4 (PL 32: 871).

<sup>26</sup>Cf. P. Henry, "Plotin et L'Occident," especially 63-95, where texts from Plotinus and the early works of Augustine are compared. Cf. also M. Grandgeorge, *St. Augustin et La Neo-Platonisme*, (Paris: 1896), 70-84; 117-147, where texts from Plotinus and Augustine are arranged in parallel columns; and A. Armstrong, "St. Augustine and the Eastern Tradition," *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, V (1943), 165 f.

<sup>27</sup>Cf. *Contra Acad.*, I, 1, 3 (PL 32:907, CSEL 63:5); *ibid.* I, 4, 11 (PL 32:908, CSEL 63:12).

<sup>28</sup>Cf. *De Ordine*, II, 11, 31 (PL 32:1009, CSEL 63:169), "Homo est animal rationale mortale. Hic genere posito quod animal dictum est, videmus additas duas differentias, quibus credo admonendus erat homo, et quo sibi redeundum esset, et unde fugiendum. Nam ut progressus animae usque ad mortalia lapsus est; ita regressus esse in rationem debet. Uno verbo a bestiis, quod rationale; et alio a divinis separatur, quod mortale dicitur. Illud igitur nisi tenuerit, bestia erit: hinc nisi se avertit, divina non erit."

<sup>29</sup>Cf. *Contra Acad.*, II, 9, 22 (PL 32:929-930; CSEL 63:39).

<sup>30</sup>See M. C. D'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, 156-166; S. Grabowski, *The Church*, 299-311. The aging bishop will have many corrections and revisions to make of the enthusiastic statements of the young convert at Cassiciacum. "Laus quoque, qua Platonem vel Platonicos seu Academicos philosophos tantum extuli quantum impios homines non oportuit, non immerito mihi displicet: praesertim quorum contra errores magnos defendenda est christiana doctrina." *Retract.*, I, 1, 4 (PL 32:587, CSEL 36:17).

<sup>31</sup>In the *Soliloquies*, among other platonic features, can be seen suggestions of the doctrine of platonic reminiscence, and the insinuation that things of the senses are to be completely avoided. Cf. *Retract.*, I, 4, 1-4 (PL 32:589-590, CSEL 36:22 f). For a brief summary of the use of the concept of image by Plato, cf. G. B. Ladner, "The Concept of the Image in the Greek Fathers and the Byzantine Controversy," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, (Harvard U. Press, Cambridge: 1953), 5-7. The position of Plato, that there are two worlds, one intelligible, the other sensible, the former being the world of truth, the latter being truth-like and an image of the former, is cited with approval by Augustine in the *Contra Acad.*, III, 17, 37, (PL 32:954, CSEL 63:76).

<sup>32</sup>Cf. *Solil.*, II, 6, 11 (PL 32:889-890).

<sup>33</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, I, 2, 2, transl. cit., 31, "We must distinguish two modes of likeness. There is the likeness demanding an identical nature in the objects, which, furthermore, must draw their likeness from a common principle: and there is the case in which B resembles A, but A is a Primal, not concerned about B, and not said to resemble B. In this second case, likeness is understood in a distinct sense; we no longer look for identity of nature, but on the contrary, for divergence, since the likeness has come about by the mode of difference."

<sup>34</sup>*Solil.*, II, 9, 17 (PL 32:892):

A. . . . sed iam illud genus exspecto, quale sit quod dixisti: Esse tendit, et non est.

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R. . . . eadem illa sunt, quorum multa supra memoravimus. An non tibi videtur imago tua de speculo quasi tu ipse velle esse, sed ideo esse falsa, quod non est.

A. Valde hoc videtur.

R. Quid omnis pictura, vel cuiuscemodi simulacrum et id genus omnia opificum, nonne illud esse contendunt, ad cuius quidque similitudinem factum est?

A. Prorsus adducor.

<sup>35</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 6, 12 (PL 32:890).

<sup>36</sup>See J. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine," 10. For a brief summary of all the historical background to the concept of image used and developed by Augustine, consult H. Somers, "Image de Dieu et Illumination divine. . . ." *Augustinus Magister*, I, 450-462. A brief treatment of the evolution of the theme of image in Augustine is also given there, 456-457.

<sup>37</sup>Cf. G. McCool, "The Ambrosian Origin of St. Augustine's Theology of the Image of God in Man," *Theological Studies*, XX (1959), 62-81. He concludes, "In the *Confessions* and in the *De Beata Vita* Augustine claims that he learned the significance of the image and likeness of God in man by listening to the discourses of Ambrose. The texts of Augustine's early works give evidence of the truth of that contention. Their theology of the image and likeness of God is a faithful echo of the Alexandrian-plotinian image synthesis which is presented in the homilies of Ambrose. Augustine's image theology is clearly in the source from which he claimed to derive it" 80.

Does Augustine in fact make such a claim? It does not appear from the *Confessions*, much less from the *De Beata Vita*. Augustine writes in his *Confessions*, "I learned [from Ambrose] that the phrase 'man created by you in your image' was not taken by your spiritual children . . .; to mean that you are bounded within the shape of a human body." (VI, 3). This is Augustine's claim at this point in his autobiography, and it also appears in the *De Beata Vita* (I, 4). It is to be taken literally, for Augustine immediately says, "I had not the vaguest or most shadowy notion of how a spiritual substance might be . . ." and the obvious parallel is stated a bit later, "Thus I was ignorant of how this image of yours might be . . ." (VI, 3-4). Augustine lays claim to ignorance about the basic factor in the imagining of God, for he could not conceive of a spiritual substance, either in the case of God, or in the case of his image, man.

What then had he learned from Ambrose at this time? He had discovered in the sermons of Ambrose that the Catholic Church "did not teach the things which I had so strongly accused her of," as these sermons "laid open the spiritual meaning of things [in the Scriptures] which taken literally would have seemed to teach falsehood" (VI, 4). Other texts could be cited, but we think the following one sums up what Augustine had learned at this time from Ambrose. "I did not indeed, God, think of you under the form of a human body. From the moment I began to know anything about philosophy I had rejected the idea; and I rejoiced to find the same rejection in the faith of our spiritual mother, the Catholic Church. But what else to think of you I did not know" (VII, 1). It was not from Ambrose that Augustine learned not to conceive of God in human form, as he already held to this view for some time. He learned from Ambrose that the Catholic Church did not teach what he had supposed, (due to the manichaeian slanders—cf. *De Gen. c. Manich.* I, 17, 27, written in the years 388-9, and so shortly after his baptism), namely, that God had human form because his image did. Even then he is still unable to conceive

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of God except as a corporeal substance, though not of human form (VII, 1), and it is only after reading some books of the platonists that he was set "toward the search for a truth that is incorporeal," and he came to see that "the invisible things [of God] are understood by the things that are made" (VII, 20).

Augustine does not claim to have derived his image-theology from Ambrose in the *Confessions*, or in the *De Beata Vita*. He only claims to have learned from Ambrose that the image text from Genesis did not receive an anthropomorphic interpretation in the Catholic Church (which he had believed), an interpretation thoroughly in accord with views he already held. The homilies of Ambrose, apparently, were not able to help him to arrive at a more positive conception of something incorporeal.

P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin*, (Paris: 1950), 106-138, has shown that Ambrose puts to use in several of his sermons whole pages of Plotinus's thought, and it is deemed probable that these sermons were heard by Augustine before his baptism. We are not denying the validity of Courcelle's research, but only the conjecture of McCool that Augustine has claimed explicitly to derive his image theology from Ambrose. Furthermore, Augustine shows remarkable ignorance, according to his own account, of the basic elements of this theology before he has personally read the *Enneads*.

<sup>38</sup>Cf. *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 51, 4 (PL 40:32-34); *ibid.*; Q. 74 (PL 40:85-86); *De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 57 (PL 34:242, CSEL 28, 1:497); *ibid.*, XVI, 61-62 (PL 34:244-245, CSEL 28, 1:501 f); *QQ. in Hept.*, V, 4 (PL 34:749-750, CSEL 28, 2:371).

<sup>39</sup>*QQ. in Hept.*, V, 4 (PL 34:749, CSEL 28, 2:371), "Quid intersit inter similitudinem et imaginem quaeri solet, sed hic non video quid interesse voluerit, nisi aut duobus istis vocabulis unam rem significaverit. . . ."

<sup>40</sup>*Loc. cit.*, ". . . in decalogo autem generaliter dicitur nullam fieri debere similitudinem nec imago commemoratur. Cum enim nulla similitudo fit, procul dubio nec imago fit, quoniam si imago, utique et similitudo, non autem si fit similitudo, continuo fit et imago; tamen si nulla similitudo, sequitur ut nulla imago."

<sup>41</sup>Cf. *De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 62 (PL 34:244-246, CSEL 28, 1:502), "Nonnulli autem putant ideo non repetitam similitudinem neque dictum: et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quia tantummodo tunc ad imaginem factus est, similitudo autem illi postea servabitur in resurrectione mortuorum; quasi posset esse imago aliqua in qua similitudo non sit. Sit enim omnino similis non est, procul dubio nec imago est. Verum tamen ut non sola ratione id agere videatur, et auctoritas apostoli Jacobi adhibenda est, qui cum de lingua hominis loqueretur ait: in ipsa benedicimus Deum et in ipsa maledicimus homines, qui ad similitudinem Dei facti sunt (Jas. 3:9)."

In the quotation just given, Augustine is rejecting an opinion quite similar to that of M. Victorinus. In the *QQ. in Hept.*, V, 4 (PL 34:749, CSEL 28, 2:371), he rejects an opinion closer to that of the Eastern Fathers, and that of Jerome, "Sed quod non addit: et similitudinem, cum superius [Gen. 1:26] dictum esset: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, quibusdam visum est similitudinem aliquid amplius esse quam imaginem, quod homini reformando per Christi gratiam postea servaretur. Miror autem si non propterea postea imaginem solam voluit commemorare, quia, ubi imago, continuo et similitudo est."

<sup>42</sup>See G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, (Harvard Press, Cambridge: 1959), 58 f and 83-94; P. Camelot, "La Theologie de L'Image de Dieu," *Revue des Sciences Phil. et Theol.*, XL (1956), 460-466; W. Burghardt,



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*The Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria*, (Catholic U. Press, Washington: 1957), 1-11.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. F. L. B. Cunningham, *The Indwelling of the Trinity*, (Priory Press: Dubuque, 1955), 327 and note (19).

<sup>44</sup>For the opinion of Ambrose, who associates the terms of image and likeness, cf. *De Fide*, I, 7 (PL 16:540) and II, Prol. (PL 16:559-560). For the position of Cyril of Alexandria, who finds no difference between the two terms, see W. Burghardt, *op. cit.*, 7-8. For modern exegesis of these two terms, *ibid.*, 8-9; many exegetes consider these two terms but synonymous expressions, and those who do find some distinction consider it to be a matter of different emphasis or connotation, rather than a genuine difference of meaning.

<sup>45</sup>For the opinion of Jerome, who seems to say that the image only is conferred at creation while the likeness is bestowed from the baptism of Christ, cf. *In Illud Ezech.*, II, 28 (PL 25:269). For the opinion of M. Victorinus, who says that only the image was conferred at creation while the likeness is reserved for the resurrection and the state of glory, cf. *Adv. Arium*, 1, 19 (PL 6:1052).

<sup>46</sup>*De Trinit.*, VII, 6, 12, *Biblioteca de Autores Christianos, Obras de San Augustin*, Madrid: 1956, V, 492. This edition of the *De Trinitate* will be used throughout our study, and it will be indicated by the abbreviation, BAC.

The references which could be given in support of the fact that Augustine uses the term of similitude or likeness not only as an element of the term image, but also as signifying the growth in likeness to God are so numerous as to preclude citation here. We refer the reader to J. Heijke, *St. Augustine's Comments on "Imago Dei,"* 2, where many references to this usage appear.

<sup>47</sup>Cf. *De Spiritu et Litt.*, 22, 37-24, 42 (PL 44:223-226, CSEL 60:190 f); *Tract in Ev. Joan.*, XL, 9 (PL 35:1691, CC,SL 36:355 f). Cf. 1 John 3:2.

<sup>48</sup>Cf. *De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 57 (PL 34:242, CSEL 28, 1:497); *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 74 (PL 40:85-86).

<sup>49</sup>Cf. e.g. *Enneads*, V, 7, 1-2; V, 8, 7, *transl. cit.*, 419-421; 428.

<sup>50</sup>Cf. *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 46, 2 (PL 40:30); *Tract. in Ev. Joan.*, I, 17 (PL 35:1387, CC,SL 36:10); E. Gilson, *L'Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Augustin*, 275 f.

<sup>51</sup>Cf. *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 46, 2 (PL 40:30).

<sup>52</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, Q. 23 (PL 40:16); S. Grabowski, *The All-Present God*, 204-210.

<sup>53</sup>*De. Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 57 (PL 34:242, CSEL 28, 1:497), "Quapropter etiam similitudo Dei, per quam omnia facta sunt, proprie dicitur similitudo, quia non participatione alicujus similitudinis similis est, sed ipsa est prima similitudo, cujus participatione similia sunt, quaecumque per illam fecit Deus."

<sup>54</sup>*De Vera Relig.*, XXXVI, 66 (PL 34:151-152), "Caetera illius unius similia dici possunt in quantum sunt, in tantum enim et vera sunt; haec autem est ipsa ejus similitudo, et ideo Veritas. Ut enim veritate sunt vera, quae vera sunt, ita similitudine similia sunt, quaecumque similia sunt. Ut ergo veritas forma verorum est, ita similitudo forma similium est. Quapropter vera quoniam in tantum vera sunt, in quantum sunt; in tantum autem, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt, ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae est summa similitudo Principii et Veritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est."

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<sup>55</sup>See E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 282; S. Grabowski, *The All-Present God*, 206. Cf. also *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 11 (BAC: 452), “. . . tamquam Verbum perfectum, cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium; et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cumquo unum.”

<sup>56</sup>Cf. *Lib.* 83 QQ., Q. 74 (PL 40:85-86); *Tract. in Ep. Joan.*, IV, 9 (PL 35:2010); *Sermo IX* (de decem chordis), 8, 9 (PL 38:82); *De Trinit.*, VII, 6, 12 (BAC: 452).

<sup>57</sup>*Lib.* 83 QQ., Q. 74 (PL 40:85), “Ubi imago . . . non continuo aequalitas: ut in speculo est imago hominis . . . quia multa desint imagini, quae tamen insunt illi rei de qua expressa est.”

<sup>58</sup>*Loc. cit.*, “Potest ergo esse aliqua imago, in qua sit etiam aequalitas. . . .” Cf. *De Vera Relig.*, XLIII, 81 (PL 34:159).

<sup>59</sup>Cf. e.g. Ambrose, *Hexaem.*, VI, 6, 41 (PL 14:257-258).

<sup>60</sup>*Sermo IX* (de dec. chordis), 8 (PL 38:82), “Aliter est enim imago tua in filio, aliter in speculo: in filio est imago tua secundum aequalitatem substantiae, in speculo autem quantum longe est a substantia, et tamen est quaedam imago tua, quamvis non talis qualis in filio suo secundum substantiam.”

<sup>61</sup>Cf. *Lib.* 83 QQ., Q. 74 (PL 40:86), “Potest ergo esse aliqua imago in qua sit etiam aequalitas; ut in parentibus et filiis inveniretur imago et aequalitas et similitudo, si intervallum temporis defuisset; nam et de parente expressa est similitudo filii, ut recte dicitur imago, et potest esse tanta, ut recte etiam dicitur aequalitas, nisi quod parens tempore praecessit. . . . Potest et similitudo esse, ubi et aequalitas et imago sit, sicut de filiis commemoravimus, excepto tempore quo praecedunt parentes. Sic enim aequalem syllabam syllabae dicimus, quamvis altera praecedit, altera subsequatur. In Deo autem, qui conditio temporis vacat, non enim potest recte videri Deus in tempore generasse Filium, per quem condidit tempora: consequens est, ut non solum sit imago ejus . . . sed etiam aequalitas tanta ut nec temporis quidem intervallum impedimento sit.”

<sup>62</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 11 (BAC: 452), “Imago enim si perfecto implet illius cuius imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imaginis suae. In qua imagine [Verbum Dei] speciem nominavit, credo, propter pulchritudinem, ubi iam est tanta congruentia, et prima aequalitas, et prima similitudo, nulla in re dissidens, et nullo modo inaequalis, et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem respondens, ei cuius imago est.”

<sup>63</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, V, 1, 6, *transl. cit.*, 374. Ambrose clearly teaches the full equality of the Son with the Father, cf. *Hexaem.*, III, 7, 32 (PL 14:169), *De Spiritu Sancto*, II, 1 (PL 16:743), *De Fide*, 1, 7 (PL 16:540).

<sup>64</sup>*De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 57 (PL 34:242, CSEL 28, 1:498), “Omnis imago est similis ei, cuius imago est; nec tamen omne quod simile est alicui, etiam imago est ejus, sicut in speculo et pictura, quia imagines sunt, etiam similes sunt, tamen, si alter ex altero natus non est, nullus eorum imago alterius dici potest. Imago enim tunc est, cum de aliquo exprimitur.” Cf. *Lib.* 83 QQ., Q. 74 (PL 40:85-86).

<sup>65</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, V, 1, 1, *transl. cit.*, 374. Cf. Ambrose, *Hexam.*, VI, 7, 47 (PL 14:260); *De Fide*, 1, 7, 48-49 (PL 16:540) where one of the favored expressions with respect to the image and its origin from the exemplar appears. This term “expression” has scriptural roots; cf. Heb., 1:2.

<sup>66</sup>*De Trinit.*, XI, 5, 8 (BAC: 630), “non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est Deo, etiam ejus imago dicenda est: sed illa sola



qua superior ipse solus est. Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur, inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est."

<sup>67</sup>Cf. J. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine," 7, note (3), for an impressive listing of works where this expression occurs in conjunction with the image.

<sup>68</sup>See *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>69</sup>*Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 51, 2 (PL 40:32-33). "Multis enim modis dici res possunt similes Deo: aliae secundum virtutem et sapientiam factae, quia in ipso est virtus et sapientia non facta; aliae in quantum solum vivunt, quia ille et summe primitus vivit; aliae in quantum sunt, quia ille summe et primitus est. Et ideo quae tantummodo sunt, nec tamen vivunt aut sapiunt, non perfecte sed exigue sunt ad similitudinem eius, quia et ipsa bona sunt in ordine suo, cum sit ille super omnia bonus, a quo omnia bona procedunt. Omnia vero quae vivunt et non sapiunt, paulo amplius participant similitudinem. Quod enim vivit, etiam est, non autem quidquid est, etiam vivit. Iam porro quae sapiunt, ita illi similitudini sunt proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Quod enim participat sapientiae, et vivit et est; quod autem vivit, necesse est ut sit, non necesse est ut sapiat."

This passage concludes with these words, "Quare cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiae secundum hominem interiorem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur; et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctus. Et sapit enim, et vivit et est: qua creatura nihil est melius."

<sup>70</sup>Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, I, 4, 9 (PL 34:249, CSEL 28, 1:7-8), "An cum primum fiebat informitas materiae sive spiritualis sive corporalis, non erat dicendum, Dixit Deus, 'Fiat,' quia formam Verbi semper Patri cohaerentis, quo sempiternae dicit Deus omnia, neque sono vocis, neque cogitantis tempora sonorum volvente, sed coaeterna sibi luce a se genitae Sapientiae, non imitatur imperfectio, cum dissimilis ab eo quod summe ac primitus est, *informitate* quadam *tendit ad nihilum*; sed tunc imitatur Verbi formam, semper atque incommutabiliter Patri cohaerentem, cum et ipsa *pro sui generis conversione* ad id quod vere ac semper est, id est ad Creatorem, *formam capit*, et fit perfecta creatura, ut in eo quod Scriptura narrat, Dixit Deus, 'Fiat,' intelligamus Dei dictum incorporeum in natura Verbi ejus coaeterni revocantis ad se imperfectionem creaturae, ut non sit informis, sed formatur secundum singula quae per ordinem exsequitur? *In qua conversione et formatione qui pro modo suo imitatur Deum Verbum*, hoc est Dei Filium semper Patri cohaerentem, plena similitudine et essentia pari, qua ipse et Pater unum sunt; non autem imitatur hanc Verbi formam, si aversa a Creatore, informis et imperfecta remaneat: propterea Filii commemoratio non ita fit quia Verbum, sed tantum quia principium est, cum dicitur 'In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram'; exordium quippe creaturae existentis ab illo abhuc imperfectae, per id autem quod Verbum est, insinuet exordium creaturae revocatae ad eum, ut informaretur inhaerendo Creatori, et pro suo genere imitando formam sempiternae atque incommutabiliter inhaerentem Patri a quo statim hoc est quod ille." Cf. *ibid.*, I, 15, 19 (PL 34:257, CSEL 28, 1:21); *Conf.*, XIII, 2 (PL 32:845, CSEL 33:345).

For comparison of Augustine and Plotinus in this area, cf. A. H. Armstrong, "Spiritual or Intelligible Matter in Plotinus and S. Augustine," *Augustinus Magister*, I, 277-283, and also cf. E. Gilson, *L'Introduction a L'Etude. . .*, 256-274.

<sup>71</sup>*De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 59-60 (PL 34:243, CSEL 28, 1:500). ". . . ad ipsam tamen similitudinem omnia non facta sint, sed sola substantia

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rationalis: quare omnia per ipsam, sed ad ipsam non omnia. Rationalis itaque substantia et per ipsam facta est ad ipsam; non enim est ulla natura interposita, quandoquidem mens humana quod non sentit, nisi cum purissima et beatissima est nulli cohaeret nisi ipsi veritati, quae similitudo et imago patris et sapientia dicitur."

<sup>72</sup>Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, III, 19, 31-32 (PL 34:292, CSEL 28, 1:84 f), "Ac per hoc, sicut in illa prima luce, eo nomine recte intelligitur facta lux intellectualis particeps aeternae atque incommutabilis sapientiae Dei, non dictum est; et sic est factum, ut deinde repeteretur: et fecit Deus, quia sicut iam, quantum potuimus, disseruimus, non fiebat cognitio aliqua verba Dei in prima creatura, ut post eam cognitionem inferius crearetur, quod in eo verbo creabatur, atque ipsa cognitio illi esset ab informitate sua converti ad Deum formantem et creari atque formari, postea vero in ceteris creaturis dicitur: et sic est factum, ubi significatur in illa luce, hoc est in intellectuali creatura, prius facta verbi cognitio, ac deinde, cum dicitur: et fecit Deus, ipsius creaturae genus fieri demonstratur, quod in verbo Dei dictum est: et fieret; hoc in hominis conditione servatur: dixit enim Deus, faciamus hominem imaginem et similitudinem nostram, etc. Ac deinde non dicitur, et sic est factum, sed iam subinfertur: et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei, quia et ipsa natura scilicet intellectualis est sicut illa lux, et propterea *hoc est fieri ei quod est agnoscere verbum Dei per quod fit.*"

Cf. C. J. O'Toole, *The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine*, (Catholic U, Washington: 1944), 84 f.

<sup>73</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, (PL 34:292-293, CSEL 28, 1:85), Quae autem non in ea cognitione creata sunt, qui sive corpora sive irracionales animae creabantur, *primo facta est in creatura intellectuali cognitio eorum a Verbo*, quo dictum est, et fierent, propter quam cognitionem primo dicebatur: et sic est factum, ut ostenderetur facta ipsa cognitio in ea natura, quae hoc in verbo Dei ante cognoscere poterat; *ac deinde fiebat ipsa corporales et irracionales creaturae*, propter quod deinceps addebatur: et fecit Deus.

For an interpretation of the "rationes seminales" in the thought of Augustine, see C. J. O'Toole, *op. cit.*, 74 f; G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, 181 f. Apparently man's body also falls into this category, and so is created separately from the soul. See O'Toole, *op. cit.*, 91 f.

<sup>74</sup>*De Vera Relig.*, XXXVI, 44 (PL 34:151), "At si corpora in tantum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitari, a quo Principio unum est quidquid est, ad cuius similitudinem quidquid nititur, naturaliter approbamus, quia naturaliter improbamus quidquid ab unitate discedit, atque in ejus dissimilitudinem tendit. . . ."

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, XLIV, 82 (PL 34:159), "Praecessit enim Forma omnium . . . ut caetera quae sunt, in quantum sunt uni similia, per eam formam fierent. Horum alia sic sunt per ipsam, ut ad ipsam etiam sint, ut omnis rationalis et intellectualis creatura, in qua homo rectissime dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Alia vero ita sunt per ipsam facta, ut non sint ad ipsam."

<sup>76</sup>Augustine's conception of creation is an ingenious reconciliation of the 6 day account in Genesis with the simultaneity required by Ecclesiasticus (18:1) together with the Joannine reference to the role of the Logos in creation. The creational order of succession (the 6 "days") are located in the quasi-temporal succession of the quasi-eternal angelic mind. The doctrine of the "rationes seminales," applying only to living corporeal things and which appear in time, are the "ad extra" aspect of the "rationes aeternae"

in the Word of God, and are the unfolding of their existence as in the angelic knowledge.

The creation of man offers a special problem, apart from the two-fold account of man's creation in Genesis. The spiritual part of man, the soul made to the image of God, was created in eternity, while the body of man was created then only as a "seminal reason." Its actual appearance is only in time (after the 6 day account), as with other irrational creatures. Cf. C. J. O'Toole, *Philosophy of Creation*. . . , 84 f, G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, 167-185.

<sup>77</sup>Cf. *De Lib. Arb.* II, 16, 41 (PL 32:1263, CSEL 74:77), *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12 (BAC: 454), XI, 1, 1 (BAC: 610); *De Civit. Dei*, XI, 28 (PL 41:342, CC,SL 48:348).

<sup>78</sup>Cf. *De Trinitate*, XII, 4, 4 (BAC: 658).

<sup>79</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, V, 1, 3; V, 1, 6, *transl. cit.*, 371; 375.

<sup>80</sup>See J. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine," 10-11.

<sup>81</sup>See G. B. Ladner, "The Concept of Image. . . , " 9, and the references to the *Enneads* there cited.

<sup>82</sup>Our purpose has been to consider the concept of image which Augustine uses with respect to the divine image in man. Other aspects of the concept of image, e.g., its application in the realm of knowledge, we have considered not to fall within the limited aim of this study. The concept of image here subjected to analysis refers primarily to the divine image in man, and its application in other areas of the functioning of an image would have to be investigated.

<sup>83</sup>See T. Camelot, "La Theologie de L'Image de Dieu," 464 f.

<sup>84</sup>Cf. G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, 55 f, where other texts from St. Paul appear with obvious reference to the description of Genesis, "to the image." The same work can be consulted for application of the distinction between Christ as the Image, and man as "to the image" among the Greek Fathers, 85 f.

<sup>85</sup>*De Trinitate*, VII, 6, 12 (BAC: 492-4); "Sed quia non omnino aequalis fiebat illa imago Dei, tanquam non ab illa nata, sed ab eo creata, huius rei significandae causa, ita imago est ut ad imaginem sit: id est, non aequatur paritate, sed quadam similitudine acceditur ad Deum. . . . Sunt enim qui ita distinguunt, ut imaginem velint esse Filium: hominem vero non imaginem, sed ad imaginem. Refellit autem eos Apostolus, dicens: Vir quidem non debet velare caput, cum sit imago et gloria Dei. Non dixit ad imaginem, sed imago." Cf. *Retract.*, I, 25 (PL 32:626, CSEL 36:122).

<sup>86</sup>Cf. *De Vera Relig.*, XLIII, 81 (PL 34:159), ". . . quia summe unus est Pater Veritatis, Pater suae Sapientiae, quae nulla ex parte dissimilis, Similitudo ejus dicta est et Imago, quia de ipso est . . . summe implens unum de quo est." Cf. also note (70).

<sup>87</sup>*De Doct. Christ.*, II, 1, 1-2 (PL 34:35-36).

<sup>88</sup>*De Lib. Arb.*, II, 16, 41 (PL 32:159, CSEL 74:77).

<sup>89</sup>See M. C. D'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," 165-167; cf. note (87).

<sup>90</sup>Augustine's basic methodology is the application of the principle, "ab exterioribus ad interioribus, ab inferiora ad superiora," cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* CXLV, 5 (PL 37:1887, CC,SL: 40:2108 f). This principle not only has application with regard to Augustine's method of arriving at the knowledge of God in the sense of demonstration, but even more so is it applicable as a principle for him in the attaining of some affective knowledge of God. It then has a basic and fundamental moral cast and



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application, as we shall see in the next chapters. See E. Gilson, *L'Introduction a L'Etude de S. Augustin*, 24.

<sup>91</sup>Cf. *Tract in Ev. Joan.*, XXIII, 10 (PL 32:1589 CC,SL 36:239); *De Trinit.*, V, 1, 2 (BAC: 394-396) where Augustine says, "Quod ergo non invenimus meliorem nostro non debemus in illo quaerere, quod longe melius est meliore nostro: ut sic intelligamus Deum, si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omni modo invenire quid sit; pie tamen cavet, quantum potest, aliquid de eo sentire quod non sit."

<sup>92</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CLXIX, 6 (CSEL 44:615-616, PL 33:744-745), "Nec ideo putanda sunt haec tria Trinitati sic comparata ut omni ex parte convenient; cui enim similitudini in disputando convenientia tanta conceditur, ut ei rei cui adhibenda est, ex omni parte coaptetur? Vel quando ex creatura ad Creatorem aliquid similis assumitur?" The "trio" which Augustine is referring to here is in general the same created trinity in man, which he will put to a more positive use in the following note, (93).

<sup>93</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, XV, 27, 50 (BAC: 938-940), "Et tamen multa vera vidisti. . . Nempe ergo multa vera vidisti, aequae discrevistis ab illa Luce qua tibi lucente vidisti: attolle oculos in ipsam Lucem, et eos in eam fige, si potes. Sic enim videbis quid distet navitas Verbi Dei a processione Doni Dei, propter quod Filius unigenitus non de Patre genitum, alioquin frater ejus esset, sed procedere dixit Spiritum Sanctum . . . Quam quidem voluntatem de cogitatione procedere (nemo vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit), non tamen esse cogitationis imaginem: et ideo quamdam in hac re intelligibili nativitas et processionis insinuari distantiam. . ."

<sup>94</sup>See M. Penido, "La valeur de la theorie 'psychologique' de la Trinite," *Ephem. Theol. Lovan*, Jan. 1931, 1-16.

<sup>95</sup>An instrumental sign can be defined "quod mediante praevia notitia sui representat aliud a se" (medium ex quo). Cf. J. Gredt, *Elementa Phil. Arist-Thomist.*, (Herder, Barcelona: 1951), I, 11.

<sup>96</sup>Cf. e.g. *Enneads*, V, 3, 9, *transl. cit.*, 390-391. Cf. also G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, 96-105, for the use of the image in the soul along the lines of Augustine's approach in Gregory of Nyssa. Augustine is more reserved and cautious in his statements about "seeing" God through the image than Gregory. Cf. F. Cayre, *La Contemplation Augustinienne*, (Paris: 1954), 2nd ed., 123 f.

<sup>97</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CXXXVII, 13, 31 (PL 33:610, CSEL 44:305 f), "Deinde potest movere quomodo iam ipsa substantia Dei videri potuerit a quibusdam in hac vita positis, propter illud quod dictum est ad Moysen, 'Nemo potest faciem meam videre et vivere' (Exod. 33:20): nisi quia potest humana mens divinitus rapi ex hac vita ad angelicam vitam, antequam per istam communem mortem carne solvatur . . . quia necesse est abstrahi ab hac vita mentem, quando in illius ineffabilitatem visionis assumitur, et non sit incredibile quibusdam sanctis . . . Paulo . . . Moysi. . ."

Augustine does not appear to concede this vision of God in this life to anyone else, cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, XII, 55-56 (PL 34:477-478, CSEL 28, 1:420 f).

<sup>98</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, XV, 23, 44 (BAC: 922), ". . . cum venerit visio quae facie ad faciem repromittitur nobis, multo clarius certiusque videbimus, quam nunc ejus imaginem quod nos sumus, per quod speculum tamen et in quo aenigmate qui vident, sicut in hac vita videre concessum est, non

illi qui sunt ea quae digessimus et commendavimus in sua mente conspiciunt; sed illi qui eam tamquam imaginem vident, ut possint ad eum cujus imago est, quomodocumque referre quod vident et per imaginem quam conspiciendo vident, etiam illud videre coniiciendo, quoniam nondum possunt facie ad faciem." Cf. F. Cayre, *La Contemplation Augustinienne*, 2nd ed. (Paris: 1954), 193 f.

<sup>99</sup>A formal sign can be defined "quod sine praevia notitia sui statim immediate representat aliud a se" (medium in quo), cf. J. Gredt, *op. cit.*, I, 11.

<sup>100</sup>See P. Camelot, "La Theologie de L'Image de Dieu," 466-468; G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, 83-84, "Whatever the original relationship between the Hebrew terms used for 'image' and 'likeness' in Genesis 1:26, it was a fateful event in the history of ideas when the Septuagint chose the word *homoiwsis* (literally: likening) rather than *homoiwma* (that which is like) or *homoiotes* (being alike) for the translation of the second of these two terms. For, the word *homoiwsis* connotes an element of action, which allows, if it does not require, the signification of "assimilation" alongside that of "likeness" or "resemblance." Furthermore, before being used by the Greek translators of the Old Testament *homoiwsis* had already had a long history in Greek philosophic-religious thought. It was bound up with the conception of the assimilation of man to God. I quote only Plato's words from the *Theaetetus* about "*homoiwsis thew kata to dunaton*," which together with similar Platonic and Platonist phrases remained an ever-present substratum also of Christian divine-human resemblance ideology in the Greek-speaking world. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that a distinction and even an antithesis of *eikwn* (image) and *homoiwsis* (likeness) was developed in early Christian Greek exegesis of Genesis 1:26. As far as known the heretical Valentinian gnostics were the first to do so . . . The Valentinians then valued *homoiwsis* higher than *eikwn*. This trait was taken by Irenaeus himself, and later, perhaps through Irenaeus, by Clement of Alexandria and by Origen." Ladner analyzes the relation between the concepts of image and likeness as understood by Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius, and Gregory of Nyssa, 85-107.



## CHAPTER TWO:

# THE IMAGE OF THE ONE GOD

The special contribution of the genius of Augustine to the doctrine of the image among the Fathers is a profound and original insight into the nature of the image of the blessed Trinity in man, and it is this teaching which will receive our closest attention. Clearly there can be no image of the Trinity in a true sense unless the unity of the divine nature is also reflected; the Trinity of Persons is one God. The two facets of the divine image in man, trinitarian and unitarian, should tend to be analogously as united as are the divine nature and the Trinity of Persons. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to distinguish and treat separately the dual aspects of the divine image in the rational creature, and, indeed, it is advisable, if undue confusion is to be avoided. We shall then treat first of the image of the one God, and later discuss the trinitarian facet of the image.

We begin with imaging of the divine nature, because this aspect of the image is more easily understood, and, moreover, is the foundation for the trinitarian image in man. Not unsurprisingly, this order is reflected in the writings of Augustine, if they are viewed in their chronological development. His earlier works concentrate on the image of the one God, that is, the image viewed from the aspect of unity in the divine na-

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ture. Only in Augustine's more mature works does the trinitarian aspect of the image receive special notice and thorough discussion.<sup>1</sup>

Before proceeding to examine the nature of the divine image in man it is important to become acquainted, at least partially, with Augustine's point of view. Many of the statements about the theme of the divine image in his writings are difficult to interpret unless we too occupy his vantage point.

### AUGUSTINE'S VIEW

In treating of the concept of image we had occasion to give a brief description of creation as Augustine visualized it. Following the lead of St. Paul, Augustine considers man, after the advent of Christ and his grace, to be a "new creature" with a newness procured by man's "renovation" or "reformation" through this grace. Such expressions, quite naturally, conjure up in the mind of the African bishop the original creation and the original formation by God, concepts which have a special meaning for him, as we have seen. Creation, in Augustine's view, includes a non-temporal act of conversion toward God which he calls *formation*, and to the latter act all temporal historical re-formation is related.<sup>2</sup>

The very first day of creation already manifests the fundamental principle which Augustine sees at work in the whole process of salvation. When God created heaven and earth—the realm of spirit and matter for Augustine—, he recalled both matter and spirit to himself by giving them form without any interval of time.<sup>3</sup> This creative act effecting the initial recall and conversion is signified by the words, "Let there be light," and they also denote the role of the Divine Word in creation. The Word is light, and forms all through some illuminative process.<sup>4</sup> This is, of course, to be understood as being in accord with the capacities of the creatures involved.<sup>5</sup> Through the same Word the re-formation of man and of the divine image was to come also.

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As Ladner has observed, this *revocatio-conversio* must be considered the archetype of all later *reformatio-conversio*.<sup>6</sup> Just as the first *formatio-conversio* was a turning from nothingness to God, so in the "new creation," and in the second *formatio-conversio* there is a second turning from nothingness to God. In the latter view nothingness is no longer simply in the "ontological" order, but in the order of time and bearing a largely moral significance. It is sin, and, like all evil, an absence of good and being. The re-formation or renewal of man and the divine image does not terminate simply at the original created condition of formation, but, due to the surpassing grace of Christ, at a more elevated level.

In your soul is the image of God, and . . . man . . . received it, and in turning himself to sin discolored it. The very One comes to it as re-designer ("re-formator") who had been its original designer ("formator"), for through the Word all things have been made, and through the Word this image had been impressed. The Word himself comes, as we hear from the Apostle, "Be re-formed in the newness of your mind."<sup>7</sup>

The principal role in creation and in re-creation is assigned to the Word by Augustine, but he also sees the Spirit playing some part in these processes. The Spirit is understood by Augustine in the words of Genesis which speak of the "spirit moving over the waters," which is the yet formless creation. To the Word is attributed formation by illumination, and to the Spirit is attributed movement and order.<sup>8</sup> The activity of the Spirit is performed concomitantly with the formation in which it is somehow included; *conversio* insofar as it denotes movement seems to be attributed to the Third Person. In the historical conversion of the rational creature to God the Spirit will have a prominent role to play, as he had a role of significance in the original creation.

To whom shall I speak, how shall I tell of that weight of cupidity dragging us down that steep abyss, and of that lifting up of charity through the Holy Spirit, who moved over the waters? To whom shall I speak? How shall I tell of it? For

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they are not places in which we sink and rise again. What is more like the reality and yet more unlike it?<sup>9</sup>

This neatly balanced point of view so permeates Augustine's thinking that he allies the sixth day of creation, the day on which man appears as created to the image of God, with the sixth epoch of the world, the period in which the image lost by Adam is "re-created" by Christ and his Spirit. The period in between these two great events sums up the whole of human history.

So five ages of the world are ended. Of these the first is from the beginning of the human race, that is from Adam. . . . From his coming [the Lord Jesus Christ] the sixth age is dated; that at length the spiritual grace which at times was known only to a few . . . might be made manifest to all nations . . . that in this sixth age the human mind may be renewed in the likeness of God, even as on the sixth day man was made in the likeness of God.<sup>10</sup>

Augustine summarizes in the following words his conception of the relation between the image of creation and the image of re-creation. "Let us be re-formed to the image of God, for on the sixth day man was made to the image of God. That which formation does there, re-formation does in us; and that which creation does there, re-creation does for us."<sup>11</sup> A platonistic concept of time as the image of eternity underlies Augustine's view, and this view is noticeably different from that of the great scholastics. For St. Thomas Aquinas the *imago creationis* is the natural image of God in man which is conferred at the time of the creation of the individual soul. The *imago re-creationis* for St. Thomas is the divine image as perfected by the gifts of grace.<sup>12</sup>

For Augustine the image of creation is the divine image bestowed on Adam, and the image of re-creation is the restoral or renewal of the image lost by Adam. The augustinian conception, simple and wonderfully unified as it is, gives rise to a problem in our minds: what effect did original sin have



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on the divine image? The view of Augustine seems to lead to the conclusion that the divine image was totally lost by Adam at the time of original sin.

### THE REMNANTS OF THE IMAGE IN WOUNDED NATURE

#### THE IMAGE AND ORIGINAL SIN

It is the opinion of Heijke, after an exhaustive analysis of texts, that for a twenty-five year period or so in the early thought of Augustine the divine image in man is considered to have been annihilated by the sin of Adam.<sup>13</sup> Some texts, it is true, do not so plainly support the opinion of Heijke, yet it is apparent that Augustine had a long-standing difficulty in conceiving how the sinner could retain the image of God in his soul, and the resemblance to the divine.<sup>14</sup> This difficulty may have been due to the fact that Augustine conceives of the image in terms of supernatural life, life with God. Sin has destroyed this, and so the image would be destroyed also. Not only the texts, but the neatly balanced augustinian conception of the image of creation and the image of re-creation also tends to support Heijke's interpretation.

The neo-platonic character of the concept of image used by Augustine also has a part to play in his difficulty with the effect of original sin on the image. For Plotinus the image must always be turned toward its model, since an image has reality only insofar as it is in contact with the divine ideas. Original sin broke off the contact of man with God, the image with its model, and so the divine likeness would tend to be completely lost. Perhaps the neo-platonic origins of Augustine's notion of image led him early in his life to such a conclusion.

Nevertheless the roots of Augustine's "ontology" would not warrant such a position. The ontological structure of the spiritual creature contains a *conversio* to God. Because this creature is also free, its *conversio* must undoubtedly be voluntary. Yet "a certain degree of conversion is necessary that mind may be,



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and that it may be mind" in the ontological order.<sup>15</sup> If this tendency is not actuated voluntarily, as in the sinner, then man still retains some capacity for imaging God. Augustine will hesitate for years before he will dignify this "relic" of the divine image in man with a title of image.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand the development in Augustine's thought may be due more to the re-thinking of his own thought and the expression given to it on the occasion of the controversy with the Pelagians. In any event, the change occurs about the year 412, the year in which Augustine begins actively to engage the Pelagians in verbal combat. A most unequivocal text declaring the image not to be identical with grace is one directed against the Pelagians. "Will nature be grace? This the Pelagians have dared to assert, that grace is nature, in which we have been created, made to the image of God, having a rational soul by which we are able to understand. . . . But this is not grace. . . ." <sup>17</sup>

By the time of the Pelagian controversy, at the very latest, Augustine will no longer be of the opinion that the image and grace are to be identified; rather there is a vestigial remains of the image in man, and it can be called an image. In the *De Trinitate*, apart from any controversy, Augustine clearly perceives that there must be a permanent image in man.

Far be it from me to think that, while the nature of the soul is immortal and from the beginning when it was created thence after never ceases to be, the best thing it has should not always endure with its immortality. Yet what better thing has been created in its nature than that it is made to the image of the Creator? That which must be called the image of God is to be found not . . . in that which will not always exist, but in that which will exist always.<sup>18</sup>

Augustine is unwilling to rest his opinion sheerly on his own insights but searches for scriptural confirmation.

. . . divine Scripture says that "although man walks in an image he is perturbed in vain: he stores up treasure and cannot tell who will gather it" (Ps. 38:7). . . . It would not attribute

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vanity to the image of God unless it had perceived it to have been factually defaced. Yet it sufficiently shows in saying, "Although man walks in an image" that this deformity did not take away the fact that it is an image.<sup>19</sup>

The divine image remains in its roots in man, as it is a property belonging to the nature of the rational or intellectual soul.

. . . there must be found in the soul of man, the rational or intellectual soul, that image of the Creator which is immortally inserted in its immortality . . . it is therefore called immortal because it never ceases to live with some kind of life, even when it is most miserable: so although reason or intellect is at one time torpid in it, at another time small, and at another great, yet the human soul is never anything except rational or intellectual.<sup>20</sup>

The mature thought of the African bishop is that the divine image remains rooted in the nature of the intellectual soul after original sin.<sup>21</sup> The question arises as to what precisely is the subject or site of the image which remains in man. This problem we shall consider next.

### THE SITE OF THE IMAGE

It is only the rational or intellectual substance among creatures which is the image of God, to Augustine's mind, and this rational substance is equated with the intellectual soul in man. What then of the body? Is not man called the image of God in Genesis, and not simply his soul? The image of God is not to be found in the body according to the constant teaching of Augustine, affirmed many times and on many different occasions.

. . . [When God said] "Let us make man to our image and likeness," he immediately added, "Let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air," etc.: so that we might understand that man is not said to be made to the image of God because of the body, but because of that power by which he dominates all beasts. The other animals are not subject to man because of his body. . . .<sup>22</sup>

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Nevertheless even the body is a witness to the image in the soul. The natural posture of the body of man, its erect stature, is more apt for viewing the celestial heavens, the most elevated of corporeal creation, than the bodies of the other animals. Symbolically this reflects the nature of the image in man's soul, which should be directed Godward, as he is the most elevated of all.

. . . our body is so designed that it indicates we are better than the beasts, and therefore like to God. The bodies of all animals . . . in the sea . . . on the land . . . in the air, are inclined toward the earth, and are not erect as the body of man. This fact signifies that our soul ought to be erect also toward the things over it, that is, to the eternal spiritualities. And so in the soul especially is man understood to be made in the image and likeness of God, the erect form of the body bearing witness to this. . . .<sup>23</sup>

The image is in the soul of man, and Augustine specifies the site of the image more precisely when he relates it to the reason, to the intellect, to the *mens* (which is translated, rather inaccurately, as mind). It is by this power that man excels the beasts and has dominion over them.

. . . when he said, "to the image," he immediately added, "and let him have dominion . . ." in order that we might understand in what man was made to the image of God, namely in that in which he excels irrational and living things. This is the reason itself, or the mind, or the intellect, or some other word, if it be more appropriately called such.<sup>24</sup>

In the more mature works, under the impetus of pauline terminology, Augustine will more definitely locate the image of God in the *mens*.

If then we are renewed in the spirit of our mind [cf. Eph. 4:23-24], and he is the new man who is renewed to the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him [cf. Col. 3:9-10], there is no doubt that man was made to the image of God that created him, not according to the body, nor according to any part of the soul, but according to the rational mind wherein the knowledge of God can exist.<sup>25</sup>

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The same thought is repeated throughout the *De Trinitate*, and in a number of other works: the image is in the *mens*.<sup>26</sup>

What does Augustine mean by the term *mens*? Here we are confronted by a characteristic example of the fluid augustinian terminology. At times the *ratio*, *intellectus*, *intelligentia* are placed on the same level as the *mens*, and at other times, they are distinguished from the *mens* and from each other.<sup>27</sup> Making no pretense as to sounding all of the profundities associated with these different terms and their different usages by Augustine, we shall present here what we believe to be the more characteristic, and the more mature, view of Augustine.

We shall consider first the relation of the *mens* to the soul. The Bishop of Hippo distinguishes between the *anima* and the *animus*. The former designates the principle of animation, the principle of corporeal and sensitive life in man, and it is found in the brute as well. The *animus*, on the other hand, designates the principle of the properly rational and intellectual life in man, and it is not found in the brute. Understood in this fashion the *animus* is to be identified with the *mens*: it is the highest part of the soul in man.<sup>28</sup>

. . . we have now arrived at the image of God in man, in that wherein he excels the other animals, that is by reason or understanding, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul (*anima*) that pertains to what is called the *mens* or *animus*. For by this name some writers . . . distinguish that which excels in man, and is not in the beast, from the soul (*anima*) which is in the beast as well.<sup>29</sup>

In the figurative language of Augustine the *mens* is like the eye of the soul, or its head or face. The *mens* is the noblest part of the human or rational soul. "Putting aside the body and considering the soul only (*anima*), the mind is something belonging to it, as though its head or eye or countenance, but these things are not to be thought of as bodies. It is then not the soul, but what is excelling in it that is called the



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mind.”<sup>30</sup> The *mens* is the specifically rational or intellectual part of the soul in man.

However, the *mens* is not simply the reason or the intellect alone, as can be seen from the citation immediately preceding the last one given. The *mens* is a complex thing, and, though at times it appears to be equated with rational or intellectual faculty (and then more accurately translated by the term mind), it rather includes this faculty. “Reason (*ratio*) and understanding (*intelligentia*) are naturally inherent in the mind.”<sup>31</sup> The well-known augustinian distinction between the *ratio inferior* and the *ratio superior* leaves intact the single nature of the *mens*, “When we discuss the nature of the human mind we discuss one thing, nor do we double it into those two which we have just mentioned [*ratio inferior* and *ratio superior*], except in relation to its functions.”<sup>32</sup>

Not only the intellectual faculty pertains to the mind, but also the will and intellectual memory, as is the constant teaching of the *De Trinitate*.<sup>33</sup> In one passage from the latter work the complex character of the *mens* and the concrete view Augustine has of it clearly appears. “In the mind one nature embraces our intellect and action, or our counsel and execution, or our reason and rational appetite, or whatever more significant terms may be by which to express this. . . .”<sup>34</sup> The *mens* embraces, for Augustine, all of the specifically human and rational activity, and the corresponding faculties.

The mind is then the most noble part of the soul in man, but what of its relation to the body? The *mens* is not the whole man for Augustine, though at times he calls it a “spiritual substance.”<sup>35</sup> In this case it seems that he is using the term *mens* interchangeably for the *animus*, which, at times, is also used interchangeably for the whole soul in man and not just the highest part.<sup>36</sup> The *mens* is that part of man which “adheres to the intelligible realities and to God,” and which seems, at times, somewhat embarrassingly found in partnership with the body.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps this is an overstatement, yet the *mens* of



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Augustine has many features of the plotinian soul which remains in the region of intelligible realities, or at least strives to get back to this region.<sup>38</sup>

Despite recognizable similarities between the augustinian *mens* and the plotinian soul, the favored association of the Bishop of Hippo with the *mens* is a pauline notion, not a neo-platonic concept. Augustine intends his *mens* to be the "inner man" of St. Paul, though the latter also has neo-platonic counterparts.<sup>39</sup> "Ascending then by certain grades of consideration along the parts of the soul, there, where something first meets us which is not common to the beasts and ourselves, reason begins, and now the inner man can be recognized."<sup>40</sup> The *mens*, the "inner man," terms used by St. Paul in association with the image in man, are used by Augustine interchangeably to designate the site of the divine image.

The union of body and soul remained a speculative problem for Augustine, though he does consider it to be a natural union.<sup>41</sup> The operations of the *mens*, the specifically human part of the soul, appear to be independent of the body. His conception of creation, in which the soul created to the image of God appears within the six-day cycle and the body only later in time as the result of the *rationes seminales*, is not a theory which lends the best support to the naturalness of the body-soul union. Yet caution must be exercised in associating the dualism of platonism with the teaching of Augustine. The manichaeian theoretical extreme with regard to the origin of the body and its relationship with the soul had a beneficial influence on the platonic tendency of Augustine's thought.

In a reply to the manichaeian Faustus, who maintained that God created only the spiritual part of man wherein resides the image and not the corporeal part, Augustine teaches the clearly Christian view of man.

The apostle Paul certainly wishes the expression "the inner man" to be understood of the spirit of the mind, and the outer man for the body and this mortal life; but never in his

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writings does it appear that he calls these two men, but rather one which is wholly made by God, that is the inner and outer; however, he made it to his image only in regard to that which is inner, which, besides being incorporeal, is rational, and not in the beasts. God then did not make one man to his image, and another man not to his image; but because the inner and outer man is together one man, he made this one man to his image, not in regard to the body and corporeal life, but in regard to the rational mind. . . .<sup>42</sup>

The site of the image, the *mens* or the "inner man," is part of man's nature, and it was not taken away by original sin. Because the divine image is rooted in the very nature of man, Augustine will reject the opinion that woman is not equally with man an image of God. Much of eastern patristic thought—especially that of the Antiochenes for whom the note of dominion was a point of stress in the concept of the divine image—finds the image in a diminished sense in woman, or refuses to admit that woman is an image of God.<sup>43</sup> Augustine finds support for his position in St. Paul and says, "Because they are there renewed to the image of God where there is no sex, man is made there to the image of God where there is not sex, that is in the 'spirit of their mind.' . . . A common nature therefore is to be recognized in their mind. . . ."<sup>44</sup> The image text from Genesis which continues, "God created man, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them, and he blessed them" (Gen. 1:27-28), in Augustine's exegesis supports his position also. For "this text says that human nature which is complete in both sexes was made in the image of God."<sup>45</sup>

### THE OBJECT OF THE IMAGE

Some passages from the *De Trinitate* created doubt in the minds of some of the medievalists as to the question of the object of the image in Augustine's teaching.<sup>46</sup> There should be no doubt as to what is the object of the divine image in man for Augustine, for this object is the exemplar, God. The dynamic augustinian concept of image includes essentially the tendency

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toward the exemplar-principle. His notion of creation, which is associated with the concept of image, includes the element of *formatio* which consists in some *conversio* to God. A text from St. Paul, which Augustine uses very often, supports his point of view, "Put on the new man which is renewed to the knowledge of God according to the image of him that created him" (Col. 3:10). God as the object of the image is fundamental to the doctrine of Augustine.

His position can be summed up in these words from the *De Trinitate*, "the most true honor of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except in relation to him by whom it is impressed."<sup>47</sup> Man does not image God by his rationality independently of some relation to God as object of his power. But how is this relation to be conceived? Admittedly, we are here at the heart of a great difficulty in the interpretation of Augustine's thought, and precisely because it was a difficulty for him. The whole bent of Augustine's temperament is to conceive of this relation, not as something static and abstract, but as operational and vital, and this tendency is reflected in his concept of image. Furthermore, the *mens* to be mind must "return" to its Creator, and, seemingly, by its characteristic action, that of knowledge. Somehow the sinner must have some "knowledge" of God, both to be rational and to image God.

The sinner's contact with God, his "knowledge" of him, can be explained satisfactorily, in Augustine's opinion, by some contact with divine illumination in the perception of the principles of knowledge, especially those of morality.<sup>48</sup> But what of the very ontological structure of the mind, the residual element of the image left to man after original sin? Is not the complex augustinian notion of *memoria Dei* (and of *memoria sui*) involved in this problem? There must be some relation between the structure of the mind and the object of the image which is God. Augustine strives mightily to render this relation operational, or, in other words, to pass from the static ontological

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order to the operational psychological order, but is not wholly successful.

He has to admit defeat, to our view, and it is clear from the texts.

. . . the image of God in the human soul has not been so completely obliterated by the stain of affections, that no faint outlines of the original remain. . . . Just as by the new covenant there is a renewal in the mind of believers of that very image of God which impiety has not entirely done away with—for *there remained this that the soul of man cannot be anything save rational*—so even here what is written is undoubtedly that law of God which was not completely effaced by unrighteousness, and is now renewed by grace.<sup>49</sup>

Though Augustine in some places does not demand knowledge of God as a requirement for the basic natural image, the image is not to be conceived of without regard for God as object. The expressions, *capax Dei* and, something of its equivalent, *capax sapientiae*, wend their way through the doctrine of the image in the works of Augustine like the master-concepts they are.<sup>50</sup> These terms specify the *mens* as the basic image of God, faint and discolored as it may be. Partial explanation of this specification is given in the following passage:

. . . and if it is made to the image of God by this that it is able to use reason and intellect to understand and behold God, then from the moment when that nature so great and so wonderful began to be; whether this image is so obsolete as to be almost none at all, or whether it is obscure and defaced, or bright and beautiful, certainly it always is.<sup>51</sup>

Augustine consistently relates the remnants of the divine image in man to the knowledge of God. This central theme of the doctrine of the image for Augustine is fortified by words from Scripture, especially a text from St. Paul's letter to the Colossians (3:10), which we have already seen.

Yet his total conception of *capax Dei*, or of *capax sapientiae* is not limited purely to knowledge of God. Manifestly the former expression would include the whole of the supernatural



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order. The later expression, related to the term *sapientia* which has a very fluid and mobile meaning for Augustine, is more difficult of interpretation.<sup>52</sup> It would appear to denote the supernatural order, not exclusively, but as its highest fulfillment. In a passage from late in his life Augustine uses the term *capacitas* and *sapientia* together in relation to the image left to man after sin. The entire spiritual organism of man is involved, and the term or perfection is supernatural life.

. . . for in him that little spark of reason, in which he has been made to the image of God, has not been entirely extinguished . . . And it is he who gave to the human soul a mind, where reason and intelligence in the infant lie asleep, as it were non-existent, but about to be aroused and exercised through the increase of age, by which it is capable of knowledge and doctrine, and fit to perceive truth and love good: *it is by this capacity that it drinks in wisdom* and becomes endowed with those virtues by which it wars prudently, courageously, temperately, and justly against errors and other inborn vices, and conquers them *by desiring no other thing than that supreme and unchangeable Good*. And even if it does not do this, who can fittingly speak of or even think of this wonderful work of the Omnipotent, of how good is such a capacity divinely instituted in rational nature?<sup>53</sup>

### THE VESTIGIAL IMAGE AND THE SUPERNATURAL

The expression *capax sapientiae* ordinarily bears a primary relation to the knowledge (and love) of God.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand the expression, *capax Dei*, has a different accent, and refers primarily to that participation of God afforded by grace. The basic image left to man in the state of sin renders possible the participation in the life of God through grace.

. . . the mind must be considered as it is in itself first before it becomes partaker of God and his image found in it. For, as we have said, although worn out and defaced by losing that participation of God, yet the image remains. For by the very fact of being his image it is capable of God, and can be a partaker of him; which so great a good is possible only because it is his image.<sup>55</sup>



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The participation in the very life, knowledge, and love of God is not to be conceived as something owed to man. It is entirely the result of a free gift of God.

You [Julian, a Pelagian] say that it is the good nature of man which merits such a magnificent outpouring of grace. This I would gratefully hear, if you would say that it is because it is a rational nature; for the grace of God through Our Lord Jesus Christ is not bestowed on stones, trees, or beasts; but because he is an image of God man merited this grace; not, however, so that his good will can precede without grace, nor even beforehand give itself, so that it was owed something, for then grace would be no longer grace, when it is not given gratuitously, but rather rendered as something owed.<sup>56</sup>

It is not because man is good through his own acts that grace is bestowed on him, for his good will cannot precede grace. On the other hand man's very nature "merits" the bestowal of grace, for he is the image of God. The participation in God which is habitual grace (and actual grace) finds a fitting subject in the rational nature of man. Lesser creatures do not have a nature which is an apt subject for such a gift. Yet this fittingness of rational nature for the life of grace ("merit" in the words of Augustine) does not take away the fact that it is a gift; otherwise grace would be no longer grace.

The remnants of the image in man, that is rational nature as it exists after the sin of Adam, renders possible the participation in the life of God, for "by this image of God within itself it has such power as to be able to cleave to him whose image it is."<sup>57</sup> Such is Augustine's conception of the relation between the image left to man after original sin and the supernatural order of grace. Man is *capax Dei* radically, because he retains the image of God in his soul always.

### THE RESTORAL OF THE IMAGE LOST BY SIN

We have already seen that the restoration of the divine image in man is a renewal of the image lost or defaced by original

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sin, according to the historical viewpoint of the bishop of Hippo. The term of the renewal is the original image lost by Adam, though it will involve some noteworthy additions because of the super-abundance of the grace of Christ. This perfection of the image will be attained by the blessed only in the state of glory. The starting point of the re-formation is the remnants of the divine image left to man after original (and personal) sin.

Those who . . . are converted to the Lord from that deformity, whereby they were conformed to this world through worldly desires, are reformed from that world when they listen to the Apostle saying, "Be not conformed to this world, but be formed again in the renewal of your mind" (Rom. 12:2): so that that image may begin to be reformed by him by whom it had been formed at first. For it cannot reform itself as it could deform itself. He also says elsewhere, "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man which is created to God in righteousness and the holiness of truth" (Ephes. 4:23-24) . . . But it lost righteousness and the holiness of truth in sinning, and on account of this that image became deformed and discolored, and this it regains when it is reformed and renewed.<sup>58</sup>

From the preceding citation it can be seen that the renewal of the image extends to the whole of man's spiritual and moral life as perfected through grace. Such a renewal, involving all of the elements which go toward achieving this perfecting (or purification, as Augustine prefers) of the vestigial image in man, can be treated here only in its broad outlines. Some distinction is necessary at the outset to see the factors engaged in this work. Three stages in this process of renewal and re-formation of the divine image can easily be distinguished: the initial restoration or renewal; the gradual perfecting of the restored image by greater and greater assimilation to God; finally the full perfection of the divine image involving the greatest resemblance to God, which is reserved for those in glory. These stages are clearly indicated to Augustine by Scripture.

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### THE INITIAL RENEWAL OF THE IMAGE

The initial renewal of the image, as the whole process of its perfecting, is brought about by grace, the grace of Christ. In this fundamental tenet Augustine is sharply and completely separated from any teaching of the neo-platonists. No one denies that the re-formation of the image is attributed to grace by Augustine, but the charge is made that his whole attitude is to view grace in its operational aspects, with little regard for any stable element in the soul like habitual grace. In this supposed position Augustine is considered to be at odds with the greater part of Greek patristic thought, which placed such emphasis on the divinization of man.<sup>59</sup> Such allegations will be seen to be largely groundless during the course of this limited study of the initial renewal of the image.

The initial renewal of the divine image takes place through the sacrament of baptism, but it is only the beginning of the process, for “. . . men individually become sons of God when they begin to live in newness of spirit, and to be renewed as to the inner man according to the image of him who created them . . . from the moment of a man's baptism. . . .”<sup>60</sup> This beginning of the restoration of the image occurring at the time of baptism is sharply distinguished by Augustine from the day by day growth in resemblance to God. The renewal of the image conferred at baptism is instantaneous.

Certainly this renewal does not take place in the single moment of conversion itself, as that renewal takes place in baptism in a single moment by the remission of all sins: for not one, however small it may be, remains unremitted . . . the first cure is to remove the cause of infirmity, and this is accomplished by the forgiving of all sins; but the second cure is to heal the infirmity itself, and this takes place gradually by making progress in the renewal of that image.<sup>61</sup>

The grace of Christ operating through the sacrament of baptism re-forms something of the image lost by original sin, and instantaneously. Here, as elsewhere, the stress of Augustine is

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on the remission of all sin by the sacrament, but this is not by any means his total conception of what is accomplished toward the renewal of the image. Baptism is the sacrament of re-birth, a spiritual birth terminating in a sharing in the divine nature. By this re-birth man becomes an adopted son of God, but this adopted sonship is not to be confused with the natural filiation of the Word.

This is the grace of the New Testament, which lay hid in the Old, yet was certainly prophesied and foretold by veiled figures, so that the soul might recognize its God and be reborn to him by grace. This is truly a spiritual birth . . . called adoption. . . . From this begetting by grace we distinguish that Son, who was the Son of God. . . . He therefore descended that we might ascend, and while remaining in his own nature, became a sharer in our nature, so that we, while remaining in our own nature, might become sharers in his nature.<sup>62</sup>

For Augustine, as for the eastern Fathers, man's reassimilation to God, his re-formation is deification, and its beginnings are associated with the adopted sonship conferred at baptism. In commenting on Psalm 81, verse 6 ("I have said: you are gods"), Augustine makes the following remarks.

It is manifest that he calls men gods because they are deified from his grace, not because they are born of his substance. For he justifies who is just of himself and not from another, and he deifies who of himself is God and not through participation of another. But he who justifies is the very One who deifies, for in justifying he makes sons of God. "For he gave them the power to become sons of God" (John 1:12). If we have been made sons of God, we also have been made gods: but this is the result of adoptive grace, not of a generating nature. For there is only one Son of God. . . . The others who become gods do so by his grace. . . .<sup>63</sup>

Why then is the stress of Augustine laid so heavily—and undeniably it is—on the operations of actual grace in the restoral of the image? The reasons are many: man's conscience testifies that he is not as thoroughly assimilated to God as he could



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be, though he has been "reborn through spiritual grace"; the Pelagian controversy centers itself about this very point; and most importantly, it has strong and clear scriptural roots, especially in the teaching of St. Paul. As we have seen, Augustine distinguishes between the initial renewal of the image and another gradual renewal taking place throughout the rest of life on this earth. This distinction is based on the text of St. Paul which says, "Even though our outer man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day" (2 Cor. 4:16), and it is precisely the inner man which is the image of God.

Certainly he who is still renewed day by day is not yet wholly renewed; and insofar as he is not yet wholly renewed, he is still in his old state. Since then men, even after they are baptized, are still [to a degree] in their old condition, they are on that account still children of the world.<sup>64</sup>

The adoptive sonship, as the re-formation of the image, is not full and perfect in this life, Augustine notes, and this thought also is based on words from St. Paul.

Our full adoption, therefore, as children, is to happen also at the redemption of the body. It is then the first-fruits of the Spirit (cf. Rom. 8:23-25) which we now possess, whereby we have already become really the children of God; but for the rest, as it is by hope that we are saved and renewed, so are we the children of God. But as we are not yet actually saved, we are also not yet fully renewed, nor yet [fully] sons of God, but children of the world. We are then advancing in renewal and uprightness of life. . . .<sup>65</sup>

By the regeneration of baptism we share in the divine nature and so become like to God, but this likeness is still mixed with much unlikeness, the remnants of the "old man." In the following citation Augustine reconciles statements of St. John, apparently contrary, about the existence of sin in man who is the child of God.

We have therefore even now begun to be like him, having the first-fruits of the Spirit; but yet we are still unlike him by reason of the vestiges of the old nature. Insofar then as

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we are like him, to that degree are we sons of God by the regenerating Spirit; but insofar as we are unlike him to that degree we are the children of the flesh and of the world. From the one side we cannot commit sin (cf. 1 John 3:9); but from the other, if we say that we have no sin (cf. 1 John 1:8), we only deceive ourselves, until we pass entirely into the adoption, and the sinner be no more. . . .<sup>66</sup>

For Augustine, as well as for the Greek fathers, man's reformation began at baptism in deification, but he insists more strongly than they that deification by grace on earth is not yet the glory of heaven, except *in spe*, as scripture plainly teaches.

### THE GRADUAL RE-FORMATION OF THE IMAGE

The whole of the spiritual theology of Augustine, with its "mystical" culminations and its "ascetical" beginnings, could be subsumed in this section on the gradual re-forming of the divine image in man. Here is the dynamic "return" of the image to its exemplar-principle, and many neo-platonic features can be recognized in this "ascent" of the soul-image to its God.<sup>67</sup> Clearly any detailed exposition of this matter is beyond the limits of this paper. The treatment here, then, will be extraordinarily abbreviated from the viewpoint of the riches to be found in the writings of Augustine. However, we do hope to place in sharp relief some of the more prominent factors associated with this "return."

The fundamental augustinian point of view should be kept in mind, if we wish to avoid misinterpretation. The greatest of the Fathers of the Church knew of no man who was not created with a supernatural destiny; his man is always completely oriented toward the celestial paradise in the plan of God, if not in the actions of men. The work accomplished by Christ is simply a restoration to the condition of Adam, though the surpassing grace of the Savior will add substantial perfections to the original. The term of the restoration is the original, though now improved, divine image. The only limits to be

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placed here are those demanded by the state of man in this life—these limits were only slowly perceived by Augustine—and the fact of remaining a creature in the next life. The process is nothing other than the “re-creation” of the perfected original image, and so involves formation and illumination by the Word, now made flesh, and the ordering and elevating of the Spirit, given now in abundance through the Word made flesh, and the presence of the Father, whose Word and Spirit they are.

The terms “re-formation” and “re-creation” are understood by Augustine as portraying the part of God in the renewal of the image; from the viewpoint of the creature who is the image, the renewal is expressed by the term “return.” If, on the one hand, Augustine emphasizes the part of man, the “return,” and, at other times, the part of God, the “re-formation,” these are not to be considered as separate processes, but one work. The renewal involves God accomplishing this work in man, and the latter cooperating in a manner consonant with his nature, that is, by a voluntary and intellectual process. Clearly the pre-eminence in this total operation is to be accorded to the part of God.

### *The radical principles*

The basic principle in Augustine’s view of the gradual growth in resemblance to God is its relation to Christ and his grace, grace bestowed through the Spirit. The grace of Christ is demanded at every step of the re-assimilation, and not only at baptism. This position is too patent a fact in the writings of Augustine to be delayed over, but it is noteworthy that in this fundamental point the “return” of the augustinian Christian man has no similarity whatever with the self-propelled ascent of the plotinian divine-man. Even in the earliest works of Augustine the need for the help of God in re-forming the image appears.

Which can in no way come about except by being reformed to his image. . . . But to me no activity seems more laborious,

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and nothing is so much like inactivity, nor can the soul undertake or complete it, except with the help of him to whom it gives itself. Hence it comes about that man must be reformed by the mercy of him whose goodness and power were the cause of man's formation.<sup>68</sup>

The renewal of the image in man is not only related to the grace won by Christ, but he is also the model for the renewal. The reason for this is simply stated by Augustine, "man ought not to follow anyone except God to beatitude, but he cannot perceive God; in following the God-made-man he follows at once him whom he can perceive, and whom he ought to follow."<sup>69</sup> Christ is not only God, but he is the Image who perfectly realizes in his divinity the sublime dignity man has been called to share in. It was most fitting that the Image of the Father became flesh, for his humanity reflects this unique relation to the Father, and so becomes for man the clearly marked route to blessedness.

Through the example of him who is the Image let us not depart from God, since we are too the image of God. . . . But we, who by striving imitate him who abides, and following imitate him who stands still, and walking in him, tend toward him: because he is made a way in time by his humility, which is an eternal mansion for us by his divinity. For to pure intellectual spirits, who have not fallen by pride, he gives an example in the form of God, and as equal to God, and as God, so in order that he might also give himself as an example of returning to fallen man, who on account of the uncleanness of sins and the punishment of mortality could not see God, "He emptied himself," not by changing his divinity but by taking up our changeableness; and "taking upon himself the form of a servant" to us "He came into the world," who "was in this world," because "the world was made by him"; that he might be an example above for those who see God, an example below for those admiring man, an example to the sound to persevere, an example to the sick to become healthy, an example to those who are to die not to fear, an example to the dead that they might rise again, "that in all things he have the pre-eminence."<sup>70</sup>



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Augustine summarizes the relation of the renewal of the image to Christ as model in these words: "His whole life on earth as man, in the humanity he deigned to assume, was an education in morals."<sup>71</sup>

The other radical principle of the gradual renewal of the image is the freewill of man. Unlike many of the eastern Fathers, Augustine does not stress freewill in his doctrine of the image; rather it is in the background. More characteristically he speaks of love as the effective principle of the "return" and freewill has no prominence as an element of divine resemblance in the augustinian doctrine. Nevertheless, the freedom of man is not slighted in his writings, and in his polemics he is forced to speak out against those "who so preach and defend man's freedom, as to deny the grace of God . . ." and, on the other hand, against those "who so defend God's grace as to deny freewill."<sup>72</sup> His position is clear, "man when he sins must impute the fault to himself," and a "work is then a good one, when a person does it voluntarily,"<sup>73</sup> for "freedom of choice is not made void by grace."<sup>74</sup> His final reconciliation of grace and man's freedom appears in the distinction between operating and cooperating grace. "He [God] operates without us in order that we may will, but when we will, and so will that we may act, he cooperates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without him either working that we may will, or co-working when we will."<sup>75</sup>

### *The proximate principles*

The proximate principles of the gradual renewal of the divine image are but two: the knowledge and love of God. The gradual growth in divine likeness is nothing other than a gradual deepening of knowledge, and the gradual strengthening of love, of God. Man becomes like God by knowledge of him, for "insofar as we know him we are like him."<sup>76</sup> Man becomes like God through love of him, and without doubt this is the greater likeness in the thought of Augustine, for "it is through love

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that we become conformed to God.”<sup>77</sup> The resemblance achieved by the growth in knowledge and love of God in turn enables man to know and love God more.

“Beloved,” he says, “we are the sons of God and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is” (1 John 3:2). Insofar as we shall be like him we shall see, since also now we do not see him insofar as we are not like him. . . . But, who would be so utterly out of his mind as to say that we are or shall be similar to God in the body? In the inner man therefore is this likeness. . . . And so much the more we progress in his knowledge and in charity, the more we shall become like him.<sup>78</sup>

The proper realm of the growth in likeness to God is the increase in knowledge and love of him. It is by love basically that man “returns to God.”<sup>79</sup> Knowledge is the foundation stone, and is also at the summit of the renewal of the image, but love builds the edifice, for it is “by love that we cleave to God.”<sup>80</sup> Through this love peace and order in the lower elements of man also is effected, the realm of the moral virtues.<sup>81</sup> The latter do not enter into the growth in resemblance to God except by way of being a necessary disposition for growth in knowledge and, especially, love of God.

Man is far off from God in the “region of unlikeness” initially;<sup>82</sup> so purification is necessary. His knowledge is clouded by corporeal images; his love is heavy with sensual pleasures. Man neither knows himself truly, nor God; he neither loves himself truly, nor God. He must “return to himself,”<sup>83</sup> first, then he can “turn to God” with some ease. Man returns to himself by knowledge purified by faith; then he begins to perceive his true nature as an image of God, above all of creation yet beneath God. He returns to himself by love, granted by God, and begins to love himself in his true nature as an image of God, but also as subject to God in humility and obedience.

Love now begins to act more effectively on the lower appetites in man and achieves moral virtue, subjecting the lower to reason

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and mind. Virtue is nothing but "the order imposed by love."<sup>84</sup> All of the purification involved in the practice of moral virtue is but the rule of love.<sup>85</sup> The keeping of the commandments is but the love of God, and of neighbor as self.<sup>86</sup> Such an exercise of the rule of love makes the elevation of the mind to God in prayer a thing more natural, and of ease.

Man is now able to turn more directly to God in tranquillity, in self-possession, and by the growing perfection of his love and knowledge of God, of his likeness to God.<sup>87</sup> Before self had been something of an obstacle; this is not to say that one does not continue to love self, nor that God had not been loved before.<sup>88</sup> But the movement of the mind toward self and God at the outset had been rather disjointed; now they become more perfectly joined and one. Man sees God in his mind; he sees, not the image of God in his mind, but God in his image, and loves him so much the more.<sup>89</sup> God is present to man, along with his gifts; why then can he not in some way be perceived?<sup>90</sup>

Nowhere in the teaching of Augustine is the remarkable unity and beautiful simplicity of his thought so apparent as it is in the "return" of the image to its God.<sup>91</sup> All of the gifts of grace appear, and the higher faculties of man, intellect and will, are fully engaged in this journey. Man grows in resemblance to God by knowledge and love of him; in the growth of likeness to God man becomes able to know and love God better, perhaps even to perceive his presence. The "return" of the image to its God is but one journey, in the view of Augustine. There may be different maxims, different ages, different stages, there may be different degrees, different steps along the route, but they are but signposts, not different ways.<sup>92</sup> The journey must initiate with purification of the lower, and this struggle is never over. The journey may terminate in this life with some union and "vision" of God, but this is rare and momentary. The important thing, in the conception of Augustine, is that purification is ordered to union. The route is one, and the journey should be

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one; it is not due to a lack of unity there that the term is not realized, but rather to a lack of unity in the traveller.

In a beautiful passage from the *De Trinitate* Augustine summarizes his fundamental principle: the gradual renewal of the inner man, the divine image, is simply progress in the knowledge and love of God, with love as the effective principle in this process.

Though our outer man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day" (2 Cor. 4:16). And it is renewed in the knowledge of God, that is, in righteousness and in the holiness of truth, as the testimonies of the apostle cited before say. He, then, who is day by day renewed by making progress in the knowledge of God, and in righteousness and in holiness, transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual; and diligently perseveres in checking and lessening his desire for the former, and in binding himself to the latter by charity. But he does this to the degree that he is helped by God.<sup>93</sup>

### *The term of the renewal in this life*

The question arises as to the high point or peak of the restoration of the divine image in man, as Augustine would conceive it. The result of this query should at the same time enable us to perceive the limits which Augustine would place on the growth in knowledge and love of God in this life, the proper realm of the renewal of the image. It is with the seventh beatitude, the highest in the order of perfection in Augustine's view, that the term of the renewal of the image is associated. "To the peacemakers—as to those who are perfectly wise and conformed to the image of God through regeneration of the new man—likeness to God [is given]."<sup>94</sup> This is the highest grade of perfection for the resemblance to God in this life, for Augustine observes that "all of these grades of perfections can be attained even in this present life."<sup>95</sup>

The perfection associated with the seventh beatitude is explained in this way by Augustine.



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Perfection lies in peace where there is no contention. And so the children of God are peacemakers, for nothing contends against God, and surely children ought to bear the likeness of their father. Those who calm the movements of their soul and subject them to reason, that is, to mind and spirit, having subdued their carnal lusts, these are peacemakers for their very selves, and become a kingdom of God. In this kingdom all things are so ordered that that which is chief and excelling in man imperates the rest of man which is common to us and the beasts without struggle. And that very element which is most excellent in man, that is mind and reason, is itself subjected to a still greater power, which is truth itself, the only-begotten Son of God. For man is unable to rule over lower things unless he himself is subjected to the superior. And this is the peace which is given on this earth to men of good will; this is the life of a man of consummate and perfect wisdom.<sup>96</sup>

Accompanying this perfect harmony in man is the gift of wisdom, the greatest of the gifts of the Spirit. "Wisdom is suited to the peacemakers, for with peacemakers all things are already in proper order, and no passion is in rebellion against reason, but everything is in submission to man's spirit, since that spirit is in submission to God."<sup>97</sup> The gift of wisdom in turn is associated with the likeness of God in these words, "Finally the seventh is wisdom itself, that is the contemplation of the truth, making the whole man peaceful, and taking on the likeness of God."<sup>98</sup>

Later in life Augustine will modify the views expressed above, and he notes that there are definite limits in the harmony between the lower and higher in man in this life. "In this life it cannot happen to anyone that a law warring against the law of the mind be entirely absent from his members (cf. Rom. 7:23), because that law would still be waging war, even if man's spirit were offering such resistance as not to fall into any assent to it."<sup>99</sup> The passions can be subdued, but never "in the manner in which it is to be accomplished in that full

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and perfect peace which we hope for when that word will be fulfilled, 'Death where is thy strife?' (1 Cor. 15:55)."<sup>100</sup> Love itself, that is charity, which is the effective agent of the order to be placed in the lower appetites of man, will be much greater in glory than it is in this life. If Augustine does speak of the fullness of charity and love in this life, it is "not to be thought that the love of God will be no greater when we see him face to face."<sup>101</sup>

Closely aligned with the seventh beatitude at the peak of the growing resemblance to God in this life is the next noblest in the descending order of beatitudes and gifts: "Blessed are the pure of heart for they shall see God." Here Augustine remarks, "To the pure of heart—as to those who possess an eye purified for understanding eternal things—the power to see God [is given]."<sup>102</sup> God is everywhere present, but "just as that light [which is around us] cannot be seen except through eyes that are clear, so neither is God seen unless that through which he can be seen is pure."<sup>103</sup> Augustine will admonish his flock to "cleanse the medium through which God can be seen," and this medium is the heart.<sup>104</sup>

It is faith which cleanses the heart (cf. Acts 15:9), not any faith, but only the faith which works through charity (cf. Gal. 5:6), or more fully, "the faith that works by charity and hopes for what God promises."<sup>105</sup> The practice of the theological virtues, and all that this practice implies in the teaching of Augustine, cleanses the medium through which God can be seen, the "heart." And the "heart" is nothing other than the divine image in man, the mind. For "wherein is the intellect, wherein is the mind, wherein the power of discovering truth, wherein is your faith, wherein is your hope, wherein your charity, there God has his image."<sup>106</sup>

The medium by which God can be seen, and insofar as he can be seen, in this life is the mind cleansed and purified, the mind at the peak of the resemblance to the divine, "for

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insofar as we become like God we shall see him.”<sup>107</sup> This sight is not the “face to face” vision accorded to those in heaven.

We come now to the clean of heart, and there the vision of God has been promised, and not without cause, for there are the eyes by which God can be seen. Paul the apostle refers to these eyes when he speaks of the “illuminated eyes of your heart” (Eph. 1:18). Now these eyes are illuminated by faith because of their infirmity; hereafter they will be illuminated by sight because of their strength. For “as long as we are in the body we are exiled from God,” for we walk by faith and not by sight. But as long as we are in this faith what is said of us? “We see now through a mirror in an enigma; but then face to face” (2 Cor. 5:6-7).<sup>108</sup>

In another work Augustine explains what the “sight through a mirror” is. It is the seeing of God through the medium of the purified mind, precisely as it is an image.

. . . they who see through this mirror [the mind] and in this enigma, as it is permitted in this life to see, are not those who behold in their own minds the things we have set down . . . but those who see this *as an image*, so as to be able to refer what they see, in some way whatever it is, to him whose image it is, and through that image which they behold, also see by conjecturing what they cannot yet see face to face.<sup>109</sup>

God is everywhere present, and even dwells in those who are in the state of grace, yet most men are distant from him. This distance is not one of space, but one of unlikeness through sin and imperfection. Those who draw near to God are those who live the life of grace to its fullest, and so take on the fullest likeness to the divine in this life. In drawing near God man becomes “with” God, and, perhaps, perceives his presence.<sup>110</sup> “Insofar as we become like him we shall see him.” In this life the likeness to God never becomes so great that God can be seen “face to face,” in the opinion of Augustine. If he does grant exceptions to this general principle, in the case of Moses and St. Paul, it is only because during the moment of vision they were no longer living the terrestrial life.<sup>111</sup>

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### THE PERFECTED IMAGE IN THE BLESSED

The final perfection of the divine image occurs in the state of beatitude, and primarily consists in the sight and vision of God, the term (and the reward) of man's "return" to God. "The likeness of God will then be perfected in this image, when the sight of God will be perfected." And of this the apostle Paul speaks, "Now we see through a mirror and in an enigma, but then face to face."<sup>112</sup> The same conclusion follows from the more explicit words of St. John, in the opinion of Augustine.

But the apostle John says, "Beloved now we are the sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be, but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is" (1 John 3:2). Hence it appears that the full likeness will be then in that image of God when it shall have the full sight of God.<sup>113</sup>

Not only shall the blessed see God "as he is" and thus receive the full likeness to him, but the act of knowledge itself will imitate God's way of knowing, for there "it is given . . . to know in one act without any succession of time."<sup>114</sup>

Charity correspondingly shall increase to full perfection.

Sight shall succeed faith; and hope shall be succeeded by the beatitude to which we shall attain; but charity shall grow greater when those others fail. For if we love by faith that which we do not as yet see, how much more shall we love it when we begin to see it? And if by hope we love that to which as yet we have not attained, how much more shall we love it when we do attain it?<sup>115</sup>

Then the subjection of the lower to the higher in man will be perfect; the body will be spiritualized and at the instant command of the spirit. Immortality will be perfected, for man will not be able to die. The will shall be fixed, but free, for man will not be able to sin.<sup>116</sup> The latter three perfections occurring in the state of glory have been added by the surpassing grace of Christ to the original image possessed by Adam. The first man did not have a spiritual body. The first man had



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only the ability not to sin, and only the possibility of not dying, if he had persevered.<sup>117</sup>

\* \* \*

In the theology of Augustine, as in the teaching of all the Fathers (and especially the Greek Fathers), the theme of the image is truly a central one. Here can be seen at the same time Christology and Trinitarian theology (which is reserved for a later chapter), anthropology and psychology, the theology of creation and grace, the problem of nature and supernature, the mystery of divinization, the theology of the spiritual life, the laws of its development and progress. Also to be observed in Augustine's doctrine of the image is the convergence of very different influences, Greek and Biblical, and the problem of the relations between Christianity and Hellenism.

This doctrine, already fairly well formulated, Augustine will integrate with his teaching about the Trinity, as we shall see next.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The image of God without reference to the Trinity is spoken of in the earliest works of Augustine written at Cassiciacum during the winter of the years 386-387; cf. *Solil.* I, 1, 4 (PL 32:871), *ibid.*, II, 9, 17 (PL 32:892). In the year 388 he speaks of the image of God, cf. *De Quant. Animae*, I, 23, and of the likeness to God in the nature of man, cf. *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 51, 2 (PL 40:32-33).

In the year 388 also he perceives that a trinitarian reflection is to be observed in every creature, cf. *Epist.* XI, 3-4 (PL 33:76-77, CSEL 34:26 f); *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 18 (PL 40:15). It is only by the time of the writing of the *Confessions* that Augustine begins to describe something of the trinitarian image in man, and then most briefly, cf. *Conf.* XIII, 11 (PL 32:849, CSEL 33:352). This part of the autobiography of Augustine is dated from the years 399-401. This discussion will receive its full development only from the years 412 on, cf. *De Trinit.*, VII-XV, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup>See G. B. Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God," *Augustinus Magister*, II, 867-878; *idem*, *The Idea of Reform*, 167 f.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *Cont. Advers. Legis*, I, 9, 12 (PL 42:610), "Nec putandus est Deus informem prius fecisse materiam, et intervallo aliquo interposito temporis formasse quod informe prius fecerat; sed sicut a loquente fiunt verba sonantia, ubi non prius vox informis post accipit formam, sed formata profertur; ita intelligendus est Deus de materia quidem informi fecisse mundum, sed simul eam concreasse cum mundo. Non tamen inutiliter prius narratur unde aliquid fit, et postea quod inde fit; quia etsi potest utrumque simul fieri, non simul potest utrumque narrari." Cf. *Conf.*, XII, 9 (PL 32:827, CSEL 33:316).

<sup>4</sup>Cf. *Conf.* XIII, 2 (PL 32:845, CSEL 33:346), "Quid enim Te promeruit coelum et terram, quae fecisti in principio? Dicant Te quid promeruerunt spiritualis corporalisque natura quae fecisti in sapientia tua, ut inde penderent etiam inchoata et informia quaeque in genere suo, vel spirituali vel corporali, euntia in immoderantiam et in longinquam dissimilitudinem tuam; spirituale informe praestantius, quam si formatum corpus esset; corporale autem praestantius, quam si omnino nihil esset: atque penderent in tuo Verbo informia, nisi per idem Verbum revocarentur ad unitatem tuam, et formarentur. . . ." Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, I, 3 (PL 34:248-249, CSEL 28, 1:7 f).

<sup>5</sup>Cf. *Conf.* XII, 28 (PL 32:841-842, CSEL 33:339), "Vident enim . . . Deus, aeterna et stabili permansione cuncta praeterita et futura tempora superari: nec tamen quidquam esse temporalis creaturae, quod Tu non feceris: cujus voluntas quia id est quod Tu, nullo modo mutata, vel, quae antea non fuisset, exorta voluntate fecisti omnia: non de Te similitudinem tuam formam omnium; sed de nihilo dissimilitudinem informem, quae formaretur per Similitudinem Tuam, recurrens in Te unum pro captu ordinato, quantum cuique rerum in suo genere datum est." Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, III, 2-3 (PL 34:280-281, CSEL 28, 1:63 f).

<sup>6</sup>See Ladner, "St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man. . . ." 869-871.

<sup>7</sup>*Enarr. In Ps. XXXII*, sermo 2 (PL 36:293-294, CC,SL 38:266), "In animo tuo est imago Dei, mens hominis capit eam. Accepit eam et inclinando se ad peccatum decoloravit eam. Ipse ad eam venit reformator

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qui erat eius ante formator: quia per Verbum facta sunt omnia, et per Verbum impressa est haec imago. Venit ipse Verbum ut audiremus ab Apostolo: Reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae."

<sup>8</sup>Cf. *Conf. XIII*, 4-11 (PL 32:846 f, CSEL 33:347 f); E. Portalie, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*, (Regnery, Chicago: 1960), 132-133 (an English translation of his article from the DTC by R. Bastian); S. Grabowski, *The All-Present God*, 102-106, where the varying interpretations of "spiritus Dei" from Genesis by Augustine are given. He says, "If this initial verse, however, is understood to mean the creation of the absolute universality of beings—comprising corporeal and spiritual creatures—then the phrase 'spiritus Dei' can designate only the divine Person of the Holy Trinity," 105.

Augustine is having difficulty here with the admission of the existence of a world-soul, which would animate the corporeal universe in the manner that a human soul animates the body; he will tend to leave the possibility open, but states that it is not a proven fact. Cf. *Retract.*, I, 11, 4 (PL 32:601-602, CSEL 36:54-56).

<sup>9</sup>*Conf. XIII*, 7 (PL 32:847-848, CSEL 33:349 f), "Cui dicam, quomodo dicam de pondere cupiditatis in abruptam abyssum et de sublevatione caritatis per Spiritum tuum, qui superferebatur super aquas? Cui dicam? Quomodo dicam? neque enim loca sunt, quibus mergimur et emergimus. Quid similis et quid dissimilis?"

<sup>10</sup>*De Catech. Rud.*, XXII, 9 (PL 40:338), "Peractis ergo quinque aetatibus saeculi, quarum prima est ab initio generis humani, id est, ab Adam. . . . Domini nostri Jesus Christi, ex cuius adventu sexta aetas agitur: ut jam spiritualis gratia manifestaretur omnibus gentibus. . . . ut hac sexta aetate mens humana renovetur ad imaginem Dei, sicut sexta die homo factus est ad imaginem Dei."

<sup>11</sup>*Sermo CXXV*, 4 (PL 38:692), "Ergo reformemur ad imaginem Dei quia sexto die factus est homo ad imaginem Dei. Quod ibi fecit formatio, hoc in nobis reformatio; et quod ibi fecit creatio, hoc in nobis recreatio."

<sup>12</sup>Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 93, a. 4.

<sup>13</sup>See J. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine," 4, 8, *idem*, *St. Augustine's Comments on "Imago Dei,"* 54.

<sup>14</sup>Cf. Heijke, "Imago Dei in the Works of St. Augustine," 4, note (4) where he admits the existence of certain "neutral texts," in which the terms "atterere" and "deterere" appear and with their meaning unclear. The opinion of Heijke is justified at least insofar as there is a clear change in the terms used by Augustine to be observed from the year 412 forward. Nevertheless, in the earliest works of Augustine the "divine faculty" in man is referred to; surely the young convert is aware that this faculty is basic to the divine image in man. It is possible that vehement temperament, which leads him to conceive of things in terms of their noblest expressions, is at work; anything short of this maximum is apt to be labelled, in hyperbolic excess, as non-existent. The *Retractions* do contain some final revisions of Augustine's thought, yet at times they simply tone down language which is too vigorous, and so open to misinterpretation.

<sup>15</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 7, where Heijke says, "the very nature of the mind is, according to Augustine, a spiritual tendency toward God, so much so that 'to be mind' means nothing else than to know and love God." He then adds, "It goes without saying that we are dealing with ontological knowledge and love." Such an inconsistency as "ontological knowledge

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and love," perhaps, can be permitted the incomplete and hesitant thought of Augustine, but we do not believe it should be perpetuated.

<sup>16</sup>Cf. *De Spiritu et Litt.*, 28, 49 (PL 44:230-231, CSEL 60:204 f), "Unde aversi obsolescere meruerunt; renovari autem nisi gratia christiana, hoc est nisi mediatoris intercessione non possunt. . . . Quod quantulacumque legis opera naturaliter insita non invenirentur in eis, qui legem non acceperunt, nisi ex reliquiis imaginis Dei. . . ." Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XXII, 24 (PL 41:789, CC,SL 48:847 f), ". . . non in eo tamen penitus extincta est quaedam velut scintilla rationis, in qua factus est ad imaginem Dei. . . ."

<sup>17</sup>*De Gratia et Lib. Arb.*, XIII, 25 (PL 44:896), the entire passage reads, "Numquid natura erit gratia? Nam et hoc Pelagiani ausi sunt dicere, gratiam esse naturam, in qua sic creati sumus, ut habemus mentem rationalem qua intelligere valeamus, facti ad imaginem Dei, ut dominemur piscibus maris et volucris caeli et omnibus pecoribus quae repunt super terram. Sed non haec est gratia quam commendat apostulus per fidem Jesu Christi. Hanc enim naturam etiam cum impiis et infidelibus certum est nobis esse communem; gratia vero per fidem Jesu Christi eorum tantummodo est quorum est ipsa fides." This particular work is from very late in Augustine's life; it is dated to the year 426.

<sup>18</sup>*De Trinit.*, XIV, 2, 4 (BAC 5:770), "Absit autem ut cum animae natura sit immortalis, nec ab initio quo creata est, unquam deinceps esse desistat, id quo nihil melius habet, non cum eius immortalitate perduret. Quid vero melius in eius natura creatum est, quam quod ad sui Creatoris imaginem facta est? Non igitur in [ea] . . . quae non erit semper, sed in eo quod semper erit, invenienda est quam dici oporteat imaginem Dei."

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, XIV, 4, 6 (BAC 5:776), ". . . Quanquam, [divina Scriptura] inquit, in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur: thesaurizat, et nescit cui congregabit ea. Non itaque vanitatem imaginem Dei tribueret, nisi deformem cerneret factam. Nec tamen valere illam deformitatem, ut auferat quod imago est, satis ostendit dicendo: Quanquam in imagine ambulat homine." Cf. *Enarr. In Ps. CIII*, sermo 4, 2 (PL 37:1378-1379, CC,SL 40:1522).

<sup>20</sup>*Loc. cit.*, ". . . sed ea est invenienda in anima hominis, id est rationali, sive intellectuali, imago Creatoris, quae immortaliter immortalitati eius insita . . . sed immortalis ideo non cupatur, quoniam qualicumque vita, etiam cum miserrima est, nunquam desinit vivere: ita quamvis ratio vel intellectus nunc in ea sit sopitus, nunc parvus, nunc magnus appareat, numquam nisi rationalis et intellectualis est anima humana. . . ." Cf. texts cited in notes (16) and (17) of this chapter.

<sup>21</sup>In his polemics against the Pelagians Augustine will tend to another extreme, though the statements must be interpreted in light of their occasion and purpose: the image in man would have admitted him to the kingdom of heaven, if it had not been for original sin. The image he is speaking of here is the vestigial image in infants, whose ultimate fate when passing from this life without baptism, always remained a problem for Augustine. Cf. *Op. Impf. C. Jul.*, II, 30 (PL 45:1145); *Contra Jul.* VI, 10, 32 (PL 44:840).

<sup>22</sup>*De Gen. c. Manich.*, I, 17, 28 (PL 34:186), ". . . Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram: addidit continuo, Et habeat potestatem piscium maris, volatilium caeli, et cetera: ut intelligeremus non propter corpus dici hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, sed propter eam potestatem qua omnia pecora superat. Omnia enim animalia cetera subjecta



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sunt homini, non propter corpus. . . ." Cf. *Lib.* 83 QQ., Q. 51, 2 (1:497); *De Civ. Dei*, XII, 23 (PL 41:375, CC,SL 48:381).

<sup>23</sup>*Loc. cit.*, ". . . corpus nostrum sic fabricatum est, ut indicet nos meliores esse quam bestias, et propterea Dei similes. Omnium enim animalium corpora, . . . in aquis, . . . in terra . . . in aere . . . inclinata sunt ad terram, et non sunt erecta sicut hominis corpus. Quo significatur, etiam animum nostrum in superna sua, id est, in aeterna spiritalia erectum esse debet. Ita intelligitur per animum maxime, adtestante etiam erecta corporis forma, homo factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei." Cf. *De Trinit.*, XII, 1, 1 (BAC 5:653 f), *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VI, 12, 22 (PL 34:348, CSEL 28, 1:185 f); *Lib.* 83 QQ., Q. 51, 3 (PL 40:33).

<sup>24</sup>*De Gen. ad Litt.*, III, 20 (PL 34:292, CSEL 28, 1:86-87), the entire passage reads, "Hic etiam illud non est praetereundum, quia, cum dixisset ad imaginem suam, statim subjunxit: et habeat potestatem piscium maris et volatilium caeli et caeterorum animalium expertum rationis, ut videlicet intelligamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei, in quo irrationalibus animantibus antecellit. Id autem est ipsa ratio vel mens vel intelligentia vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur." Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* XLVIII, 11, pars 2 (PL 36:564, CC,SL 38:574), "Vos autem, fratres, considerate vos homines factos ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Imago Dei intus est, non est in corpore, non est in auribus istis quas videtis, et oculis, et naribus, et palato et manibus et pedibus; sed est facta tamen, ubi est intellectus, ubi est mens, ubi ratio investigandae veritatis. . . ."

<sup>25</sup>*De Trinit.*, XII, 7, 12 (BAC 5:670), "Si ergo spiritu mentis nostrae renovamur, et ipse est novus homo qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit eum; nullum dubium est, non secundum corpus, neque secundum quamlibet animi partem, sed secundum rationalem mentem, ubi potest agnitio Dei, hominem factum ad imaginem ejus qui creavit eum."

<sup>26</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, *passim*; *De Gen. Lib. Impf.*, XVI, 55 (PL 34:214, CSEL 28, 1:497); *Contr. Faust.*, XXIV, 2 (PL 42:475, CSEL 25, 1:721); *De Gen. ad Litt.*, VI, 27 (PL 34:355-356); *Conf.* XIII, 22 (PL 32:859, CSEL 33:369); *De Spiritu et Litt.*, 28-48 (PL 44:230, CSEL 60:204 f), *Tract. in Ev. Joan.*, III, 4 (PL 35:1398, CC,SL 36:22), *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 2 (PL 41:317-318, CC,SL 48:322); *Retract.*, I, 26 (PL 32:626, CSEL 36:122).

<sup>27</sup>See E. Gilson, *Introduction a L'Etude. . . .*, p. 56, note (1); S. Grabowski, *The All-Present God*, 87-88; R. Tremblay, "La Theorie Psychologique de la Trinite chez Saint Augustin," *Etudes et Recherches, Cahiers de Theol. et Phil.*, VIII, (1952), 85-86.

<sup>28</sup>See M. C. D'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," 170-171; J. Burnaby, *Augustine: Later Works*, The Library of Christian Classics, VIII (The Westminster Press: 1955), 34. These references tend to support our view, but for a contrary opinion, cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 56, note (1), where the term "animus" is understood to designate the soul proper to man as a whole. Unquestionably Augustine uses the term in both ways, yet when speaking of the "mens" most formally as the site of the trinitarian image, he will often identify it with the "animus," and then it is to be considered as the highest part of the human soul. However, he is not consistent, as can be seen from the text cited in note (25) of this chapter.

<sup>29</sup>*De Trinit.*, XV, 1, 1 (BAC 5:828), ". . . iam pervenimus ad ejus imaginem quod est homo in eo quo ceteris animalibus antecellit, id est ratione vel intelligentia, et quidquid aliud de anima rationale vel intellectuali dici potest, quod pertinet ad eam rem quae mens vocatur vel

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animus. Quo nomine nonnulli auctores linguae latinae id quod excellit in homine, et non est in pecore, ab anima quae inest et pecori, suo quodam loquendi more distinguunt."

<sup>30</sup>*De Trinit.*, XV, 7, 11 (BAC 5:850), "Detracto corpore etiam, si sola anima cogitetur, aliquid ejus est mens, tamquam caput ejus, vel oculus, vel facies: sed non ut corpora cogitanda sunt. Non igitur anima, sed quod excellit in anima mens vocatur."

<sup>31</sup>Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 2 (PL 41:318, CC,SL 48:322), the entire passage reads, "At illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine caeteris quibus homo constat est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior. Cum enim rectissime intelligatur, vel si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei; profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori Deo, qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet. Sed quia ipsa mens, cui ratio et intelligentia naturaliter inest. . . ."

<sup>32</sup>*De Trinit.*, XII, 4, 4 (BAC 5:656 f), "Cum igitur disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo quae commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus."

<sup>33</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, X, 11, 17-22; XIV, 8-11, XV, *passim*. See also *C. Serm. Arian.*, 16 (PL 42:695); *Sermo LII*, 6 (PL 38:360).

<sup>34</sup>*De Trinit.*, XII, 3, 3 (BAC 5:656), "Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et femina, sic intellectum nostrum et actionem, vel consilium et executionem, vel rationem et appetitum rationalem, vel si quo alio modo significantius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur. . . ."

<sup>35</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "ex illa rationali nostrae mentis substantia. . . ."

<sup>36</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, XII, 1, 1 (BAC 5:645), ". . . sic animus qui sustantia spiritualis est. . . ."

<sup>37</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, XV, 27, 49 (BAC 5:938), ". . . ipsa mens cui quidam rerum invisibilium tributus est visus, et cui tamquam in loco superiori atque interiore honorabiliter praesedenti, diudicanda omnia nuntia etiam corporis sensus; et qua non est superior, cui subdita regenda est nisi Deus."

<sup>38</sup>See P. Henry, "Plotinus' Place in the History of Thought," *op. cit.*, xlvii-xlviii. The dying words of Plotinus are very revealing, "Strive to bring back the god in yourselves to the Divine in the universe," *Vita Plotini*, Porphyry, 2, 26.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. *Enneads*, I, 4, 5; VI, 9, 11, *transl. cit.*, 45; 624-625.

<sup>40</sup>*De Trinit.*, XII, 8, 13 (BAC 5:672), "Ascendentibus itaque introrsus quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animae partes, unde incipit aliquid occurrere, quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio, ubi homo interior iam possit agnosci."

<sup>41</sup>See C. O'Toole, *The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine*, 91-92. The reason Augustine prefers to use for the naturalness of the body and soul union is the desire the soul naturally has to be united with the body.

<sup>42</sup>*Cont. Faust.*, XXIV, 3 (PL 42:475, CSEL 25, 1:721), "Paulus quidem apostolus interiorem hominem per spiritum mentis, exteriorem vero in corpore atque ista mortali vita vult intelligi; non tamen utrumque horum simul duos homines eum dixisse, aliquando in ejus litteris legitur, sed unum, quem totum Deus fecerit, id est et id quod interius est, et id quod exterius est, sed eum non ad imaginem suam fecit, nisi secundum id quod interius est, non solum incorporeum, verum etiam rationale, quod pecoribus non inest. Non itaque unum hominem fecit ad imaginem

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suam, et alterum non fecit ad imaginem suam, sed quia hoc utrumque, interius et exterius, simul unus homo, hunc unum hominem ad imaginem suam fecit, non secundum id quod habet corpus corporalemque vitam, sed secundum id quod habet rationalem mentem. . . ."

<sup>43</sup>See H. Graef, "Image de Dieu et La Structure de L'Ame D'après Les Pères Grecs," *La Vie Spirituelle*, Suppl. 22, 15 Sept., 1952, 332; W. Burghardt, *The Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria*, 57-63, 139 f.

<sup>44</sup>*De Trinit.*, XII, 7, 12-8, 13 (BAC 5:670 f), "Sed quia ibi renovantur ad imaginem Dei, ubi sexus nullus est, ibi factus est homo ad imaginem Dei, ubi sexus nullus est, hoc est in spiritu mentis suae . . . Ergo in eorum mentibus communis natura cognoscitur. . . ." cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.*, XI, 42, 58 (PL 34:452-453, CSEL 28, 1:377).

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, XII, 7, 10 (BAC 5:666), "Ad imaginem Dei quippe naturam ipsam humanam factam dicit, quae sexu utroque completur. . . ."

<sup>46</sup>Cf. F. L. B. Cunningham, *The Indwelling of the Trinity*, 341-342, note (37).

<sup>47</sup>*De Trinit.*, XII, 11, 16 (BAC 5:676), "Honor enim hominis verus est imago et similitudo Dei, quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur."

<sup>48</sup>Cf. e.g., *ibid.*, XIV, 15, 21 (BAC 5:812); *De Spiritu et Litt.*, 28-48 (PL 44:230, CSEL 60:202).

<sup>49</sup>*De Spiritu et Litt.*, 28, 48 (PL 44:230, CSEL 60:202), ". . . non usque adeo in anima humana imago Dei affectuum labe detrita est, ut nulla in ea velut lineamenta extrema remanserint. . . . Nam sicut ipsa imago Dei renovatur in mente credentium per testamentum novum, quam non penitus impietas aboleverat (nam remanserat utique id quod anima hominis nisi esse rationalis non potest), ita etiam ibi lex Dei non ex omni parte deleta per injustitiam profecto scribitur renovata per gratiam." Cf. *De Trinit.*, XIV, 4, 6, cited in note (20), and *De Civ. Dei*, XXII, 24 in note (16) of this chapter.

<sup>50</sup>Cf. *Enarr. in Ps. CIII*, sermo 4, 2 (PL 37:1378-1379, CC,SL 40:1522); *Tract in Ep. Joan.*, VIII, 6 (PL 35:2039); *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 2 (PL 41:318, CC,SL 48:322); *Enarr. in Ps. CXVIII*, sermo 18, 4 (PL 37:1552-1553, CC,SL 40:1726); *De Civ. Dei*, XXII, 24 (PL 41:789, CC,SL 48:847 f); *Contra Iul.*, IV, 3 (PL 44:743-744); *De Trinit.*, XIV, 5, 7 (BAC 5:776); *ibid.*, XIV, 12, 15 (BAC 5:798 f).

<sup>51</sup>*De Trinit.* XIV, 4, 6 (BAC 5:776), ". . . ac per hoc si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, profecto ab initio quo esse coepit ista tam magna et mira natura, sive ita obsoleta sit haec imago, ut pene nulla sit, sive obscura atque deformis, sive clara et pulchra sit, semper est."

<sup>52</sup>See H. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique*, 364 f, and appendix, 567, article "Sapientia." See also S. Grabowski, *The All-Present God*, 273-276.

<sup>53</sup>*De Civ. Dei*, XXII, 24 (PL 41:789, CC,SL 48:847), ". . . non in eo tamen penitus extincta est quaedam velut scintilla rationis, in qua factus est ad imaginem Dei . . . Ipse itaque animae humanae mentem dedit, ubi ratio et intelligentia in infante sopita est quodammodo, quasi nulla sit, excitanda scilicet atque exserenda aetatis accessu, qua sit scientiae capax atque doctrinae, et habilis perceptioni veritatis et amoris boni: qua capacitate hauriat sapientiam virtutibusque sit praedita, quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, et iuste, adversus errores et caetera ingenerata



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vitia dimicet, eaque nullius rei desiderio nisi boni illius summi atque immutabilis vincat. Quod etsi non faciat, ipsa talium bonorum capacitas in natura rationali divinitus instituta quantum sit boni, quam mirabile opus Omnipotentis, quis competenter effatur, aut cogitat?"

<sup>54</sup>Cf. *Enarr. in Ps. CXXV*, 8 (PL 37:1760, CC, SL 40:1962), ". . . non incongruenter intelligimus sapientiam in cognitione et dilectione ejus quod semper est, atque incommutabiliter manet, quod Deus est." Cf. S. Grabowski, *op. cit.*, 276, where he concludes, "Wisdom, therefore embraces the intellect and will, understanding and volition, knowledge and love. In order to merit the name of wisdom, the functions of both of these faculties must have as their object that truth and that love which are directed toward the ultimate Truth and uncreated Charity."

<sup>55</sup>*De Trinit.*, XIV, 8, 11 (BAC 5:788), "Sed prius mens in se ipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps Dei, et in ea reperienda est imago ejus. Diximus enim etsi amissa participatione, absoletam atque deformem, Dei tamen imaginem permanere. Eo quippe ipso imago ejus est, quo ejus capax est, ejusque particeps esse potest; quod tam magnum bonum, nisi per hoc quod imago ejus est, non potest."

<sup>56</sup>*Contr. Jul.*, IV, 3, 15 (PL 44:744), "Bonam, dicis, hominum natura, quae talis gratiae opitulationem meretur. Quod gratanter audirem, si hoc propterea quia rationalis natura est diceres, neque enim gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum lapidibus, aut lignis pecoribusque praestatur: sed quia imago Dei est, meretur hanc gratiam; non tamen ut ejus bona voluntas possit praecedere praeter gratiam, nec vel ipsam prior det ut retribuat illi, ac si gratia iam non sit gratia, dum non datur gratuitas et redditur debita."

<sup>57</sup>*De Trinit.*, XIV, 14, 20 (BAC 5:808), ". . . qua in se imagine Dei tam potens est, ut ei cujus imago est valeat inhaerere."

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, XIV, 16, 22 (BAC 5:814), "Qui vero . . . convertuntur ad Dominum ab ea deformitate, qua per cupiditates saeculares conformabantur huic saeculo, reformantur ex illo, audientes Apostolum dicentem: Nolite conformari huic saeculo, sed reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae: ut incipiat illa imago ab illo reformari, a quo formata est. Non enim reformare se ipsam potest, sicut potuit deformare. Dicit etiam alibi: Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, eum qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis . . . Sed peccando, iustitiam et sanctitatem veritatis amisit; propter quod haec imago deformis et decolor facta est: hanc recipit, cum reformatur et renovatur."

<sup>59</sup>See V. Campanaga, "La Deificacion en la Soteriologia Agustiniana," *Augustinus Magister*, II, 745 f.

<sup>60</sup>*De Pecc. et Remiss.*, II, 9 (PL 44:156, CSEL 60:79 f).

<sup>61</sup>*De Trinit.*, XIV, 17, 23 (BAC 5:818), "Sane ista renovatio momento uno fit ipsius conversionis, sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo renovatio remissione omnium peccatorum: neque enim vel unum quantulumque remanet quod non remittatur . . . ita prima curatio est causam remove languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in renovatione huius imaginis."

<sup>62</sup>*Epist. CXL*, 3-4 (CSEL 44:26-27, PL 33:541-542), "Haec est gratia Novi Testamenti, quod in Vetere latuit, nec tamen figuris obumbrantibus prophetari pronuntiarique cessavit, ut intelligat anima Deum suum et gratia ejus renascatur illi. Haec quippe nativitas spiritalis est . . . adoptio vocatur . . . et ab hac generatione gratiae discernitur ille Filius, qui cum esset Filius Dei . . . Descendit ergo ille ut nos ascenderemus, et



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manens in natura sua factus est particeps naturae nostrae, ut nos manentes in natura nostra efficeremur participes naturae ipsius." Cf. *De Trinit.*, IV, 2, 4 (BAC 5:324), "Adjungens (verbum Dei) ergo nobis similitudinem humanitatis suae, abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostrae: et factus particeps mortalitatis nostrae, fecit nos participes divinitatis suae." Cf. also *In Ep. Joan.*, II, 14 (PL 35:1997).

<sup>63</sup>*Enarr. in Ps. XLIX*, 2 (PL 33:541-542, CC,SL 38:575 f), "Manifestum ergo, quia homines dixit deos, ex gratia sua deificatos, non de substantia sua natos. Ille enim justificat, qui per semetipsum non ex altero justus est; et ille deificat, qui per seipsum non alterius participatione Deus est; Qui autem justificat, ipse deificat, quia justificando, filius Dei facit. 'Dedit enim eis potestatem filii Dei fieri' (John 1:12). Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus, sed hoc gratiae adoptantis, non naturae generantis. Unicus enim Dei Filius. . . . Caetera qui fiunt dii, gratia ipsius fiunt. . . ."

<sup>64</sup>*De Pecc. et Remiss.*, II, 9 (PL 44:157, CSEL 60:79 f), "Profecto enim qui de die in diem adhuc renovatur, nondum totus est renovatus; et in quantum nondum est renovatus, in tantum adhuc in vestustate est. Proinde ex hoc quod adhuc in vetustate sunt, quamvis iam baptizati, ex hoc etiam adhuc sunt filii saeculi."

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 10 (PL 44:157, CSEL 60:80 f), "Adoptio ergo plena filiorum in redemptionem fiet etiam corporis nostri. Primitias itaque spiritus nunc habemus, unde iam filii Dei reipsa facti sumus; in caeteris vero spe sicut salvi, sicut innovati, ita et filii Dei; re autem ipsa quia nondum salvi, ideo nondum plene innovati, nondum etiam filii Dei, sed filii saeculi. Proficimus ergo in renovationem iustamque vitam. . . ."

<sup>66</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Nunc ergo et ei similes esse jam coepimus, primitias habentes spiritus; et adhuc dissimiles sumus, per reliquias vetustatis. Proinde in quantum similes, intantum regenerante spiritu filii Dei; in quantum dissimiles autem, in tantum filii carnis et saeculi. Illinc ergo peccare non possumus: hinc vero si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipimus; donec totum transeat in adoptionem, et non sit peccator. . . ."

<sup>67</sup>See P. Henry, *Plotin et L'Occident*, 104 f, also S. Connolly, "The Platonism of St. Augustine's 'Ascent' to God," *Irish Eccles. Record*, 78 (1952), 44-53; 80 (1953), 28-36.

<sup>68</sup>*De Quant. Animae*, 28, 55 (PL 32:1067), "Quod omnino fieri potest, nisi ad eius reformemur imaginem. . . . Hac autem actione nihil mihi videtur operosius, et nihil est cessationi similis; neque tamen eam suscipere aut implere animus potest, nisi eo ipso adiuvante cui redditur. Unde fit ut homo eius clementia reformandus sit, cuius bonitate ac potestate formatus est."

<sup>69</sup>*De Trinit.*, VII, 3, 5 (BAC 5:472).

<sup>70</sup>*Loc. cit.*, (BAC 5:470-472), "Cuius imaginis exemplo et nos non discedamus a Deo, quia et nos imago Dei sumus. . . . Nos autem nitentes imitamur manentem, et sequimur stantem, et in ipso ambulantes tendimus ad ipsum: quia factus est nobis via temporalis per humilitatem, quae mansio nobis aeterna est per divinitatem. Quoniam quippe spiritibus mundis intellectualibus qui superbia non lapsi sunt, in forma Dei et Deo aequalis et Deus praebet exemplum: ut se idem exemplum redeundi etiam lapsos praeberet homini, qui propter immunditiam peccatorum poenamque mortalitatis Deum videre non poterat, semetipsum exinanivit, non mutando divinitatem suam, sed nostram mutabilitatem assumendo; et formam servi

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accipiens, venit ad nos in hunc mundum, qui in hoc mundo erat, quia mundus per eum factus est; ut exemplum sursum videntibus Deum, exemplum deorsum mirantibus hominem, exemplum sanis ad permanendum, exemplum infirmis ad convalescendum, exemplum morituris ad non timendum, exemplum mortuis ad resurgendum esset, in omnibus ipse primum tenens."

<sup>71</sup>Cf. *De Vera Relig.*, 16, 32 (PL 34:135).

<sup>72</sup>Cf. *De Gratia et Lib. Arb.*, 1 (PL 44:880).

<sup>73</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 4 (PL 44:885-886).

<sup>74</sup>Cf. *De Spiritu et Litt.*, 52 (PL 44:233, CSEL 60:208).

<sup>75</sup>*De Gratia et Lib. Arb.*, 33 (PL 44:901), "Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur: tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus."

<sup>76</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, IX, 11, 16 (BAC 5:564) "Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus; sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia nec tamen eum novimus, quantum ipse."

<sup>77</sup>Cf. *De Morib. Ecc. Cath.*, I, 13, 23 (PL 32:1321), "Fit ergo per charitatem ut conformemur Deo et ex eo conformati atque configurati, et circumcisi ab hoc mundo, non confundamur cum iis quae nobis debent esse subjecta." Cf. *In Ep. Joan.*, II, 9, (PL 35:1993).

<sup>78</sup>*Epist.* XCII, 3 (PL 33:319, CSEL 34, 2:438 f), "Dilectissimi, inquit, filii Dei sumus et nondum apparet quod erimus. Scimus quia, cum appuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. In tantum ergo videbimus, in quantum similes erimus, quia et nunc in tantum non videbimus, in quantum dissimiles sumus . . . quis autem dementissimus dixerit corpore nos vel esse vel futuros esse similes Deo? In interiore igitur homine ista similitudo. . . . Et tanto efficimur similiores illi, quanto magis in ejus cognitione et caritate proficimus." Cf. *Enarr. In Ps. LXX*, pars 2, 6 (PL 36:895 f, CC,SL 39:964).

<sup>79</sup>This is a fundamental point of view in the thought of the Doctor Caritatis. It appears in his letters, sermons, in his commentaries on the psalms; it is the basic theme of the *Confessions*; it is developed at length in the latter half of the *De Trinitate*, and it is on the basis of the love of God that the monumental *De Civitate Dei* is erected. For a more objective view of the principle in action, cf. *De Mor. Ecc. Cath.*, I, cc. 11-26 (PL 32:1319-1332).

<sup>80</sup>Cf. *De Morib. Ecc. Cath.*, I, 14, 24 (PL 32:1321-1322), "Id est solus Deus cui haerere certe non valemus, nisi dilectione, amore, charitate."

<sup>81</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 15, 25 (PL 32:1322) where the cardinal virtues are defined in relation to love.

<sup>82</sup>Cf. *Conf.* VII, 10 (PL 32:742, CSEL 33:157); *Enarr. In Ps. XCIV*, 2 (PL 37:1217, CC,SL 39:1331 f).

<sup>83</sup>Cf. *Tract in Ev. Joan.*, XXIII, 10 (PL 35:1588-1589, CC,SL 36:239 f).

<sup>84</sup>Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XV, 22 (PL 41:467, CC,SL 48:488), ". . . unde mihi videtur quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis, ordo est amoris. . . ."

<sup>85</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CLXVII, 4, 15 (PL 33:739, CSEL 44:602); *De Mor. Ecc. Cath.*, I, 15, 25 (PL 32:1322).

<sup>86</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CLXVII, 5, 16 (PL 33:739-740, CSEL 44:604); *De Mor. Ecc. Cath.*, I, 26, 48 (PL 32:1331-1332).

<sup>87</sup>Cf. *De Quant. Animae*, 33, 73-74 (PL 32:1075-1076).

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<sup>88</sup>Cf. *De Mor. Ecc. Cath.*, I, 26, 48 (PL 32:1331), “. . . non fieri enim potest ut seipsum, qui Deum diligit, non diligit: imo vero solus se novit diligere, qui Deum diligit.”

<sup>89</sup>Cf. *De Trinit.*, XV, 23, 44 (BAC 5:922); *Tract. in Ev. Joan.*, XXIII, 10 (PL 35:1588, CC, SL 36:239 f), “Sed relinque foris et vestem tuam et carnem tuam descende in te ad secretarium tuum, mentem tuam, et ibi vide quod volo dicere, si potueris. Si enim tu ipse a te longe es, Deo propinquare unde potes? Dicebam de Deo: et intellecturum te arbitraris: de animo dico, de te dico; intelligo, ibi te probabo. Non enim valde longe pergo in exemplar, quando de mente tua volo aliquam similitudinem dare ad Deum tuum; quia utique non in corpore, sed in ipsa mente factus est homo ad imaginem Dei. In similitudine sua Deum quaeramus, in imagine sua Creatorem agnoscamus.”

<sup>90</sup>Cf. *Conf.* IX, 10 (PL 32:774, CSEL 33:216 f), “Cumque ad eum finem perduceretur, ut carnalium sensuum delectatio quantalibet, in quantalibet loco corporeo, prae illius vitae iucunditate, non comparatione, sed ne commemoratione quidem digna videretur: ergentes nos ardentius affectu in idipsum, perambulamus gradatim cuncta corporalia, et ipsum coelum. . . . Et adhuc ascendebamus interius cogitando, et loquendo, et mirando opera tua; et venimus in mentes nostras, et transcendimus eas ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis Israel in aeternum veritatis pabulo, et ubi vita sapientia est, per quam fiunt omnia ista. . . . Et dum loquimur et inhiamus illi *atingimus eam modice toto ictu cordis*. . . .” The very same process (the platonic dialectic) is practiced by Augustine earlier in the *Confessiones*, VII, 17 (PL 32:745, CSEL 33:162 f), and with the same result apparently: some experiencing of God, “Et pervenit ad id quod est, *in ictu trepidantis aspectus*.”

<sup>91</sup>Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* CXLV, 5 (PL 37:1887-1888, CC, SL 40:2108 f), “Quibusdam enim perturbationibus ex quadam sui parte fluitabat, ex quadam vero parte quam vocant mentem rationalem, illa qua cogitat sapientiam, inhaerens Donino iam et suspirans in illum, animadvertit quasdam suas inferiores partes perturbari motibus secularibus, et cupiditate quadam terrenorum desideriorum ire in exteriora, relinque interiorem, *revocat se ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora*, et dicit: lauda anima mea Dominum . . . iam ergo diu occupata vixisti, et desideriorum diversitate verberata portas plagas, saucia divisa per amores multas, ubique inquieta, nusquam secura, colligere ad teipsam quidquid tibi foris placebat, *quaere quem habeat auctorem*. Nil melius in terra. . . . Non occuperis in eo quod factum est et recedas ab illo qui fecit. Haec enim quibus occuparis sub te fecit, quia sub seipso te fecit. *Si haerebis superiori, calcabis inferiora*; si autem recedes a superiori, ista tibi in supplicium convertentur. Sic enim factum est, fratres mei: accepit homo corpus tamquam in famulatum, Deum autem dominum habens: servum corpus, habens supra se Conditorum, infra se quod sub illo conditum est, in medio quodam loco rationalis anima constituta est, legem accepit *haerere superiori, regere inferiorem. Regere non potest inferiorem nisi regatur a meliore*. Trahitur ab inferiore, deseruit ergo meliorem. Non potest regere quod regebat quia regi noluit a quo regatur . . . Itaque *colligit se ad sanitatem*.”

A basic augustinian methodological principle is expressed in the words, “ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora.” Augustine will use this method when demonstrating the existence of God; he uses this method in arriving at some experiencing of the presence of God (cf. note 90), and finally here he proposes it as a program for life and daily living. This methodological principle permeates the writings of



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Augustine (and his life), and it reveals both his marvelous simplicity and profundity at one time.

<sup>92</sup>The different expressions used here are some of the descriptions which occur in the writings of Augustine. For the different maxims, cf. *De Sermo Domini*, I, 1-4 (PL 34:1229-1235); different ages and stages, cf. *De Vera Religione*, 26, 48-49 (PL 34:143); the different degrees of the soul, cf. *De Quantit. Animae*, 33, 70-77 (PL 32:1073-1077); different steps, cf. *De Doct. Christ.*, II, 25, 116 (PL 34:48).

<sup>93</sup>*De Trinit.*, XIV, 17, 23 (BAC 5:818), "Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renovatur de die in diem. Renovatur autem in agnitione Dei, hoc est, in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis; sicut sese habent apostolica testimonia quae paulo ante commemoravi. In agnitione igitur Dei, iustitiaeque et sanctitate veritatis, qui de die in diem proficiendo renovatur, transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a visibilibus ad intelligibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritualia; atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere, illisque se charitate alligare diligenter insistit. Tantum autem facit, quantum divinitus adiuvatur."

<sup>94</sup>*De Sermo Domini*, I, 4, 12 (PL 34:1235), "Pacificis Dei similitudo, tamquam perfecte sapientibus formatisque ad imaginem Dei per regenerationem renovati hominis."

<sup>95</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Et ista quidem in hac vita possunt compleri, sicut completa esse in Apostolis credimus."

<sup>96</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 2, 9 (PL 34:1233), "In pace perfectio est, ubi nihil repugnat; et ideo filii Dei pacifici, quoniam nihil resistit Deo, et utique filii similitudinem patris habere debent. Pacifici autem in semetipsis sunt, qui omnes animi sui motus componentes et subicientes rationi, id est, menti et spiritui, carnalesque concupiscentias habentes edomitas, fiunt regnum Dei: in quo ita sunt ordinata omnia, ut id quod est in homine praecipuum et excellens, hoc imperet caeteris non reluctantibus, quae sunt nobis bestiisque communia; atque idipsum quod excellit in homine, id est, mens et ratio, subiciatur potiori, quod est ipsa veritas unigenitus Filius Dei. Neque enim imperare inferioribus potest, nisi superiori se ipse subiciat. Et haec est pax quae datur in terra hominibus bonae voluntatis; haec vita consummati perfectique sapientis."

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 4, 11 (PL 34:1235), "Sapientia congruit pacificis, in quibus iam ordinata sunt omnia, nullusque motus adversum rationem rebellis est, sed cuncta obtemperant spiritui hominis, cum et ipse obtemperet Deo. . . ."

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 3, 10 (PL 34:1234), "Postremo est septima, ipsa sapientia, id est contemplatio veritatis, pacificans totum hominem, et suscipiens similitudinem Dei. . . ."

<sup>99</sup>*Retract.*, I, 19, 1 (PL 32:614, CSEL 36:88), "Non enim cuiquam provenire in hac vita potest, ut lex repugnans legi mentis omnino non sit in membris. Quandoquidem etiam si ei sic resisteret spiritus hominis, ut in nullum ejus laberetur assensum. . . ."

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 19, 2 (PL 32:614, CSEL 36:89), ". . . non sicut complenda sunt illi quam speramus pace plenissima, quando dicitur: ubi est, mors, contentio tua?"

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 7, 4 (PL 32:593, CSEL 36:31), ". . . ne forte putaretur charitatem Dei non futuram esse majorem, quando videbimus facie ad faciem." It may be wondered if these later qualifications of Augustine were necessary purely because of an excess in vigorous language. We do not think so, for the whole of his early view of man and the image was exaggerated. His first view of the image in man was that it had



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been lost by original sin, and his early conception of the restoration of the image tends to achieve the other extreme, for it is almost totally restored except for immortality. Part of his difficulty is his tendency to give a literal interpretation of a scriptural passage (cf. Luke 20:34-37) equating man with the angels. The creation of the soul, at least the soul of Adam, apparently is identical with that of the angels. The restoral is to the state of the angels, though the body will share in this. The expression *nulla natura interjecta* signifies some equality with the angels, and, it is interesting to note, Augustine nowhere, to our knowledge, speaks of the angel as an image of God, though this would certainly follow from his principles. His early view is that no other nature is more excellent than the soul, "and if sometimes any of these is more excellent, then it is the result of sin, not of nature" (*De Quant. Animae*, 34, 78 [PL 32:1078]), and he expressly includes the angels in this early opinion.

This view is modified gradually, and in his later works "man's nature . . . was to be a mean between the angelic and bestial," cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XII, 21 (PL 41:372, CC,SL 48:377) is his opinion. In the developing of his thought Augustine abandons earlier extremes, and allows a greater and greater role to the body of man (and concomitantly a lesser control of the body by the spirit), a position quite sharply in contrast with some of his earliest statements.

<sup>102</sup>*De Sermo Domini*, I, 4, 12 (PL 34:1235), "Mundis corde facultas videndi Deum, tamquam purum oculum ad intelligenda aeterna gerentibus. . . ."

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 2, 8 (PL 34:1233), ". . . et quemadmodum lumen hoc videri non potest nisi oculis mundis, ita nec Deus videtur nisi mundum sit illud quo videri potest."

<sup>104</sup>Cf. *Sermo* LIII (de beat.), 7 (PL 38:367), "Nam si accensus desiderio videndi Deum, faciem tuam preparaveris corporalem ad videndum; talem faciem desiderabis et Dei . . . Ubi enim sedem habet Deus, nisi ubi habitat? Ubi autem habitat, nisi in templo suo? Templum enim Dei sanctum est, quod estis vos. Videte ergo quomodo excipias Deum. Spiritus est Deus; in spiritu et veritate oportet adorare Deum. Iam in cor tuum, si placet, intret arca testamenti, et ruat Dagon. Audi ergo nunc, et discite Deum desiderare, discite unde Deum videre possis praeparare. Beati, inquit, mundi cordes, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Quid praeparas oculos corporis? Si sic videbitur, in loco erit quod videbitur. Non est in loco qui ubique totus est. *Munda unde videatur.*"

<sup>105</sup>Cf. *Ibid.*, 10-12 (PL 38:368-370), "Fides enim nostra mundat cor . . . Sed qua fide, quali fide, nisi quam definit Paulus apostolus, ubi ait: Fides quae per dilectionem operatur . . . Quae per dilectionem operatur, sperat quod Deus pollicetur. Nihil ista definitione perpensus, nihil perfectius. Necesse est ut in quo est fides quae per dilectionem operatur, speret quod Deus pollicetur."

<sup>106</sup>*Enarr. In Ps.* XLVIII, 11 (2a pars), (PL 36:564, CC, SL 38:574), "Imago Dei intus est, non est in corpore, . . . sed est facta tamen, ubi est intellectus, ubi est mens, ubi est ratio investigandae veritatis, ubi est fides, ubi est spes vestra, ubi caritas vestra, ibi habet Deus imaginem suam."

<sup>107</sup>Cf. *Epist.* XCII, 3 (CSEL 34, 2:439 f, PL 33:319) cited in note (78) of this chapter.

<sup>108</sup>*Sermo* LIII, 6 (PL 38:366 f), "Ventum est ad mundi cordes, ibi visio Dei promissa est. Non sine causa, nisi quia ibi sunt oculi, unde videtur

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Deus. De his oculis Paulus apostolus loquens ait: Illuminatos oculos cordis vestri. Modo ergo oculi isti pro infirmitate sua illuminatur fide: postea pro sua firmitate illuminabuntur specie. Quamdiu enim sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino, Per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem. Quamdiu autem in hac fide sumus, quid de nobis dicitur? Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem." The two passages from St. Paul which appear here are used constantly by Augustine in his writings. They appear in his *Confessions* after the recounting of his own mystical experiences, and in his *Christian Doctrine* when he is speaking of the highest grade of the knowledge of God in this life. See G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, 191, note (18) for some of the literature on this aspect of Augustine's thought.

<sup>109</sup>*De Trinit.*, XV, 23, 44 (BAC 5:922), ". . . per quod speculum et in quo aenigmate qui vident, sicut in hac vita videre concessum est, non illi sunt qui ea quae digessimus et commendavimus in sua mente conspiciunt; sed illi qui eam tamquam imaginem vident, ut possint ad eum cuius imago est, quomodocumque referre quod vident, et per imaginem quam conspiciendo vident, etiam illud videre conjiendo, quoniam nondum possint facie ad faciem." Augustine specifies this medium more closely as love or charity, a consistent view of his; cf. *In Ep. Joan.*, V, 7 (PL 35:2016); *De Trinit.*, VIII, 7, 10 f (BAC 5:526 f).

<sup>110</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CLXXXVII, 16-17 (PL 33:837-838), "Unde fatendum est ubique esse Deum per divinitatis praesentiam, sed non ubique per habitationis gratiam. . . . Cum igitur qui ubique est, non in omnibus habitat; etiam in quibus habitat, non aequaliter habitat. Nam unde est illud quod Elisaeus poposcit ut dupliciter in eo fieret Spiritus Sanctus qui erat Elia, et unde in omnibus sanctis sunt alii aliis sanctiores, nisi abundantius habendo habitorem Dei? Quomodo ergo verum supra diximus quod Deus est ubique totus, quando in aliis est amplius, in aliis minus? Sed non est negligenter intuendum quod diximus, in seipso esse ubique totum. Non ergo in eis quia alii plus capiant eum, alii minus. Ideo enim ubique esse dicitur, quia nulla parte rerum absens est; ideo totus quia non parte alteram partem suam presentem praebet, et altera alteram partem, aequalis aequalibus, minori vero minorem, majorique majorem; sed non solum universitate creaturae, verum etiam cuilibet parti ejus totus pariter adest. *Hique ab eo longe esse dicuntur, qui peccando dissimilimi facti sunt; et hi ei propinquare, qui ejus similitudinem pie vivendo recipiunt.* Sicut recte dicuntur oculi tanto esse ab hac luce longius, quanto fuerint caeciores. Quod enim tam longe est a luce quam caecitas, etiamsi lux praesto sit, atque oculos perfundat extinctos? Propinquare autem luce merito prohibentur oculi, qui sanitatis accessu aciem recipiendo proficiunt."

<sup>111</sup>Cf. note (97) of Chapter One.

<sup>112</sup>*De Trinit.*, XIV, 17, 23 (BAC 5:818-820), "In hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit Dei similitudo, quando Dei perfecta erit visio. De qua dicit apostolus Paulus: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem."

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*, XIV, 18, 24 (BAC 5:820), "Apostolus autem Joannes: Dilectissimi, inquit, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit, quid erimus: scimus autem quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri ejus plenam similitudinem, quando ejus plenam perceperit visionem."

<sup>114</sup>Cf. *Conf.* XII, 13 (PL 32:832, CSEL 33:320).

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<sup>115</sup>*De Doctr., Christ., I, 38, 42 (PL 34:35), "Sed fidei succedit species, quam videbimus; et spei succedit beatitudo ipsa, ad quam perventuri sumus: charitas autem etiam istis decedentibus augebitur potius. Si enim credendo diligimus quod nondum videmus, quanto magis eum videre coepimus? et si sperando diligimus quo nondum pervenimus, quanto magis eum pervenerimus?"*

<sup>116</sup>*Cf. De Civ. Dei, XXII, 30 (PL 41:801 f, CC, SL 48:863 f).*

<sup>117</sup>*Cf. De Corrept. et Grat., XII, 33 (PL 44:936).*

## CHAPTER THREE:

# VESTIGES OF THE TRINITY

At a very early date in his writings Augustine takes note of the trinitarian reflections to be observed in every creature, the "vestiges" of the Trinity in the universe, but it is only gradually that he arrives at what is called the psychological image of the Trinity in man. Fourteen years elapse after his conversion before mention is made of this psychological trinity, and then the appearance is a brief one. It will be another decade or so before this trinity receives its full and definitive elaboration in the latter part of the *De Trinitate*. Here, in this work, is the peak of the development of his insight with regard to the trinitarian image. After this work he is content to repeat aspects of the psychological trinity in a brief way, and without new insights.<sup>1</sup> The principal matter for our discussion of the image of the Trinity in man must be from the *De Trinitate*.

In this work, however, Augustine becomes involved in a complicated platonic and dialectical order which consists, in theory, in proceeding from the exterior to the interior in man, and then from the lower to the higher of the interior. It is only when we arrive at the "inner man" and then when the trinity of the inner man is concerned with the highest objects that we meet the augustinian trinitarian image. Many psycho-



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logical trinities are found by Augustine in his analysis of man's operations and at different levels of operation, but those which do not attain to the requirements he lays down for an image are referred to, at times, as "vestiges" of the Trinity in man. It is these deficient psychological trinities in man which will constitute the main subject of this chapter, though perhaps Augustine would not agree that the label of "vestige" of the Trinity should be applied without qualification to all of them equally.

Before considering these trinities it will be worthwhile first to see something of the trinitarian reflections in every creature, as Augustine conceives them. The developing of his teaching about the trinitarian image in man has roots in the more universal augustinian doctrine about the resemblances, or "vestiges," of the Trinity in every creature. This chapter then will begin with the trinitarian reflections in general, though a few remarks about the platonic sources of this theme are considered as a necessary introduction.

### THE PLATONIC CURRENTS

The thought of Augustine is markedly platonic in outline, as we have seen in a brief way, and the judgment of St. Thomas Aquinas to the effect that the great African Father "was imbued with platonism" is echoed by all the moderns. What then of the Christian God who is a Trinity of Persons? Has Augustine found a counterpart to the Trinity in neo-platonic thought? Enthused by his first contact with an intellectual system which enabled him to overcome many conceptual difficulties, Augustine, in youthful excess, will exaggerate the similarities of platonism to the Christian teaching. He found there, in the *Enneads* of Plotinus, he asserts, the very same teaching as is expressed in the opening verse of the Gospel according to St. John.<sup>2</sup> He will continue to maintain the opinion that the Father and the Son could be seen in the writings of these philosophers, but he is certain they were not familiar with the Holy Spirit. "They

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philosophized," he remarks, "without the Holy Spirit, although they were acquainted with the Father and the Son."<sup>3</sup>

In an early work he can optimistically declare that the platonists "with the change of a few words and sentiments would become Christians"; yet it seems that he was always aware that the Spirit of God was not to be found, in any true sense, in their writings.<sup>4</sup> The three hypostases of neo-platonism, either as proposed by Plotinus, or, with some differences, by Porphyry, are not the Christian Trinity of Persons for Augustine.<sup>5</sup> To equate such an hypostasis as the *Nous* of Plotinus with the *Logos* of God called for considerable alteration in the features of the former by Augustine, and is to be attributed, most probably, to the intellectual and emotional state of the young catechumen, and to the fact that he read the *Enneads* when already a Christian. The differences between the third neo-platonic hypostasis and the Holy Spirit are too pronounced to be glossed over even by the impetuous ardor of the young convert.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, Augustine could find among the platonists a synthesis of the triple causal role of God, the principle of things. They knew, Augustine can report late in life, that the one God was "the author of the entire universe, the bestower of all understanding, and the source of love by which a good and happy life is lived."<sup>7</sup> In the *Enneads*, as in other neo-platonic writings, the triple causal influence is distributed among the different hypostases in various ways, and undoubtedly Augustine was familiar with this aspect of plotinian thought.

The three plotinian hypostases are, roughly, the three Gods or Absolutes of the three great philosophies which preceded the neo-platonist, platonism, aristotelianism, stoicism, though transformed in a basically platonic frame of reference. Among the three hypostases which are not only distinct, but separate and unequal, Plotinus distributed many of the attributes which Christianity refers to the Triune God. The One is the source of all things; the Intellect (*Nous*) is the seat of self-thought, of

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the unchanging Ideas, and the source of illumination; the Universal Soul (*Psyche*) is the seat of Providence, though more of an immanent and necessary order in the evolution of beings and events, than a personal and voluntary power.<sup>8</sup>

There is no need to make Plotinus the unique source of the triple causality and its distribution which Augustine uses, as this feature was part of the common philosophical currency of the times. Moreover, something of the same causality is to be seen in the writings of many of the Fathers, where it is associated with the Trinity of Persons. Augustine assigns this triple causal influence either to the one God, or attributes one of the causal roles to the individual Persons who are the one God on the basis of the special attributions to the distinct Persons. This facet of augustinian thought appears in the earliest works, and becomes one of its predominant characteristics.

### THE TRINITARIAN REFLECTIONS IN GENERAL

The compression of this feature of augustinian thought into several pages of summary is a hazardous venture. Augustine finds trinitarian reflections everywhere, as is evident from the sheer number of the trinitarian formulae in his works.<sup>9</sup> The reason for the many and varied trinitarian reflections in creatures is the triple causal influence of God, which is attributed by Augustine to the Persons of the Trinity. Manifestly nothing is removed from the causality of God, and so nothing escapes bearing within itself an impress of this triple causality, though its brilliance will vary with the type of creature involved. The whole of the universe, the whole of nature and its operations, reveal a Triune God to Augustine.

Aside from the universal Christian teaching that the Creator is a Trinity of Persons, Augustine uses, principally, two texts from Scripture as warrant for his position that there is a trinitarian reflection in every creature.<sup>10</sup> A text which appears in his earliest works and innumerable times after that is one from

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St. Paul, "For from him and through him and in him are all things" (Rom. 11:36).<sup>11</sup> This text, a favorite of the eastern Fathers, enables Augustine to synthesize the triple causal role of the first principle found among the philosophers with the Christian teaching about the creator of all things who is a Trinity of Persons.<sup>12</sup> God the Father made all things through the Word (cf. John 1:3) and in the Holy Spirit (cf. 1 John 4:13; 1 Thes. 1:5).

Let us not heed those who say there is only the Father who has no Son and with whom there is no Holy Spirit; but that the same Father is sometimes called the Son, sometimes called the Holy Spirit. These heretics do not understand the First Principle from whom all things have their existence; or his Image, through whom all things have been made; or his Sanctifier, in whom all things are made subject to order.<sup>13</sup>

The text from St. Paul, which we have just seen, is used by Augustine as basic confirmation for the association of the triple causal influence of God with the distinct Persons of the Trinity. There is another text from Scripture which he uses as confirmation of his opinion that there is a reflection of the triple causality in every creature, "He has disposed all things in measure, number, and weight" (Wis. 11:20). This formula with its obvious relation to corporeal things is at the foundation of other formulae which Augustine prefers to use when finding a trinitarian reflection on all levels of being. The latter formulae, "unity, species, order," or, in a slightly different form, "mode, species (form), order," are analogous applications of the "measure, weight, number" formula to beings which are not purely material.<sup>14</sup>

In a passage from the *Contra Faustum* Augustine recapitulates the entire universe of beings according to these formulae.

From God we derive the beginning of existence, the principle of knowledge, the law of loving; from God all animals, rational and irrational, derive the nature by which they live, the power by which they sense, the motion by which they are appetitive; from God also all bodies derive the measure by which they



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subsist, their number by which they are beautified, their weight by which they are ordered.<sup>15</sup>

In the passage just cited Augustine relates the three-fold characteristic of each being to the one God, and distinguished according to the different grades of beings in the universe. In the following passage he relates the triple reflection to the Trinity of Persons, noting that creation is a work of the entire Trinity, and finds the same more general trinitarian reflection in every being.<sup>16</sup>

When this Trinity is known as it can be known in this life, it is perceived, without any doubt, that every creature, intellectual, animal, corporeal derives such existence as it has from that same creative Trinity, has its own species and is subject to the most perfect order. It is not as if the Father were understood to have made one part of creation, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another, but the Father through the Son in the Gift of the Holy Spirit together made all things and each individual thing. For every thing, substance, essence, nature, or whatever better word there may be, possesses at once these three qualities: It is a particular thing; it is distinguished from other things by its own species; and it does not transgress the order of nature.<sup>17</sup>

In a passage from a work of Augustine's maturity (*the De Trinitate*) the expression *vestigia Trinitatis* appears, and again a distinction among the different general classes of beings.

All these things therefore, which are made by the divine art, show in themselves a certain unity, and species, and order. For each of them is both one particular thing, as are the natures of bodies and the dispositions (*ingenia*) of souls; and is formed in some species, as are the figures and qualities of bodies and the learnings or skills of souls; and seeks or maintains some order, as are the weights or combinations of bodies, or the loves and the delights of souls. We must then understand as Creator, gathering understanding from the things which have been made, the Trinity of whom there appear vestiges in the creature, as is fitting. For in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things, and the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight.<sup>18</sup>

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In the monumental *City of God* Augustine extends the reflections of the triple causality to be found among creatures. The sciences now are seen to be triple also, distinguished on the basis of the trinitarian reflections. The three sciences are first physics dealing with the nature of things, logic treating of the way of attaining truth, and finally ethics which treats of the good to which man's actions ought to tend.<sup>19</sup> Much earlier Augustine had seen the triple reflection flowing from the three-fold causality as the basis for the three scientific questions, *utrum omnino sit*, *utrum hoc an aliud sit*, *utrum approbandum improbandumve*.<sup>20</sup>

Augustine ranges far and wide with his trinitarian formulae representing the trinitarian reflections in creatures. At the basis of this teaching is another remarkably simple, consistent, and unified view of the relations between the Creator who is a Trinity of Persons and the creature. The formulae may vary, but the basic notes, as the total view, remain the same. The first member of the triads refers to the unity, limit, or termination of the creature expressed in its existence, subsistence, or being. The second member of the augustinian triads is associated with the distinction, species, or form of the creature which concomitantly bears with it beauty, imitation of the divine, and truth. The third member of the triads is associated with the effecting of order through movement, which takes on the forms of weight, appetite, love, and is in the order of the good.<sup>21</sup>

The first characteristic of the creature can be associated with the Person of the Father, who is the *principium deitatis*. The work of creation (and concursus) is common to the Trinity, but only the Father among the Persons is *principium sine principio*, and so he is referred to as the principle and origin of the existence, subsistence, and unity of creatures. The Second Person of the Trinity is the *Logos*, the fullness of the divine ideas, the species or form expressing the divine pattern among things, the image perfectly expressing the Father, truth and

beauty itself resulting from this perfect expression. Clearly the second member of the augustinian triads can be referred to the Son of God. The final characteristic of the creature which belongs primarily in the realm of motion is reflective of the personal property of the Spirit who is the Love of the Trinity uniting the Father and Son, and so considered to be the cosmic principle of motion and unity.

The effect of the triple causality of the Creator varies with the natures of the creatures involved, and so with respect to man the concentration is on his properly human side, the rational and intellectual nature. "I worship one God, the principle of all things, and his wisdom who makes every soul wise, and his gift whereby all the blessed are blessed."<sup>22</sup> Christ is the inner teacher of the soul, for he is the Word and the Wisdom of the Father. The Spirit is the greatest of the gifts of God who sanctifies and moves the soul, for he is the love and gift of the Father and Son. With regard to man Augustine develops the notion of the triple causality of God in this way:

Wherefore it is fitting for us to retain and to worship the Gift of God, equally unchangeable with the Father and the Son, a Trinity of one substance. We worship one God from whom, through whom, and in whom we have our being, from whom we fell away, becoming unlike him, by whom we have not been allowed to perish, the principle to which we have recourse, the form we imitate, the grace whereby we are reconciled. We worship one God by whom we are made and his likeness by whom we are formed for unity, and his peace whereby we cleave to unity.<sup>23</sup>

The triple causality of God with respect to the intellectual creature continues in heaven, as Augustine sees it in his *City of God*.

. . . the whole Trinity is intimated in its works. In this, too, is the origin, the enlightenment (*informatio*), the blessedness of the holy city which is among the holy angels. For if we inquire whence it is, God built it; or whence it is wise, God illumined it; whence it is happy, God is its enjoyment:

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subsisting by him it has its form, contemplating him its enlightenment, adhering to him its joy; it is, it sees, it loves; its life is in God's eternity, its light in God's truth, its joy in God's goodness.<sup>24</sup>

The triple causality of the one God with respect to the intellectual creature can be summed up in an augustinian dictum which had great influence on the Middle Ages: the one God is the *causa subsistendi* (*essendi*), *ratio intelligendi*, *et ordo vivendi*.<sup>25</sup> Despite the relatively early perception of this principle, or one very similar to it, Augustine does not find a psychological trinity in man until the writing of the latter part of the *Confessions*, and it does not receive any true exposition until the writing of the latter part of the *De Trinitate*, a decade later.<sup>26</sup> We might, not unreasonably, ask the reason for this fact. The relating of the trinity of *esse*, *nosse*, *velle*, as found in the *Confessions*, to the principle that the one God is the *causa essendi*, *ratio intelligendi*, *et ordo vivendi* demands no great mental gymnastics.

The answer, it seems to us, lies in Augustine's use of the triple causal principle. The trinitarian reflections he finds are not immediately related to the Persons as exemplars, but to the triple causality attributed to the Persons. Up to the time when he first perceives something approaching a psychological trinity in man, Augustine finds the trinitarian reflection even in man to be principally in the ontological order.<sup>27</sup> When this reflection does touch the psychological order, as it clearly does, it is related immediately to the efficiency and activity of the Persons concerned and to their inner properties only insofar as these are expressed in this causality.

The reason for this view is Augustine's understanding of the principle which states that God is the *causa essendi*, *ratio intelligendi*, *et ordo vivendi*. The temptation must be resisted of seeing in this principle when it is attributed to the Persons any division of efficient, exemplary, and final causality. Ef-



ficient causality is not to be attributed to the Father alone, nor exemplary causality to the Son and final causality to the Spirit exclusively.<sup>28</sup> Augustine's theories of illumination, attributed to the Son, and of the operations of love and grace, attributed to the Spirit, find their foundation in the principle that God is the *ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi*. The Spirit, in the view of Augustine, is the cosmic principle of motion effecting the order in the universe. The Son, the *Logos*, is the cosmic pattern of the universe effecting formation and illumination of the creature.<sup>29</sup>

And so when Augustine finds a general trinitarian reflection in man it is primarily related to what he considers the *ad extra* aspect of the Persons, that is their causality among creatures.<sup>30</sup> It is only with the perception of the psychological trinity in man that the trinitarian reflection is immediately related to the *ad intra* nature of the intra-trinitarian processions. The trinitarian reflections in a general way among creatures are deficient in representing the Trinity of Persons. For even at the highest level, in the case of man, they are related more proximately to the activity of the Persons, than to their personal properties.

But there is another difficulty with the trinitarian reflections expressed in the far-reaching formulae of Augustine. They do not seem even to fully reflect the Trinity. The Trinity of Persons is not simply Three, but Three-in-One. Where is the unity of the Godhead expressed by the trinitarian reflections of Augustine? In some of the general trinitarian formulae of Augustine the first member of the triad is unity.<sup>31</sup> In others the first member of the triad is closely associated with the unity of the creature through the notions of existence and limit.<sup>32</sup> The formulae which Augustine uses in a universal way for the resemblances to the Trinity, related as they are to the triple causal role of God, express the triplicity but seem to be deficient in representing the unity of God. This defect is only overcome by the trinitarian reflections in man on the psychological level.

## Image of the Trinity

### PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE TRINITY

Man alone among the whole of visible creation images the Trinity, but does he image the Trinity at every level of his being, and with regard to every object of the operations of his being? It is in the *De Trinitate* that Augustine will raise these questions and give his answers to them. The answers are not entirely unknown to Augustine before he begins his search for the image of the Trinity in man, but he will work his way through an involved platonic dialectic before his solutions appear. We shall follow in his path as he proceeds from exterior things to interior realities, then from the lower among the latter to the higher, inverting his order only where consistency would demand.<sup>33</sup>

### THE OUTER MAN

After finding a trinitarian reflection in all things including those of the corporeal order, Augustine no longer considers these exterior realities independent of man's activity in their regard. This activity, and the part of man engaged in it, coincides with his understanding of the term "outer man" from St. Paul.<sup>34</sup> The outer man is simply that life in man which remains on the sense level, whether external or internal sense. The inner man, site of the image, is the specifically human life, that is rational and intellectual life in man. The place to begin, in accordance with the methodology of Augustine, is with the lower in man and try to perceive some reflection of the Trinity there.

No one doubts that as the inner man is endowed with understanding, so the outer man is endowed with bodily sense. Let us try, then, if we can, to discover in this outer man also some sort of vestige of the Trinity, not that it is itself in the same manner the image of God [as the inner man]. For the apostolic opinion is evident, which declares that the inner man is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him (Col. 3:10); and in another place he says, "Though the outer man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day" (2 Cor. 4:6).<sup>35</sup>

## Vestiges of the Trinity

Augustine will find in the outer man two trinities in general. The one he calls a trinity of external vision; the other he refers to as the trinity of internal vision. He begins with the first of these, the trinity pertaining to the external senses. His selection for the representative of these senses is the sense of sight, as it is closest in nature to the vision or sight of the mind.<sup>36</sup>

### *Trinity in external vision*

In the act of seeing there are three things involved which coalesce into a close-knit unity: the visible object, the act of vision itself, and the attention of the mind. Here then is a trinity which has unity also, yet not such a trinity as will attain the dignity of an image. This trinity is deficient in representing most of the outstanding characteristics of the divine Trinity. Yet it is the place to begin, at the lowest level of man's cognoscitive operations.

The first thing to be observed here is the evident distinction and triplicity of these three, "When we see some corporeal thing, these three, must be considered and distinguished, as is most easy to do." Augustine proceeds to distinguish,

First the object itself which we see . . . which certainly can exist even before it is seen; next, vision itself which did not exist before we perceived the body as an object of the sense; third that which keeps the sense of the eyes on the object which is seen as long as it is seen, that is the attention (*intentio animi*) of the mind.<sup>37</sup>

The unity of this trinity is now explained:

Although the substances of these three are so different, yet they come together in such a unity, that the first two can scarcely be distinguished even with the intervention of the reason as judge, namely the species of the body which is seen, and its image which is produced in the sense, that is [the act of] vision.<sup>38</sup>

The augustinian theory of "active sensation" begins to appear more clearly as the explanation is given of how the attention

## *Image of the Trinity*

of the mind flowing from the will combines the above two, indeed effects the operation.<sup>39</sup>

And the will has so great a power of combining these two that it both applies the sense to the thing which is perceived that it may be formed, and retains it when formed in the sense. And if it is so violent that it can be called love, or desire, or lust, it vehemently affects even the body of living being also. . . .<sup>40</sup>

In addition to the simple trinity and unity thus far presented Augustine finds some similarities between the processions within the divine Trinity and aspects of the trinity in external vision. The object produces in the sense its form which imitates in a limited way the generation of the Son by the Father in the blessed Trinity. "But we gather by reason that we could not sense at all, unless some similitude of the body seen were produced in our sense . . . And so it cannot be that the sense of the eye does not have the image of the body seen as long as it is seen, for if that image is removed, vision ceases."<sup>41</sup> Likeness to the Spirit can be perceived in the will, for it is neither parent, nor offspring, "And so we can neither call the will the quasi-offspring of vision, since it existed before vision; nor the quasi-parent, because the vision was not formed and expressed from the will but the bodily thing which was seen."<sup>42</sup>

The much more evident dissimilarities between this trinity and the divine Trinity are noted by Augustine. The first of these is the lack of what can be considered as consubstantiality. These three, the object, the act of vision, the will, are not of the same substance, or subject.<sup>43</sup>

The first of these, that is the visible thing itself, does not pertain to the nature of the living thing, except when we perceive our own body. But the second of these pertains [to that nature] to this extent that it is done in the body, and through the body in the soul: for it is produced in the sense which is neither without the body nor without the soul. The third is of the soul alone, because it is the will.<sup>44</sup>



## Vestiges of the Trinity

Another insight of Augustine is that there is not an equality of nature among these three, which is a fundamental characteristic of the Christian Trinity of Persons. Though some overlapping is clear, as is a lack of precision in the terms of Augustine, the point made now is different from the preceding one.

And so the will which unites both . . . is more spiritual than either of the others. For the bodily thing which is perceived is not spiritual at all. The act of vision which is in the sense has something spiritual mixed with it, since it cannot occur without the soul. But it is not wholly spiritual; since that which is formed is a sense of the body.<sup>45</sup>

The production of the form in the sense by the body, which had been noted before as somewhat imitating the generation of the Son, is now perceived to be only a quasi-generation. It does not fully imitate the generation in the Trinity.

The form of the body from which it is produced is something like a parent of that vision, that is of the form which is produced in the sense of the percipient. But it is not a true parent; whence neither is that a true offspring; for it is not wholly born therefrom, since something other is applied to the body and formed from it, that is the sense of him who sees.<sup>46</sup>

It is only with regard to the will and its functioning that Augustine associates the name of any of the divine Persons. He sees in the will some real intimation of the Holy Spirit. "The will which unites both is clearly recognized as being more spiritual, as I have said, and so begins to suggest (*insinuare*) the Person of the Spirit in that Trinity."<sup>47</sup>

### *Trinity in internal vision*

This trinity is a natural development from the previous trinity to be observed in the external senses, though it be a "more inward trinity."<sup>48</sup> "Even if the species of the body which was corporally perceived be withdrawn, there remains in the memory a likeness of it, to which the will may again direct its glance (*aciem*), so as to be formed thence from within, as the sense

## *Image of the Trinity*

was formed from without by the presence of the sensible corporeal object."<sup>49</sup> The trinity effected in this way consists of memory, internal vision, and the will uniting both, "And so that trinity is produced from memory, and internal vision, and the will joining both of these. When these three are combined into one, from this combination itself they are called cogitation."<sup>50</sup>

The trinity in the internal sense is formed from that "storehouse" which is the internal sense of memory, and consists then in some recollection or remembrance of a bodily thing, or, in addition, some original association of images from the memory resulting in an imagination.<sup>51</sup> To be noted with respect to this trinity is one outstanding improvement over the previous trinity in the imitation of the divine Trinity. There is consubstantiality of members here, Augustine believes.

And in these three there is no longer a diversity of substance . . . but in place of the species of the body which was perceived exteriorly there comes the memory retaining that species which the soul has taken in through the sense of the body; in place of that vision which was directed outward when the sense was formed through the sensible body, there comes within a similar vision when the gaze of the soul is formed from that which the memory retains, and absent bodily things are "thought" of: and the will itself as it applied the sense to be formed to the corporeal thing without, and joined them when formed, so it now turns the glance of the soul to the memory, that it may be formed from that which the memory retains, and there may be a like vision in "thought."<sup>52</sup>

Here, as before, consubstantiality means belonging to the same subject. "Although this trinity is composed of things of diverse nature . . . yet the unity resulting from these three no longer belongs to discrete and diverse natures, but to one and the same substance; for this trinity is wholly within, and the whole one soul."<sup>53</sup>

An additional element of similarity to the procession of the Spirit is observable in this trinity also. The act of the will is

said to proceed from the memory in a limited way, and so suggests the dependence of the Spirit on the Father. "For the very will to remember cannot arise in the case of a thing which we have altogether and absolutely forgotten: since whatever we wish to remember, has already been remembered as being, or having been, in our memory. . . . Whence it can be understood that the will of remembering proceeds indeed from those things which are contained in the memory."<sup>54</sup>

Augustine makes an attempt to correlate his general trinitarian formula of "measure, number, weight," with the trinity in the internal sense, but is not too successful, for he will not make the effort again with other trinities. "There is in those things whence vision is expressed a certain measure; in the vision itself there is number. The will which conjoined these two and orders them, and makes a certain unity from them . . . is similar to weight."<sup>55</sup>

The trinities of the outer man, Augustine concludes, are not images of the Trinity. The objects concerned, though like God in a limited way, are even less like God than the soul itself.

Therefore that trinity is not an image of God: since it is produced in the soul itself through the sense of the body from the lowest creature, that is the corporeal creature, to which the soul is superior. Yet it is not entirely dissimilar: for what is there that does not have a likeness to God according to its kind and measure, since God made all things very good, and for no other reason than because he is himself the greatest good?<sup>56</sup>

Augustine may reject the trinities of the outer man as images of the Trinity, yet he does not therefore consider all knowledge of corporeal things and use of them by the will as evil. It is only when man lives according to the trinity of the outer man, that is when his will does not ordain this knowledge and use to praiseworthy ends, that he sins.

The rational soul lives in a deformed fashion, when it lives according to the trinity of the outer man; that is, when it

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does not refer a praiseworthy will to those things which form the sense of the body exteriorly by which it directs them to something useful, but rather a base desire by which it cleaves to them.<sup>57</sup>

### THE INNER MAN

Augustine turns to the "inner man" in his search for the image of the Trinity. As we have seen, the inner man is the *mens* and the site of the divine image. Nevertheless certain distinctions and eliminations are in order before the true trinitarian image is found.

Leaving behind then those things which belong to the outer man, and desiring to ascend within from those things which we have in common with the beasts, before we come to the understanding of things intelligible and supreme which are eternal, the rational knowledge of things temporal presents itself. Let us find then a trinity here also, if we can. . . .<sup>58</sup>

Intent as the bishop of Hippo was on the contemplation of the eternal realities, he never abandoned a realistic view of human nature; man must deal with corporeal and temporal things, and it should be in a thoroughly rational manner. The distinction Augustine makes between the *ratio inferior* and the *ratio superior* has its application here.<sup>59</sup> As we have seen, this distinction does not divide the mind into different parts, but rather is the assignation of different offices to the one mind.

It is the function of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal realities according to incorporeal and eternal reasons (*rationes*) . . . But that which belongs to us and is engaged in the handling of corporeal and temporal things is indeed rational, as it is not common to us and the beast, but it is drawn from the rational substance of our mind, by which we cleave dependently to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and is deputed to handle and govern inferior things.<sup>60</sup>

Paralleling the distinction between the inferior and superior reason is the distinction made here by Augustine between knowledge (*scientia*) and wisdom.<sup>61</sup> He tries to base his dis-



inction on texts from St. Paul, but is aware that there are differing usages for the terms in Scripture. "Action by which we use temporal things well is distant from the contemplation of eternal things, and the latter is deputed to wisdom, the former to knowledge."<sup>62</sup>

The mind is one and has one nature, in the view of Augustine, but if it be engaged with temporal things even legitimately, it is not as such an image of the Trinity. Trinities may be found in the realm of the *ratio inferior*, but they do not attain to the imaging of the Trinity. In a general way here Augustine rejects all of the trinities that may be found in the area of *scientia*, and opts for the trinities in the field of *sapientia*.

. . . not only a trinity may be found, but also an image of God in that alone which pertains to the contemplation of eternal realities; while in this other which is diverted from it in dealing with temporal things, although there may be a trinity, yet there cannot be found an image of God.<sup>63</sup>

#### THE TRINITY OF FAITH

In the realm of the inferior reason, which is co-terminous with the domain of *scientia activa*, innumerable trinities are possible, but Augustine tries to treat all of them summarily in the highest kind of trinity to be found here, and with which he associates all the others. This trinity he calls the trinity of faith. At first sight it is rather disconcerting to find Augustine assigning to the inferior reason the operations of faith, for in this functioning of the mind the image of God is not to be found. However, if Augustine's use of the term faith here is carefully understood, much of the difficulty is avoided.

A distinction is made between faith which has for its object temporal events (e.g. events in the life of Christ on earth), and faith which has for its object eternal truths.<sup>64</sup> Faith is the necessary bridge in this life for the transition from *scientia* to *sapientia*.<sup>65</sup> On the basis of this distinction by Augustine faith can be considered as operative in the realm of the *ratio*

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*inferior*. After devoting much time to the commendation of faith and to the emphasizing of its necessity, Augustine proceeds to the trinities to be found in it.<sup>66</sup> They are not all of the same grade, and it is the highest level with which he is principally concerned.

The lowest level of this trinity is composed of recollections of sayings from faith, which are the effect of the memory reproducing them at the instigation of the will. Yet at this level the meaning of these words or sayings from the faith is not known, and so it is only a trinity of the outer man involving but sense-knowledge. If the teachings of the faith are understood, then there is a trinity of the inner man, but only a partial trinity, if these teachings are not loved. When man lives according to these teachings, that is he really believes them to be true and loves those things which are to be loved according to faith, then he lives a life according to a trinity of the inner man.<sup>67</sup>

With this highest level of the trinity of faith Augustine associates knowledge or science (*scientia*).

. . . this definition (cf. 1 Cor. 13:12) is to be so divided that the knowledge of things divine shall be properly called wisdom, and that of things human properly take the name of knowledge . . . not however so as to attribute to this knowledge everything whatever that can be known by man about human things, wherein there is much of superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity, but that by which the most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened: and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not proficient, however exceptionally strong in the faith itself.<sup>68</sup>

Also to be associated with the highest level of the trinity of faith is the practice of the moral virtues.

. . . we admonish now that the just man lives by faith (Rom. 1:17); which faith works by love (Gal. 5:6), so that the virtues themselves by which one lives prudently, courageously, temperately, and justly also be all referred to the same faith; for in no other way can they be true virtues.<sup>69</sup>

## Vestiges of the Trinity

Here then is the highest trinity of faith, for "from this faith and such a life whatever notions are in the mind of the man of faith, since they are contained in the memory, beheld in recollection, and please the will, do yield a trinity of its own kind."<sup>70</sup> It should be observed here that the will's activity is now one of love and enjoyment, not simply that of use (and of unitive functioning). A basic augustinian distinction underlies this difference.<sup>71</sup>

Without comment on the characteristics of the trinity in faith which are similar to some properties of the divine Trinity Augustine rejects it as the image of the Trinity in man. The first reason given is that the image in man must have something permanent about it, and faith is not of that nature; it will yield to the vision of God in the next life. "That trinity which now consists in the remembering, contemplating, and love of this same faith while present and enduring then will be found to be done with and finished, and not enduring."<sup>72</sup> The same reasoning is noted of the virtues, though in a more limited way. "And so the works of the virtues which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they must be referred, will be considered among things past."<sup>73</sup>

Later Augustine will find another reason to reject the trinity of faith because of its temporary nature. The trinity of faith, and the things associated with it are "adventitious" to the mind. They have a beginning in time in the soul of man, which cannot be said of the true image of the Trinity. In fact, Augustine finds that the whole of the subject-matter of *scientia* is adventitious to the mind.

. . . brought there by historical information, as deeds and words which take place in time and pass away, or which are established in the natures of things in their own places and regions, or arise in man himself not being there before, either through the teaching of others or by his own thoughts, as faith, . . . as the virtues by which, if they are true virtues, we live well in this mortality so that we may live happily in that immortality which God has promised.<sup>74</sup>

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In the context of seeking a permanent trinitarian image in man Augustine has rejected the trinity of faith. But what has he really eliminated here from the image? Faith is the fundamental contact of man with God in this life, of the image with its model, and this is the constant teaching of Augustine. Faith then has a fundamental role to play also in the trinitarian image in this life. The principle on which Augustine eliminates faith is this, "lest the image seem to be constituted in temporal things, whereas it must be constituted in eternal realities." Surely he is aware that the prime objects of faith are "eternal realities." What he actually rejects from the trinitarian image in man is not faith absolutely speaking, but faith in its temporal nature as the object of the image.

Wherefore, since, as it is written, "While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. 5-7); undoubtedly as long as the just man lives by faith, although he lives according to the interior man, and through this same temporal faith strives for the truth and tends toward eternal things, yet *in the retaining, contemplating, and loving of this same temporal faith*, not yet is there such a trinity as to be called the image of God: lest it seem to be constituted in temporal things that which should be constituted in eternal realities. For the human mind *when it sees its own faith*, by which it believes what it does not see, does not see something eternal.<sup>75</sup>

Augustine has not yet found a trinity even at the psychological level in man which measures up to the requirements he lays down for the image of the Trinity. Some of these requirements have already been clearly formulated. To be the image of the Trinity in man there must be found a trinity in the inner man, that is in the mind, the site of the divine image. The object of the trinity must be eternal realities, and so the trinity will have to be operative in the realm of wisdom, not that of knowledge (*scientia*). The trinity also must have permanent roots in the nature of man and not be something adventitious to the mind, wherein is the image. The perception



of Augustine that the members of the trinity must be on the level of intellectual knowledge and love, here taken for granted, will receive fuller exposition in the following chapter.

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There are two broad avenues of approach, not completely separate, to be observed in Augustine's growing perception of the trinitarian reflections among creatures. The first approach used by Augustine is associated with the triple causality distributed among the Persons of the Trinity. The trinitarian reflections resulting here are the impress of this causality, that is of the *ad extra* operations of the Persons. This grand view of the relations between the creative Trinity and the creature with its metaphysical overtones and cosmic implications tends to leave the *ad intra* aspect of the intra-trinitarian processions in obscurity. The principle of triple causality is too rich and too broad a view of reality to lead directly to such a limited result. Unquestionably an insight into the personal properties of the Persons is behind Augustine's distribution of the triple causality among the Persons; yet, historically speaking, the trinitarian reflections resulting here do not immediately exemplify, as they well could in the case of man, the nature of the processions.

It is only with the use of another method by Augustine that the trinitarian reflection in man attains to this level. Augustine arrives at the beginnings of his psychological trinity in man as the result of the attempt to exemplify to his readers something of the Trinity.<sup>76</sup> It is by use of the divine image in man as analogy that Augustine arrives clearly at the psychological trinity in man. It is by use of the same method—a method which greatly complicates the search for the trinitarian image—that Augustine eventually develops his original perception.<sup>77</sup> This development we shall consider next.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The beginnings of the psychological trinity are to be observed only at the time of the writing of the latter part of the *Confessions*; cf. *ibid.*, XIII, 11 (PL 32:849, CSEL 33:352 f). This trinity receives its full development only in the latter part of the *De Trinitate*; cf. *ibid.*, VIII-XV, *passim*. The latter part of the *Confession* is dated from the years 399-401, and the latter part of the *De Trinitate* from the year 410 (412) on. The psychological trinity in the form used by the *Confessions* receives somewhat fuller discussion in the *De Civitate Dei*; cf. *ibid.*, XI, 26-28 (PL 41:339-342, CC, SL 48:345 f). The latter passage is dated to the year 416. Aspects of the psychological trinity as expressed in the *De Trinitate* are repeated in the sermons of Augustine; cf. *Sermo*, LII, 6 (PL 38:360 f) which is dated to the years 410-412; *Sermo* CXXVI, 9, 11 (PL 38:703) which dates from the year 417. The same approach is used in the *C. Sermo. Arian.*, 16 (PL 42:695) dating from the year 418, and in the following letters of Augustine: cf. *Epist.* CXX, 2-4 (PL 33:453 f, CSEL 34, 2:710 f) from the year 410-411, and *Epist.* CLXIX, 1-2 (PL 33:744 f, CSEL 44:615 f), from the year 415.

See F. Cavallera, "Les Premieres Formulas Trinitaires de Saint Augustin," *Bulletin de Litt. Eccles.*, XXI (1930), 97-123 for a study of the trinitarian reflections in creatures up to the writing of the *De Trinitate* (around the year 401). His conclusion is that the psychological trinity first finds its appearance in the *Confessions*, 122.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *Conf.* VII, 9 (PL 32:710, CSEL 33:154), "... quosdam Platoniorum libros . . . et ibi legi, non quidem his verbis, sed hoc idem omnino multiplicibus et multis suaderi rationibus, quod in Principio erat Verbum et Deus erat Verbum. . . ."

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *QQ. in Hept.*, II, 25 (PL 34:604, CC,SL 33:80), "Commendatur enim fortasse Trinitas, et quod verum est, summi philosophi gentium, quantum in eorum litteris indagatur, sine Spiritu sancto philosophati sunt, quamvis de Patre et Filio non tacuerunt. . . ."

<sup>4</sup>*De Vera Relig.*, 4, 7 (PL 34:126), "... et paucis mutatis verbis atque sententiis christiani fierent sicut plerique . . . Platonici fecerunt." Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, X, 23 (PL 41:300, CC,SL 47:296).

<sup>5</sup>Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, X, 29 (PL 41:307-308, CC,SL 47:306), *ibid.*, X, 23 (PL 41:300, CC,SL 47:296).

<sup>6</sup>See E. Portalie, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*, 98; E. Gilson, *Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Augustin*, 276 and note (1).

<sup>7</sup>Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 25 (PL 41:338, CC,SL 48:344), "Quamvis Plato primo istam distributionem reperisse . . . dicatur, cui neque naturarum omnium auctor nisi Deus unus neque intelligentiae dator, neque amoris, quo bene beateque vivitur, inspirator."

<sup>8</sup>Cf. e.g. *Enneads*, V, 3, 9, *transl. cit.*, 390-391, and P. Henry, "Plotinus' Place in the History of Thought," xlii-xliv, an introduction to the translation of the *Enneads* cited.

<sup>9</sup>For a partial listing, see *Oeuvres de Saint Augustin*, XVI, *La Trinité*, transl. by P. Agaesse and J. Moingt (Desclee de Brouwer, Paris: 1956), 586-588; *Obras de San Agustin*, V, *Tratado de La Santisima Trinidad*, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, (Madrid: 1956), 2nd ed., L. Arias, "La Imagen de la Trinidad en el hombre," 101-103; E. Gilson, *Introduction*

a *L'Etude* . . . , 282-285, and especially 282, note (1). For a complete listing of the formulae up to the time of the writing of the *De Trinitate* see F. Cavallera, "Les Premières Formules Trinitaires de St. Augustin," 101 f.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. F. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, 119-120, where he says that the text from St. Paul, Rom. 11:36, is the one Augustine uses most often as the scriptural basis for his trinitarian formulae. In view of Augustine's extensive usage of this text one does not know what to make of Portalie's statement, "Hence arose those expressions which sounded quite strange to Latin ears: 'From the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit,'" *A Guide to the Thought of Augustine*, 133.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. *Solil.* I, 1-5 (PL 32:869-872) where this text receives almost endless variations by Augustine. Cf. *Epist.* XI, 3 (PL 33:76, CSEL 34, 1:26 f), "Nulla natura est, Nebridi, et omnino nulla substantia, quae non in se habeat haec tria et prae se gerat: primo ut sit, deinde ut hoc vel illud sit, tertia ut in eo ipso, quod est maneat, quantum potest primum illud causam naturae sustentat, *ex qua* sunt omnia: alterum speciem *per quam* fabricantur et quodam modo . . . formantur . . . tertium manentiam quamdam, ut ita dicam, *in qua* sunt omnia."

<sup>12</sup>See the excellent study of G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, (Billings and Son, London: 1959), 76-94, 129-156. The concentration of this work is the thought of the Greek Fathers; consequently the Latin Fathers are slighted, and, perhaps, not as well understood as could be hoped for.

<sup>13</sup>*De Agone Christ.*, 14, 16 (PL 40:299, CSEL 41:118 f), "Nec eos audiamus, qui dicunt Patrem tantummodo esse, nec habere Filium, nec esse cum eo Spiritum Sanctum; sed ipsum Patrem aliquando appellari Filium, aliquando Spiritum Sanctum. Nesciunt enim Principium ex quo sunt omnia, et Imaginem ejus per quam formantur omnia, et Sanctitatem ejus in qua ordinantur omnia."

<sup>14</sup>Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 3-6 (PL 34:299 f, CSEL 28, 1:99 f), where he applies the "measure, number, weight" formula at all levels of being, but because they refer primarily to material beings, he allows the substitution of other formulae. The triad of measure, number, order appears in *De Gen. c. Manich.* I, 26, 1 (PL 34:185 f); *De Lib. Arb.*, II, (PL 32:1270, CSEL 74:87 f); *Contra Faust.*, XX, 7 (PL 42:372, CSEL 25, 1:541). The Wisdom formula appears in *De Natura Boni*, 21 (PL 42:557, CSEL 25, 2:864), *Contra Faustum*, *loc. cit.*; *De Trinit.*, XI, 11. The formula of mode, species, order appears in *De Natura Boni*, 3 (PL 42:553, CSEL 25, 2:856); *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 15 (PL 41:331, CC,SL 48:335). The triad of unity, species, order appears in *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 2; *De Vera Relig.*, VII, (PL 34:129); *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 15 (PL 41:331, CC, SL 48:335), and in *De Musica*, VI, 17 (PL 32:1191 f) appears the triad of unity, number, order.

See W. J. Roche, "Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine," *The New Scholasticism*, XV, (1941), 350-376, and P. Blanchere, "La Trinité dans les Creatures," *Revue Augustinienne*, 1903, 114-123; 219-233, and R. Allers, "Triad and Mediation in Augustine," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXI (1957), 499-525.

<sup>15</sup>*Cont. Faust.*, XX, 7 (PL 42:372, CSEL 25, 1:541 f), ". . . et inde nobis est initium existendi, ratio cognoscendi, lex amandi; inde omnibus et irrationalibus animantibus natura qua vivunt, vigor quo sentiunt, motus quo appetunt; inde etiam omnibus corporibus mensura ut subsistant, numerus ut ornantur, pondus ut ordinentur."

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<sup>16</sup>See E. Portalie, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*, 132-133. The favored expression of Augustine is that the Trinity works "inseparabiliter," but it follows from his principles (especially from the theory of appropriation as worked out in the *De Trinitate*) that the Trinity also operates *indiscrete*. Nevertheless there are some ambiguous expressions, especially in his earlier writings; cf. *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 18 (PL 40:15), "Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit. Universa igitur creatura si est, et quoquo modo, et ab eo quod omnino nihil est, plurimum distat, et suis partibus sibimet congruit, *causam* quoque *eius trinam esse oportet*: qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua amica sibi sit. Creaturae autem causam, id est auctorem, Deum dicimus."

<sup>17</sup>*De Vera Relig.*, VII, 13 (PL 34:128-129), "... qua Trinitate quantum in hac vita datum est cognita, omnis intellectualis et animalis et corporalis creatura, ab eadem Trinitate creatrice esse in quantum est, et speciem suam habere, et ordinatissime administrari, sine ulla disputatione perspicitur; non ut aliam partem totius creaturae fecisse intelligatur Pater, et aliam Filius, et aliam Spiritus Sanctus, sed et simul omnia et unamquamque naturam Patrem fecisse per Filium in dono Spiritus Sancti. Omnis enim res, vel substantia, vel essentia, vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo melius enuntiatur, simul haec tria habet: ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat."

<sup>18</sup>*De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12 (BAC 5:454), "Haec igitur omnia, quae divina arte facta sunt, et unitatem quamdam in se ostendunt, et speciem et ordinem. Quidquid enim horum est, et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae corporum, et ingenia animarum; et aliqua specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum, ac doctrinae vel artes animarum; et ordinem aliquem petit, aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes corporum, atque amores aut delectationes animarum. Oportet igitur ut Creatorem, per ea quae facta sunt, intellectum conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus, cuius in creatura, quomodo dignum est, apparet vestigium. In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium, et perfectissima pulchritudo, et beatissima delectatio." Despite the profuse use of the expression "vestigia Trinitatis" by later commentators, it is rarely found in the *De Trinitate*.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 25 (PL 41:338, CC,SL 48:344).

<sup>20</sup>Cf. *Lib. 83 QQ.*, Q. 18 (PL 40:15).

<sup>21</sup>Cf. W. Roche, "Measure, Number, Weight in the Writings of St. Augustine," where the first conclusion is that these various triads are the most general metaphysical principles of being, 350-351, but it is apparent from the rest of the article that the triads transcend any limited view which would confine them to abstract and static principles. It is the function of the third member of the formulae to effect order and through it unity. The order of the whole of the universe is implicated in the triads, and it is dynamic at all levels.

P. Blanchere, "La Trinité dans les Creatures," 117-122, sees the trinitarian reflection of measure, number, weight in the limited context of efficient, exemplary, final causality attributed to the Father, Son and Spirit, respectively.

<sup>22</sup>*De Vera Relig.*, 54, 112 (PL 34:171), "Ecce unum Deum colo, unum omnium Principium, et Sapientiam qua sapiens est quaecumque anima sapiens est, et ipsum Munus quo beata sunt quaecumque beata sunt."

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 54, 113 (PL 34:172), "Quare ipsum Donum Dei cum Patre et Filio aequae incommutabile colere et tenere nos convenit: unius sub-



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stantiae Trinitatem, unum Deum a quo sumus, per quem sumus, in quo sumus: a quo discessimus, cui dissimiles facti sumus, a quo perire non permissi sumus: principium ad quod recurrimus, et formam quam sequimur, et gratiam qua reconciliamur: unum Deum quo auctore conditi sumus, et similitudinem eius, per quam ad unitatem formamur et pacem qua unitati adhaeremus. . . ."

<sup>24</sup>*De Civ. Dei*, XI, 24 (PL 42:338, CC,SL 48:344), ". . . universa nobis Trinitas in suis operibus intimatur. Inde est civitatis sanctae, quae in sanctis angelis sursum est, et origo, et informatio, et beatitudo. Nam si quaeratur unde sit, Deus eam condidit; si unde sit sapiens, a Deo illuminatur; si unde est felix, Deo fruitur: subsistens modificatur, contemplans illustratur, inhaerens jucundatur; est, videt, amat; in aeternitate Dei viget, in veritate Dei lucet, in bonitate gaudet."

<sup>25</sup>See M. Chenu, *Introduction a L'Etude de St. Thomas D'Aquin*, (Institut D'Etudes Medievales, Montreal: 1954), 48 f.

<sup>26</sup>See F. Cavallera, "Les Premieres Formules. . . .," 122; *idem*, *La Trinité, Oeuvres de Saint Augustin*, XVI, 586-587. The treatment of the trinitarian image in the *Confessions* is compressed into a paragraph or so, and in the tract on the Trinity it takes up the better part of the last eight books.

<sup>27</sup>See F. Cavallera, "Les Premieres Formules. . . .," 118 f.

<sup>28</sup>Efficient causality is not the only aspect of the triple causal role of God which reflects the personal characteristics of the Father. Exemplary causality pertains to him in virtue of the fact that the Image forms all to his own likeness, which is the likeness of the Father. Final causality also can be attributed to him, for creation is like to the very likeness of the Father, the Son, only insofar as it is *ad Patrem* as the Son. The Son is not only exemplary cause of all, being the Image and the *Logos*, that is the pattern of the universe, but he is also efficient cause of illumination in the order of knowledge, and of formation in the order of being. The Son is also final cause in the sense that the universe of creatures is *ad Patrem* only through him who is the prime relative of the Father. The Spirit is the cosmic principle effective of order (and unity) in the universe, as he is representative of the unity of the Trinity effected by love. Exemplary causality can be attributed to him also, for as the Father and Son are united in him, so too creatures reflect the union of Father and Son in him, that is through his movement. For the same reason final causality can be attributed to him, for the term of the cosmic motion of the universe of creatures, according to their natures manifestly, is the "rest" achieved in the Spirit.

If anything stands clear from this limited summary it is the fact that the thought of Augustine is only with great difficulty measured by the categories of later thinkers. It is too rich, and too profound, to be confined by any single set of distinctions or classifications. This is not to say that the distinctions of a later period are not valid, but to point out that Augustine was unhindered by the rigidity which these tend to assume in the minds of some writers.

<sup>29</sup>See C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, (Oxford Univ. Press: 1957), 236 f., 422 f. 444 f.

<sup>30</sup>See F. Cavallera, "Les Premières Formules. . . .," 120-121.

<sup>31</sup>Perhaps this is because the Father as *principium deitatis* is in a sense the source of the unity of the Trinity.

<sup>32</sup>See W. Roche, "Measure, Number, Weight in Saint Augustine," 353 f, and P. Blanchere, "La Trinité dans les Creatures," 117-118.

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<sup>33</sup>Consistency demands that we invert the order used by Augustine at the very outset. In Book 8 of the *De Trinitate* Augustine begins to seek for "an understanding of what has been believed," that is the doctrine of the Trinity, and in a method characteristic of himself and Plotinus, by a "more inward way." The method of introspection is justified for it is a matter of faith that God is manifested by the "things that are made," and that man alone among these is the image of God. His purpose then is to see in the mind of man, the site of the image, something of the divine Trinity. But after addressing himself to various features in the mind reflecting the Trinity, he descends to the lower and corporeal in man as being "more familiar," and less of a strain on his readers. Then he rises again to the mind of man, and probes more deeply into the trinitarian aspect of the image there.

We shall not follow Augustine's order as imperfectly realized in the *De Trinitate*, but rather as perfectly set forth in his methodological principle, *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora*. If Augustine had had a chance to revise and edit this work before its partial and surreptitious publication, we believe that this would have been a change made by him. He will even claim to have followed this procedure later in the *De Trinitate* (XIV, 3, 5), and in fact he has from the eleventh book on.

<sup>34</sup>Cf. e.g., *Enarr. in Ps. CXLV*, 5 (PL 37:1887 f, CC,SL 40:2108 f); *Enarr. in Ps. LVII*, (PL 36:673 f, CC,SL 39:708 f).

<sup>35</sup>*De Trinit.*, XI, 1, 1, "Nemini dubium est, sicut interiorem hominem intelligentia, sic exteriorem sensu corporis praeditum. Nitamur igitur, si possumus, in hoc quoque exteriori indagare qualemcumque vestigium Trinitatis, non quia et ipse eodem modo sit imago Dei. Manifestum est quippe apostolica sententia, quae interiorem hominem renovari in Dei agnitione declarat secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum; cum et alio loco dicat: Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, tamen interior renovatur de die in diem."

Due to the fact that the great preponderance of the footnotes to follow in this chapter (and in the next one) are from the *De Trinitate*, we shall adopt an abbreviated form of reference. The edition which we use of this work is volume 5 of the series *Biblioteca De Autores Cristianos*, Madrid: 1956, 2nd edition. We shall then henceforth leave out reference to this edition, and simply use the abbreviation DT followed by book, chapter, and section number.

<sup>36</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, and XV, 3, 5.

<sup>37</sup>DT, XI, 2, 2, "Primo ipsa res quam videmus . . . quod utique iam esse poterat, et antequam videretur; deinde, visio, quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus; tertio, quod in ea re quae videtur, quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est, animi intentio."

<sup>38</sup>DT, XI, 2, 5, "Cum igitur horum trium tam diversae substantiae sint, tamen in tantam coeunt unitatem, ut duo priora vix intercedente iudice ratione discerni valeant, species videlicet corporis quod videtur, et imago eius quae fit in sensu, id est, visio."

<sup>39</sup>Cf. V. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest for Wisdom*, (Bruce, Milwaukee: 1945), 241-247, for an explanation of the "active sensation" theory of Augustine.

<sup>40</sup>DT, XI, 2, 5, "Voluntas autem tantam vim habet copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur, et in ea formatum teneat. Et si tam violenta est, ut possit vocari amor, aut cupiditas, aut libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis vehementer afficit. . . ."

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<sup>41</sup>DT, XI, 2, 3, "Sed ratione colligimus nequaquam nos potuisse sentire, nisi fieret in sensu nostro aliqua similitudo conspecti corporis . . . Sic sensus oculorum non ideo non habet imaginem corporis quod videtur quamdiu videtur, quia eo detracto non remanet."

<sup>42</sup>DT, XI, 5, 9, "Ideoque nec quasi prolem visionis possumus dicere voluntatem, quia erat ante visionem; nec quasi parentem, quia non ex voluntate sed ex viso corpore formata et expressa est."

<sup>43</sup>Cf. R. Tremblay, "La Theorie Psychologique de la Trinité chez Saint Augustin," 95-96, for an understanding of Augustine's use of the term substance.

<sup>44</sup>DT, XI, 2, 5, "Horum primum, id est, res ipsa visibilis non pertinet ad animantis naturam, nisi cum corpus nostrum cernimus. Alterum autem ita pertinet, ut in corpore fiat, et per corpus in anima: fit enim in sensu, qui neque sine corpore est neque sine anima. Tertium vero solius animae est, quia voluntas est."

<sup>45</sup>DT, XI, 5, 9, "Itaque voluntas quae utrumque coniungit . . . magis spiritualis est quam utrumlibet illorum. Nam corpus illud quod cernitur, omnino spirituale non est. Visio vero quae fit in sensu habet admixtum aliquid spirituale, quia sine anima fieri non potest. Sed non totum ita est: quoniam ille qui formatur, corporis sensus est." Cf. V. Bourke, *loc. cit.*, for Augustine's usage of the term *spiritus*.

<sup>46</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Visionis igitur illius, id est formae quae fit in sensu cernentis, quasi parens est forma corporis ex qua fit. Sed parens illa non vera; unde nec ista vera proles est: neque enim omnino inde gignitur, quoniam aliquid aliud adhibetur corpori, ut ex illo formetur, id est sensus videntis."

<sup>47</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Voluntas ergo quae utrumque coniungit, magis, ut dixi, spiritualis agnoscitur, et ideo tanquam personam Spiritus insinuare incipit in illa trinitate."

<sup>48</sup>Cf. DT, XI, 3, 6.

<sup>49</sup>DT, XI, 3, 6, "Quia etiam detracta specie corporis quae corporaliter sentiebatur; remanet in memoria similitudo eius, quo rursus voluntas convertat aciem, ut inde formetur intrinsecus, sicut ex corpore obiecto sensibili sensus extrinsecus formabatur."

<sup>50</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Atque fit illa trinitas ex memoria, et interna visione, et quae utrumque copulat voluntas. Quae tria cum in unum coguntur, ab ipso coactus cogitatio dicitur." Here Augustine is speaking of the combining function of the will which will result in the recollection of some sense-object. He is at liberty to use the term *cogitatio* for such an operation, as the word has that basic meaning. Later Augustine will use the term *cogitatio* for that process by which knowledge is expressed in a mental word, though something of the unifying function is still present. The latter would be more accurately rendered as thought, whereas the former is difficult to translate into adequate English. Cf. *Oeuvres de Saint Augustin*, XVI, 606.

<sup>51</sup>Cf. DT, XI, 5, 8; XI, 8, 14; XI, 10, 17.

<sup>52</sup>DT, XI, 3, 6, "Nec iam in his tribus diversa substantia est . . . sed pro illa specie corporis quae sentiebatur extrinsecus, succedit memoria retinens illam speciem quam per corporis sensum combibit anima; proque illa visione quae foris erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili formaretur, succedit intus similis visio, cum ex eo quod memoria tenet, formatur acies animi, et absentia corpora cogitantur: voluntasque ipsa quomodo



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foris corpori obiecto formandum sensum admovebat, formatumque iungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi convertit ad memoriam, ut ex eo quod illa retinuit, ista formetur, et sit in cogitatione similis visio."

<sup>53</sup>DT, XI, 4, 7, ". . . ut fiat ibi quaedam unitas trium, quamvis eorum sit diversa natura, . . . fiat et hic quaedam unitas ex tribus, non iam naturae diversitate discretis, sed unius eiusdemque substantiae; quia hoc totum intus est, et totum unus animus."

<sup>54</sup>DT, XI, 7, 12, "Quod enim omni modo et omni ex parte obliti fuerimus, nec remiscendi voluntas exoritur: quoniam quiddid recordari volumus, recordati iam sumus in memoria nostra esse vel fuisse . . . Unde intelligi potest, voluntatem reminiscendi ab iis quidem rebus quae memoria continentur procedere. . . ."

<sup>55</sup>DT, XI, 11, 18, "In his ergo rebus unde visiones exprimuntur, quaedam mensura est; in ipsis autem visionibus, numerus. Voluntas vero quae ista coniungit et ordinat, et quadam unitate copulat . . . ponderi similis est."

<sup>56</sup>DT, XI, 5, 8, "Quapropter non est ista trinitas imago Dei; ex ultima quippe, id est corporea creatura, qua superior est anima, in ipsa anima fit per sensum corporis. Nec tamen est omnino dissimilis: quid enim non pro suo genere ac pro suo modulo habet similitudinem Dei, quandoquidem Deus fecit omnia bona valde, non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est?"

<sup>57</sup>DT, XI, 3, 6, "Sed anima rationalis deformiter vivit, cum secundum trinitatem exterioris hominis vivit; id est, cum ad ea quae forinsecus sensum corporis formant, non laudabilem voluntatem, qua haec ad utile aliquid referat, sed turpem cupiditatem qua his inhaerescat, accomodat."

<sup>58</sup>DT, XII, 15, 25, "Relinquentibus itaque nobis ea quae sunt exterioris hominis, et ab eis quae communia cum pecoribus habemus introrsum ascendere cupientibus, antequam ad cognitionem rerum intelligibilem atque summarum quae sempiternae sunt veniremus, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis occurrit. Etiam in hac igitur inveniamus, si possumus, aliquam trinitatem. . . ."

<sup>59</sup>See E. Gilson, *Introduction a l'Etude de Saint Augustin*, 151-153.

<sup>60</sup>DT, XII, 2, 2-3, 3, "Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporeales et sempiternas . . . Illud vero nostrum quod in actione corporalium atque temporalium tractandorum ita versatur, ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore, rationale quidem est, sed ex illa rationali nostrae mentis substantia, qua subhaeremus intelligibili atque incommutabili veritati, tanquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est."

<sup>61</sup>See H. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et La Fin de La Culture Antique*, Note B, 561 f, "Scientia et Sapientia dans la langue de Saint Augustin."

<sup>62</sup>DT, XIII, 14, 22, "Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur."

<sup>63</sup>DT, XII, 4, 4, ". . . et facta iam ista distributione, in eo solo quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum, non solum trinitas, sed etiam imago Dei; in hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen imago Dei possit inveniri."

<sup>64</sup>Cf. DT, XIII, 19, 24, "Haec autem omnia quae pro nobis Verbum caro factum temporaliter et localiter fecit et pertulit, secundum distinc-



tionem quam demonstrare suscepimus, ad scientiam non ad sapientiam pertinent. Quod autem Verbum est sine tempore et sine loco, est Patri coaeternum, et ubique totum . . . sermo ille erit sapientiae: ac per hoc Verbum caro factum, quod est Christus Jesus, et sapientiae thesaurus habet et scientiae" (cf. Col. 2:1-3).

<sup>65</sup>Cf. *DT*, XIV, 1, 3, ". . . ipsam praecipue fidem commendare curavi, a temporalibus aeterna breviter ante distinguens, atque ibi de temporalibus disserens: aeterna vero in hunc librum differens, etiam de rebus aeternis fidem temporalem quidem, et temporaliter in credentium cordibus habitare, necessariam tamen propter adispiscenda ipsa aeterna esse monstravi."

<sup>66</sup>Cf. *DT*, XIII, *passim*.

<sup>67</sup>Cf. *DT*, XIII, 20, 26.

<sup>68</sup>*DT*, XIV, 1, 3, ". . . ista definitio dividenda est ('alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae,' 1 Cor. 12:8), ut rerum divinarum scientia proprie sapientia nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat . . . non utique quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis, ubi plurimum supervacaneae vanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est, huic scientiae tribuens, sed illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur: qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum."

<sup>69</sup>*DT*, XIII, 20, 26, ". . . admoneamus quod iustus ex fide vivit, quae fides dilectionem operatur, ita ut virtutes quoque ipsae quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, iusteque vivitur, omnes ad eandem referantur fidem: non enim aliter poterunt verae esse virtutes."

<sup>70</sup>*Loc. cit.*, ". . . ex hac fide et tali vita quaecumque notiones sunt in animo fidelis hominis, cum memoria continentur, et recordatione inspicuntur, et voluntati placent, reddunt quamdam sui generis trinitatem."

<sup>71</sup>See B. R. Gosselin, "St. Augustine's System of Morals," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, 247-248; S. Grabowski, *The Church*, 363-367.

<sup>72</sup>*DT*, XIV, 2, 4, ". . . etiam trinitas ista, quae nunc in eiusdem fidei praesentis ac manentis memoria, contuitu, dilectione consistit, tunc transacta et praeterita reperietur esse, non permanens."

<sup>73</sup>*DT*, XIV, 9, 12, "As per hoc ista virtutum opera, quae huic mortali vitae sunt necessaria, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in praeteritis habeantur. . . ."

<sup>74</sup>*DT*, XIV, 8, 11, ". . . cognitione historica illata, ut sunt facta et dicta, quae tempore peraguntur et transeunt, vel in natura rerum suis locis et regionibus constituta sunt, sive in ipso homine quae non erant oriuntur, aut aliis docentibus aut cogitationibus propriis, sicut fides, . . . sicut virtutes, quibus, si verae sunt, in hac mortalitate ideo bene vivitur, ut beatae in illa quae divinitus promittitur immortalitate vivatur."

<sup>75</sup>*DT*, XIV, 2, 4, "Quapropter, quoniam sicut scriptum est: Quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, non per speciem; profecto quamdiu iustus ex fide vivit, quamvis secundum hominem interiorum vivat, licet per eandem temporalem fidem ad veritatem nitatur, et tendat ad aeterna, tamen in eiusdem fidei temporalis retentione, contemplatione, dilectione, nondum talis est trinitas, ut Dei iam imago dicenda sit: ne in rebus temporalibus constituta videatur, quae constituenda est in aeternis. Mens quippe humana cum fidem suam videt, qua credit quod non videt, non aliquid sempiternum videt."

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<sup>76</sup>Cf. *Conf.*, XIII, 11 (PL 32:848 f; CSEL 33:352 f), where Augustine asks the question, "Who can understand the omnipotent Trinity?" and then gives the trinitarian analogy of *esse*, *nosse*, *velle* with a very brief exposition.

<sup>77</sup>Cf. e.g., *DT*, XV, 8, 14, where he sums up his procedure in these words, "Videmus nunc, inquit, per speculum . . . quale sit et quod sit hoc speculum si quaerimus, profecto illud occurrit, quod in speculo nisi imago non cernitur. Hoc ergo facere conati sumus, ut per imaginem hanc quod nos sumus, videremus utcumque a quo facti sumus, tamquam per speculum." The opening words of Augustine's treatment of the trinitarian image reveal the same pre-occupation, "Behold and see, if you are able," the divine Trinity through the analogies he is about to present. Cf. *DT*, VIII, 2, 3; 3, 4.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

# THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY

In the *Confessions*, as we have seen, the trinitarian reflection in man first appears on the psychological level as resembling something of the inner nature of the Trinitarian processions. There, in answer to the question "Who can understand the omnipotent Trinity?" Augustine gives the following illustration:

I wish that men would think about three things to be found in themselves. These three are very different from the Trinity, but I mention them that men may exercise their minds and test and see how far different they are. The three things of which I speak are existing, knowing, willing. For I am, and I know, and I will. I am a being that knows and wills: I know that I am and that I will; I will to be and to know. In these three how inseparable is life, the one life, one mind, one essence; how inseparable the distinction, yet the three are distinct. Let him see this who can. Certainly the fact is in himself. . . .<sup>1</sup>

This is the only treatment in the *Confessions* of the psychological trinity in man. It bears great similarity with later trinities from the *De Trinitate*, but there are two differences, among others, worthy of note here. The first difference is this: Augustine does not say this is an image of the Trinity, but proposes it purely as an illustration of the Trinity. The second difference is the caution and hesitancy with which this trinity is offered.

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"For whether there is a trinity there because of these three, or whether all three are in each so that they are each triple: or whether both things are true and in some marvelous manner at once simple and multiple . . . who can easily conceive?"<sup>2</sup>

In the *De Trinitate* Augustine clearly perceives that man is not only an image of the one God, but of the Trinity, for the Trinity is the one God.

For God said "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; but a little later it is said, "And God made man to the image of God" (Gen. 1:26-27). The term "our" certainly would not have been correctly used, being plural in number, if man had been made to the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made to the image of the Trinity, therefore it was said, "to our image." But, on the other hand, lest we think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, since the same Trinity is one God, it is said, "And God made man to the image of God"; instead of this, "to His own image."<sup>3</sup>

With the principle clearly expressed that man is an image of the Trinity Augustine proceeds to use the image of the Trinity in man as analogy of the divine Trinity. However this usage of the trinitarian image in man presupposes the knowledge of what that image truly consists in, and here Augustine will run into difficulty. The trinity which he finds eventually to be the best analogy is not the best image of the Trinity in man. It will take a remarkable synthesis by Augustine to bring these two diverging factors together in the end.

Because of these two currents in Augustine's treatment of the trinitarian image in the *De Trinitate*, it will be best to present his teaching much as it has come down to us from this work. The dialectic and reasoning of the African bishop in the *De Trinitate* is so intricate that it would be difficult to do otherwise, though it has been attempted.<sup>4</sup> We return then to the last stage of the ascending platonic dialectic—the first stages appeared in the previous chapter—to the inner man, and here Augustine will find not one, but three trinitarian images.



## Image of the Trinity

### THE FIRST IMAGE: *Mens, Notitia Sui, Amor Sui*

Augustine first uses the notions of truth, good, and righteousness to illustrate some aspects of the nature of God.<sup>5</sup> But when he starts to search for some analogy of the Trinity, he begins with the characteristically augustinian theme of love and charity. "God is love," says St. John, and Augustine adds, "If you see love, you see the Trinity."<sup>6</sup> The trinity to be observed here consists in the subject loving, the object loved, and the act of love itself. These three are united and form one living reality in the soul loving something, "for love is a certain life which joins together, or seeks to join together, two things, namely, the lover and the beloved."<sup>7</sup> The trinity in love is then a concrete act of love existing in the soul of the one loving, and in which act the object loved is somehow present and united as the term of love.

This trinity can be deficient when the object of the love is the same as the subject, that is when one loves self, for then "he who loves and that which is loved are one."<sup>8</sup> But another member for the augustinian trinity comes swiftly to mind, as "the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself; for how can it love what it does not know?"<sup>9</sup> In this simple way appear the beginnings of the first trinity which Augustine considers to be appropriately called "in some way" an image of the divine Trinity in man. This position, however, is a conclusion of Augustine, and does not appear until he has worked his way through some complex reasoning. We shall try to follow him.

Before proceeding it is important to realize that Augustine conceives of the mind and its activity in a concrete, existential way. This view of the mind is intimated in these words of Augustine, "In the mind one nature embraces our intellect and action, or our counsel and execution, or our reason and rational appetite."<sup>10</sup> The mind cannot be separated from its faculties, or it ceases to be mind; the mind cannot be separated

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from its activities, or it ceases to be acting. This is not to deny distinction between the mind, its faculties, and its activity, but simply to ignore it for worthy purposes, and it is the view of Augustine in the *De Trinitate*.

The first likeness which is found between the trinity of mind, self-love, and self-knowledge and the divine Trinity is the equality possible to the members of this created trinity which is a resemblance to the equality of the Three Persons. "The mind itself, and the love of itself, and the knowledge of itself are three things, and these three are one, and when they are perfect they are equal."<sup>11</sup> If the mind loves itself only as much as the body is to be loved, its love is not perfect; on the other hand, if the mind loves itself as much as God is to be loved, it is even more imperfect, and at fault. The mind's love of self is perfect, and equal to itself, when it loves itself precisely to that degree of being which it actually has from the Creator. Much the same thing can be said of knowledge. Knowledge is a kind of life in the knower, and so the knowledge of a body is better than the existence of body in reality.<sup>12</sup> Similarly the knowledge of God possible to the mind is less, much less than he is in reality.<sup>13</sup> But when the mind perceives itself entirely, and with no foreign elements included, then it is neither greater nor less than itself.<sup>14</sup>

The second element of similarity perceived by Augustine between the created trinity and the divine Trinity is that of consubstantiality, and unity of substance. Manifestly this is a point of some difficulty and hesitance for Augustine himself, and so many interpretations are given of how he has solved the problem of the consubstantiality of mind, self-love, and self-knowledge. He observes that knowledge and love of self "exist in the soul, and as if bound up with it evolve in such a way as to be perceived and reckoned as substantial, or, so to say, essential, not as in a subject."<sup>15</sup> And what is his proof, at the moment, for such an assertion? No color, quantity, quality which are in a body as in a subject, he remarks, can go beyond

the subject in which it is, but knowledge and love can. "The mind can love also something besides itself with that love with which it loves itself. And, further, the mind does not know itself only, but also many other things besides. Wherefore love and knowledge are not in the mind as in a subject, but these also exist substantially as the mind itself does. . . ." <sup>16</sup>

It is our personal preference to see in these words of Augustine two points at stake. His first statement that self-love and self-knowledge are bound up with the very substance, or essence, of the soul will only receive its interpretation when he later "discovers" a perpetual knowledge and love of self hidden in the depths of the soul. The proof he offers now for the assertion that knowledge and love of self are substantial is the fact they transcend the bounds of their subject, the mind. No accident can migrate from subject to subject. Clearly knowledge and love do not migrate from substance to substance either. There is the definite probability that Augustine here is using the terms self-knowledge and self-love to mean the mind as known and the mind as loved.<sup>17</sup> Accordingly knowledge and love are not in the mind, considered as object, as in a subject, but simply bespeak a relation to it. For the knowledge and love of an object do not inhere in that object as in a subject, but are only related to it.<sup>18</sup>

So mind, self-knowledge, and self-love each can be said to exist substantially, and, as bound up with the soul, in the same substance, and yet they are distinct by reason of mutual relations. Here Augustine is trying to exemplify the distinction of the Persons through relation. His explanation is that mind, self-knowledge, self-love are mutually referred to one another, and so distinct as terms of relations. But they are not related as color and the colored subject are, for color is not a substance, while mind, self-love, self-knowledge have substantial existence, as explained. The latter trio are mutually referred to one another as two friends would be. Friends are in reality substances, that is men, but as friends they are mutually related.<sup>19</sup>

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The mind and its knowledge of self are opposed one to the other, and so distinct, as the terms of one relation; similarly, mind is opposed to its love of self. Mind, understood in the sense of object, is opposed to knowledge and love as the term of these acts. On the other hand, mind understood as subject knowing and loving is necessarily related to these acts as their principle.<sup>20</sup> The same situation obtains, if we reverse the consideration of mind. Mind, understood as object, is necessarily related to knowledge and love, for neither of these acts can exist without an object.<sup>21</sup> Mind, understood as subject, is opposed to the acts of knowledge and love as their principle.<sup>22</sup>

In the view of Augustine, there is no mind without knowledge and love of self, in some sense. There is no knowledge of self without mind and self-love, and there is no self-love without self-knowledge and mind. This trinity is inseparable because of the mutual relation, the members distinct through the mutual relation, co-substantial because of inseparability and relation, and one because the same substance and inseparable.

I cannot see how these three are not of the same substance, since the mind loves itself, and knows itself, and these three so exist that the mind is neither known nor loved by any other creature. These three then must necessarily be of one and the same essence: and so if they were confused together as if by some commixture, they could not be in any way three, nor could they be referred to each other.<sup>23</sup>

The discovery is now made of a property of this created trinity which resembles the circuminsession of the divine Trinity. This insight had been partially developed when Augustine had rejected the notion that self-knowledge and self-love are referred to mind as parts of a whole, or that the three together were parts of still another whole. His reason for this statement was the fact that knowledge and love of the mind extended to the whole of the mind, and no part encompasses the whole.<sup>24</sup> Now he finds that each member of the triad encompasses the other,



and the whole, while remaining individual in itself. And so each one is in the other.<sup>25</sup>

Thus far it has not been clear to what type of self-knowledge Augustine has been referring, although he obviously believes that the mind knows itself through itself, and not through the senses.<sup>26</sup> Now he begins to speak openly of a perfect knowledge of self, which consists in a definition. Here appears Augustine's peculiar concept of how man knows, with its platonic overtones.

When the human mind knows and loves itself it does not know and love anything unchangeable: and each individual declares his own mind in one way in speaking, considering what takes place in himself; but defines the human mind by special or general knowledge in another way. . . . Whence it is clear that each sees one thing in himself so that another may believe but not see it; and another in the truth itself so that the other may intue it also. . . . For we do not gather a generic or specific knowledge of the mind by means of a similitude in seeing many minds with the eyes of the body; but we intue the inviolable truth from which we can perfectly define, as far as possible, of what kind the human mind ought to be in the eternal reasons, not of what kind the mind of one man is.<sup>27</sup>

This perfect knowledge terminates in the generation of a mental word, the likeness of the eternal Word of God.

And so in that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the sight of the mind the form according to which we exist, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason either in ourselves or in corporeal creation; thence having conceived a truthful knowledge of things, we have within us a word begotten by inner speech: nor does it depart from us in being born.<sup>28</sup>

In the production of the mental word Augustine sees several elements of similarity to the eternal procession of the Word of God. In the citation just given can be seen a resemblance to the immanence of the Word within the Godhead, for our inner word remains within the mind. The next resemblance to be

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noted is the imaging associated with the production of our mental word. The word is the image of the object known, and a perfect imaging because of the equality possible to perfect self-knowledge. Many resemblances then can be perceived between our word as an image of thought, and the divine Word who is the Image of the Father. The basic principle involved here is expressed in this fashion by Augustine: "all knowledge is like the thing it knows according to species." He now applies it to self-knowledge.

And since knowledge has a likeness to that which it knows, that is to that of which it is the knowledge; it is perfect and equal when the mind itself which knows is also known. And so it is both image and word, because it is expressed from that mind, since in knowing it is equalled to it, and that which is begotten is equal to the begetter.<sup>29</sup>

Here, too, can be observed a true generation of the type in the Trinity, not the quasi-generation associated with sense-knowledge.

And so it must be held that everything whatsoever we know, begets in us the knowledge of itself. For knowledge is brought forth from both, from the knower and from the thing known. And so when the mind knows itself, it is the sole parent of its knowledge: for the knower itself is also the thing known.<sup>30</sup>

The procession of the Holy Spirit also is reflected in the created trinity of mind, self-knowledge, and self-love. As love follows upon knowledge, so does the procession of the Spirit follow upon the generation of the Son. This has been the general principle of Augustine, made early in his exposition of this trinity. Now he raises the question as to whether "all knowledge is word, or only knowledge which is loved," and his answer is that "a word is knowledge together with love."<sup>31</sup> With respect to the mind he observes that "love joins together our word and the mind from which it is begotten as a mean, and without any confusion binds itself together to them as

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a third member in an incorporeal embrace.”<sup>32</sup> The mutualness of that love of the Father and the Son who is the Spirit is suggested to us by these words of Augustine.

The final point of comparison between the created trinity and the divine Trinity is an effort by Augustine to show that love following upon the mind's knowledge of itself is neither an image, nor a word, nor is there any generation involved. He is trying here to perceive the distinction between the two processions within the Trinity, but is not entirely successful. This problem continues to recur for Augustine until the very end of the *De Trinitate*, and then his efforts meet with more success.

The begetting [birth] of the mind is preceded by desire, by which in the seeking and finding of what we desire to know, knowledge is born as an offspring. It is for this reason that this appetite whereby knowledge is conceived and brought forth, cannot properly be called a begetting or an offspring; this same appetite . . . becomes the love of the thing when known, holding in its embrace the offspring, that is knowledge, in which it delights and which it joins to the begetter.<sup>33</sup>

Here, then, is the first trinity which Augustine will call an image of the divine Trinity in man. “There is a certain image of the Trinity in the mind itself, and the knowledge of itself which is its offspring and word, and love as the third, and these three are one and one substance.”<sup>34</sup> In this way Augustine brings to a close his discussion of the first trinity in which he sees “a kind of image of the Trinity” in us. He does not advert to this trinity again in detail, but will find a new and better image of the Trinity in man.

### SUMMATION

In the trinity of mind, self-knowledge, and self-love Augustine has found many resemblances to the major characteristics of the divine Trinity, but they have not all been found on the same level of self-knowledge. The discussion begins with self-knowledge understood in a general and indistinct way, but

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when he comes to the production of a word he demands perfect knowledge of self.<sup>35</sup> With respect to love he had laid down the principle that love follows knowledge, but in trying to note the difference between generation and procession in the Trinity by means of the created analogy he runs into difficulty. At the root of this problem is his consistent view of love as the unitive force in man's knowledge. This latter position leaves the impression that knowledge follows upon love, and his sudden change of terms (from *amor* to *appetitus*) does nothing really to alleviate the problem.<sup>36</sup> Finally, with respect to mind, the other member of the trinity, he consistently notes that it is something absolute, existing in itself, and not relative to some object like knowledge and love.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly, mind would seem to be out of place as part of a trinity composed of parts distinguished, apparently, only by relation. We have already seen that the mind is the site of the divine image for Augustine, and reflective of the unity of the Godhead. It then really has no place in the trinitarian image as one of the triad.

Each of the difficulties mentioned above will receive their solution in Augustine's discussion of his second trinity and image.

### THE SECOND IMAGE: *Memoria, Intelligentia, Voluntas Sui*

Continuing his investigations Augustine arrives eventually at another trinity in the mind of man: "Behold then the mind remembering itself, understanding itself, loving itself: if we perceive this, we perceive a trinity; not yet God, indeed, but already an image of God."<sup>38</sup> This trinity, in the opinion of Augustine, is a better image than the previous one, because, as he says, it is a "more evident" one.<sup>39</sup> Again, these are conclusions reached by Augustine after long and involved analyses, and we shall follow in his path. This image is treated of in two different places, and the final treatment is a development of the preliminary discussion. We will then begin with the earlier discussion of this trinity.



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### PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

This second trinity, though different from the first image proposed by Augustine, appears to be only a further development of the first trinity, as he sets out to examine more closely a point under discussion at the conclusion of the treatment of the first image.<sup>40</sup> The point being analyzed was the act of will which preceded the production of a mental word in the mind, and the principle that love follows knowledge had not fared well in his discussion. Now he proceeds to verify the truth that love does follow knowledge, and to examine the influence of love upon knowledge.<sup>41</sup>

Practically the whole of the tenth book of the *De Trinitate*, wherein occurs the preliminary discussion of the second image, is concerned with the process by which the mind comes to know itself in its true "word." Here is revealed Augustine's predilection for the platonic "theory of knowledge," and his constant efforts to combat the scepticism of the New Academy. The result of his search, manifesting the "strange adhesive power of love," and its capacity to pervert man's knowledge, remains a classic study in the psychology of man (and the complement to the same theme as proposed in his *Confessions*). We will make use of this penetrating analysis of the mind of man only when it is directly associated with the operation or the structure of the image of the Trinity.

His initial problem is stated in this way, "What does the mind love when it seeks so ardently to know itself, as yet still unknown to itself? For the mind seeks to know itself, and is inflamed with this desire. It loves therefore, but what does it love? Is it itself?"<sup>42</sup> His answer will be that the mind does know itself in some way before the desire to know itself arises. The first general answer is given in this way by Augustine, "In seeking to know itself is not the mind by this fact of seeking to know itself convicted of being more known to itself than unknown? For it knows itself as seeking and as not knowing itself, as long as it seeks to know itself."<sup>43</sup>

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This knowledge of self is plainly very imperfect, despite the fact that the whole mind knows and is known in some way. "Does that which knows itself in part not know itself partially? But it is absurd to say that it does not know as a whole what it knows. I do not say that it knows wholly, but what it knows it knows as a whole. When therefore it knows anything about itself, which it can only know as a whole, it knows itself as a whole."<sup>44</sup> This imperfect knowledge is not that knowledge or definition of mind which "is seen in the truth itself," and which results in the production of a mental word. Rather it is something of that imperfect knowledge which each "sees in himself."<sup>45</sup>

How is such knowledge possible? It is possible because the mind knows itself through itself—as is the case with other incorporeal things—and it is always present to itself and so offering the opportunity for knowledge. "When it is said to the mind 'know thyself' then it knows itself at the very moment when it understands the word 'thyself'; and this is so for no other reason than the fact that it is present to itself."<sup>46</sup> This point receives further clarification by Augustine when he observes the difference between self-knowledge and sense knowledge, whose object some had associated with the nature of the mind.

If it were any one of these, it would think of this one in a different manner than the rest, not, that is, by means of some figment of the imagination as absent things are thought of, which the bodily sense had contacted, either in themselves or others of the same kind, but by some kind of interior, not simulated but true, presence (for nothing can be more present to itself than itself); even as it thinks of itself as living, and remembering, understanding, and loving self. For it knows these things in itself, nor is it the result of imagination as if it touched these things outside of itself by sense. . . .<sup>47</sup>

The mind is always present to itself so Augustine can speak of a perpetual knowledge and love, (for it loves itself through itself also) of self.<sup>48</sup> Clearly this opinion will have to be

defended against those who are mistaken about the nature of the mind. This mistaken notion is ascribed by Augustine to (sinful) love.

Let the mind become acquainted with itself, and not seek itself as absent. . . . And so it will see that at no time did it ever not love itself, at no time did it ever not know itself: but by loving another thing with itself it has confused itself with it, and, in some manner, grown together with it; and so while embracing diverse things as though they were one, it comes to believe those things to be one which are diverse.<sup>49</sup>

Augustine is aware of the need for some distinction here, for the mind may, perhaps, always know itself, but certainly it is not always thinking of itself. His solution is to use the example of habitual knowledge. "It is one thing not to know oneself, and another not to think of oneself (for neither do we call the man skilled in many disciplines ignorant of grammar, although he is not thinking of it then when he is thinking of the art of medicine). . . ." <sup>50</sup> Then Augustine proceeds to distinguish the habitual type of knowledge from another kind of knowledge of self. The latter knowledge is certain knowledge, all have it, and all are certain that they have it. This means that Augustine will have to leave aside sense-knowledge from his consideration here. Personally he is convinced in his mature thought that what the senses tell us is true and certain, but the Academicians would not agree, and his discussion here is aimed at their faulty philosophy.<sup>51</sup>

Since we treat of the nature of the mind let us remove all knowledge from our consideration, all knowledge which is received from the exterior through the bodily senses; let us consider and attend more diligently to those things which all minds know about themselves and are certain of.<sup>52</sup>

This certain knowledge which all have is that personal consciousness and awareness of self. Consciousness of self reveals many points of certitude, although the nature of self, and of these certainties, may be doubted.

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Men have doubted whether the power of living, of remembering, of understanding, of willing, of thinking, of knowing, of judging be properties of air, of fire, of the brain, of the blood, of atoms, or besides the usual four elements, of a fifth kind of body of which I am ignorant. . . . But who doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts he lives; if he doubts he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts he understands that he doubts; if he doubts he wills to be certain; if he doubts he thinks; if he doubts he knows that he does not know; if he doubts he judges that he must not assent too rashly.<sup>53</sup>

From among the many points of certain knowledge Augustine selects three—rather arbitrarily if one judges from the immediate context only—for his new trinity. “Putting aside for the moment the other things of which the mind is certain concerning itself, let us especially consider memory, understanding, will.”<sup>54</sup> Despite the fact that Augustine had been speaking of activities of the soul which were certain to all, it seems that the terms *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas* include also the capacities in the soul corresponding to these activities.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps this interpretation of these terms appears evident to the reader, yet it is by no means that clear in the exposition of Augustine.

Thus far in his teaching Augustine has given no stress to the faculties of the soul whatsoever. The whole emphasis has been on knowledge (and love), either actual (and certain), or habitual (and permanent). The term *memoria* will range in his usage from the capacity for memory to habitual and actual recollection (and beyond). The same breadth of meaning, from power to habit to act, can be observed for the terms *intelligentia* and *voluntas*. Confusion will be compounded when Augustine finds trinitarian resemblances here, as he will find these resemblances at the different levels of the members of this trinity often without noting that they occur at different stages.

Very briefly, at this time, Augustine notes the consubstantiality and unity of this second trinity. “Since these three, memory,



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understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life, nor three minds, but one mind, it follows that they are not three substances, but one substance."<sup>56</sup> Plain here is the concrete and existential view which Augustine has of the mind. It is his conclusion that this trinity is one substance, because it is one mind. Before he had observed that knowledge and love were individually a "certain kind of life" in the subject of knowledge and love. Doubtless the same observation could be made of the operations of memory.<sup>57</sup> Yet these are not three lives of the mind, but one life, being one complex activity which necessarily, in the view of Augustine, includes all three aspects.<sup>58</sup> These three are one mind, because they constitute the complex activity of the one mind, not of three minds.

And so he can say that memory, or understanding and will, regarded as life, mind, substance are absolute, but regarded as memory, or understanding and will, they are relative. It is for this reason that Augustine chose these three from the many items of certain knowledge for his new trinity. Each member, memory, understanding, will, is relative to its object (and to the other two), while life, existence, and mind are not relative entities but absolutes.<sup>59</sup> At the same time he has been able to preserve distinction of the members of this trinity through relation, "for they are three by the fact that they are mutually referred to one another."

The mutual relation he notes here between the members of the second image bears with it the possibility of equality and circuminsession.

And if they were not equal, and not only to each other, but also each to all, they could not then mutually contain each other. For not only is each taken in by each, but also all by all. For I remember that I have memory and understanding and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will that I will and remember and understand.<sup>60</sup>

In his final remarks about this trinity a new similarity to the divine Trinity appears, namely the lack of time in the

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order of the members of this trinity to each other. This simultaneity in the order of parts reflects the co-eternity of the divine Persons. It is especially evident now that he is not referring to the faculties of memory, understanding, and will.

We found the mind itself, in its memory, understanding, and willing of itself, to be such that it must be understood as always remembering, knowing, and loving self at the same time, since it was apprehended as always knowing and loving self; although not always thinking of itself as distinct from those things which are not itself: and so its memory of self and understanding of self are not easily distinguished in it. For in this case where two things are very closely joined together, the one not preceding the other in time, it may appear as if they were not two, but one thing called by two names: and love itself is not perceived to be such, when need does not disclose it, for that which is loved is always present.<sup>61</sup>

The permanence of self-knowledge and self-love (from the presence of the mind knowable and lovable through itself) necessarily includes the memory of self for Augustine. Despite the lack of time in this perpetual trinity the members can be distinguished. In his final discussion of this trinity Augustine will explain what he means by the permanent (and habitual-type) trinity. For the present he concludes that these three "are one, one life, one mind, one essence," a description identical with that of the earliest trinity found in the *Confessions*.<sup>62</sup>

### THE FINAL DISCUSSION

In the context of seeking for a permanent image in man—on this count the trinity of faith had been eliminated—Augustine returns to the trinity of memory, understanding, and love of self. The preliminary discussion had ended with the recognition of a permanent trinity of memory, understanding, love of self in the mind. This point is now resumed by Augustine. "It suffices for us to be certain that when man becomes able to think of the nature of his own mind, and to find out the truth

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about it, he will not discover it anywhere but in himself. He will find, not that which he was ignorant of, but that which he was not thinking of. What can we know, if we are ignorant of that which is in our own mind; since whatever we know, we can only know by the mind."<sup>63</sup>

Augustine has reasserted in these words the distinction already made between knowledge of self and the thinking of oneself. Why is it, Augustine now asks, that the mind cannot always think of itself? The mind knows itself through itself, and is always present to itself.<sup>64</sup> The answer given by Augustine is a confession of ignorance on his part.

Such is the power of thought that the mind itself can only place itself in its own sight in some manner by thinking of itself. . . . But in what way it is not in its own sight when it is not thinking of itself, while it can never be without itself, as though it were itself one thing and the sight of itself another, I am not able to discover.<sup>65</sup>

Uncertain as he may be on that point he is definitely convinced that there is a knowledge of self natural to the mind, but it is only attained by reflexion.

It remains then that the sight of itself is something pertaining to the nature of the mind, and it is recalled to it when it thinks of itself, not by spatial movement but by incorporeal conversion: but when it is not thinking of itself, it is indeed not in its own sight, nor is its gaze formed from it, yet it knows itself as though it were a memory of self to itself.<sup>66</sup>

The knowledge of self, natural and native to the mind, is like a "memory" of self, for it is like knowledge in the memory, that is it is like habitual knowledge. "Certainly the mind does not beget this knowledge of self, when it beholds itself understood by thought, as though it had been unknown to self before: but it was known to itself in the way that things known are contained in the memory."<sup>67</sup> This unusual use of the term memory is now justified by Augustine, "as that is called memory

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in things past by which it is possible to recall and remember them, so in a thing present, as the mind is to itself, that is not absurdly called memory by which the mind is present to itself so that it can be understood by its own thought, and both can be joined together by love itself."<sup>68</sup>

In the complex "memory of self" love is also contained, for there is a love of self natural to the mind, as there is knowledge.

Hence we are admonished that there is in the hidden part of the mind knowledge of some things, and that it then comes forward into the middle, and is constituted more openly in the sight of the mind, when they are thought of: for then the mind discovers that it both remembers and understands and loves itself, even when it was thinking, not of itself, but of something else.<sup>69</sup>

It finally becomes clear what Augustine means by *memoria sui*, the perpetual and habitual trinity at the "back" of the mind. Clearly this is also the explanation for the earlier statement of Augustine that knowledge and love are somehow bound up with the substance of the soul, or mind, and evolve from it. It should be observed here also that this is not platonic "remembrance." Augustine expressly rejects this peculiarity of platonic thought in an earlier section.<sup>70</sup>

Nevertheless this perpetual trinity and "memory of self" is not the trinity he proposes as his final choice.

If we refer to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always at once together, and always have been since they began to be, whether they were being thought of or not, it will seem that the image of that Trinity pertains to the memory alone; but because there cannot be a word without thought . . . this image is rather to be perceived in these three, memory, understanding, will.<sup>71</sup>

On the basis of the principle that "a word cannot be without thought" Augustine selects his image. The image consists in



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acts of perfect knowledge (expressed in the mental word) and love of self flowing from the perpetual memory of self, which has been described above.

But I mean now by understanding that by which we understand in thought, that is when our thought is formed by the discovery of those things which were present to the memory, but not being thought of; and I mean that will, or love, or dilection which combines this offspring and parent, and is in some way common to both.<sup>72</sup>

The final choice is justified, not only because of the mental word produced, but because the mind (and the perpetual memory of self) is not "adventitious" to itself. Thus with regard to self as object of the image both permanence of the trinitarian facet in its roots is assured, and the proper order of knowledge (and love) flowing from the habitual trinity can be admitted. The memory of other created objects has followed upon the knowledge of them, and so in such knowledge the "consubstantiality" is deficient, and the permanence of the trinity is lacking. Furthermore, there is a time interval involved in the knowledge of objects other than self, and so the co-eternity of the Persons is not represented. This last feature of the trinity with self as object would apply only to the habitual and permanent trinity.

It is not so however with the mind itself, for it cannot be adventitious to itself . . . it does not see itself established in its own memory by recollection after knowing itself, as if it had not been there before it knew itself; undoubtedly from the moment it began to be, it never ceased to remember itself, to understand itself, and to love itself. . . ."<sup>73</sup>

It is the conclusion of Augustine that here we have the best trinity and image so far proposed. "Therefore in its turning to itself in thought, there appears a trinity, in which it is possible now to discern a word, formed indeed in that thought, and the will uniting both. Here then is where the image which we have been seeking may be more recognized."<sup>74</sup>

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### SUMMATION AND SYNTHESIS

Any attempt to precise the thought of Augustine where he has not done so himself is not without risk of error. Yet there is always a strong logic at work in his great mind, and this leads one to believe that such an effort has possibilities. The question arises as to the relation between the first two trinitarian images found by Augustine. Are they truly different, or is one simply a development of the other? It seems to us that the images with self as object are not only closely related, but that the second is only a refinement and development of the other. As a result there would be only one image with self as object.

The first image with mind, knowledge (*notitia*), and love (*amor*) of self as its parts terminated in the production of a mental word. The mental word itself did consist in perfect knowledge of self which was seen "in the truth itself." However there were suggestions as to other kinds of self-knowledge: one which each "sees in himself," and another somehow bound up with the substance of the soul and mind. The relations between these different types of knowledge and the production of the mental word was not explicated.

The second trinity as Augustine first proposed it did not terminate with the production of a mental word. It consisted—in a confused way, it is true—of self-memory, self-knowledge (*intelligentia*), and self-love (*voluntas*). The faculties corresponding to these acts did receive some attention, but little stress. The knowledge of self at this time (and the love) appeared to be operative on two levels: one a type of spontaneous consciousness, and the other a permanent quasi-habitual knowledge and love.<sup>75</sup>

In the final discussion of the second trinity a mental word again appears produced by thought (*cogitatio*). This word arises from the quasi-habitual self-knowledge and self-love which is native to the mind and so like a permanent memory of self.

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There is no difficulty in identifying this permanent memory of self with the perpetual and quasi-habitual self-knowledge and self-love outlined in the original discussion of the second trinity. It seems that it could also be identified with that mysterious knowledge of self bound up with the essence of the soul which appeared in the discussion of the first trinity. Finally the consciousness of self, mentioned in the original treatment of the second trinity, can be associated with that knowledge which each one "sees in himself," appearing in the discussion of the first image.

Two difficulties remain. The first, concerning the place of the *mens* in the two images, is easily disposed of. The mind belongs to the trinitarian image as representative of the unity of the divine nature. Augustine is aware of this, or soon becomes aware of it, for he notes even in the treatment of the first image that the mind is not something relative (as are knowledge and love), but exists in itself. At the beginning of his treatment of the second trinity he no longer places the mind in the trinity of parts, but assigns to it the role of reflecting the unity of the Godhead. The other difficulty has to do with the mental word: in the first trinity it is the result of being seen "in the truth itself," and in the second it appears to be the activation of the habitual self-knowledge belonging to the permanent "memory of self." Are these words to be numerically identified, or is this asking too much consistency from the incomplete augustinian "theory of knowledge"?<sup>76</sup>

Whatever be the solution to the last difficulty it seems that there is only one image with self as object, and that it exists at different levels and stages of operation. Why does not Augustine say this? Because it is part of the platonic dialectic to ascend from the lower to the higher, from complexities to simplicities, and because the thought of Augustine is developing as he leads his readers along this route. We shall present the one image with self as object in a schematic fashion.

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the <i>Mens</i> (unity)	STAGES OF THE TRINITY	PARTS OF THE TRINITY		
		<i>Memoria sui</i>	<i>Intelligentia sui</i>	<i>Voluntas sui</i>
	potential	memory	intellect	will
	quasi-habitual	permanent and habitual memory of self from presence of mind	permanent and habitual self-knowledge native to the mind	permanent and habitual self-love of the mind
	actual, but imperfect	remembrance of self	consciousness of self	concomitant love
	actual, and perfect	complex memory of self, the habitual knowledge and love of self	the production of a mental word from this memory of self	perfect love consequent upon word, from this memory

Unquestionably Augustine selects the last stage of this trinity as the best image thus far presented by him, and for the reason that there is a word produced. The other similarities to the divine Trinity have appeared at different stages of this image, and are of lesser note to his mind.

### THE THIRD IMAGE: *Memoria Dei, Intelligentia, Voluntas*

"The most true honor of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except in relation to him by whom it is impressed."<sup>77</sup> This is the basic principle of Augustine, and it is asserted in the midst of his search for trinities in man with regard to objects other than God. The augustinian notion of image, as we have seen, includes as an essential note the dynamic tendency toward the exemplar which is God. Yet Augustine has found two trinitarian images with self as object; these we have seen to be reductively one image. Nevertheless, even in treating of self as object of the activity of the trinitarian image Augustine has made clear, though scattered, statements that God is the object.<sup>78</sup> The reconciliation of diverse objects of the image, God and self, becomes the concern of Augustine now. Here also is to be observed the integration of his general doctrine of the image with the trinitarian aspects.



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Immediately after concluding that the trinity of *memoria sui, intelligentia, voluntas* is an image of God, Augustine appears to deny that it is an image, though the denial is not complete. "Now this trinity of the mind is not therefore the image of God because the mind remembers, understands, and loves self: but because it is able to remember, understand, and love him also by whom it was made. When it does this it becomes wise."<sup>79</sup> Self as object of the image has never met the augustinian requirements for a trinity of wisdom, in any true sense, and wisdom is the proper realm of the image, as we have seen. The object of wisdom is an eternal and divine object; the mind does not meet this specification very well.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, Augustine has not denied absolutely that self is some sort of object; this would be to reject practically all of his preceding discussion of the trinitarian image, to say nothing of later statements. The word "also" in the augustinian text will not permit such an interpretation, but what it does signify is that self as the object of the image is not to be conceived independently of the true object which is God. Self as object must be related to God as the object, and in a subordinate way.

With characteristic vigor Augustine sets about reducing self to a relative and subordinate object of the trinitarian image. "If it does not do this [refer the activity of the trinity in man to God], even if it remember, understand, and love self, then it is stupid. Let the mind then remember its God, in whose image it was made, let it understand him and love him."<sup>81</sup> If the activity of the created trinity is not referred to God, but only to self, then we have a trinity of "stupidity," not a trinity of wisdom. Augustine uses the same tactic with respect to the individual parts of the trinity in man.

The love which man has for himself is a natural endowment, but if God is not loved then this love can be considered more properly as hate of self.

And the human mind is so constructed that it can never forget itself, never not understand or love itself. . . . with

## Image of the Trinity

good reason the mind of man may be said to hate itself when it is harmful to itself . . . Therefore he who knows how to love himself, loves God: while he who does not love God, even if he loves himself—which belongs to his nature—may yet and not improperly be said to hate himself, when he does that which is opposed to his own good, and attacks himself as his own enemy.<sup>82</sup>

If man does not know himself, precisely as under God and over other creatures, and does not act in accordance with this knowledge, then he has “forgotten self,” and does not truly understand himself. To the question “why man is to know himself,” Augustine answers:

In order that he may understand himself, and live according to his nature; that is to strive to be ordered in accordance with his nature, under him whom it should be subject to, and above those things to which it ought to be preferred, under him by whom it ought to be ruled, over all that it ought to rule. For it does many things through depraved desire as though it had *forgotten self*. For it sees things intrinsically beautiful in that more excellent nature which is God, and though it should stand steadfast as to enjoy them, it is turned away from him by wishing to attribute these things to itself, *and not from him be like him*, but to be from itself what he is, and it moves and slips down into less and less, that which it thinks is more and more; for neither is it sufficient for itself, nor is anything at all sufficient for it, if it withdraws from him who is alone sufficient. . . .<sup>83</sup>

The reduction of self to the status of a relative and subordinate object of the trinitarian image, relative and subordinated to that object which is God, is now complete. If self is an object of the image independently of God, then we have a trinity of stupidity, whose members are self-forgetfulness, self-ignorance, and self-hate. However, Augustine is not dazzled by his own rhetoric so as to believe he has solved completely the problem of the relation of self to God as object of the trinity by this method. The perpetual trinity with self as object

remains in the soul, and this he will have to account for in his final solution of the problem.

Augustine now turns to the establishing of a trinity with God as object. The members of this trinity, manifestly, will parallel the parts of the trinity with self as object. It will be composed of the "memory" of God, the knowledge, and love of God as its members. There is no need to delay over the last two members of this trinity—nor does Augustine devote much time to their exposition here—as they concern matter which we have already seen in a previous chapter. It is sufficient to recall here that *intelligentia Dei*, the knowledge of God, presupposes the gift of faith and the illumination of the Word himself, and reaches its peak in this life with the operation of the Gift of Wisdom. *Amor* (or *voluntas*) *Dei*, the love of God, is charity, the special gift of the Spirit who comes to dwell in the soul along with the other Persons of the Trinity.<sup>84</sup> It is only with respect to the first member of this trinity, the *memoria Dei*, that Augustine treats of matter new to this study.

As *memoria sui* was made possible in its permanent aspect by the presence of the mind to itself in some intelligible way, so too, *memoria Dei* is associated with an intelligible presence of God in the view of Augustine.

And indeed "He is not far from each of us," as the apostle says, "for in him we live and move and exist" (Acts 17:27-28). If this were said with regard to the body, it might also be understood of the corporeal world. For we also live and move and exist in it, with respect to the body. Wherefore it ought to be understood in a more excellent way with regard to the mind which is his image, that is in an *intelligible way*, and not in a visible way.<sup>85</sup>

The presence of God to man, the exemplar to its image, is a recurring theme in the teaching of Augustine. In the *Confessions* he finds God in his memory; here, in the *De Trinitate*, the relation of God to the memory is different. The presence of God is conceived of in this work as the basis (partial) for the

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activation of the "remembering of God." "And he is everywhere in his totality so that in him man both lives, and moves, and exists; and therefore man can remember him."<sup>86</sup> Man can "remember" God, for he is present to all, and in some sort of "intelligible" way.

God is present everywhere and to all men, yet not all men are "with" him, nor, indeed, is he "with" all men in the same way. Man attains to some union with God by remembering, understanding, and loving him. On the other hand, God may be present everywhere by the common presence of his divinity, but he is "with" some men in that special way only which is the indwelling of grace.<sup>87</sup>

If then all things are in him, in whom can those things which live possibly live, or those which move possibly move, except in him in whom they are. Yet not all are with him in that way in which it is said to him, "I am always with you." Nor is he with all in that way in which it is said: "The Lord be with you." And so it is the great misery of man not to be with him without whom he cannot possibly be. For he is in him, and without a doubt cannot be without him: and yet if he does not remember, understand, and love him, he is not with him.<sup>88</sup>

When he talks of being "with" God, Augustine is not speaking any "recall" of God, but of a special one which flows from the presence of the Spirit, and his gifts.

But when it rightly remembers its Lord, having received his Spirit, then, it perceives clearly, because it learns from an inward teaching, that it cannot rise except through his freely given affection, and that it had been able to fall only through its freely chosen defection.<sup>89</sup>

The "rightly remembering" God presupposes a more basic "reminder" to those who had "forgotten" their God. The first "reminder" then is to sinners, and consists in the initial reformation of the image through baptism, and the gifts of grace.

But those by being reminded have been converted to the Lord from that deformity, in which through worldly desires



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they were conformed to this world, are re-formed from it . . . so that the image is re-formed by him who had formed it at first.<sup>90</sup>

Sinners may have "forgotten" their God, but they still remain capable of being "reminded," and for two reasons, the presence of God, and the permanent trinity in the mind of man. God is present even to the sinner, and sometimes "touches" him by his grace.

But the mind is reminded so that it can be turned to God, as though to that light by which it was touched in some way even when turned from him. For thus it is that even the impious think of eternity, and correctly blame or praise much in the morals of man . . . touched sometimes by the splendor of the everywhere present truth.<sup>91</sup>

Associated with the possibility of being "reminded" to turn to God from their "forgetting" of him, is the permanent trinity of self-memory, self-knowledge, self-love remaining even in the sinner. *Memoria sui*, the habitual trinity in the mind, is the image left to the sinner, and (together with the natural presence of God) the ground for the renewal of the trinitarian image with God as object.

Yet such a man [the sinner] walks in an image (cf. Ps. 38:7) because his mind has a memory, understanding, and love of himself . . . by reason of this image in himself he is able to cleave to him whose image it is. For it has been so placed in the rank of natures, not of place, that above it there is only God.<sup>92</sup>

In this way Augustine has finally been able to reconcile what he considers to be a natural and indestructible trinitarian image in the mind with the true image of the Trinity in man having God for its object. Man is *capax Trinitatis* because he bears within himself always and indestructably an image of the Trinity.

Let the mind remember its God, in whose image it was made, and let it understand and love him. Briefly, let it

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worship the uncreated God who created it with the capacity for himself, and in whom it is able to be a partaker . . . and it will be wise, not by its own light, but by participating in that supreme light. . . .<sup>93</sup>

The trinitarian image with God as object is the trinity of wisdom which he had been "searching" for through a long and involved dialectic. In these words Augustine sums up his discussion of this image, the third and final one.

We treated of the true wisdom of man which is granted by God's gift in the participation of God himself, which is distinct from knowledge, and the discussion reached this point that a trinity appeared in the image of God, which man is with respect to his mind, and which is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him to his image, and so obtains wisdom wherein is the contemplation of things eternal.<sup>94</sup>

The full perfection of the trinitarian image is reserved for the full sight of God who is the Trinity.

That image of which it is written, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," because it was not said "to my image" or "to your image" we believe to have been made to the image of the Trinity, and it is this we have tried to understand as far as possible by our investigation. And therefore it is according to this image that we may better understand the words of St. John, "We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."<sup>95</sup>

### SUMMATION AND FINAL SYNTHESIS

Here we shall consider but two factors from the augustinian discussion of the trinitarian image in man: the stages or different levels of the trinitarian image, and the relation of self as subordinate object of the activity of the image to God as the principal, and true object of the image. With respect to the first consideration Augustine has distinguished generally three levels of the trinitarian image in man: a permanent ineradicable trinity, a renewed and re-formed trinitarian image, and finally the full perfection of the trinitarian image in the state of glory.

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The natural and permanent trinitarian image left to man after sin is the habitual (*quasi*) trinity consisting in self-memory, self-knowledge, self-love. In the view of Augustine no one loses this natural reflection of the Trinity for it is bound up with the very essence of the mind or soul. Clearly he is not speaking of this trinity as activated by acts of self-knowledge and love. These acts either will be referred to God in some way, and then this trinity will belong to the renewed image, or they are not referred to God and we have then the trinity of "stupidity," which is not a reflection of the divine Trinity at all.

Also to be associated with the permanent trinity in the mind of man is the common presence of God. For it is by reason of the presence of God, and the natural capacities underlying the perpetual trinity, that man will be able "to remember" God. This common presence of the divinity may be called by Augustine an "intelligible" presence of God, but he is certain that there is no union with God nor perception of his presence except by grace.<sup>96</sup> The presence of God, common to all men, together with the perpetual trinity in the mind, even in sinners, is considered by Augustine as the potential basis for the actual remembering, knowing, and loving of God, which is the act of the renewed image. In other words the "relics" of the trinitarian image in man are as a complex unit related by Augustine to the re-formed and supernatural image of the Trinity as its basis.

The re-formed trinitarian image presupposes the renewal of the image in the mind by grace and the accompanying gifts. It consists in the "memory," knowledge, and love of God. It is perhaps better to use the Latin terms here of *memoria*, *intellectus*, *voluntas* (*amor*), for these terms retain the breadth of meaning which they had in previous trinities. They range in meaning from power to habit to act, but inasmuch as the term "potential" has been usurped by the relics of the natural trinitarian image, they will have a correspondingly limited meaning. The "memory" of God in the supernatural image is associated with the indwelling of the Trinity, and its act is the "recollection"

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of God. *Intelligentia Dei* is knowledge of God, ranging from the gift of faith to the operations of the Gift of Wisdom, and at this peak, perhaps, God's presence is perceived. *Voluntas Dei* is the love of God which is charity, and its growth accompanies, and, in another sense, precedes the growing perception and knowledge of God.<sup>97</sup>

The full perfection of the image is reserved for the blessed in heaven. There God is present immediately to the mind by reason of the beatific vision. There too knowledge of God attains to him "as he is" in himself, and not as he is perceived in this life through the veils of faith, and charity receives its fullest measure.

We can schematize the different stages of the trinitarian image in the following way, well aware that it is not as explicit in the treatment of Augustine.

	STAGES OF THE TRINITY	PARTS OF THE TRINITY		
		<i>Memoria Dei</i>	<i>Intelligentia Dei</i>	<i>Voluntas Dei</i>
the <i>mens</i> after original sin	natural and potential	self-memory as capacity for the memory of God and the common presence of God	self-knowledge as capacity for knowledge of God	self-love as capacity for love of God
the <i>mens</i> as reformed by grace	supernatural and reformed image: habitual to imperfect act	recollection of God — associated with the indwelling	knowledge of God ranging from faith to perception of God's presence in operation of Wisdom	love of God accompanying, and preceding knowledge of him
the <i>mens</i> in glory	the state of the blessed - perfect act	the presence of God in the beatific vision	knowledge of God "as he is" in himself	love of God to its fullest

The final problem has to do with self as an object of the image. We have seen that when Augustine treats of his third image he attempts to synthesize self as an object of the image with God as the true object. On the one hand he fabricates his



trinity of "stupidity" with self as an object unrelated to God, and on the other hand he relates the perpetual trinity with self as object in the mind as the potential basis for the re-formed image with God as object. How then does self really fit into the trinitarian image as object, if it does at all?

Self must be related as object to God as object of the trinitarian image and in a subordinate way. What is self's relation to God in reality? Man is related to God as the image of God, and it is this relative and subordinate position that self must assume as the object of the image. Self is an object of the trinity in man if known and loved precisely as an image of God.<sup>98</sup> In this way Augustine synthesizes the objects of the image. The trinity of self-knowledge and love, bound up as it is with the nature of the mind, expresses the true nature of man, it expresses man as the image of God, and so of its very nature it is related to God in the subordinate way of being an image.<sup>99</sup>

And they who see through this mirror [the mind] and in this enigma, as it is allowed in this life to see, are not those who behold in their own minds the things we have set forth but those who see this *as if an image*, so as to be able to refer what they see to him whose image it is . . .<sup>100</sup>

Under the formal aspect of image self is the object of the image, but then it is truly only an intermediate object, and not the formal object. God alone is the formal object of the image, because an image as image represents the imaged, and is not the term of activity, but simply the medium.

Nevertheless, there is an aspect of the trinitarian image in which self is the best object, and it is the use of the image as analogy for the Trinity. We have seen that Augustine in the *De Trinitate* is not at first concerned with the nature of the trinitarian image as such, but wishes to illustrate the Trinity to his readers through an analogy. This procedure is precisely the aspect of the trinitarian image which is able to give unity to Augustine's treatise on the Trinity.<sup>101</sup> The same approach

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was used in the *Confessions*, as has been noted. While discussing the two trinities with self as object, Augustine has had to observe that God as object of the image does not result in the equality of the various members of the trinity in man.<sup>102</sup> Self is the best object for the trinitarian image used as an analogy or illustration for the divine Trinity. Augustine continues to use the trinity with self as object, and the capacities underlying this trinity, as analogy for the divine Trinity, even after he has finished his formal treatment of the trinitarian image in man. He will point out the many similarities involved (and the greater dissimilarities) between the members of the created trinity and the divine Trinity.<sup>103</sup> "Memory," understood especially as quasi-habitual knowledge, is like the Father; the word in us is like the Word of God; our will and our love bear noteworthy resemblance to the Spirit.<sup>104</sup> Here Augustine finally resolves the problem of the difference between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, and he uses the difference between the processes of human knowing and loving for the solution. Knowledge produces an image of itself, whereas love does not;<sup>105</sup> similarly the Son who is the Word is the Image of the Father, while the Spirit is not.

The difference between the use of the created trinity as analogy and its nature as the image of the Trinity appears very clearly when Augustine finally comes to the discussion of God as the object of the image. Up to this time Augustine has devoted much energy to the similarities between facets of the created trinities and the divine Trinity. Nothing of this procedure appears in his treatment of the image with God as object.<sup>106</sup> The only sufficient reason for this marked change is the fact that the trinity with God as object is not an analogy, and was never intended to be such; it is the image of the Trinity. Man *becomes* like God by knowing God; he *becomes* like God by loving him. Man *is* like God naturally in knowing and loving himself, but he becomes more like God only by knowing and loving God (and self as the image of God).

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In Augustine's view, the difference between the use of the trinity with self as object for analogy and illustration of the divine Trinity and the trinity with God as object is based on the difference between a static, ontological image fundamentally and a dynamic, operational image. For Augustine the knowledge and love of self is bound up indestructibly with the essence of the soul or mind, and this is the fundamental trinitarian image left to man. The activation of this perpetual trinity adds nothing really to the original likeness, but can only diminish it, if it is perverse.<sup>107</sup> It is only in knowing and loving God that the trinity in man becomes more and more like God, and here is the "return" of the image upon its exemplar, that is the activation of the essential tendency of the image.<sup>108</sup>

In the following passage from close to the end of the *De Trinitate* the complex (and confusing) view which Augustine has of the trinitarian image plainly appears.

We have done our best to admonish those who seek a reason for such things to perceive the invisible things of him as they are able through the things that are made, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature which is made in the image of God; through which they may see, as in a mirror, if they can and as far as they can the Trinity of God in our memory, understanding, will.

This is the use of the trinity in man as analogy, and, we should add that the terms memory, understanding, will are not to be interpreted purely as the powers corresponding to these. More probably he is referring to the permanent and natural trinity of self-memory, self-knowledge, and self-love. He continues:

Let a man have the lively perception of these three, existing naturally in his mind by divine institution, and how great a thing this is in it whence the eternal and immutable nature also can be recalled, seen, desired, remembered through memory, beheld through understanding, embraced through love, and there assuredly he will find an image of that supreme Trinity.

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This is the image of the Trinity in man wherein God is the object. The change of the last member of this trinity to "love" from "will" leads one to believe that he is now referring to acts, and not the powers. He concludes:

To the remembering, seeing, loving of that supreme Trinity, that he may recall it, contemplate it, and delight in it, the whole of his life ought to be referred.<sup>109</sup>

Here is the "return" of the image upon its exemplar, the trinity in man upon its only true object, the Trinity that is God.

\* \* \*

Augustine has succeeded in integrating the whole of his teaching about the image of the one God with the doctrine of the image of the Trinity, but the process was not without great labor.<sup>110</sup> The use of trinities in man to exemplify the divine Trinity—and this was his principal aim—delayed and obstructed the integration to such a degree that achieving it required a magnificent effort at synthesis. Here appeared, in addition to the profound insights into the trinitarian processions, the brittleness and weakness of the philosophical instrument used by Augustine. Platonic thought led him into such an anamoly as the assertion of a perpetual self-knowledge (and love) in the roots of the human spirit.<sup>111</sup> Having denied platonic reminiscence and the pre-existence of souls he is unable to account for this phenomenon. At the same time his attachment to memory, and his penchant for parallels, resulted in strange and forced uses of this term. These minor defects do not, and cannot, detract from the beautiful simplicity and unity, the profound richness of the augustinian synthesis. The originality of the genius of Augustine is nowhere more evident than it is here in the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in man. It is to this originality that we shall direct our attention next.



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>*Conf. XIII, 11* (PL 32:849, CSEL 33:352 f), "Vellem ut haec tria cogitarent homines in se ipsis. Longe aliud sunt ista tria quam illa trinitas, sed dico, ubi se exerceant et probent et sentiant, quam longe sunt. Dico autem haec tria: esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim et scio et volo: sum sciens et volens et scio esse me et velle et volo esse et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita et una vita et una mens et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest. Certe coram se est. . . ." Cf. *De Civ. Dei*, XI, 26-28 (PL 41:399 f, CC,SL 48:345 f), where something of the same trinity is perceived to be in man, "nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus."

<sup>2</sup>*Loc. cit.*, ". . . et utrum propter tria haec et ibi trinitas, an in singulis haec tria, ut terna singulorum sint, an utrumque miris modis simpliciter et multipliciter . . . quis facile cogitaverit? . . ." Later in this same work Augustine gives a full trinitarian exegesis to the image text from Genesis, yet there is no expressed statement to the effect that man is an image of the Trinity. For this reason, and for the fact that Augustine does not bring the scriptural text into the context of the trinity he finds in man we consider his explicit statements must be taken at face value. The trinity is proposed purely as an illustration of the Trinity, as an analogy. Cf. *Conf. XIII, 22* (PL 32:858-859, CSEL 33:369 f), ". . . ad imaginem et similitudinem suam . . . et doces eum quod iam capacem videre trinitatem unitatis vel unitatem trinitatis. Ideoque pluraliter dicto: facimus hominem, singulariter tamen infertur: et fecit Deus hominem, et pluraliter dicto: ad imaginem nostram, singulariter infertur: ad imaginem Dei."

<sup>3</sup>*DT, XII, 6, 7*, "Dixit enim Deus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; paulo post autem dictum est: Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei. Nostram certe, quia pluralis est numerus, non recte diceretur, si homo ad unius personae imaginem fieret, sive Patris, sive Filii, sive Spiritus sancti; sed quia fiebat ad imaginem Trinitatis, propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem ne in Trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos, cum sit eadem Trinitas unus Deus: Et fecit, inquit, Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei; pro eo ac si diceret: ad imaginem suam." We have chosen to use Augustine's interpretation of the image text as it appears after much of his discussion of the trinities in man. However, the same interpretation appears *before* he begins with his search for analogies. Cf. *DT, VII, 6, 12*, "Aliquando latenter omnino, sicut in Genesi: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Et 'faciamus,' et 'nostram,' pluraliter dictum est, et nisi ex relativis accipi non oportet. Non enim ut facerent dii, aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum; set ut facerent Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, ad imaginem Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, ut subsisteret homo imago Dei. Deus autem Trinitas."

<sup>4</sup>Cf. *Epist. CLXXIV* (PL 33:758) which he wished appended to his treatise on the Trinity as a sort of preface because this work had been surreptitiously published before he had finished the thirteenth book. He complains, not only about the theft, but because the books were linked one to the other by a *developing inquiry*, and should be read (and interpreted) in that way. Cf. *Retract., II, 15* (PL 32:635 f).

## Image of the Trinity

There are many articles, and even books, which treat of the image of the Trinity as found in St. Augustine. The following are those available to us, and some do not proceed along the development given by Augustine, but rather summarize and synthesize using the texts not completely in context. See E. Gilson, *Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Augustin*, 275-298; C. Boyer, "L'Image de Trinité Synthèse de la Pensee Augustinienne," *Gregorianum*, V (1946), 173-199; 333-352; A. Gardeil, *La Structure de L'Ame et L'Experience Mystique*, 2 vol. (Paris: Gabalda, 1927); L. Arias, "La Imagen de la Trinidad en le Homme," *Obras de San Agustin*, V, 56-104; R. Tremblay, "La Théorie Psychologique de la Trinité chez Saint Augustin," *Etudes et Recherches*, VIII (1952), 83-110; and others. Unfortunately the work which is considered "classic" in this area, that of M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus*, (Aschendorff, Munster: 1927), has not been available to us.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. *DT*, XV, 3, 5, where Augustine gives his own summary of preceding books, "Deinde per veritatem quae intellectu conspicitur, et per bonum summum a quo est omne bonum, et per iustitiam propter quam diligitur animus iustus ab animo etiam nondum iusto, ut natura . . . quod est Deus, quantum fieri potest, intelligeretur admonui: et per charitatem, quae in Scripturis sanctis Deus dicta est, per quam coepit utcumque etiam Trinitas intelligentibus apparere, sicut sunt amans, et quod amatur, et amor."

<sup>6</sup>Cf. *DT*, VIII, 8, 12, "Imo vero vides Trinitatem, si charitatem vides." This is a favored approach of Augustine, to see God in love. It appears profusely in his sermons, letters, exegetical works, and others.

<sup>7</sup>*DT*, VIII, 10, 14, "Quid est ergo amor, nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet, et quod amatur?"

<sup>8</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 2, 2.

<sup>9</sup>*DT*, IX, 3, 3, "Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest, nisi etiam se noverit: nam quomodo amat quod nescit?"

<sup>10</sup>*DT*, XII, 3, 3, ". . . intellectum nostrum et actionem, vel consilium et executionem, vel rationem et appetitum rationalem, vel si quo alio modo significantius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur. . . ." Cf. C. Boyer, "L'Image de Trinite. . . .", 182-183; A. Gardeil, *La Structure de L'Ame. . . .*, I, 28-34. It is also the interpretation of St. Thomas, cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad 6; *ibid.*, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1.

<sup>11</sup>*DT*, IX, 4, 4, "Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius, tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt; et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt."

<sup>12</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Illa [notitia] enim vita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis: corpus autem non est vita."

<sup>13</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 11, 16, "Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus; sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia nec tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse se . . . ita cum Deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus, maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata verbum est, fitque Dei similitudo illa notitia: tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus."

<sup>14</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 4, 4, "Cum ergo se totam cognoscit, neque secum quidquam aliud, par illi est cognitio sua." Cf. *DT*, IX, 2, 2, "Et cum tantum se vult esse, quantum est, par menti voluntas est, et amanti amor aequalis."

<sup>15</sup>*DT*, IX, 4, 5, "Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere, et tanquam involuta evolvi ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, non tamquam in subjecto. . . ."

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<sup>16</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Mens autem amore quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se. Item non se solam cognoscit mens, sed et alia multa. Quomobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subiecto insunt menti; sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt, sicut ipsa mens. . . ." Cf. *DT*, IX, 2, 2, "Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus, sed spiritus: nec mens corpus, sed spiritus est." It can be observed in the latter statement, which is the earlier, that Augustine proposes the "substantiality" of love with great caution. The first citation given is his next reference to substantiality, and hesitancy is observable there too.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 5, 8, "Nam et mens est utique in se ipsa, quoniam ad se ipsam mens dicitur: quamvis noscens, vel nota, vel noscibilis ad suam notitiam relative dicitur; amans quoque et amata vel amabilis ad amorem referatur, quo se amat. Et notitia quamvis referatur ad mentem cognoscentem vel cognitam. . . . Et amor quamvis referatur ad mentem amantem, cujus amor est. . . ."

Augustine's notion of substance is very elastic, and ranges from that which is opposed to nothing to identification with nature, essence, though he does find distinction of some kind between substance, nature, essence. See R. Tremblay, "La Theorie Psychologique de la Trinité chez S. Augustin," 95 f.

<sup>18</sup>It is the interpretation of St. Thomas, cf. *Quodl.* 7, a. 4; *De Spir. Creat.*, a. 11, ad 16. It is repeated by A. Gardeil, *La Structure de L'Ame.* . . ., I, 55-56; C. Boyer, "L'Image de la Trinité synthese. . . ." 185-186; R. Tremblay, "La Theorie Psychologique. . . ." 103-104.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 4, 5-4, 6, ". . . quia et si [amor et cognitio] relative dicuntur ad invicem, in sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia. Nec sicut color et coloratum relative ita dicuntur ad invicem, ut color in subiecto colorato sit, non habens in se ipso propriam substantiam; quoniam coloratum corpus substantia est, ille autem in substantia. Sed sicut duo amici etiam duo sunt homines, quae sunt substantiae; cum homines non relative dicantur, amici autem relative."

<sup>20</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 4, 6, "Amor autem quo se mens amat, si esse desinat, simul et illa desinet esse amans. Item notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse se desinet." Cf. text cited in note (17) of this chapter.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 2, 2, ". . . nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur." Cf. *DT*, IX, 12, 18, "Ab utroque enim paritur notitia, a cognoscente et a cognito." Cf. text in note (17) of this chapter.

<sup>22</sup>See C. Boyer, "L'Image de la Trinité synthese. . . ." 181 f.

<sup>23</sup>*DT*, IX, 4, 7; "Quomodo autem illa tria non sint eiusdem substantiae, non video; cum mens ipsa se amet, atque ipsa se noverit; atque ita sint haec tria, ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel nota sit. Unius ergo eiusdem essentiae necesse est haec tria sint: et ideo si tanquam commixtione confusa essent, nullo modo essent tria, nec referri ad invicem possent." Cf. *DT*, IX, 5, 8, "Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum quodque substantia est, et simul omnia una substantia vel essentia, cum relative dicantur ad invicem."

<sup>24</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 4, 7, "Sed nulla pars totum, cujus pars est, complectitur: mens vero cum se totam novit, hoc est perfecte novit, per totum ejus est notitia ejus; et cum se perfecte amat, totam se amat, et per totum ejus est amor ejus." It is clear that Augustine here rejects parts of integral whole only as embracing the whole, and so leaves open the question of a potestative whole. The latter concept will be used by St. Thomas with respect to the *mens* and its powers (and acts), cf. *De Verit.*, Q. 10, a. 1 and ad 8.



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<sup>25</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 5, 8, "Ita sunt haec singula in se ipsis . . . in alternis . . . singula in binis . . . bina in singulis . . . tota vero in totis. . . ."

<sup>26</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 3, 3, "Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetisam. Ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam novit, quoniam est incorporea."

<sup>27</sup>*DT*, IX, 6, 9, "Sed cum se ipsam novit humana mens et amat se ipsam, non aliquid incommutabile novit et amat: aliterque unusquisque homo loquendo enuntiat mentem suam, quid in se ipso agatur attendens; aliter autem humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit . . . Unde manifestum est, aliud unumquemque videre in se, quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen videat; aliud autem in ipsa veritate, quod alius quoque possit intueri. . . . Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes videndo, per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam; sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat."

<sup>28</sup>*DT*, IX, 7, 12, "In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus: atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus: nec a nobis nascendo discedit." The form according to which we are made is the "divine idea" of man, and the true "word" of man will be measured against it, as will man himself in his actions. For it is also the form according to which we do anything in accordance with reason, and the plan of God. It is then the proximate exemplar for the image in man and its activity.

<sup>29</sup>*DT*, IX, 11, 16, "Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam novit, hoc est, cuius notitia est; haec habet perfectam et aequalem, qua mens ipsa, quae novit, est nota. Ideoque et imago et verbum est, quia de illa exprimitur, cum cognoscendo eidem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est."

<sup>30</sup>*DT*, IX, 12, 18, "Unde liquendo tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito. Itaque mens cum se ipsam cognoscit, sola parens est notitiae suae; et cognitum enim et cognitor ipsa est." Later, in book XV, Augustine will find many more similarities between our mental word and the Word of God. As our word is expressed in sound yet not changed into sound, so the Word of God was made flesh but not changed into flesh; there are no works of man without an inner word preceding, and no works (creation) of God without the Word of God; our word can be without a work following upon it, and so too with the Word of God, for creatures are not necessary to his existence, (*DT*, XV, 11, 20).

<sup>31</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 10, 15, "Verbum est . . . cum amore notitia."

<sup>32</sup>*DT*, IX, 8, 13, "Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur, quasi medius amor coniungit, seque cum eis tertium complexu incorporeo, sine ulla confusione constringit."

<sup>33</sup>*DT*, IX, 12, 18, "Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam, quo id quo nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniando, nascitur proles ipsa notitia; ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia partus et proles recte dici non potest; idemque appetitus . . . fit amor cognitae, dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est, notitiam, gignentique coniungit."



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<sup>34</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Et est quaedam imago Trinitatis, ipsa mens, et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de se ipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius, et haec tria unum atque una substantia." Cf. *DT*, XV, 3, 5.

<sup>35</sup>There is a problem with the translation of the word *notitia*. It has been translated in the only manner possible, that is by the term knowledge. Nevertheless the signification of the term *notitia* in book IX is rather vague; in book X and the following books, for the most part, it appears to signify habitual, virtual and implicit knowledge. When Augustine speaks of actual knowledge he more often uses the term *intelligentia*, and *cogitatio* is used for the process by which the mental word is produced. Such variations cannot all appear in translation, and they are of some significance. See E. Gilson, *L'Introduction a L'Etude*. . . ., p. 292, note (3), where he takes the position, against M. Schmaus, *Die Psychologische des hl. Augustinus*, 250 f, that *notitia* not only refers to actual knowledge in book IX, but is even here sometimes taken for habitual and implicit knowledge. Gilson is closer to the truth of the matter when he says, "Peut-être d'ailleurs voulons-nous les uns et les autres trouver dans la pensée d'Augustin plus de précision qu'elle n'en comporte, ou même un certain genre de précision abstraite qu'elle exclut."

<sup>36</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 12, 18, "Qui appetitus, id est, inquisitio, quamvis amor esse non videatur, quo id quod notum est amatur; hoc enim adhuc ut cognoscatur agitur: tamen ex eodem genere quiddam est."

<sup>37</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 2, 2, "Mens vero et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. . . ."; IX, 4, 6, "Sed item quamvis substantia sit amans vel sciens, substantia sit scientia, substantia sit amor, sed amans et amor, aut sciens et scientia relative ad se dicantur, sicut amici; mens vero aut spiritus non sint relativa. . . ."

<sup>38</sup>*DT*, XIV, 8, 11, "Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se: hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei."

<sup>39</sup>Cf. *DT*, XV, 3, 5, "In decimo hoc idem diligentius subtiliusque tractatum est, atque ad id perductum, ut inveniretur in mente evidentior trinitas ejus, in memoria scilicet et intelligentia et voluntate."

<sup>40</sup>Cf. *DT*, X, 1, 1, "Nunc ad ea ipsa consequenter enodatus explicanda limatio accedat intentio." Cf. also text cited in note (39) of this chapter.

<sup>41</sup>Cf. *DT*, X, 1, 2, "Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. . . ." *ibid.*, X, 1, 3, "Illud enim fieri potest ut amet quisquis scire incognita, ut autem amet incognita non potest," *ibid.*, X, 2, 4, ". . . neque omnino quidquam ametur incognitam."

<sup>42</sup>*DT*, X, 3, 5, "Quid ergo amat mens, cum ardentem se ipsam quaerit ut noverit, dum incognita sibi est? Ecce enim mens semetipsam quaerit ut noverit, et inflammatur hoc studio. Amat igitur: sed quid amat? Se ipsam?"

<sup>43</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Quapropter eo ipso quo se quaerit, magis se sibi notam quam ignotam esse convincitur? Novit enim se quaerentem atque nescientem, dum se quaerit ut noverit."

<sup>44</sup>*DT*, X, 4, 6, "Quid ergo dicemus? an quod ex parte se novit, ex parte non novit? Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: 'Totum scit'; sed 'quod scit, tota scit.' Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit." There is a variant reading involved here, for some manuscripts read "tota se scit" (the whole of itself knows), and "totam se scit" (it knows the whole of itself), but it comes down to the same result. See J. Burnaby, *Augustine: Later Works*, The Library of Christian Classics, VIII (Westminster Press, Phila-

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delphia: 1955), 79, note (2). Cf. *DT*, X, 10, 16, "Nullo modo autem recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum ejus ignoratur substantia. Quapropter, cum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit. . . ."

<sup>45</sup>Cf. *DT*, VIII, 6, 9, "Non enim tantum sentimus animum, sed etiam scire possumus quid sit animus consideratione nostri. . . ."; cf. *DT*, X, 1, 2, "Aliud est enim quod eam in veritatis luce conspicit, aliud quod in sua facultate concupiscit."; cf. *DT*, IX, 6, 9, ". . . aliud unumquemque videre in se . . . aliud autem in ipsa veritate. . . ." From the parallels existing between these texts, and from other considerations, it appears that the knowledge which one sees "in himself" is experiential knowledge of self, the *an sit*, and the *quid sit* is reserved for seeing "in the truth itself." This agrees exactly with what Augustine has already said about definition and the mental word.

<sup>46</sup>*DT*, X, 9, 12, "Sed cum dicitur menti: 'Cognosce te ipsam,' eo ictu quo intelligit quod dictum est 'te ipsam,' cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud, quam eo quod sibi praesens est."

<sup>47</sup>*DT*, X, 10, 16, "Si quid autem horum esset, aliter id quam cetera cogitaret, non scilicet per imaginale figmentum, sicut cogitantur absentia, quae sensu corporis tacta sunt, sive omnino ipsa, sive eiusdem generis aliqua; sed quadam interiore, non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius); sicut cogitat vivere se, et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle se. Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit. . . ."

<sup>48</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 12, 18, "An eo quidem manifeste ostenditur hoc amoris esse principium, unde procedit: ab ipsa quippe mente procedit, quae sibi est amabilis antequam se amet; atque ita principium est amoris sui, quo se amat." See note (26) of this chapter for Augustine's view of how the mind knows itself.

<sup>49</sup>*DT*, X, 8, 11, "Cognoscat ergo semetipsam nec quasi absentem se quaerit. . . . Ita videbit quod nunquam se non amaverit, nunquam nescierit: sed aliud secum amando cum eo se confudit et concrevit, quodam modo; atque ita dum unum diversa complectitur, unum putavit esse quae diversa sunt."

<sup>50</sup>*DT*, X, 5, 7, "Ita cum aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare (neque enim multarum doctrinarum peritum, ignorare grammaticam dicimus, cum eam non cogitat, quia de medicinae arte tunc cogitat). . . ."

<sup>51</sup>Cf. *DT*, XV, 12, 21, "Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quae sciuntur, unum earum quae per sensus corporis percipit animus, alterum earum quae per se ipsum; multa illi philosophi garriunt contra corporis sensus; animi autem quasdam firmissimas per se ipsum perceptiones rerum verarum, quale illud est quod dixi, 'Scio me vivere,' nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt. Sed absit a nobis ut ea quae per sensus corporis didicimus vera esse dubitemus. . . . Quod si absurdissimum est dicere; non solum nostrorum verum etiam et alienorum corporum sensus plurimum addidisse nostrae scientiae confitendum est."

<sup>52</sup>*DT*, X, 10, 14, "Sed quoniam de natura mentis agitur, removeamus a consideratione nostra omnes notitias quae capiuntur extrinsecus per sensus corporis; ea quae posuimus, omnes mentes de se ipsis nosse certasque esse, diligentius attendamus."

<sup>53</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Utrum enim aeris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intelligendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, iudicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quatuor elementa quinti nescio cuius corporis . . . dubitaverunt homines. . . . Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et iudicare quis dubitet?"

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Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit: si dubitat unde dubitat, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, iudicat non se temere consentire oportere."

<sup>54</sup>DT, X, 11, 17, "Remotis igitur paulisper ceteris, quorum mens de se ipsa certa est, tria haec potissimum considerata tractemus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem."

<sup>55</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Cum ergo dicuntur haec tria, ingenium, doctrina, usus, primum horum consideratur in illis tribus, quid possit quisque memoria, intelligentia, et voluntate." See J. Burnaby, *Augustine: Later Writings*, 34-36, for an explanation of the terms *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas* (*amor*). He finds no place in his exposition for reference to the faculties, yet at this place in the text he admits that Augustine is using "remember" in the sense of being able to recall, 89, note (12). The first time the terms of *memoria*, *intellectus*, *voluntas* occur as a trinity is early in the *De Trinitate*, IV, 21, 31, where Augustine says "Et quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt; nullum enim horum trium nominum est, quod non et memoria et intellectus et voluntas mea simul operata sint: ita Trinitas simul operata est. . . ." Later, in book XV, the terms *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas* become more abstract in Augustine's usage, and more emphasis is given to the capacities corresponding to these terms.

<sup>56</sup>DT, X, 11, 18. "Haec igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia."

This text and others have generated a problem much debated in the Middle Ages as to whether there is an absolute identification between the soul and its faculties in the view of Augustine. The commentators of the present day continue the controversy. On one side are such thomistic theologians and philosophers as A. Gardeil, *La Structure de l'Âme*. . . ., 1, 32, 52-55, and C. Boyer, "L'Image de la Trinité Synthèse. . . ." 182-197, 344-347, who are of the opinion that Augustine did not hold such a view. On the other side are some who would more readily fall into the classification of historians of thought as E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'Étude de St. Augustin*, 290-292, Schmaus, *Die Psychologische Trinitätslehre*, 272, J. Moingt, *Oeuvres de St. Augustin*, XVI, 594-597. L. Arias in his article, "La Imagen de la Trinidad en el Hombre," 61 states that the great majority of the psychologists of our century consider the identification of the soul and its faculties as a genuine augustinian thesis.

We do not consider Augustine to be holding here for the identification of the faculties with the essence of the soul. First of all it is not at all clear that he is speaking in any way exclusively of the faculties here, if at all. Secondly there is a great risk in trying to separate the psychology of Augustine from the trinitarian theology it is immersed in. In other words it is the doctrine of the Trinity which leads and directs his "psychology" in many places of the *De Trinitate*, and he is often able to find what he wishes to find at the expense of distinction. If the reader will refer to the texts cited in note (16) he will see that Augustine first makes love to be substantial conditionally, but does not give the condition. The second text is more openly proposed but it still is hesitant, for he says that love and knowledge should be "considered" substantial. Other texts could be cited to assert Augustine's growing "awareness" of the "substantiality" of knowledge, love, etc. In other words he is



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trying mightily to find reasons for holding to the substantiality of these members, because they should be so to reflect and illustrate the Trinity to his readers. In the text cited at the beginning of this note he gives another reason for their substantiality, because none have been sufficient nor can be in reality. It is only by ignoring distinction that he is as successful as he has been, but to ignore distinction is not the same as to be ignorant of it.

We wonder what the commentators who hold that Augustine identified the soul with its faculties would say to this text, "Ad hoc utcumque intelligendum adsumimus memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem. Quamvis enim haec suis separatisque temporibus singillatim singula enuntiemus, nihil tamen horum sine aliis duobus agimus vel dicimus. Nec ideo putanda sunt haec tria trinitati sic comparata, ut omni ex parte conveniant; cui enim similitudini in disputando convenientia tanta conceditur, ut ei rei cui adhibenda est, omni ex parte coapetur? Vel quando ex creatura ad creatorem aliquid simile adsumitur? Primo ergo in hoc invenitur ista similitudo dissimilis, quod tria haec, *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, animae insunt non eadem tria est anima*, illa vero trinitas non inest, sed ipsa Deus est." Earlier in this same letter Augustine had said, ". . . sicut discernitur in animo nostro *memoria, intellectus, voluntas*. . . ." *Epist. CLXIX*, 2, 6; 1, 2 (PL 33:743-745). In the first citation Augustine uses the more usual *intelligentia* and says it is in the soul (*anima*); in the second he uses *intellectus* as the middle member of the trinity and says it is in the *animo* (mind?). He clearly says that these three are not the soul itself; is this not the same as saying they are not the essence of the soul?

<sup>57</sup>Cf. *DT*, VIII, 10, 14 for love as life; *DT*, IX, 4, 4 for knowledge as life. See texts given in notes (7) and (12) of this chapter.

<sup>58</sup>Cf. e.g. *DT*, IV, 21, 31, "Et quemadmodum cum memoriam meam et intellectum et voluntatem nomino, singula quidem nomina ad res singulas referuntur, sed tamen ab omnibus tribus singula facta sunt; nullum enim horum trium nominum est, quod non et memoria et intellectus et voluntas mea simul operata sunt: ita Trinitas simul operata est . . . Qua similitudine utcumque cognoscitur inseparabilem in se ipsa Trinitatem per visibilis creaturae speciem separabiliter demonstrari, et inseparabilem Trinitatis etiam in singulis esse rebus. . . ." Inseparability is the basic note of all the trinities and appears in the first to the last.

<sup>59</sup>Cf. *DT*, X, 11, 18, "Memoria quippe, quae vita et mens et substantia dicitur, ad se ipsam dicitur: quod vero memoria dicitur, ad aliquid relative dicitur. Hoc de intelligentia quoque et de voluntate dixerim; et intelligentia quippe et voluntas ad aliquid dicitur. Vita est autem unaquaque ad se ipsam, et mens, et essentia. Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria, quo ad se invicem referuntur. . . ." Cf. also, *X*, 10, 14.

<sup>60</sup>*DT*, X, 11, 18, ". . . quae si aequalia non essent, non solum singula singulis, sed etiam omnibus singula; non utique se invicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, verum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem, et intelligo me intelligere, et velle atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intelligere. . . ."

<sup>61</sup>*DT*, X, 12, 19, "Mentem quippe ipsam in memoria et intelligentia et voluntate suimetipsius talem reperiabamus, ut quoniam semper se nosse semperque se ipsam velle comprehendebatur, simul etiam semper



sui meminisse, semperque se ipsam intelligere et amare comprehenderetur; quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt, quod ipsa est: ac per hoc difficile in ea dignoscitur memoria sui, et intelligentia sui. Quasi enim non sint haec duo, sed unum duobus vocabulis appelletur, sic apparet in ea re ubi valde ista coniuncta sunt, et aliud alio nullo praeceditur tempore: amorque ipse non ita sentitur esse, cum eum non prodit indigentia, quoniam semper praesto est quod amatur." The same general statement appears in his recapitulation of this trinity, though more clearly distinguishing the three levels of this trinity, cf. *DT*, XV, 3, 5, "Sed quoniam et hoc compertum est, quod mens *numquam* esse ita potuerit, ut non sui meminisset, non se intelligeret, et diligeret, quamvis *non semper se cogitaret, cum autem cogitaret, non se a corporalibus rebus eadem cogitatione discerneret. . .*" There is no mention of faculties whatsoever here.

<sup>62</sup>Cf. *DT*, X, 11, 18. See note (56) of this chapter for text, and note (1) for the text from the *Confessions*.

<sup>63</sup>*DT*, XIV, 5, 8, "Hinc tantum certos nos esse suffecerit, quod cum homo de animi sui natura cogitare potuerit, atque invenire quod verum est, alibi non inveniet, quam penes se ipsum. Inveniet autem, non quod nesciebat, sed unde non cogitabat. Quid enim scimus, si quod est in nostra mente nescimus; cum omnia quae scimus, non nisi mente scire possimus?" He has reasserted his distinction between "knowing" and "thinking" here. Cf. *DT*, XIV, 5, 7.

<sup>64</sup>Cf. e.g. *DT*, XIV, 5, 7, "nihil enim tam novit mens, quam id quod sibi praesto est: nec menti magis quidquam praesto est, quam ipsa sibi."

<sup>65</sup>*DT*, XIV, 6, 8, "Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis, ut nec ipsa mens quodem modo se in conspectu suo ponat, nisi quando se cogitat. . . . Quomodo autem, quando se non cogitat, in conspectu suo non sit, cum sine se ipsa nunquam esse possit, quasi aliud sit ipsa, aliud conspectus eius, invenire non possum." Certainly a distinction between the essence of the mind and its act of vision is asserted here by Augustine.

<sup>66</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi per loci spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur: cum vero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu suo, nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen noverit se tanquam ipsa sit sibi memoria sui." Augustine has been led to this position logically from his premise that the mind knows itself through itself, for it is incorporeal. It is always present to itself and so should be always known, but clearly it isn't always thought of. To understand itself it must turn its sight upon itself which is nothing other than thinking of itself. Yet it remains present to itself, though unseen, that is not understood, and this presence is like knowledge in the memory. In Augustine's view all the mind has to do is reflect on itself and this knowledge steps forth actualized. This manner of knowing would seem to approach that of angelic knowledge.

<sup>67</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens, quando cogitando intellectam se conspicit, tanquam sibi ante incognita fuerit; sed ita sibi nota erat, quemadmodum notae sunt res quae memoria continentur. . . ."

<sup>68</sup>*DT*, XIV, 11, 14, "Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit ut valeant recolere et recordari, sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens, memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intelligi, et utrumque sui amore coniungi."

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<sup>69</sup>DT, XIV, 7, 9, "Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarundam rerum quasdam notitias, et tunc quodam modo procedere in medium, atque in conspectu mentis velut apertius constitui, quando cogitantur: tunc enim se ipsa mens et meminisse, et intelligere, et amare invenit, etiam unde non cogitabat, quando aliud cogitabat." Cf. XV, 21, 41, "Sicut ergo inest intelligentia, inest dilectio illi memoriae principali, in qua invenimus paratum et reconditum ad quod cogitando possumus pervenire; quia et duo ista invenimus ibi, quando nos cogitando invenimus et intelligere aliquid et amare, quae ibi erant et quando inde non cogitabamus. . . ." The *memoria principalis* is intellectual memory, as Augustine distinguishes between sense memory and intellectual memory. Cf. XV, 23, 43.

<sup>70</sup>Cf. DT, XII, 15, 24.

<sup>71</sup>DT, XIV, 7, 10; "Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intelligentiam qua se intelligit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, et semper simul fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt, sive cogitarentur, sive non cogitarentur; videbitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere; sed quia ibi verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest . . . in tribus potius illius imago ista cognoscitur, memoria, scilicet, intelligentia, voluntate." Cf. XIV, 7, 9.

<sup>72</sup>Loc. cit. "Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes, id est, quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant, sed non cogitabantur, cogitatio nostra formatur; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem, vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est."

<sup>73</sup>DT, XIV, 10, 13; "Porro autem in mente non sic est: neque enim adventitia sibi ipsa est . . . aut post cognitionem sui recordando se ipsam velut in memoria sui constitutam videt, quasi non ibi fuerit antequam se ipsam cognosceret; cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, nunquam sui meminisse, nunquam se intelligere, nunquam se amare destiterit. . . ." Cf. XIV, 8, 11 f.

<sup>74</sup>Loc. cit., "Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione convertitur, fit trinitas, in qua iam et verbum possit intelligi: formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, voluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus." In his recapitulation of the previous books made in book XV Augustine makes no reference at all to the image with self as object from book XIV. Perhaps his summary of this image from book X is considered sufficient.

<sup>75</sup>There is a valid sense in which consciousness of self can be considered permanent also, though unconsciousness does interrupt it in sleep, etc. But Augustine distinguishes this from the permanent quasi-habitual knowledge of self, as can be seen from the text cited in note (61) of this chapter.

<sup>76</sup>It would seem that the knowledge of self bound up with the essence of the soul, that is natural and native to it, should express the same "divine idea" of self as is attained by knowledge seen "in the truth itself." Whether they are to be numerically identified is really the problem.

<sup>77</sup>DT, XII, 11, 16, "Honor enim hominis verus est imago et similitudo Dei, quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur."

<sup>78</sup>Cf. e.g. IX, 11, 16, and especially the lengthy statement of XII, 11, 16, and X, 5, 7.

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<sup>79</sup>DT, XIV, 12, 15, "Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit mens, et intelligit ac diligit se: sed quia potest etiam meminisse, et intelligere, et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit, sapiens ipsa fit."

<sup>80</sup>Cf. e.g. IX, 6, 9; XIV, 15, 21.

<sup>81</sup>DT, XIV, 12, 15, "Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit, seque diligit ac intelligit, stulta est. Meminerit itaque Dei sui, ad cuius imaginem facta est, eumque intelligat atque diligit."

<sup>82</sup>DT, XIV, 14, 18, "Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut numquam sui non meminerit, numquam se non intelligat, numquam se non diligit . . . non immerito et mens hominis, quando sibi nocet, odisse se dicitur. . . . Qui ergo se diligere novit, Deum diligit: qui vero non diligit Deum, etiam si se diligit, quod ei naturaliter inditum est, tamen non inconvenienter odisse se dicitur, cum id agit quod sibi adversatur, et se ipsum tamquam suus inimicus insequitur."

<sup>83</sup>DT, X, 5, 7, ". . . ut se ipsam cogitet et secundum naturam suam vivat, id est, secundum naturam suam ordinari appetat, sub eo scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeposenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet. Multa enim per cupiditatem pravam, tanquam sui sit oblita, sic agit. Videt enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra in praestantiori natura quae Deus est: et cum stare debeat, ut eis fruatur, volens ea sibi tribuere, et non ex illo similis illius, sed ex se ipsa esse quod ille est, avertitur ab eo, moveturque et labitur in minus et minus, quod putat amplius et amplius; quia nec ipsa sibi, nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit. . . ."

<sup>84</sup>Cf. DT, XIV, 14, 18; 17, 23; 19, 25; XV, 16, 30-19, 37. In the latter section he sums up in these words, "Quapropter si sancta Scriptura proclamat, 'Deus charitas est'; illaque ex Deo est, et in nobis id agit ut in Deo maneamus, et ipse in nobis, et inde cognoscimus, quia de Spiritu suo debet nobis, ipse Spiritus est Deus charitas. Deinde si in donis Dei nihil maius est charitate, et nullum est maius donum Dei quam Spiritus sanctus, quid consequentius quam ut ipse sit charitas, qui dicitur et Deus et ex Deo? Et si charitas qua Pater diligit Filium, et Patrem diligit Filium, ineffabiliter communionem demonstrat amborum; quid convenientius quam ut ille dicatur charitas proprie, qui Spiritus est communis ambobus? Hoc enim sanius creditur vel intelligitur, ut non solus Spiritus sanctus charitas sit in illa Trinitate, sed non frustra proprie charitas nuncupetur, propter illa quae dicta sunt."

<sup>85</sup>DT, XIV, 12, 16, "Et quidem non longe positus ab unoquoque nostrum, sicut Apostolus dicit, adiungens: In illo enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus. Quod si secundum corpus diceret, etiam de isto corporeo mundo posset intelligi. Nam et in illo secundum corpus vivimus, movemur, et sumus. Unde secundum mentem quae facta est ad ejus imaginem debet hoc accipi, excellentiore quodam, eodemque non visibile, sed *intelligibili modo*."

<sup>86</sup>Cf. DT, XIV, 15, 21, "Et ubique totus est: propter quod ista in illo et vivit, et movetur, et est: et ideo reminisci eius potest."

<sup>87</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CLXXXVII, 16-17 (PL 33:837-838). See text cited in note (110) of Chapter Two.

<sup>88</sup>DT, XIV, 12, 16, "Proinde si in ipso sunt omnia, in quo tandem possunt vivere quae vivunt, et moveri quae moventur, nisi in quo sunt? Non tamen omnes cum illo sunt eo modo quo ei dictum est: ego semper tecum. Nec ipse cum omnibus eo modo quo dicimus: Dominus vobiscum. Magna itaque hominis miseria est cum illo non esse, sine



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quo non potest esse. In quo enim est, procul dubio sine illo non est: et tamen si eius non meminit, eumque non intelligit, nec diligit, cum illo non est."

<sup>89</sup>DT, XIV, 15, 21, "Quando autem bene recordatur Domini sui, Spiritu eius accepto, sentit omnino quia hoc discit intimo magisterio, nonnisi ejus gratuito affectu posset se surgere, nonnisi suo voluntario defectu cadere potuisse."

<sup>90</sup>DT, XIV, 16, 22, "Qui vero commemorati convertuntur ad Dominum ab ea deformitate, qua per cupiditates saeculares conformabantur huic saeculo, reformatur ex illo . . . ut incipiat illa imago ab illo reformari, a quo formata est." Cf. XIV, 15, 21, "Sed commemoratur, ut convertatur ad Dominum. . . ." Augustine's use of "remembering," "forgetting," and "reminding" finds some basis in the psalms. Cf. Ps. 9:18, "Convertantur peccatores in infernum, omnes gentes quae obliviscuntur Deum," and Ps. 21:28, "Commemorabuntur et convertentur ad Dominum universi fines terrae." Both of these texts are used in XIV, 13, 17.

<sup>91</sup>DT, XIV, 15, 21, "Sed commemoratur, ut convertatur ad Dominum, tanquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo avertetur quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem, et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus . . . splendore aliquoties ubique praesentis veritatis attingitur. . . ."

<sup>92</sup>DT, XIV, 19-20. "Verumtamen, quia etiam talis in imagine ambulat homo, et habet memoriam, et intellectum, et amorem sui, hominis mens . . . qua in se imagine Dei tam potens est, ut ei cuius imago est valet inhaerere. Sic enim ordinata est naturarum ordine, non locorum, ut supra illam non sit nisi ille."

<sup>93</sup>DT, XIV, 12, 15, "Meminerit itaque Dei sui, ad cuius imaginem facta est, eumque intelligat atque diligit. Quod ut brevius dicam, colat Deum non factum, cuius ab eo capax est facta, et cuius particeps esse potest . . . et non sua luce, sed summae illius lucis participatione sapiens erit. . . ."

<sup>94</sup>DT, XV, 3, 5, ". . . de sapientia hominis vera, id est, Dei munere in eius ipsius Dei participatione donata, quae ab scientia distincta est, disputatur: et eo pervenit disputatio, ut trinitas apparet in imagine Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, quae renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit hominem ad imaginem suam, et percipit sapientiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum."

<sup>95</sup>DT, XIV, 19, 25, "At vero illa imago, de qua dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; quia non dictum est: 'ad meam,' vel 'ad tuam,' ad imaginem Trinitatis factum hominem credimus, et quanta potuimus investigatione comprehendimus. Et ideo secundum hanc potius et illus intelligendum est quod ait apostolus Joannes. Similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. . . ."

<sup>96</sup>See L. Keeler, *Sancti Augustini Doctrina de Cognitione*, (Rome: 1934), 61 f; also E. L. Watkin, "The Mysticism of St. Augustine," *A Monument to St. Augustine*, 108 f; S. Grabowski, *The Church—An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine*, 312 f, where numerous references to other works are to be found.

<sup>97</sup>It may appear that Augustine leaves no room at all in his system of thought for the natural knowledge and love of God, and certainly there is a strong tendency in this direction, especially when it is a question of love. He will much more readily admit that even the pagan philosophers have come to the knowledge of God without the gift of faith than he will grant any love for God by sinners without the gift



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of charity. Nevertheless, in the following passage he seems to grant even the possibility of the latter, "Valet ergo fides ad cognitionem et ad dilectionem Dei, non tamquam omnino incogniti, aut omnino non dilecti; sed quo cognoscatur manifestius, et quo firmitus diligatur," *DT*, VIII, 19, 13.

<sup>98</sup>As we have seen in Chapter Two, to know and love oneself as the image of God is to know and love oneself as under God and above the rest of creation. Conversely then to know oneself as under God and above all creation is to know and to love oneself as the image of God. The essential note of an image in the view of Augustine is that it issues immediately from God and tend immediately toward him, and this is to be immediately under God and over other creatures.

<sup>99</sup>See J. Burnaby, *Augustine: Later Works*, 30 f.

<sup>100</sup>*DT*, XV, 23, 44, ". . . per quod tamen speculum et in quo aenigmate qui vident, sicut in hac vita videre concessum est, non illi sunt qui ea digessimus et commandavimus in sua mente conspiciunt; sed illi qui eam tamquam imaginem vident, ut possint ad eum cuius imago est, quomodocumque referre quod vident. . . ."

<sup>101</sup>Cf. *DT*, I, 2, 4 for the general outline of the *De Trinitate*, which is more succinctly worded in IV, 6, 10, where he says, "Ergo autem quas reddidi, vel ex Ecclesiae auctoritate a maioribus traditas, vel ex divinarum testimonio Scripturarum, vel ex ratione numerorum similitudinumque collegi." The first part of the work concentrates more on the positive theology of the dogma of the Trinity, while the latter half (the section we have been considering) gives much greater attention to the speculative theology of the dogma.

<sup>102</sup>Cf. *DT*, IX, 4, 4; IX, 11, 16; XV, 15, 26.

<sup>103</sup>Cf. *DT*, XV, 11, 20 f, where Augustine equivalently oscillates in his expressions between *similitudo dissimilis* and *dissimilitudo similis*; such expressions are close to the notion of analogy.

<sup>104</sup>For comparison of the Father and *memoria*, cf. *DT*, XV, 12, 22-14, 23; for the Son and the mental word, cf. XV, 10, 19-11, 21, and XV, 15, 25-16, 26; for the Spirit and love or will, cf. XV, 18, 32-21, 41.

<sup>105</sup>Cf. *DT*, XV, 27, 50, "Et tamen multa vera vidisti . . . atolle oculos in ipsam lucem, et eos in eam fige, si potes. Sic enim videbis quid distet nativitas Verbi Dei a processione Doni Dei, propter quod unigenitus Filius non de Patre genitum, alioquin frater eius esset, sed procedere dixit Spiritum sanctum . . . Quam quidem voluntatem de cogitatione procedere (nemo vult quod omnino quid vel quale nescit), non tamen esse cogitationis imaginem; et ideo quamdam in hac re intelligibili nativitas et processionis insinuari distantiam. . . ."

<sup>106</sup>Nothing of the trinity with self as object, and its use as analogy, appears in Augustine's recapitulation of book XIV. He refers only to the image with God as object, which is the trinity of wisdom. Cf. *DT*, XV, 3, 5.

<sup>107</sup>This is to deny distinction between potency, habit, and act, but to discern the fact that act, in this case self-knowledge and self-love, cannot exceed the limits of the potency or habit, in this case the permanent and quasi-habitual trinity of self-knowledge and love. Manifestly action adds perfection to habit and potency, but it cannot add, beyond actualization, to what was already well-defined in the potency.

<sup>108</sup>St. Thomas will observe this difference in Augustine's treatment of the trinitarian images in the *De Trinitate*, and will resolve the problem

## Image of the Trinity

by his distinction between *imago secundum analogiam* and *imago secundum conformitatem*. The former, with self as object, acts like its exemplar; the latter, with God as object, "becomes" the exemplar in the order of intentional being. Manifestly "identity" is a greater likeness than simply similitude of activity. Cf. *De Verit.*, a. 7, and P. Matthijs, *De Imagine Dei in Homine* (Rome: 1955), 2 vols., I, 25-31.

<sup>109</sup>DT, XV, 20, 39, "De creatura etiam quam fecit Deus, quantum valuimus, admonuimus eos qui rationem de rebus talibus poscunt, ut invisibilia eius, per ea quae facta sunt, sicut possent, intellecta conspicerent, et maxime per rationalem vel intellectualem creaturam, quae facta est ad imaginem Dei; per quod velut speculum, quantum possent, si possent, cernerent Trinitatem Deum, in nostra memoria, intelligentia, voluntate.

Quae tria in sua mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna, immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci, reminiscitur per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem, profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem. Ad quam summam Trinitatem reminiscendam, videndam, diligendam, ut eam recorderetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur, totum debet referre quod vivit."

<sup>110</sup>In fact the whole of the doctrine of the image could be gathered from the *De Trinitate* alone, but not without much difficulty and labor, for it is scattered throughout the work.

<sup>111</sup>It is not completely clear whether Augustine considers this to be truly knowledge and love, or not. Many commentators consider it to be so, and, perhaps, because of historical considerations, it is. In this case they label this permanent "memory of self" as the "subconscious" or "unconscious."

St. Thomas interprets this perpetual trinity of self-knowledge and self-love bound up with the essence of the soul as the soul knowable and lovable through itself to itself, that is by its essence, as God does. But this is not really knowledge or love in the view of Thomas, but simply the essence of the soul as incorporeal, and so intelligible after the manner of a habit. This thomistic *memoria sui* is not itself actualized, for it is the soul or mind, but rather the soul understands itself in its acts (*an sit*) because of this property of its nature. It attains to its *quid sit* only by reflection on its acts and objects. There is undoubtedly great outward similarity between the teaching of Augustine and that of Thomas here, but is it because the genius of Aquinas has made it so? In the view of Augustine, incomplete as his "theory of knowledge" is, the mind knows itself through itself, independently of the body, and not only habitually. For Thomas the mind can only know itself because of some activity—initially at the sense level and raised to the intellectual order by the agent intellect—, for the intellect is like pure potency in the intellectual order. The mere presence of self to the intellect is not sufficient for knowledge, nor is the additional step of conversion of the intellect to self, if the intellect is not actualized by something else. The physical presence of self (and God) to the mind is not a presence *in ratione objecti*, that is not a presence intelligible in first act. Cf. *De Verit.*, Q. 10, aa. 6-9, especially.

PART TWO: THE ORIGINALITY  
AND INFLUENCE OF  
ST. AUGUSTINE





## CHAPTER FIVE:

# THE TRINITARIAN IMAGE IN PATRISTIC THOUGHT

Clearly no exhaustive treatment can be expected here of the developing doctrine of the trinitarian image in man among the Fathers which reaches its peak in the teaching of St. Augustine. Only the broad outlines of the development of this theme will be revealed by the general survey attempted. Necessarily our approach is limited to the more outstanding members of the patristic group, and, among these, often to mere selections from among their many writings. As a safeguard, the classical historical studies of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the more recent treatises on the doctrine of the image from the works of the eastern Fathers are used for guidance and in confirmation of the limited research undertaken.

For our purposes there are two fundamental questions to be asked with respect to the trinitarian image. The more basic question is concerned with the very existence of a trinitarian image in man, and to help resolve this facet of our survey we will have recourse to the Fathers' interpretation of the image text from Genesis: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." If an individual Father is convinced that there is an image of the Trinity in man, this should appear with his exegesis of this text, or, at least, be dependent upon it. There is no better scriptural warrant for believing such an image does truly exist in man.<sup>1</sup>

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The second, and more complicated, question has to do with the nature of the trinitarian image. As an aid in answering this question we shall give a general survey of the trinitarian formulae used by the Fathers, but only those formulae having a foundation in the nature of man. Hence we shall concentrate on the psychological trinities found in their writings. Here we come face to face with a difficulty, for the psychological trinities are usually proposed purely as analogies of the blessed Trinity. They are the product of another current of thought among the Fathers, and seldom bear any relation to their doctrine of the image or to the image text from Genesis.

St. John teaches that the Son of God is the *Logos*. Clearly any attempt to explain the meaning of this scriptural term will demand the use of the *logos* in man as analogy. Other texts, principally from St. Paul, compare the Holy Spirit to the *pneuma* in us, and, together with St. John's expression, establish a clear precedent for the ancients to follow. The result is an analogy of the Trinity with at least partial psychological features. Even then, when use is made of such a trinitarian analogy, there is little evidence as to the conviction of most of the Fathers that this is an image of the Trinity in man. It is proposed, often along with other analogies of less exalted rank, purely as an illustration of something ineffable. In the meantime the doctrine of the image will take a separate course, rarely being related to the use of trinities in man as illustrations of the divine Trinity.

We have seen something of the same phenomenon in the thought of Augustine. The first trinity on the psychological level to be found in his writings is offered simply as an analogy. Apparently the relation between a trinity in man used as an analogy and the image of the Trinity in man was not at first perceived by Augustine, despite the fact that the image text receives a full trinitarian exegesis later in the same work. It is in the *De Trinitate* that Augustine relates these two separate

currents of thought, and the image of the Trinity in man is used also as analogy.

Our survey will consider then the Fathers' interpretation of the image text from Genesis, the psychological trinities used, and the correlation, if any, of the preceding two aspects of their thought.

#### PRE-NICENE FATHERS: THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

There is little to detain us in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. The text from Genesis does not appear in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, the authentic letters of Ignatius, nor in Polycarp.<sup>2</sup> A passing reference to part of the text appears in the *Letter to Diognetus*, and the complete text is to be found in the *Epistle to the Corinthians* of St. Clement of Rome.<sup>3</sup> Neither author gives a trinitarian exegesis of the text. The Genesis text does appear in the Ps.-Ignatian *Epistle to the Antiochenes*, and in the Ps.-Clementine *Apostolic Constitutions*, and both authors interpret the text as words addressed by God (the Father) to the Son.<sup>4</sup> However these writings are to be assigned to a much later period in the history of Christian literature, and need not delay us now.

The first time that the image text from Genesis receives an interpretation of significance for the history of trinitarian thought is in the *Epistle of Barnabas*, which is usually associated with the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. Pseudo-Barnabas sees the Father speaking to the Son in the creation of man and the fashioning of divine image, and a passing reference is made relating the renewal of this image according to the pattern of the Son.<sup>5</sup> This is the first historically verifiable usage of the image text in a pluralistic fashion among Christians, but it is not the first time such an interpretation is attempted. Well before the writing of the *Epistle of Barnabas* Hebrew scholars had seen the text from Genesis as a command given by God to the angels, or to his Wisdom (understood in an abstract sense). To this judaic interpretation Philo added a platonic flavor,

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and he interprets the text as an instance of God calling upon inferior powers or collaborators to help with the creation of man.<sup>6</sup> The subordinationist tendency of the philonic, and earlier rabbinic interpretations, will be a heavy burden for the earlier Fathers in their polemical uses of this text.

### THE GREEK APOLOGISTS

In a polemical context the image text appears in the *Dialogue with Trypho* of St. Justin, and there it is given a pluralistic interpretation. The plural form, "let us make" indicates to Justin that these words were not said by God to himself, nor to the elements, nor even to the angels. It was said to someone rational, distinct from the Father but yet existing in unity with the Father before creation. It was said to the Wisdom born of the Father, the Son, for the plural forms in the text "at the least refer to two."<sup>7</sup> The Spirit is not included by Justin, but he leaves the possibility of such an interpretation open for later commentators.

No consideration is given by Justin to the image effected by these words of the Father to the Son. However he does make use of the analogy of the "word" in us to illustrate the procession of the Word of God, along with the illustration of fire.<sup>8</sup> In explaining the generation of the Son Justin makes an unfortunate association with the will of the Father which later Fathers will take up with many resultant difficulties. Justin says that the Son was begotten of the Father "by an act of the will."<sup>9</sup>

Something of this appears in one of Justin's pupils, Tatian the Syrian, who later initiated the Gnostic-Encratic heresy. In a work written probably after his defection from the Church, Tatian says that the *Logos* springs forth from the simple will of the Father as the first-begotten work.<sup>10</sup> The heavenly *Logos*, in imitation of the Father who begot him, makes man an image of immortality.<sup>11</sup> Later in this work Tatian distinguishes between two kinds of spirit in man, the *psyche* (soul) and the



*pneuma* (spirit), and it is the latter which is made to the image of God.<sup>12</sup> The Holy Spirit is associated with the image in man, and without his presence there is no image in man.<sup>13</sup> It is difficult to be more precise, as it is not certain that Tatian distinguishes here between the spirit in man and the divine Spirit.

In the writings of Athenagoras, the Christian philosopher of Athens, we find for the first time the complete and clear exposition of trinitarian doctrine. God made and formed all things by the *Logos*, and governs and sustains all things in existence by the Spirit.<sup>14</sup> All things were made after the pattern of the *Logos*, and so, presumably, also the image in man, though no such specific application is made. Then Athenagoras gives a full trinitarian analogy, but with only partial psychological features. The Father is the Mind (*Nous*), the Son is the Word, and the Spirit is the effluence of God flowing from him and returning like the ray of the sun (or as light from fire).<sup>15</sup> The terms with intellectual connotations are reserved by Athenagoras for the Son of God, while the likeness for the Spirit is conceived of in terms of light and fire.<sup>16</sup>

St. Theophilus of Antioch is the last of the Apologists to appear in our survey and some interesting developments appear in his works. For the first time the term of Trinity (*trias*) appears among the Fathers, and also something approximating the term of image of the Trinity.<sup>17</sup> Theophilus states that the three days which preceded the creation of light and the light-giving heavenly bodies are "types of the Trinity" (*tupoi triados*), that is of "God, the Word, Wisdom."<sup>18</sup> Continuing, Theophilus observes that the words from the image text in Genesis are to be understood of God speaking "to his Word and Wisdom," for man is the only work "worthy of his hands."<sup>19</sup> It appears certain that Theophilus is in this last statement referring to the Trinity of Persons, as in the prior remark.<sup>20</sup> The term of Wisdom at this time is applied to both the Son and Spirit, and the reference to the Son and the Spirit as "the hands" of

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God (the Father) is a recurring description in the works of the Fathers.

It also seems that our Antiochean writer refers the image in man to God without distinction of Persons. In an analogy beautifully developed he compares God to the sun, and man, his image and reflection, to the moon.<sup>21</sup> Theophilus sees the image in man as something like an image on a mirror, and, if the mirror is kept without rust, without moral stain, then God can be beheld there. He makes bold to say to his pagan friends, "Show me your man [the invisible soul], and I will show you my God."<sup>22</sup> Later in his work appears the stoic distinction between the inner word (*logos endiathetos*), and the uttered word (*logos prophoricos*).<sup>23</sup> This distinction is applied by Theophilus to the Word of God with unhappy repercussions for the later Fathers.

### ST. IRENAEUS

The next writer to appear on the scene is the strong figure of St. Irenaeus, "the father and founder of theology." The image text from Genesis appears many times in his great work against the Gnostic heresies, and he gives it a full and completely explicit trinitarian interpretation.<sup>24</sup> First he recounts some heretical interpretations of this text and rejects them: the interpretation of Saturninus which relates the text to the angels, who speak to each other and make man to their image; and the even more peculiar theory of the Ophites, who related the image text to the six lesser powers and their mother.<sup>25</sup> The consistent interpretation of Irenaeus is to see the whole Trinity implicated by the plural forms of the Genesis text. "With him always is the Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, through whom and in whom he freely and spontaneously made all things, and to whom he said, 'Let us make man to our image and likeness.'"<sup>26</sup> Like Theophilus, Irenaeus refers Wisdom to the Spirit, and calls the Son and the Spirit the "hands of God."<sup>27</sup>

Irenaeus never speaks of an image of the Trinity in man, nor is it easy to discover what relation the Trinity bears in his

teaching to the image effected by the words of Genesis. In anticipation of Augustine he has a neatly balanced view of the original creation and the restoration of the benefits lost by Adam through Christ. His theory of the "recapitulation" of all in Christ, the second Adam, is the fruit of this unified view. The first man was created after the image and likeness of God, but the likeness was lost by sin.<sup>28</sup> In the original creation the Son forms and fashions the image, being the Image of the Father, and the Spirit, the Image of the Father and Son, is associated with the likeness to God through his vivifying action.<sup>29</sup> In virtue of the recapitulation in himself of his original handiwork the Son shows forth the image, and re-establishes and exhibits the likeness to man after the Incarnation.<sup>30</sup> Again the Spirit is to be seen at work, now as effecting the restoral of the likeness by his sanctifying presence, which is consistently related to the spirit (*pneuma*) in man.<sup>31</sup>

Whatever be the proper understanding of the teaching of Irenaeus it seems that he most often relates the exemplarity of the image (and likeness?) to the Word (and through him to the Father).<sup>32</sup> The Spirit's relation to the divine likeness appears to be principally in the order of efficiency.

In reaction to Gnostic speculations, and in particular to speculation concerning the two-fold state of the human word as utilized by Theophilus, Irenaeus takes a strong position against the use of human psychology as analogue for the generation of the *Logos* of God. It is not that the bishop of Lyons considers the analogy of the human word as completely invalid, but he objects to those who so explain the "altogether indescribable" generation of the Word "as if they themselves had assisted at his birth."<sup>33</sup> He also notes with vigor the difference between the breath (*pneuma*) of life in man and the vivifying Spirit of God.<sup>34</sup> His preference is then to use expressions derived principally from Scripture, mostly pure metaphor, to describe the Trinity.<sup>35</sup> Because of the tremendous influence of Irenaeus in

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the East, the Fathers there will always retain somewhat of an attitude of suspicion toward the use of analogies derived from the human spirit to explain the processions within the Trinity.

### WESTERN WRITERS OF THE THIRD CENTURY

The adamant position of the great Irenaeus seems to have had little effect on his one-time pupil in the West, Hippolytus of Rome. To the stoic distinction between the inner and uttered word he adds a third stage in the evolution of the Word of God. This third stage is the Incarnation, at which time the *Logos* appears as perfect Son of God. The first two stages of the Word are seen to be from before and at the time of creation.<sup>36</sup> The familiar comparison of the ray from the sun, or light from light, is utilized by Hippolytus to illustrate the unity of the Father and the Word.<sup>37</sup> The Spirit receives but passing mention in his works, and is not an object for speculation. Despite Hippolytus's erudition and wide-spread acquaintance with Hellenism, his theories about the Word of God leave much to be desired in the way of accuracy of expression.

The first great Latin contribution of theology to appear at Rome is the *De Trinitate* of Novatian. The image text appears twice in this work, and it is related both times to Christ, the Son of God. The first time it appears it is used to prove that Christ is also God, for he made the image of God in man,<sup>38</sup> later it is used to prove that Christ is distinct from the Father.<sup>39</sup> Novatian notes that the Spirit effects sanctification of man through his gifts, and, presumably, the perfection of the image.<sup>40</sup> The Son is the Image of the Father, and the Father can be seen through this Image. A subordinationist tendency can be seen in the latter view, for it is Novatian's opinion that perfect contemplation is to be directed toward God the Father as immediate object, and not as seen through his Image.<sup>41</sup> The same tendency appears even more clearly when he states that "when the Father willed it, the Son, the Word was born."<sup>42</sup>



The next author to appear in our survey is the most important and original ecclesiastical author in Latin (excepting St. Augustine), the African Tertullian. The image text appears numerous times in his writings, and it does not always receive the same interpretation. A rather consistent interpretation is that in which he relates the text to Father and Son.<sup>43</sup> The Father speaks these words to the Son, for he had Christ in his thoughts who was to become man one day. It seems that the body has an important role to play in the image for Tertullian, as the Genesis text appears not only in relation to the Incarnation of the Son, but is also cited in the context of abstaining from fornication.<sup>44</sup> In this view Tertullian is followed by St. Cyprian, who later admonishes women not to alter what God had made (in the image and likeness, for he cites the Genesis text) by such adornments as rouge and the like.<sup>45</sup>

In a work dating from the Montanist period of his life, the *Adversus Praxeas*, Tertullian gives a full trinitarian exegesis to the image text from Genesis.

If the plurality of the Trinity still offends you, as if it were not connected in simple unity . . . how is it possible for someone who is absolutely one and singular to speak in a plural saying, "Let us make man to our image and according to our likeness"? . . . He is either deceiving or amusing us in speaking plurally if he is only one and singular. . . . It was because there was already one united to Him, as a second Person, his own Word, and a third, the Spirit in the Word, and so he spoke in a plural fashion . . . For with whom did he make man, and to whom did he make him like? He was speaking with the Son who was to put on human nature, and the Spirit who was to sanctify man in the unity of the Trinity, as with his ministers and witnesses.<sup>46</sup>

It is not altogether clear from the passage just cited to whom man was to be made like by God. Continuing Tertullian relates the image, as before, to the Word who was to become man.

The following text also distinguishes among the Persons, "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God

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he created him" (Gen. 1:27). Why not simply "his own image," if there were not also one in whose image he made man? But there was one there in whose image God was making man, that is in the image of his Son, who one day to become man . . . had already caused man, then to be formed of clay, to be called his image, the image and likeness of the true man.<sup>47</sup>

Tertullian consistently relates the image in man which includes the body to the Word who was to become flesh, and the Spirit is seen as the sanctifier and perfecter of the image.

In another passage from this same work, undoubtedly of great influence on Augustine, we see an explicit usage of the image in man as analogy for the generation of the Word.

In order that you more readily understand this [the generation of the Word], consider first of all from yourself, who are made "in the image and likeness of God," for what purpose you also have reason in yourself, who are a rational creature. . . . Observe then, when you are silently in your reason conversing with yourself, this very process is carried on within you, which meets you with a word at every movement of your thought, at every impulse of your conception . . . in a sense the word is a second [person] within you. . . .<sup>48</sup>

When it comes to a complete trinitarian analogy Tertullian is forced to use metaphors of the corporeal order, because of the ignorance of the procession of the Spirit.

For God sent forth the Word just as the roots put forth the tree, and a spring the river, and the sun a ray . . . I should not hesitate to call the tree the son of the root and the river son of the spring and the ray son of the sun, because every source is a parent and everything which issues from a source is an offspring . . . [as] the Word of God . . . yet the tree is not separated from the root . . . anymore than the Word is separated from God . . . [yet] God and His Word [are] two. For the root and the tree are distinctly two, but conjoined. . . . Now the Spirit is third from God and the Son; just as the fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as the irrigating stream out of the river is third from the spring, or as the apex of the ray is third from the sun. . . .

In like manner the Trinity flowing down from the Father by intertwined and connected steps does not disturb the monarchy while guarding the state of the economy.<sup>49</sup>

The subordinationist tendency of the thought of some of the earlier writers is not completely overcome by Tertullian, and the stoic distinction between the inner word and the uttered word led him to regard the generation of the Son as taking place gradually. The influence of his trinitarian doctrine as found in the *Adversus Praxeas*, from which we have cited, cannot be overestimated. It is the most important contribution to the doctrine of the Trinity in the Ante-Nicene period.

#### THE SCHOOL AT ALEXANDRIA

The foundations of the Christian intellectual movement appears in the East during this period at Alexandria, and there the first noteworthy writer is Clement. If Irenaeus can be considered the man of tradition, Clement can be regarded as the founder of speculative theology. St. Irenaeus reacts strongly against Hellenism and the Gnostic heresies, while Clement attempts, not entirely successfully, to form a Christian Gnosis. The center of his theology is the *Logos*, and this is reflected in his doctrine of the image. There is no sign of a full trinitarian exegesis of the image text in his writings, but he does see Christ as perfectly fulfilling these words said by God.<sup>50</sup> Christ fulfills the words "Let us make man to our image and likeness" by forming man from the dust, regenerating man by water, and making him grow by his Spirit. Moreover it is Christ himself who perfectly realized these words in himself, for he is the Image, while the rest of mankind is in his image, the "image of the Image."<sup>51</sup> Christ is the Image of God, for he is "the Divine *Logos*, the genuine Son of Mind, the archetypal Light of Light," and man is the image of the *Logos* in his mind, which "is therefore said to have been made 'in the image and likeness of God.'"<sup>52</sup>

The successor of Clement as head of the school at Alexandria is Origen, the greatest teacher and scholar of the early Church.

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His teaching about the image in man reveals many points of similarity with the thought of his teacher, Clement. The image text from Genesis is consistently interpreted of the Father and Son, except for one instance in which it is considered to be addressed to the angels.<sup>53</sup> The *Logos*, the Image of God, is conceived of by Origen as the "instrumental" cause and the exemplary cause in the creation of man.<sup>54</sup> The Son only is the Image, while man is "to the image" of the Son.<sup>55</sup> Origen also finds some distinction between image and likeness, for only the image was conferred at the time of creation, whereas the likeness is a gradual acquisition attaining its perfection only at the consummation of the world.<sup>56</sup>

Nevertheless Origen does see the entire Trinity at work in creation, basing his opinion on a favored patristic reference, "the heavens were made by the Word of the Lord, and all their host by the Spirit of his mouth" (Ps. 33:6).<sup>57</sup> Yet when he refers to the creation of man the Spirit seems to have little part to play. This is probably due to what Origen calls "the special working" of the Persons of the Trinity. He maintains that "the power [*energia*] of the Trinity is one and the same," but that there is also a special work of the Father with respect to natural life and existence; a special work of the Son with regard to rationality and the gifts of reason; and a special work of the Spirit with regard to sanctification and spiritualization of the just through grace.<sup>58</sup> Here can be seen, in anticipation of Augustine, a distribution of effects among the divine Persons, and probably to be accounted for by Origen's knowledge of platonism and the triple causal role assigned to God in that system of thought.

Not only does Origen see special effects to be assigned to the different Persons among creatures, but he also notes that as a result of the triple causality there is a participation in the Trinity. Man is capable of a participation in the Trinity (the divine nature, or Godhead), because of the "inner man" and image of the divine there. Christ may be the model, but it is



only by his Spirit that man is made holy and spiritual. This sanctification is viewed as a participation in the Spirit which, for Origen, is the same thing as to participate in the Trinity, for he is the Spirit of the Father and Son.<sup>59</sup> Surely some exemplarity of the entire Trinity is implied in this view of Origen, though he does not explicitly relate it to the divine image in man.

With regard to the analogy of the human word as illustrating the procession of the Word Origen reflects the position of St. Irenaeus. The excesses of the heretics in this matter have imposed caution on the otherwise impetuous Alexandrian. When he does attempt some explanation of the generation of the Son he relates it to the will of the Father. "As an act of the will proceeds from the understanding [mind] and neither cuts off any part nor is separated or divided from it, so in some way the Father is to be considered as having begotten his Son, his own Image."<sup>60</sup> The subordinationism implicit in this understanding of the relation of the Son to the Father is heightened by his notion of the Son as Image, for an image is not quite as good a thing as the exemplar.<sup>61</sup> The latter view of an image might have its roots in the teaching of the new-platonist Ammonius Saccas at whose feet both Origen and Plotinus gathered their philosophical training.

The last of the pre-Nicene Fathers to be considered here is St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, who studied under Origen for five years and wielded great influence on the thought of the Cappadocians. In a short Creed which he formulated he sums up many of the major aspects of Trinitarian doctrine prevalent in the East of this time. The Father is referred to simply as God; the Word is the Image of God, Wisdom comprehensive of all things, Efficient Power formative of the whole creation; the Spirit is Life and the cause of life, sanctity and the font of all sanctification, and the Image of the Son.<sup>62</sup> The latter notion, the Spirit as Image of the Son, is not new in the teaching of the Eastern Fathers, for it had already appeared in St.

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Irenaeus (and Tatian?). Nevertheless it is only from the time of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus that it becomes a popular teaching of the Oriental Church.<sup>63</sup>

### SUMMATION

By the end of the 3rd century among the Fathers the image text from Genesis has received a full trinitarian interpretation by St. Theophilus, St. Irenaeus, and Tertullian only, although steps had already been taken in this direction by Ps. Barnabas and St. Justin. Other ancient writers, notably those from Alexandria, go no further than Barnabas. Origen is alone in his mentioning of the angels in connection with this text.<sup>64</sup> On the other hand the image effected by the words of Genesis is commonly considered to be an image of the Son, who is the Image of the Father. The Spirit, when he is referred to, is associated with the perfecting of this image. Trinitarian analogies have appeared with partial psychological features, principally that of the human word related to the generation of the Son. In several of the earlier writers the spirit (*pneuma*) in man is associated with the sanctifying action of the Holy Spirit, yet no explicit connection is made between the *pneuma* in man and the Spirit in the order of exemplarity. The analogue for the Spirit thus far has been of the corporeal order reflecting a general characteristic of this early age; the Spirit and his Personality are objects for faith, not for theological speculation.<sup>65</sup> However there is reason to believe that a solution is not far removed from this period, for Tertullian has made explicit the relation between the image in man and its use as an analogy for the generation of the Word. Later writers will extend this usage to the procession of the Spirit also.

### THE POST-NICENE FATHERS

From the Council of Nicaea in the year 325 comes the first official Creed to be formulated since the baptismal formulas. Here the consubstantiality of the Father and Son is defined

by use of the term *homoousios*, and Arianism is explicitly condemned. The selected of the term *homoousios*, whose usage was once condemned by a council at Antioch,<sup>66</sup> and the condemnation of Arius, an adherent of the school of Antioch, represents a victory for its ancient rival the see of Alexandria. It will be the Alexandrinians who are in the forefront of the ensuing theological combat with members of the school of Antioch.

#### THE NEO-ALEXANDRIANS

The great champion of Nicene orthodoxy in the East is St. Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria. He comments many times on the image text from Genesis and it is always interpreted as words addressed by the Father to the Son, his Word.<sup>67</sup> The Image of the Father is the Son, and man is consistently referred to as "to the image."<sup>68</sup> The Spirit is seen to be the Image of the Son, though assuredly he is not the Son of the Son. The scriptural basis asserted for the latter position is a rather unusual interpretation of the words of St. Paul, "those whom he pre-knew he has predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son" (Rom. 8:29). The "image of his Son" is the Holy Spirit in the view of the bishop of Alexandria.<sup>69</sup>

The Spirit as Image of the Son is a secondary consideration in the doctrine of the image as explained by Athanasius. His more characteristic view is to see the Word as the Image according to which man was made, and the Spirit as the "agent" in the perfecting of this image. The Spirit also effects the union in spirit through the bond of charity, which exists among the faithful, and this is a reflection of the unity of the Father and Son.<sup>70</sup> Athanasius will speak of man partaking in the Spirit (and through him in the divine nature), and of a participation in the Son (and through him in the Father), and so some common exemplarity of all Three Persons is implicit in his thought.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, the stress is on the exemplarity of the Son (and the Father), while the Spirit is the sanctifier.

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In his use of analogies for the illustration of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit the bishop of Alexandria is most cautious. He carefully avoids the theory of the two-fold state of the Word, and prefers simply to repeat the Nicene expression of consubstantiality for the relation between the Father and Son.<sup>72</sup> Almost unwittingly he does point out that the human word like the divine Word is begotten without passion or division, and admits that "our word is the image of the Word who is the Son of God."<sup>73</sup> He rejects a heretical theory that there are a pair of attributes, Thought and Will, belonging to the Unoriginate God. This theory seems to demand the action of the will before the word is actually put forth, and Athanasius is certain that the Word of God is not from the Will of God, but "begotten by nature."<sup>74</sup> When he comes to describe the Spirit, Athanasius uses scriptural descriptions such as the "anointing," the "seal," or the "Gift," reflecting again the simplicity of the definition of Nicaea with regard to the Spirit, and his own disinclination toward speculation.<sup>75</sup>

The direction of the catechetical school at Alexandria was confided to Didymus the Blind, who remained master there for over fifty years. In a work important for the development of trinitarian thought, the *De Trinitate*, Didymus interprets the words of Genesis effecting the image in man as referring to the Three Persons of the Trinity. The words, "Let us make" were said to the Son and Spirit, not as ministers or subordinates, but as having one power and will with the Father. The words "to our image and likeness" demonstrate the one essence or nature of the Trinity.<sup>76</sup> From these words it would seem that Didymus considers man to be an image of the Trinity. Yet his commentary on the following verse assigns different functions to different Persons. The words "and God made man" are referred to the Son as the maker; the words, "in the image of God he made him" are referred to the Father as exemplar; the words, "and God saw that it was good and blessed them" are referred to the Spirit who sanctified man. Continuing he in-



interprets the words, "to the image," albeit with reservation, as signifying that man has from the divine fashioning an immortal spirit (*pneuma*), and a mind (*nous*), and a word (*logos*).<sup>77</sup>

Clearly the blind master at Alexandria has tried to relate elements of the divine image in man to the Persons of the Trinity. It would seem that he is giving in the trinity of *pneuma*, *nous*, *logos* an image of the Trinity resulting from creation, and not an analogy, for no use is made of it. In his earlier words he is also opting for an image of the Trinity, but one which is common to the Persons, as reflective of the common essence. In relating the image to the Father there he is summing up the common image as expressed in the Principle of the Deity, for the Son is the Image of the Father, and, in Didymus's thought, the Spirit is the Image of the Son.<sup>78</sup>

#### THE CAPPADOCIANS

In his tract on the Holy Spirit St. Basil the Great clearly asserts that the entire Trinity is engaged in the creation of all things: the Father as the original cause, the Son as the creative cause, and the Spirit as the perfecting cause.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, if we except *Adver. Arium*, V, 4 (commonly attributed to Didymus), and *De Homini Structura*, I (possibly the work of St. Gregory of Nyssa), when he speaks of the text from Genesis he will say that God is speaking to his Son.<sup>80</sup> The words of Genesis cannot be addressed to the angels, but only to one who has the same divine form as the Father, and this is his Image.<sup>81</sup> Because there were followers of Arius who would agree that the Son is like the Father, but deny that he is consubstantial with the Father, Basil will shy from describing the Son as being like the Father, but rather points out the identity of nature and consubstantiality.<sup>82</sup>

Perhaps it is due to the earliness of the composition of the *Hexameron*, to which we have been referring, that Basil does not associate the Spirit with the words of the Genesis text. He will have to be defended both by Athanasius and Gregory

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Nazianzus because of his general reticence about the divinity of the Spirit.<sup>83</sup> Yet he does later associate the Spirit with the perfecting of the image and the spiritualization of man through his gifts. At the peak of this likeness to God Basil will say that the Spirit shows in himself the Image of the Invisible (the Son), and in this Image the archetype (the Father) can be seen.<sup>84</sup> It would seem then that the image in man could be related to the common Image (considered as exemplar) of all Three Persons.

Basil is against excessive stress being given to the analogy of the human word as illustrative of the generation of the Divine Word. Yet he does see some likeness between them: the inner word is generated without passivity, and the exterior word is an image of thought.<sup>85</sup> Both of these characteristics are to be observed with regard to the Divine Word. On the basis of St. Paul's comparison of the human spirit to the Divine Spirit Basil will use the spirit in man (*pneuma*) as illustrative of the union of the Spirit with the Father, but this analogy appears rarely.<sup>86</sup> In one of his letters Basil manifests the continuing lack of insight into the intimate nature of the procession of the Spirit when he speaks of the special characteristics of the Persons as being "fatherhood, sonship, sanctification."<sup>87</sup>

In fact, it is only with the teaching of his close friend and pupil St. Gregory Nazianzus that the term "procession" is related exclusively to the Spirit, and the "notions" of the Persons expressly appear.<sup>88</sup> It is also Gregory the Theologian who extends the concept of relation to the Third Person, whereas it had been restricted to the Father and Son in the thought of Basil, Origen, and others.<sup>89</sup> The acuteness of Gregory's mind leads him to reject the traditional trinitarian analogies (sun, ray, light, or spring, fountain, river) as very far short of the truth.<sup>90</sup> He does make a passing comment to the effect that the trinity of mind (*nous*), word (*logos*), spirit (*pneuma*) in us reflects, in a defective way, the characteristics of the Three Persons: the Father being without principle as the mind is, the Son generated

like the word in man, the Spirit proceeding as the spirit in man.<sup>91</sup> In another passage he will find that the Son is related to the Father as word to mind because of the passionless generation, the union, and the declaratory function (definition) to be associated with the word.<sup>92</sup> The nature of the procession of the Spirit receives little comment from the pen of St. Gregory the Theologian.

St. Gregory of Nyssa, the brother of Basil and friend of Gregory Nazianzus, is the most speculative and most gifted of the Cappadocians. In one place he anticipates modern exegesis of the image text from Genesis by calling it simply the verbal description of the creation of man, who is so great a work of God that something like deliberation or counsel is described as preceding.<sup>93</sup> Later he interprets the image text as revealing the entire Trinity, and the image resulting is related to the common likeness among the Three Persons.<sup>94</sup> Gregory does not say this, but it appears that he considers an image of the nature common to the Trinity is constituted by the words of Genesis. Man images the Trinity in its Unity, but not, it seems, the distinctive characteristics of the Persons.

In a passage from this same work of Gregory there appears a trinity of mind, word, love (*nous, logos, agape*), but there is difficulty in interpreting the thought of the Cappadocian here. He does not call this a trinity, nor even an image, but he does say it is a likeness to the Godhead in the image we possess. The Godhead is Mind (related to a text from St. Paul referring to the mind of Christ), and Word (related to the Prologue of St. John), and Love (related to expressions from the 1st Epistle of St. John). Man has in himself mind and word, and should have love (charity) for others, otherwise the whole likeness is transformed (deformed?).<sup>95</sup>

In another work Gregory uses the trinity of mind, word, breath (*pneuma*) for an analogy of the divine Trinity in us. Here the third member is the breath inhaled and exhaled, which on the occasion of the uttering of a word becomes the

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vocal utterance expressing the meaning of the word. So too the Spirit accompanies the divine Word and manifests his power. However both the human word and human breath are ineffective and unsubstantial, and so very deficient analogues. Nevertheless some perception of the nature of God can be gathered here.<sup>96</sup>

Thus far we have been using the certainly authentic works of Gregory of Nyssa, but there is a treatise edited among his works (regarded by some as authentic) which is especially interesting for our purpose. This work is the treatise entitled "*De eo quid sit ad imagine Dei et similitudinem.*"<sup>97</sup> The author understands the words of Genesis as referring to the Trinity of Persons, and the effect is that "our soul is made to the image of the Trinity." The image of the Trinity in man is a trinity of soul, word, mind (*psyche, logos, nous*), which reflects not only the distinction of the Persons but together the unity of the divine nature. The soul is not generated and lacks a principle, and so is like the Father; the mental word is generated in us without passivity, and so is like the Divine Word; the mind is neither without a principle, nor generated, but proceeds from the soul and so is something like the Spirit.<sup>98</sup>

What is also noteworthy about this work is the method used by the writer in arriving at the image of the Trinity in man; it is identical with that of Augustine. The procedure to follow in order to know the Trinity of Persons is to enter into self, for self is an image of God. There can be seen a trinity in unity which is an image of the divine Trinity.<sup>99</sup>

### OTHER EASTERN WRITERS

In the homilies attributed to Macarius of Egypt we find an observation in the commentary on the image text from Genesis which is new to this study. Ps.-Macarius is not only of the opinion that the words of the text were not spoken to the angels, but they are to be understood only of man, for the angel is not an image of God.<sup>100</sup> This position—man only



among creatures images God—has other adherents in the early writings of the Church, and perhaps the reticence of Augustine on this point is thus to be accounted for. St. Ephraem the Syrian refers the words of the Genesis text to the Trinity of Persons, and trinitarian analogies abound in his poetical writings.<sup>101</sup> He will call the Father Mind, the Son Word (inner), and the Spirit is Voice (exterior word).<sup>102</sup> He speaks of the trinity of spirit, soul, body in man which are related to the Father, Son, Spirit respectively.<sup>103</sup> In anticipation of Augustine he will compare the memory in man to the Father.<sup>104</sup>

The so-called Traditionalists, St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Epiphanius, add little of interest. St. Cyril consistently interprets the words of Genesis as being addressed by the Father to the Son, and the image resulting is called simply an image of God.<sup>105</sup> Speculation is not the inclination of Cyril, for he is of the opinion that it is enough to know what has been written (in the Scriptures) about the Trinity, and to go beyond this is to pursue a dangerous course.<sup>106</sup> St. Epiphanius will agree that the words from the Genesis text were spoken by the Father to the Son, but he sees the work accomplished by them as belonging also to the Spirit.<sup>107</sup>

#### WESTERN WRITERS

The teaching of the *De Trinitate* of St. Hilary, written during his four year-exile in the East, where he assimilated the thought of the Eastern Fathers, is of especial interest to us, for it is the only work from the Fathers cited by St. Augustine in his treatise on the Trinity. The text from Genesis is put to polemical uses by Hilary, and the plural forms indicate that the Father spoke to his Son. The image effected by these words is an image "common" to the Father and Son.<sup>108</sup> No reference is made here to the Spirit, and, in fact, little comment is given to the Spirit throughout the work. A trinitarian formula does appear, and it is one which Augustine will use, though giving his own interpretation to it. It is the formula of *Infinitas in Aeternitate, Species in Imagine, Usus in Munere*.<sup>109</sup> There is no

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evidence in this work that St. Hilary conceived of the image in man as a trinitarian one in the augustinian sense.

During this same period in the West we have the familiar figure of M. Victorinus, the African convert from neo-platonism, whose translations and example were of great influence on the life and thought of Augustine. In the *Adversus Arium* of this writer we can see many features of the augustinian trinitarian image anticipated, though many important differences are also observable. The African neo-platonist interprets the words of Genesis as the *Logos* cooperating with the Father in the creation of the image. Christ is the Image of God, while man is only "to the image." He also notes that the term of image refers to the present state of man, and the term likeness refers to the resurrection.<sup>110</sup> The latter two opinions were expressly rejected by Augustine.

Victorinus then finds an image of the Trinity in the soul wherein is the divine image. The trinitarian facet of the image is that of *esse, vivere, intelligere*. Victorinus relates *esse* to the Father, *vivere* to the Son, and *intelligere* to the Spirit, and undoubtedly this is an original view of the African writer.<sup>111</sup> He not only compares the procession and operation of the Spirit to the intellectual faculty in man, but associates the Word of God with the will of God. The latter opinion is not a novelty in the writings of the earlier Fathers, but the reason Victorinus alleges for this association appears to be original with him. "Every will [act] is an offspring."<sup>112</sup> The refutation of this view occupies the mental efforts of Augustine repeatedly in his *De Trinitate*. Later in this work of Victorinus an illustration of the Trinity is given using the power of sight in man. The trinity consists in *visio, videre, discernere*, and anticipates the augustinian trinity in external vision.<sup>113</sup> Surely this work exercised a great influence (much of it in a negative fashion) on the developing thought of the bishop of Hippo.<sup>114</sup>

Several other western writers of this period comment on the image text from Genesis. In the *De Trinitate*, of Faustinus,

a priest of Rome, we find the text interpreted of the Father and Son. The image effected is that of the Father and Son, for there is one image (exemplar) involved which is the one Deity of the Father and Son. The Spirit is not associated with the Genesis text, though he appears later in the work.<sup>115</sup> The pseudo-augustinian *Questions on the Old and New Testaments*, attributed to Ambrosiaster, interprets the Genesis text of the Three Persons. The Son carries out the words of the Father through the Holy Spirit. The image resulting is "one image of the Three," for the Father, Son, and Spirit are one God.<sup>116</sup>

#### CONTEMPORARIES OF AUGUSTINE

In the West at this time there is the influential bishop of Milan, who is greatly dependent upon the Eastern Fathers for his teaching. In the *Hexameron*, modelled after the work of the same name by St. Basil, St. Ambrose sees the words of Genesis as being addressed by the Father to the Son.<sup>117</sup> In the *De Fide* the same opinion is asserted, and he adds that the image effected is "one image, one likeness" belonging "not to diversity but to the unity" of God.<sup>118</sup> In the *De Spiritu Sancto*, considered as a revision of Didymus's work of the same name, the identical thought appears: it is the Son to whom the words of Genesis were spoken and the result is a "common image," which "signifies nothing but the oneness of the same Majesty."<sup>119</sup> Later in this work Ambrose states that "every creature exists both of the will and through the operation and in the power of the Trinity as it is written, 'Let us make man to our image and likeness.'"<sup>120</sup>

There is no indication that Ambrose considers man to be an image of the Trinity in the augustinian sense. When he speaks of traces of the Trinity, he refers to the three-fold question and answer in the baptismal rite, and he describes the Son as "the right hand" of God, and the Spirit as "the finger" of God.<sup>121</sup>

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There is little of significance for our limited purpose appearing in the works of two western contemporaries of Augustine, St. Jerome and St. Peter Chrysologus. St. Jerome does see in the image text from Genesis some indication of the mystery of the Trinity, but he is very reserved in his statements.<sup>122</sup> He considers speculation as to nature of the image as fruitless, and leaves the knowledge of it to God who created the image.<sup>123</sup> St. Peter Chrysologus interprets the words of Genesis as being addressed by the Father to the Son, and the image effected is that of the Father and the Son, for one and the same substance of both is imaged by man.<sup>124</sup>

In the East at this time the decisive person of St. Cyril of Alexandria holds a place of great prominence. The bishop of Alexandria associates the Trinity with the words from the text of Genesis, as does St. Isidore of Pelusium who wielded significant influence on Cyril, and the former speaks of the imaging of the Trinity by man.<sup>125</sup> Yet he gives up the search for the trinitarian image as futile speculation, and it seems that it is a problem he is unable to resolve. As Burghardt notes, the image in man is considered by Cyril to represent all Three Persons, not one to the exclusion of the others.<sup>126</sup> It seems that Cyril in this view is referring the image in man to the divinity common to the Trinity of Persons. When he does speak of the representation in man of a particular Person, it is with the Son that it is associated.

The Spirit is not slighted by Cyril in his doctrine of the image. As with the other Fathers, Cyril considers the Spirit as the proximate source, so to speak, of sanctification and divinization.<sup>127</sup> He will speak of a participation in the Spirit, a participation in the Son, and a participation in God (the Father).<sup>128</sup> The natural concomitant to participation is imitation, and so some exemplarity to the individual Persons would be expected here. But Cyril's explanation again results in an image of the divine nature.



It would have been impossible for us to be restored to our original beauty [the original image of Adam], once we had fallen from it through the transgression in the first man, had we not achieved that inexpressible communion and union with God. . . . But union with God is impossible of achievement for anyone save through participation in the Holy Spirit, instilling in us his own proper sanctification and refashioning to his own life the nature that fell subject to corruption, and thus restoring to God and to God's semblance what had been deprived of this glory. For the perfect image of the Father is the Son, and the natural likeness of the Son is His Spirit. The Spirit, therefore, refashioning as it were to himself the souls of men, engraves on them God's semblance and seals the representation of the supreme essence.<sup>129</sup>

Representing the more orthodox part of the Antiochene tradition at this time in the East is St. John Chrysostom and following him Theodoret of Cyrus. St. John Chrysostom consistently interprets the text of Genesis as being addressed to the Son, and he uses the text to prove the divinity of the Son. The image resulting is one and related to the common likeness of Father and Son.<sup>130</sup> On the other hand, Theodoret sees the words from Genesis as referring to the Trinity of Persons, though he does admit to some obscurity here. The unity of the divine nature is disclosed by the singular form in this text. Continuing with his exposition he finds what he calls a more evident and fitting image in the soul (*psyche*) consisting in a trinity of mind, word, spirit (*nous, logos, pneuma*).<sup>131</sup> He interprets this trinity in much the same fashion as had Gregory of Nyssa with a notable difference. Theodoret may not call this explicitly an image of the Trinity but it is proposed as such, and not purely as a trinitarian analogy.

Such is the witness of history to the developing notion of the trinitarian image in man up to the time of the death of St. Augustine. In the West the teaching of the bishop of Hippo becomes the Latin heritage, and is transmitted by an ever-growing chorus of followers to the Middle Ages. This process

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initiates with St. Fulgentius, who is known as "Augustinus Abbreuiatus." If you wish to understand the divine Trinity somewhat, Fulgentius writes, enter into your self, and there you will find the three elements of which the soul is composed: memory, intellect, and will.<sup>132</sup> These three are an image of the Trinity in the human soul. St. Fulgentius repeats the teaching of St. Augustine even to details, and he will be joined in this repetition by most of the later western writers.

In the East the story is different, and to show the direction the thought of the Fathers there takes with respect to the trinitarian image we shall call on several more witnesses from that sector of the Church. With these writers from the East the patristic period is brought to a close.

### POST-AUGUSTINIAN WRITERS IN THE EAST

From the early sixth century and representing the school at Gaza there is St. Procopius. He comments on the text from Genesis several times, and consistently relates it to the Trinity of Persons. The image effected is considered to be an image of the Trinity, but, apparently, one which reflects the unity of the Godhead common to the Persons.<sup>133</sup> Later in the same treatise he proposes to his readers an example illustrating the Trinity of Persons. The example is that of the soul (*psyche*) which has two powers flowing from it in an inseparable way. The two powers are reason (*logos*), and a life-giving power called spirit (*pneuma*). Procopius then points out that the Scriptures give us the names of *logos* (cf. John 1:1) and of *pneuma* (cf. 1 Cor. 2:11) to lead us to the knowledge of the Son and the Spirit.<sup>134</sup>

Edited among the writings of Anastasius of Antioch, who lived toward the end of the sixth century, there are fragments from a sermon on the image in man which reproduces the teaching we have already seen from a sermon of pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa. The author uses the augustinian method to find the image of the Trinity in his soul. The trinitarian image discovered

is that of *psyche*, *logos*, *nous*.<sup>135</sup> The teaching of this sermon is so similar to that of the ps.-gregorian treatise on the image that it seems very probable it represents fragments of the latter.

From the middle of the 7th century we have the writings of St. Maximus Confessor. In a work called *Questions to Thalassium* he interprets the image text from Genesis as referring to the Three Persons of the Trinity. The work accomplished here, that is the image, is the work of the Father, Son, and Spirit, for creation is their common function.<sup>136</sup> Earlier in this work Maximus sees a trinitarian reflection in creatures, using a text of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (1:20) as a spring-board like St. Augustine. The being and essence of creatures reflects the person of the Father; the distinction flowing from the essence represents wisdom and the person of the Word; the movement or motion flowing from the essence reflects life and the person of the Spirit.<sup>137</sup>

The Patristic period is brought to a close in the 8th century by St. John Damascene in the East. St. John is a faithful collector of the teachings of his predecessors, and his teaching should be an accurate reflection of the tendencies of the Orientals with regard to the trinitarian image in man. Meany, who has made a thorough study of the doctrine of the image in the writings of St. John, comes to the conclusion that the trinitarian facet of the image was a secondary consideration for him. The reason given by Meany is the fact that the references to such teaching are scattered throughout the writings of Damascene, and are not incorporated into the main body of his image teaching.<sup>138</sup> This is also a general characteristic of the Greek Fathers.

It is difficult to be certain, but it seems that St. John does interpret the Genesis text as effecting a trinitarian image in man. In his treatise on images he speaks of the Father as Mind, the Son as Word, and the Spirit as being one God, and compares them to the mind, word, spirit (*nous*, *logos*, *pneuma*) which are one man. The words of Genesis follow almost im-

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mediately, and he relates them to the dominion exercised by man over the rest of creation by the trinity of mind, word, spirit in him.<sup>139</sup> In other places St. John places much reliance on the trinitarian analogy just cited (the more characteristic formula of the East) as an illustration of the distinction of the Persons of the Trinity.<sup>140</sup> There is no indication in these passages that he considers this trinity to be an image resulting from creation; rather it is used purely as an analogy. Even when so used Damascene will place it on the same level as those of a corporeal nature, giving the impression that he does not assign any greater weight to it.<sup>141</sup> Again, this is characteristic of the eastern writers as a whole.<sup>142</sup>

By the time of Gregory Palamas the full augustinian psychological trinity appears in the East (middle of the 14th century), and it is most likely due to translations of Augustine (or of St. Thomas Aquinas) available there. Despite the great veneration paid to Gregory and his writings by the Byzantines, the augustinian trinity did not attract many adherents.<sup>143</sup>

### SUMMATION

After the Council of Nicaea the image text from Genesis receives an almost unanimous trinitarian exegesis from the Fathers, and the exceptions are easily explained.<sup>144</sup> The two outstanding defenders of the Nicene definitions—and so of the divinity of the Son—St. Athanasius in the East and St. Hilary in the West refer the Genesis text to Father and Son. A similar interpretation is given by two Fathers noted especially for their preaching, St. John Chrysostom in the East and St. Peter Chrysologus in the West. The special circumstances in which the traditionalist St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Basil the Great find themselves sufficiently accounts for their dualistic interpretation, and that of M. Victorinus is more than offset by the fact that he finds an image of the Trinity in the soul.

The Fathers in their interpretation consistently use much the same argument to prove that the words were addressed to a



divine Person or Persons. No creature, not even an angel, can produce a divine image in man, as no creature has an "image" common with God. On the other hand the proof of the divinity of the Son and of the Spirit is the fact that they can deify man, as they do have a "common image" with the Father. The trend of this constantly appearing argument is to relate the image in man to the divinity possessed by all of the Persons in common.<sup>145</sup> As a consequence the distinctiveness of the Persons as portrayed by the image tends to become lost to view. Some few of the Fathers from late in the fourth century do find an image in man which reflects something of the distinctive properties of the Persons, but they are exceptional.

The use of trinitarian analogies by the Fathers is, for the most part, not related to the image text, nor to their doctrine of the image. The use of such analogies begins with the earliest Fathers, but encounters much delay because of excesses in relation to the human word. The more usual analogy, especially among the Greek Fathers, namely the trinity of *nous*, *logos*, *pneuma* attains general recognition by the time of the Cappadocians and Didymus, though it has much earlier roots. Complications develop when an interpretation of *pneuma* is attempted. For some of the Fathers it means no more than breath in association with the word; for others it is the human spirit, and for still others it appears to be identified with or closely related to the Holy Spirit.

With respect to the last interpretation of *pneuma* especially there is a tendency for this member of the analogy to become associated with the doctrine of the image among the eastern Fathers. The *pneuma* is then understood as the human spirit under the impulse and sanctifying action of the divine Spirit who is the Image of the Son. The Spirit as the "seal" or "stamp" of God re-impresses the divine likeness lost by Adam on the *pneuma* of man. Even here there is a strong inclination to return to the unity of the Trinity, to the Godhead possessed in common, rather than to find any distinctive representation

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of the different Persons. The Spirit impresses the divine resemblance which is the image of the Son, who is in turn the Image of the Father.<sup>146</sup> Such an interpretation of *pneuma* is not found ordinarily among the eastern Fathers when they give their trinitarian analogies. The latter appear to be natural trinities, whereas the former is thoroughly supernatural, involving participation in the Spirit, the Word, and God as a result of the sanctifying action of the Spirit of the Father and Son.<sup>147</sup>

Some very few Fathers before Augustine do find a natural trinity in man which they consider to be an image of the Trinity, and not purely a trinitarian analogy. The only ones that have appeared from our survey have been the trinities proposed by M. Victorinus, Didymus the Blind, and the author of the pseudo-gregorian treatise on the divine image in man. The triad of *nous*, *logos*, *agape* given by St. Gregory of Nyssa, and the only one from the time before Augustine which has love or charity as the third member, cannot be considered to be an image of the Trinity for the Cappadocian; it is not in any way related to the divine Trinity, nor is it called a trinitarian image.<sup>148</sup>

\* \* \*

The originality of St. Augustine does not consist so much in the assertion that there is an image of the Trinity in man. The trinitarian exegesis of the image text from Genesis by the Fathers would seem to indicate a conclusion like this, despite the fact that most of them do not make an explicit statement to this effect. Nevertheless, because of the different points of view prevailing among the Fathers, the results are not the same. The later eastern Fathers, beginning around the time of the Arian crisis and the Cappadocians, generally start from the vantage point of the Trinity of Persons and work their way back to the unity of the Godhead, and this is reflected in their trinitarian image which emphasizes the unity of the Trinity. Augustine takes a different view: he starts with the unity of the divine nature and proceeds to the distinction of the Persons. As a consequence the

augustinian image accentuates the distinction of the Persons.<sup>149</sup> These different viewpoints are not mutually exclusive, but a matter of different stress which tends to direct their doctrine of the image into different channels. The augustinian view of the divine image in man as an image of the Trinity is a secondary consideration at the best for the Greek Fathers, and as such finds a faithful echo in St. John Damascene's teaching.<sup>150</sup>

It is when we come to the nature of the trinitarian image that the originality of St. Augustine is most manifest. The third member of the augustinian trinity, love or will, finds no counterpart in any of the trinities proposed by preceding Fathers, whether the trinity is offered purely as an analogy or as an image.<sup>151</sup> The relation of the Person and procession of the Spirit to the will and love in man finds little anticipation in the earlier writers. It is not that the other fathers do not associate charity with the Spirit or with the divine image in man, for the inspired writings make the association for them. Nevertheless they do not have the single-mindedness of Augustine in this regard. The doctrine of the image among the Greek Fathers is a complex teaching, stressing freewill, incorruptibility, dominion, among other things.<sup>152</sup> No such complexity appears in the teaching of Augustine; immortality, free-will, dominion receive little attention in his doctrine of the image.<sup>153</sup> Love and charity are the pre-occupation of the mind of Augustine, and the result is his singularly original image of the Trinity in man.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Modern exegesis of this text is best represented, perhaps, by the conclusion of Père Lagrange: "Man has been created to the image of God. The author insists too strongly on this to allow us to suppose that the Creator holds converse with the angels. God speaks to Himself. His use of the plural presupposes in Him a plenitude of being such that He can deliberate with himself as many persons deliberate with one another. The mystery of the Holy Trinity is not expressly indicated, but it gives the best explanation of the turn of phrase which will recur." *Revue Biblique*, "Hexaemeron," V (1896), 387. Cf. P. Ceuppens, *Theologia Biblica*, I, *De Deo Uno* (Marietti, Rome: 1948), 86-87, II, *De Sanctissima Trinitate*, 3; J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, (Paris: 1927), I, 556.

<sup>2</sup>See R. M. Wilson, "The Early Exegesis of Gen. 1:26," *Studia Patristica*, (Akademie Verlag, Berlin: 1957), I, 426.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. *Epist. ad Diog.*, 10, 2 (PG 2:1181); *Clem., ad Cor.*, 33 (PG 1:273).

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Ps. Ignat., *ad Antioch.*, (PG 5:900); Ps. Clem., 7 *Apost. Const.*, 34 (PG 1:1025-1026).

<sup>5</sup>Cf. Ps. Barnabas, *Epist.* VI, 12 (PG 2:742), *ibid.*, V, 5 (PG 2:735).

<sup>6</sup>See J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, I, 161 f, 228 f; H. Somers, *Folia*, IX (1955), 2, "The Riddle of a Plural (Genesis 1:26): Its History in Tradition," 64-68, and 77-82 for texts from Philo, rabbinic literature, apocrypha, and mythology.

<sup>7</sup>Cf. Justin, *Dialog.*, n. 62 (PG 6:619).

<sup>8</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, n. 61 (PG 6:619).

<sup>9</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos*, c. 5 (PG 6:813 f).

<sup>11</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 7 (PG 6:820).

<sup>12</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 12 (PG 6:829 f).

<sup>13</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 13 and c. 15 (PG 6:831 f & 837 f).

<sup>14</sup>Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg. pro Christ.*, cc 4-6, (PG 6:897 f).

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, c. 10 (PG 6:908 f).

<sup>16</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 24 (PG 6:964).

<sup>17</sup>Cf. G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, (SPCK London: 1959), 90-91, where it is pointed out that the better translation of *trias* is triad, and not trinity, for there is no question here of trying to reconcile the three "powers" with monotheism. Prestige also admits to some doubt as to whether this is the first actual appearance of the term *trias* in connection with the Godhead. It may be that a usage of this term in Clement of Alexandria is earlier (*Exc. Theod.* 80:3), 93.

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Theophilus, *Ad Auto.*, II, 15 (PG 6:1078 f).

<sup>19</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 19 (PG 6:1082).

<sup>20</sup>J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, II, 513, notes, in answer to an objection stemming from Petavius that Theophilus identifies the *Logos* and the Spirit, that in certain texts the distinction does seem to vanish. H. Somers, "The Riddle of a Plural. . .," 68, seems to think that it would be hazardous to assume a trinitarian text here. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 90, sees no difficulty with a trinitarian interpretation.



- <sup>21</sup>Cf. Theophilus, *Ad Auto.*, II, c. 15 (PG 6:1078).
- <sup>22</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, c. 2 (PG 6:1025).
- <sup>23</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, c. 10 (PG 6:1064); *ibid.*, II, c. 22 (PG 6:1088). Cf. H. Passaic, *Théologie du Verbe* (Editions du Cerf, Paris: 1951), 86-87; G. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 123-128 for the subsequent history of Theophilus's distinction between inner word and uttered word.
- <sup>24</sup>Cf. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haereses*, IV, 20 (PG 7:1032); *ibid.*, V, proem. (PG 7:975); *ibid.*, V, 1, (PG 7:1123); *ibid.*, V, 6 (PG 7:1137). The text from Genesis is referred to Father and Son only in V, 15 (PG 7:1166).
- <sup>25</sup>Cf. *Adv. Haer.*, I, 24 (PG 7:674); *ibid.*, I, 30 (PG 7:698).
- <sup>26</sup>*Adv. Haer.*, IV, 20 (PG 7:1032).
- <sup>27</sup>See J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogma de la Trinité*, II, 565 f.
- <sup>28</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 38, 3-4 (PG 7:1107 f); *ibid.*, V, 6 (PG 7:1137); E. Peterson, "L'Immagine di Dio in S. Ireneo," *La Scuola Cattolica* (1941), 46-54.
- <sup>29</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, V, 1, 1-2 (PG 7:1123 f).
- <sup>30</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, V, 16 (PG 7:1167); *ibid.*, III, 18 (PG 7:933 f).
- <sup>31</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, V, 6 (PG 7:1137 f).
- <sup>32</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 33 (PG 7:1072 f).
- <sup>33</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 28 (PG 7:809 f).
- <sup>34</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, V, 12, 2 (PG 7:807 f). As J. Quasten notes, *Patrology* (Spectrum, Utrecht: 1950), I, 308 f, it is difficult to decide whether Irenaeus is speaking of the spirit in man or the divine Spirit. Following the platonic trichotomy Irenaeus considers man to be composed of body, soul, spirit. The third essential part, the spirit, which crowns and perfects human nature, most of the time seems to be identified with the Holy Spirit.
- <sup>35</sup>See J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de Trinité*, II, 560-570.
- <sup>36</sup>Cf. Hippolytus, *Contra Haer. Noeti*, c. 10 (PG 10:817).
- <sup>37</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 11 (PG 10:817).
- <sup>38</sup>Cf. Novatian, *De Trinit.*, c. 17 (PG 3:917 f).
- <sup>39</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 26 (PL 3:936).
- <sup>40</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 29 (PL 3:945).
- <sup>41</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 28 (PL 3:942).
- <sup>42</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 31 (PL 3:949).
- <sup>43</sup>Cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Marcion*, II, 4 (PL 2:288); *ibid.*, V, 8, (PL 2:488); *De Resurr. Carnis*, 6 (PL 2:802).
- <sup>44</sup>Cf. *De Pudicitia.*, 16 (PL 2:1101).
- <sup>45</sup>Cf. Cyprian, *De Hab. Virg.*, 15 (PL 4:454 f).
- <sup>46</sup>Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.*, c. 12 (PL 2:167 f), "Si te adhuc numerus scandalizat trinitatis quasi non connexae, in unitate simplici . . . quomodo unicus et singularis pluraliter loquitur: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram . . . fallit aut ludit ut, cum unus et solus et singularis esset, numerose loquitur . . . Immo, quia iam adhaerebat illi Filius secunda persona, Sermo ipsius et tertia, Spiritus in Sermone, ideoque pluraliter pronuntiant . . . Cum quibus enim faciebat et quibus faciebat similem, Filio quidem qui erat inditurus hominem, Spiritu vero qui erat sanctifactorus hominem, quasi cum ministris et arbitris ex unitate trinitatis loquebatur."
- <sup>47</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Denique sequens scriptura distinguit inter personas: Et fecit Deus hominem, ad imaginem Dei fecit illum. Cur non "suam," si

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unus qui faciebat et non erat ad cuius faciebat? Erat autem ad cuius imaginem faciebat, ad Filii scilicet, qui, homo futurus . . . , imaginem suam fecerat dici hominem qui tunc de limo formari habebat, imago veri et similitudo."

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, c. 5 (PL 2:160), "Id quo facilius intellegas, ex te ipso ante recognosce ut ex imagine et similitudine Dei, quo haberi et tu in temetipso rationem qui es animal rationale . . . Vide, cum tacitus tecum ipse congrederis ratione, hoc ipsum agi intra te, occurrente ea tibi cum sermone ad omnem cogitatus tui motum, ad omnem sensus tui pulsum . . . ita secundus quodammodo in te est sermo. . . ."

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, c. 8 (PL 2:164), "Protulit enim Deus sermonem, quemadmodum etiam Paracletus docet, sicut radix fructicem et fons fluvium et sol radium . . . nec dubitaverim Filium dicere et radicis fructicem et fontis fluvium et solis radium, quia omnis origo parens est et omne quod ex origine profertur progenies est, multo magis sermo Dei . . . nec frutex tamen a radice nec fluvius a fonte nec radius a sole discernitur, sicut nec a Deo sermo . . . duos dicere: Deum et sermonem eius . . . nam et radix et frutex duae res sunt, sed coniunctae. . . . Tertius enim est Spiritus a Deo et Filio sicut tertius a radice fructus ex frutice et tertius a fonte rivus ex flumine et tertius a sole apex ex radio . . . Ita Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens, et monarchiae nihil obstrepit et oikonomiae statum protegit."

<sup>50</sup>Cf. Clement of Alex., *Cohort. ad Gent.*, c. 10 (PG 8:213-215); *Paedagog.* I, 12 (PG 8:367); *Strom.* V, 14 (PG 9:139). Cf. R. Wilson, "The Early Exegesis of Gen. 1:26," 433. It is interesting to observe that both Clement of Alexandria and his older contemporary Tertullian see an analogous relation between the Trinity of Persons and the Church. For Clement's usage, see *Paedagog.*, I, 6 (PG 8:299), and for Tertullian, see *De Baptismo*, 6 (PL 1:1315).

<sup>51</sup>Cf. *Paedagog.*, I, 12 (PG 8:367).

<sup>52</sup>Cf. *Cohort. ad Gent.*, c. 10 (PG 8:213 f).

<sup>53</sup>Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, II, 9 (PG 11:810); *ibid.*, V, 37 (PG 11:1237); *Comm. in Matt.*, XII, 2 (PG 13:980); *Comm. in Joan.* II, 3 (PG 14:110); *Hom. in Gen.* I, 13 (PG 12:156 f). In the foregoing passages the image text is referred to Father and Son. In the *Comm. in Joan.*, XII, 49 (PG 14:490) Origen sees the words as addressed by God to the angels, who do their part in the creation of man. Here Origen is following the lead of Philo, see H. Somers, "The Riddle of a Plural. . . .," 72.

<sup>54</sup>See P. Crouzel, *Théologie de L'Image de Dieu chez Origene*, (Aubier, Paris: 1956), 125-126.

<sup>55</sup>Cf. *Comm. in Joan.*, II, 3 (PG 14:110); *De Princip.*, III, 6, 1 (PG 11:333).

<sup>56</sup>Cf. *Contra Cels.*, IV, 30 (PG 11:1072); P. Crouzel, *op. cit.*, 126 f.

<sup>57</sup>Cf. *De Princip.*, IV, 1, 30 (PG 11:404).

<sup>58</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 3, 5-8 (PG 11:150 f).

<sup>59</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 1, 31-32 (PG 11:405 f); *ibid.*, IV, 1, 35 (PG 11:409 f).

<sup>60</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 2, 6 (PG 11:401 f); *ibid.*, IV, 1, 28 (PG 11:134 f).

<sup>61</sup>See P. Crouzel, *op. cit.*, 120.

<sup>62</sup>Cf. Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Exposit. Fidei*, (PG 10:983-988).

<sup>63</sup>See T. De Regnon, *Etudes de Théologie Positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, (Paris: 1898), III, 320 f. De Regnon is of the opinion that the Greek notion of the Spirit as Image of the Son approaches the *Filioque* expression of the West. He also points out that the Spirit is the Image of the

Son only, and not the Image of the Father. This is possible, according to De Regnon, because the notion of image here includes not only a likeness in nature, but also a similitude of the personal properties.

<sup>64</sup>See G. M. Perella, "Il Domma Trinitario nel Genesi I-XI," *Divus Thomas* (Piac.), VII (1930), 419-420; R. M. Wison, "The Early Exegesis of Gen. 1:26," 437.

<sup>65</sup>See G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 80-86; P. Th. Camelot, "Le dogme de La Trinité, et Formulation des formules dogmatiques," *Lumière et Vie*, XXX (1956), 25.

<sup>66</sup>See G. L. Prestige, *op. cit.*, 197 f, for the Greek understanding of the term *homoousion*.

<sup>67</sup>Cf. Athanasius, *C. Arian.*, III, 37 (PG 26:385); *ibid.*, II, 31 (PG 26:212); *C. Gentes*, 34 (PG 25:68 f); *ibid.*, 46 (PG 25:92-93). See G. M. Perrella, "Il Domma Trinitario nel Genesi I-XI," 422, for other references in Athanasius.

<sup>68</sup>See R. Bernard, *L'Image de Dieu d'après Saint Athanase* (Aubier, Paris: 1952), 20-21, and note (2) for the references in the works of Athanasius.

<sup>69</sup>Cf. *IV ad Serap.*, 3 (PG 26:640 f); *I ad Serap.*, 24 (PG 26:588); R. Bernard, *op. cit.*, 127-130.

<sup>70</sup>Cf. *C. Arian.*, II, 18-24 (PG 26:184 f).

<sup>71</sup>Cf. *De Synodis*, 51 (PG 26:784 f); *I ad Serap.*, 23-24 (PG 26:484 f); *C. Arian.*, I, 50 (PG 26:116 f), and R. Bernard, *op. cit.*, 127-130.

<sup>72</sup>Cf. H. Passaic, *Theologie du Verbe*, 74-75.

<sup>73</sup>Cf. *De Decretis*, n. 11 (PG 25:436); *C. Arian.*, II, 78 (PG 26:312).

<sup>74</sup>Cf. *C. Arian.*, III, 60-63 (PG 26:448 f).

<sup>75</sup>Cf. *I ad Serap.*, 23 (PG 26:584 f); *C. Arian.*, II, 18 (PG 26:184); *De Synodis*, 51 (PG 26:784 f).

<sup>76</sup>Cf. Didymus, *De Trinitate*, II, VII (PG 39:565); *ibid.*, I, 16 (PG 39:333).

<sup>77</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*

<sup>78</sup>Cf. *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 22 (PG 39:1052).

<sup>79</sup>Cf. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, XVI, 38 (PG 32:136).

<sup>80</sup>Both Perrella, "Il Domma Trinitario. . .," 423-424, and H. Somers, "The Riddle of a Plural. . .," 92-93, list *Advers. Arium*, V, 4 as Basil's work, and therefore assign to him a trinitarian exegesis of Gen. 1:26. However, cf. J. Quasten, *Patrology*, III, 210, and 217.

<sup>81</sup>Cf. *Hexam*, IX, 6 (PG 29:204-208).

<sup>82</sup>Cf. *Epist.* VIII, 3 (PG 32:249).

<sup>83</sup>Cf. *De Spiritu Sancto*, I, 3 (PG 32:72), where he relates an incident in which he used both forms of the lesser doxology: Glory be to the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost; Glory be to the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost. His usage of the first form is attacked by some present and he gives a long defense of it in the reference given above. Nevertheless he never calls the Holy Spirit explicitly God in his tract on the Holy Spirit.

<sup>84</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, IX, 23 (PG 32:109).

<sup>85</sup>Cf. *Homilia in Illud, In Principio erat Verbum*, n. 3 (PG 31:477 f).

<sup>86</sup>Cf. *De Spiritu Sancto*, XVI, n. 40 (PG 32:144).

<sup>87</sup>Cf. *Epist.* CCXXXVI, n. 6 (PG 32:884).

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<sup>88</sup>Cf. Gregory Nazianzus, *Orat.* XXXIX, 12 (PG 36:348); *Orat.* XXX, 19 (PG 36:128); *Orat.* XXXI, 29 (PG 36:165 f).

<sup>89</sup>Cf. *Oratio* XXXI, 7-9 (PG 36:140 f).

<sup>90</sup>Cf. *Orat.*, XXXI, 31-33 (PG 36:169).

<sup>91</sup>Cf. *Orat.*, XXIII, 11 (PG 35:1161 f).

<sup>92</sup>Cf. *Orat.*, XXX, 20 (PG 36:129 f).

<sup>93</sup>Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hom. Opif.*, III, 1 (PG 44:135).

<sup>94</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 3 (PG 44:139); *Contra Eun.*, II, 12 (PG 45:556); *De Virginitate*, c. 12 (PG 46:369 f); *De Hom. Opif.*, XI, 3 (PG 44:156); *ibid.*, XVI, 1-22 (PG 44:177 f).

<sup>95</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, V, 2 (PG 44:137); R. Leys, "L'Image de Dieu chez Saint Gregoire de Nysse" (Desclee de Brouwer, Paris: 1951), 93-97. It is Leys's opinion that Gregory never speaks of an image of the Trinity in the augustinian sense, that is of a reflection of the Three Persons in the natural structure of the soul; and it seems here, at least, that the context supports this interpretation.

<sup>96</sup>Cf. *Orat. Catech.*, 1-5 (PG 45:18-23).

<sup>97</sup>See M. Penido, "Prélude Grec a La Théorie 'Psychologique' de la Trinité," *Revue Thomiste*, 45 (1939), 666-667. In Penido's opinion this treatise is probably genuine, and he labels it the "Greek Prelude" to the psychological theory of the Trinity. There is good reason to doubt the authenticity of this treatise, but for our purposes it can be considered part of the 4th century Alexandrian tradition.

<sup>98</sup>Cf. *De eo, quid sit ad imaginem Dei et similitudinem* (PG 44:1328-1335).

<sup>99</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, (PG 44:1339); M. Penido, *op. cit.*, 665-674.

<sup>100</sup>Cf. Macarius, *Hom.* XV, 22 (PG 34:589-591); *Hom.* XVI, 13 (PG 34:624).

<sup>101</sup>The works of St. Ephraem have not been available to us except in translation, so our references will be only to these. See G. M. Perrella, "Il Domma Trinitario. . .," 422-423.

<sup>102</sup>See H. Passaic, *Théologie du Verbe*, 72, note (3), *Hymnus de defunctis et Trinitate*, 11.

<sup>103</sup>Cf. *Rhythms of Saint Ephraem the Syrian*, (J. Parker, Oxford: 1847), trans. J. B. Morris, Rhythm the Eighteenth, 1-2, 166-167.

<sup>104</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, Rhythm the Fifty-Seventh, 2-5, 292-296.

<sup>105</sup>Cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, X, 6 (PG 33:669); *ibid.*, XI, 23 (PG 33:721).

<sup>106</sup>Cf. *Catech.*, XVI, 24 (PG 33:953).

<sup>107</sup>Cf. Epiphanius, *Haereses*, XXIII, 5 (PG 41:304); *ibid.*, 3 (PG 41:841); *ibid.*, LV, 9 (PG 41:985).

<sup>108</sup>Cf. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, III, 23 (PL 10:92); *ibid.*, IV, 17-18 (PL 10:110 f); V, 7 (PL 10:134).

<sup>109</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 1 (PL 10:51). In book VI, 10, 11 of the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine the formula of Hilary is cited, though not altogether accurately; Augustine uses *Aeternitas in Patre*, rather than *Aeternitas in Infinitate*. In the last member of Hilary's formula Augustine sees his own notion of *frui*, that is fruition with love. See P. Wild, *The Divinization of Man According to Saint Hilary of Poitiers*, (Mundelein, Illinois: 1950), 137-149.



- <sup>110</sup>Cf. M. Victorinus, *Adv. Arium.*, I, 19-20 (PL 6:1052-1054).
- <sup>111</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 63 (PL 6:1087); I, 53 (PL 6:1081 f); III, 4 (PL 6:1101).
- <sup>112</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 31 (PL 6:1064). This description of Victorinus may derive from Origen's notion of the generation of the Son.
- <sup>113</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, III, 5 (PL 6:1102).
- <sup>114</sup>See P. Henry, "The Adversus Arium of Marius Victorinus," *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1950, 42-55.
- <sup>115</sup>Cf. Faustinus, *De Trinit.*, I, 6 (PL 13:42).
- <sup>116</sup>Cf. QQ. in V & N. T., Q. 45 (PL 35:2244); Q. 106 (PL 35:2319).
- <sup>117</sup>Cf. Ambrose, *Hexaemer.*, VI, 7, 10 (PL 14:257).
- <sup>118</sup>Cf. *De Fide*, I, 7, 53 (PL 16:257); I, 7, 51 (PL 16:540); I, 3, 23 (PL 16:533 f).
- <sup>119</sup>Cf. *De Spirit. Sanct.*, II, Prol., 2 (PL 16:745).
- <sup>120</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 9, 100 (PL 16:764).
- <sup>121</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 10, 105 (PL 16:765); III, 3, 11-14 (PL 16:779 f).
- <sup>122</sup>Cf. Jerome, *In. Is.*, III, 6 (PL 24:97); *In illud Ezeck.*, IX, 28 (PL 25:269).
- <sup>123</sup>Cf. *Epist.* LI, n. 7 (PL 22:525).
- <sup>124</sup>Cf. Peter Chrysol., *Sermo* 131, (PL 52:560).
- <sup>125</sup>Cf. Cyril of Alex., *Cont. Jul.*, 4 (PG 76:725); *ibid.*, 8 (PG 76:909). For Isidore of Pelsium, cf. *Epist.*, 3, 112 (PG 78:818).
- <sup>126</sup>Cf. W. Burghardt, *The Image of God in Man According to St. Cyril of Alexandria*, (Catholic U. Press, Washington: 1957), 120-124. With regard to the teaching of St. Cyril we shall use summarizations from Father Burghardt's excellent study.
- <sup>127</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 65-83.
- <sup>128</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, *passim*.
- <sup>129</sup>*In. Joann.*, II, 11 (PG 74:553). This translation is from Burghardt, *op. cit.*, 72.
- <sup>130</sup>Cf. John Chrysos., *In Gen. Hom.*, 8 (PG 53:71-72); *In Gen., sermo* 2 (PG 54:588 f); *C. Anon. Hom.*, 11 (PG 48:798).
- <sup>131</sup>Cf. Theodoret, QQ. in *Gen.* 1:19 (PG 80:108); *Graec. affect. cur.*, 2 (PG 83:845).
- <sup>132</sup>Cf. Fulgentius, *Contra Fabianum*, Frag. 18 (PL 65:771 f); *De Fide* 5 (PL 65:674).
- <sup>133</sup>Cf. Procopius, *In Gen.* 1:26 (PG 87:114); *In Gen.* III, 22 (PG 87:221).
- <sup>134</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, (PG 87:125).
- <sup>135</sup>Cf. Anastasius, *Sermo Imag.* 1, (MG 89:1145); *Sermo Imag.*, 3 (MG 89:1169). If this fragment is actually part of the ps.-gregorian sermon on the image in man, then it cannot belong originally to both authors, and it need not belong to either.
- <sup>136</sup>Cf. Maximus Conf., QQ *ad Thal.*, 28 (PG 90:362 f).
- <sup>137</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 13 (PG 90:296).
- <sup>138</sup>Cf. J. Meany, *The Image of God in Man according to the Doctrine of St. John Damascene* (Manila: 1954), 136, footnote (109).
- <sup>139</sup>Cf. John Damascene, *De Imag.*, III, 20 (PG 94:1340); cf. *De Duab. Vol.*, 30 (PG 95:168).

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<sup>140</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 11 (PG 94:1241); *Expos. Fidei*, II (PG 95:420); *Contra Manich.* 8 (PG 94:1513).

<sup>141</sup>Cf. *Contra. Manich.*, 8 (PG 94:1513); *De Imag.*, I, 11 (PG 94:1241).

<sup>142</sup>See T. De Regnon, *Etudes de Théologie Positive sur La Saint Trinité*, III, 414. For some of the more common analogues used by the eastern writers in relation to the Holy Spirit: see *ibid.*, IV, 389-400, living water; 401-406, anointing, chrism; 407-412, royalty; 413-421, perfume, divine vapor, divine quality; 426-465, living action (energia); 465-498, donation (gift).

<sup>143</sup>See M. Jugie, *Theologia Dogmatica Orientalium* (Paris: 1933), II, 271 f., where the augustinian trinity as used by Gregory Palamas in a work written during the years 1354-1359 is discussed. The augustinian trinity was adopted by George the Scholar also, 279 f., but most others rejected it, starting at the end of the 13th century when it first appeared in the East, 260 f.

<sup>144</sup>See G. M. Perrella, "Il Domma Trinitario nel Genesi I-XI," 435, where the results of his study are arranged in a synthetic chart.

<sup>145</sup>Cf. J. Gross, *La divinisation du chrétien d'après les Pères grecs*, (Paris: 1938), 252, where it is noted with regard to the Alexandrian school that these teachers concern themselves with divinization less for itself than for the fact that it offers arguments to prove the divinity of the Word and of the Holy Spirit.

<sup>146</sup>We are speaking here of a general tendency, and are not denying that texts can be found among the eastern Fathers to support the contention that each of the Persons leaves his own impress on the soul. See M. Jugie, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti ex fontibus Revelationis et secundum Orientales dissidentes*, (Lateranum, Rome: 1936), 129, where it is noted: "Trinitatis enim operatio sanctificans deificat creaturam rationalem per praesentiam ipsarum Personarum Divinarum. Personae . . . conjunguntur et immediate applicantur creaturae sanctificatae et quasi sua propria effigie illam notant ac sigillant producentes in ea aliquem effectum, aliquod donum creatum, quo ipsa deiformis evadit."

<sup>147</sup>See M. L.-Borodine, "La doctrine de la "Deification" dans L'Eglise Grecque jusqu'au XIe siècle," *Revue de L'Histoire des religions*, CV (1932), 23-31; CVII (1933), 35-42.

<sup>148</sup>See J. Muckle, "The Doctrine of St. Gregory of Nyssa on man as the Image of God," *Mediaeval Studies*, 7 (1945), 58-59, where this passage from Gregory is discussed without any adversion to a possible reflection of the Trinity being involved.

<sup>149</sup>See M. Jugie, *op. cit.*, 42-43, 122; P. Galtier, *De SS. Trinitate in Se et in Nobis*, (Paris: 1933), 164-165.

<sup>150</sup>Cf. J. Meany, *The Image of God in Man according to the Doctrine of St. John Damascene*, 36, footnote (109). The other studies of the doctrine of the image among the eastern Fathers devote little attention to the trinitarian facet of the image, at least as it is understood in the augustinian sense. W. Burghardt devotes 4 pages to the trinitarian image as found in Cyril of Alexandria; nothing is found on this subject in P. Crouzel's study of Origen's doctrine of the image; R. Leys finds 4 or 5 pages sufficient for this aspect of the image doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa; little of significance is to be found in R. Bernard's study of the image doctrine of Athanasius. The conclusion is inescapable; the doctrine of the image is not integrated with the doctrine of the Trinity among the Greek Fathers, and remains a secondary consideration.

<sup>151</sup>Cf. T. de Regnon, *Etudes de Théologie Positive sur la sainte Trinité*, III, 398, 401-404, 414-415; M. Jugie, *Theologica Dogmatica Orientalium*, II, 285 f; G. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 235 f. On the part of Augustine the association of charity with the Spirit in a unique way is found even in his earlier works; cf. F. Cavallera, "La doctrine de S. Augustine sur l'Esprit Saint à propos du 'De Trinitate,'" *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, 2 (1930), 382-387. There is no need to exaggerate the originality of Augustine, for the Greek notion of the Spirit as the Gift of the Trinity bears a close relation to the love and will of God, as does the concept of the Spirit as the "communion" of the Trinity, and the effector of "communion" among men. It is Augustine who brings the full implications of these concepts into the open by his associating charity and the Spirit in an explicit way. Cf. e.g. Didymus, *De Spiritu Sancto*, n. 4 (PG 39:1036).

<sup>152</sup>Cf. W. Burghardt, *The Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria*, *passim*. Chapters 4, 5, 7 of this work are devoted to freedom, dominion, incorruptibility which are points of consequence in the doctrine of the eastern Fathers.

<sup>153</sup>Only once does Augustine mention immortality in relation to the divine image, and it is in one of his earliest works; cf. *De Quant. Animae* II, 3 (PL 32:1037). Dominion is consistently relegated to a minor role by Augustine's conclusion that this is a consequence of man's rationality wherein lies the primary resemblance to God. There is no place in the writings of Augustine, to our knowledge, that the freedom of man receives any special association with the divine image, although it is implicitly involved in the growth of the divine resemblance.

## CHAPTER SIX:

# ST. AUGUSTINE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

### FROM AUGUSTINE TO THOMAS

The originally augustinian teaching about the image of the Trinity in man is the common teaching of the theologians of the present day, but there are differences. The teaching of St. Augustine as interpreted by the Angelic Doctor is the common teaching; augustinian thought influences modern Catholicism with regard to the trinitarian image most directly through the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is unfortunate, perhaps, but true, that few theologians have other than a passing acquaintance with the doctrine of St. Augustine as found in the *De Trinitate*. A complete exposition of the thomistic teaching then is unnecessary, but it should be worthwhile to observe where St. Thomas diverts the augustinian deposit into channels more compatible with aristotelianism than with neo-platonism.

It is only at the end of the thirteenth century that the doctrine of the trinitarian image in man as proposed in the writings of St. Augustine appears in the East, and then it does not gain much support from writers there. In Latin Christendom, on the other hand, the name of Augustine stands out as the greatest of the Fathers, and his thought will dominate the western scene until late in the Middle Ages. In the West the augustinian teaching about the image of the divine Trinity in the human



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soul swiftly becomes the traditional teaching. We have already seen the beginnings of the Latin assimilation of the augustinian doctrine in the works of the African St. Fulgentius. In this final chapter the transmission of this teaching will be traced in survey fashion until it appears in the works of St. Thomas. There we shall pause in an effort to delineate more fully the influence of St. Augustine.

### THE TRANSMISSION

Before considering briefly the western transmission of the augustinian teaching to the high Middle Ages, notice should be taken of the writings of one whose influence on medieval thought will rival that of Augustine. The writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, the Athenian convert of St. Paul, enjoyed high esteem among all the later Latins because of their reputed authorship. Nevertheless, one will search in vain among the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius for any teaching about the image of the divine Trinity in man. Neo-platonic exemplarism, and its cycle of emanation and return—which is associated with the image and likeness of God in man—form major themes of these works, but the Areopagite is silent about the trinitarian image in the soul.<sup>1</sup> The illustrations he uses for explanation of the unity and distinction of the Persons are not taken from the psychological order.<sup>2</sup>

Another undoubted master for the Middle Ages was Boethius, but nothing is to be found in his writings about the divine Trinity which would lead one to suspect that he is aware of the augustinian teaching about the image of the Trinity in man. Boethius does claim to follow the opinions of St. Augustine when the mystery of the divine Trinity is discussed, but the aristotelian elements of the Boethian teaching are far more important for the history of theology.<sup>3</sup> The brilliant Roman statesman, Cassiodorus, also refers to the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine when he gives a brief exposition of the doctrine of the divine Trinity. Following the augustinian method he searches in the soul of man, the image of God, for an analogy. "There

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is another illustration [of the divine Trinity] from incorporeal beings, and it is from the soul which is made to the image of God. The soul itself is an incorporeal substance and rational, in which there is intellect and life. . . ."<sup>4</sup> Cassiodorus then proceeds to compare the substance of the soul to the Person of the Father, the virtue and knowledge of the soul to the Person of the Son, and the vivifying property of the soul to the Person of the Spirit. The trinity given by Cassiodorus reveals a lack of thorough acquaintance with the augustinian teaching.

The Spanish dominions do not altogether escape the influence of the augustinian doctrine about the image of God in man as can be seen in the following text from the *Etymologies* of St. Isidore of Seville.

The *mens* is that which is eminent in the soul, or that which remembers, for those who have lost their memory are said to be without a mind (*amentes*). Therefore it is not the soul, but that which excels in the soul which is called the mind, as its head or eye. And man himself is said to be the image of God according to the mind. All of these together belong to the soul so that it is one thing. The soul has obtained different names for the distribution (*efficientiis*) of causes. The mind is the memory, since those without memory are [called] *amentes*; when it is vivifying the body it is the soul; when it wills it is the *animus*; when it knows it is the *mens*; when it recalls it is the memory. . . .<sup>5</sup>

We find also that Julian of Toledo adopts the trinitarian analogy of St. Augustine, and the same can be said of several councils held at Toledo in the seventh century.<sup>6</sup>

In the work entitled the *Hexaemeron*, which is expressly modelled after works of the same name or type by St. Basil, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine, Venerable Bede gives a trinitarian interpretation to the image text from Genesis. Yet it seems that his interpretation of the image stresses the unity of the Trinity rather than the respective properties of the Three Persons. "When it is said, 'Let us make man to our image and likeness,' the unity of the Holy Trinity is openly asserted . . . 'let us make'

shows the one operation of the Three Persons, and in that which follows, 'to our image and likeness,' the one and equal substance of the same Trinity is indicated."<sup>7</sup>

At the dawn of the Middle Ages the writers in the West either briefly repeat something of the teaching of St. Augustine about the trinitarian image, as St. Fulgentius and, to a lesser degree, Cassiodorus and St. Isidore, or at the least intend to take St. Augustine as their principal guide in theological matters, as St. Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Gregory the Great, Venerable Bede, and even Boethius. In conformity with this established pattern the Carolingian Renaissance of the ninth century will be dominated by the thought of St. Augustine.

Alcuin, the first master of the palace school at Aachen, is more remembered for his part in the intellectual revival under the patronage of Charlemagne than for any original thought. The brief work he composed on the mystery of the divine Trinity is dedicated to the Emperor and his court. Here, in the dedicatory letter, it is pointed out that the writer's intention is to make use of the teaching of the bishop of Hippo.<sup>8</sup> In another of his works Alcuin remarks that the soul bears in its nature an image of the Trinity which consists in a trinity of intellect, will, and memory. Without addition the second trinitarian image of Augustine is briefly explained by Alcuin.<sup>9</sup> Nothing original has been contributed yet the repetition of augustinian teaching is important in itself, for in this way contact with the great witnesses from the glorious past of the Church has been re-established in the schools of the Middle Ages.

The first writer to appear in this survey who can be considered as an original thinker is John Scotus Erigena. The principal authority for John Scotus was the neo-platonic tradition as seen in the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, but from time to time he does refer to the teachings of St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine, particularly when speaking of the divine Trinity. On several occasions in his principal work, the *De Divisione Naturae*, John Scotus refers to the image of the Trinity in the

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human soul, and he gives us several different trinities which are likenesses of the divine in man. The first trinity is that of intellect, reason, and sense (interior); "the essential trinity of the soul made to the image of God consists in these three . . . intellect or *nous* . . . reason or *logos* . . . and sense or *dianoia*. . . ." <sup>10</sup> Later he finds a trinity consisting in "essence, power, and operation" which he associates with the previous trinity. <sup>11</sup> Finally he gives the augustinian trinity of mind, self-knowledge, and self-love. "St. Augustine in the books he wrote about the most holy Trinity . . . shows that the trinity of our interior nature and belonging to the rational soul, a trinity made to the image of God, consists in mind, the principal part of the soul, and the self-knowledge by which it knows itself, and love. . . ." <sup>12</sup> In these words the first trinitarian image of Augustine appears without much comment. The original synthesis of Erigena, imposing as it is considering the context of the times, was not as sound as it looked and later was condemned.

### THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHOLASTICISM

St. Anselm has been called "the founder of scholastic theology," and in his works the influence of St. Augustine appears more clearly and far more exclusively than in the writings of John Scotus Erigena. The doctrine of the divine Trinity is explained in the *Monologium* by use of the augustinian trinity of memory, understanding, and will. After having reproduced the analyses of Augustine at great length, Anselm remarks, "If the mind alone of all the things that are made can remember, know, and love itself, then I do not see why it is denied that in these [three] is the true image of that essence which through memory, knowledge, and love of itself consists in an ineffable Trinity." <sup>13</sup> In one of his meditations St. Anselm removes any doubts that his readers might have with respect to the object of the activity of the trinity in man. "How [is the soul] made to the image of God? Listen! God always remembers, always knows, and always loves himself. And so if you are unceasingly mindful of him,



as your model, if you know him, if you love him, you will be to his image; for you ought to strive to do that which God himself does always."<sup>14</sup>

In another of his works the archbishop of Canterbury will speak of demonstrating the mystery of the divine Trinity through "necessary reasons." Later writers of the Victorine school will exaggerate the possibility of demonstration with regard to the divinely revealed mystery of the Trinity, and such a view probably derives from the words of St. Anselm, and from some expressions used by St. Augustine himself. At any rate Anselm is an outstanding disciple of the bishop of Hippo in all theological matters.

The work of Anselm, and others, prepared the way for the golden age of theology. At the beginning of the twelfth century from the school of Anselm of Laon comes the first systematic grouping of the opinions of the Fathers, a synthetic arrangement and the first of the *Sententiae*. Abelard, and Peter the Lombard after him, will imitate Anselm's work with their own writings of this nature. The *Sententiae* are gradually enlarged, enriched, and then replaced by the *Commentaries*, and then, little by little, the *Summae* will crown the whole enterprise.

A more vigorous exponent of the use of dialectic in theology than St. Anselm was the controversial Abelard. He was to see some of his theories condemned, and his *Sic et Non* encouraged ridicule for the opinions of the Fathers. Yet it does not seem that it was Abelard's intention to discredit the Fathers, and St. Augustine appears as one of his authorities. He follows the augustinian method in seeking to understand something of the divine Trinity through analogies in man who is the image of God.<sup>15</sup> But the created trinity he proposes is not totally identical with that of St. Augustine. After explaining the image text from Genesis in a trinitarian sense, he says, "it is well said that man was made to the image and likeness of the Trinity, that is to something of an express likeness of the Three Persons . . . [to] the Father through power, and the Son through

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reason, and the Spirit through the benevolence of innocence which was later lost by sin."<sup>16</sup> The last member of this trinity is to be understood as signifying charity or love, and so the trinity of Abelard is not completely dissimilar to that of St. Augustine.<sup>17</sup>

It was the penetrating eye of St. Bernard which detected many erroneous teachings in the writings of Abelard and brought about their condemnation. St. Bernard repeats something of the augustinian doctrine with regard to the divine image in man in these words,

That blessed and eternal Trinity, the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, the one God, power, wisdom, and benignity to the greatest degree, created a certain trinity to their image and likeness, that is the rational soul. This soul bears in itself the vestige of that highest Trinity, which consists in memory, reason, and will.<sup>18</sup>

Even something of the augustinian penchant for finding trinities everywhere can be observed in the same sermon of St. Bernard.

We say, then, that there is a creative Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, from whom the created trinity of memory, reason, and will fell away. And there is a trinity through which it fell, namely by suggestion, delectation, and consent. And there is a trinity into which it fell, that is, impotence, blindness, uncleanness. And further the trinity which fell, memory, reason, and will has a triple fall associated with each member. Memory fell into three species of thoughts, disturbing, burdensome, and useless. Reason fell into a triple ignorance: the ignorance of good and evil, of true and false, of the fitting and unfitting. The will fell into the concupiscence of the flesh, of the eyes, and of the world. There is a trinity through which we rise, that is of faith, hope, charity. And these have a subdivision. For there is a faith in precepts, signs, and promises; and there is a hope of pardon, grace, and glory; and there is a charity of a pure heart, of a good conscience, and of an unfeigned faith.<sup>19</sup>

Yet the overall view of the doctrine of the divine image as appearing in the works of St. Bernard is that in some respects

it appears to be less in the line of the augustinian tradition than that of other writers considered. The Cistercian abbot places the principal element of the divine resemblance in the will and most "especially in freedom."<sup>20</sup> Despite the decided lack of emphasis in the teaching of St. Bernard on the trinitarian aspect of the image in man, there is a text edited among his works which, while probably spurious, may have influenced the later scholastics through the medium of the *Book of Sentences* of Peter Lombard. The text as it appears in the latter work refers to the augustinian trinity of "memory, intellect, and will," while the text from St. Bernard speaks of "memory, intellect, and discretion," but does not speak of a trinitarian image. In any event the greater scholastics will follow the interpretation of Peter Lombard.

He [God] created you to his image and likeness; to the image by conferring on you natural things; to the likeness by bestowing on you the gifts of grace; so that you might excel in mind and overcome all other creatures by reason. . . . You should have your Creator in mind and unceasingly recall your origin. He made you . . . to his image and likeness: to the image so that you would have memory, intellect, and discretion (*discretionem*), and the other natural endowments; to the likeness that you might have innocence, justice, and the other gifts of grace; to the image in the knowledge of truth; to the likeness in the love of virtue. Or surely you were made to the image of God because of all these things which were given to you; and to the likeness according to the essence of the Deity you were made immortal and indivisible.<sup>21</sup>

The influence of Augustine's doctrine of the trinitarian image is more apparent in the teaching of the friend and contemporary of St. Bernard, William of Saint Thierry. In the view of the latter the divine image is in the mind and consists in a created trinity of memory, intellect, and will. Memory begets reason, and will proceeds from both memory and reason.<sup>22</sup> The dependence of the teaching of William on that of Augustine is

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clear, and much the same could be observed with regard to another member of the Cistercian school, Isaac of Stella.

The same augustinian influence can be perceived in the doctrine of the image as set forth by the Victorines, Hugh and Richard. Hugh uses the image of the Trinity in man as the means of gathering some understanding of the mystery of the divine Trinity. When the mind of man loves the wisdom expressed in its mental word, then the image of the Three Persons shines forth with brilliance.<sup>23</sup> There is a tendency in the teaching of Hugh of St. Victor, as in the works of St. Anselm, to attempt to give a true demonstration of the mystery of the divine Trinity through the use of the image in man, though it must be recalled that faith is presupposed as a premise in his arguments.<sup>24</sup>

Richard, the successor of Hugh at the school of St. Victor, also insisted on the necessity of using reason in the pursuit and investigation of the truths of faith. The first important systematic treatise about the divine Trinity since the time of St. Augustine was composed by our author. In this work Richard declares his intention of trying to prove the existence of the Trinity of Persons through "necessary reasons."<sup>25</sup> His method is that of Augustine, and he uses the image of the Trinity in man as his "proof" for the mystery. In particular Richard selects love as the object of his concentration, and proceeds to find a necessary trinity in love, for is not God Love and Triune?<sup>26</sup> Here the Victorine is employing the very first trinity offered by Augustine, the trinity in love, as his supposed proof for the existence of the divine Trinity. And it must be admitted that Augustine himself had attempted to find a necessary trinity in the act of love.

Peter the Lombard intends to follow St. Augustine above all in his theological writings, but he is less original than the Victorines. He compiles the principal affirmations of St. Augustine, and, to a lesser degree, those of other Fathers in an order deriving from Augustine in the *Book of Sentences*. The augustinian image of the Trinity in man appears on the first pages



of this work, but it is the second trinitarian image of Augustine, the trinity of memory, intellect, and will, which receives his first and major consideration.<sup>27</sup> The first augustinian trinitarian image of mind, knowledge, love is put in second place, and is more briefly treated by the Lombard.<sup>28</sup> The third trinitarian image of Augustine, the trinity with God as object, receives little explicit recognition in this section of the summary of Peter.

The work of Peter the Lombard is not important for its originality, but for the reason that it will become the principal theological text in the schools for centuries to come. And so it will receive numerous and important commentaries by all of the greater scholastics. In this way the teaching of Augustine becomes the common teaching of the medievalists, though each will interpret it according to his own lights.

#### THE GREATER SCHOLASTICS

Two main currents of thought can be distinguished in the thirteenth century. One current is conservative in character, retains the teaching, spirit, and even the method of St. Augustine generally, and is reserved, if not antagonistic, in its attitude toward aristotelianism, newly arrived on the scene. This current of thought is more characteristic of the Franciscan thinkers, of Alexander of Hales and of St. Bonaventure. The other current does not abandon the augustinian deposit, but largely adopts a purified aristotelianism for its philosophical instrument. The latter current of thought becomes characteristic of the Dominican school, of St. Albert the Great and of St. Thomas Aquinas. The doctrine of St. Augustine concerning the trinitarian image in man will be repeated by all of these great theologians, but developed in accord with their own insights and in their own style.

Alexander of Hales first brought the Franciscans into contact with theological studies at the University of Paris. In the *Summa*

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*Theologica* attributed to him appears the augustinian image of the Trinity consisting in the trinity of memory, intellect, and will.<sup>29</sup> Alexander will hold to the view that the powers of the soul are one with its substance, and this position will remain characteristic of the Franciscan school up to the time of Duns Scotus. As we shall see, St. Thomas will categorically deny that the spiritual powers of the rational soul are to be identified with the substance or essence of the soul. The problem here is not so much psychological as it is theological, Gilson believes, for the Franciscans could not bring themselves to hold that the created trinity in the soul (the powers of memory, intellect, will) was "accidental." Would not then the divine image in man also be "accidental"?<sup>30</sup>

Since the time of St. Bonaventure the Franciscans glory in being disciples of St. Augustine, and it has been said that the Seraphic Doctor does no more than reproduce the doctrinal corpus of Augustine in many points, while his writings embody the augustinian spirit to a high degree.<sup>31</sup> A major theme of the Franciscan Doctor's teaching is the originally augustinian image of the Trinity in man, but it is beyond the limits of this survey to give other than a few remarks to the rich development accorded this doctrine by the brilliant mind of St. Bonaventure. The following remarks are from the *Soliloquies*,

Consider first how generous nature has been toward you. This generosity of nature, it seems to me, consists in that the image of the most blessed Trinity has been impressed naturally in you for your beauty. Whence Anselm says in the Proslogion, "I confess, Lord, and give thanks, that you have created me to your image in order that I may be mindful of you, think of you, love you." Bernard in the *Meditations* [apocryphal work] adds, "I find in myself three things in the interior man by which I think of God, know him and love him. These three are memory, understanding, and will. For when I am mindful of God, I delight in him. . . . By the understanding I look upon him and see how incomprehensible he is in himself, for he is the beginning and the end; I see how desirable he is in the angels, because they desire to

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contemplate him; I see how delectable he is in the saints, because they are happy constantly in him; I see how wonderful he is in every creature, because he created all by his power, governs all by his wisdom, and dispenses all freely." When I see these things, I desire him. "For I love God by my will, and I transform myself into him."<sup>32</sup>

Like St. Augustine the principal interest of the Franciscan theologian was the relation of the soul to God. His interest in the material world was principally an interest in that world as a manifestation of God, and he delights in seeing therein *vestigia* of the triune God; "creatura mundi est quasi quidam liber in quo legitur Trinitas fabricatrix."<sup>33</sup> Yet it is only the human soul which is an image of the Trinity, and the basic image "consists in the unity of the essence and the trinity of powers," and these powers are memory, intellect, and will.<sup>34</sup> This image is a natural image, an "aptitudinal" image, while the supernatural or "actual" image consists in a higher trinity effected by grace and other supernatural gifts. "The image of re-creation consists in the three theological virtues and the unity of grace, just as the image of creation consists in the three powers and the unity of substance."<sup>35</sup> The human soul in a certain way is naturally a *forma beatificabilis* because of the trinity of powers, but this is solely an aptitude for beatitude; it is only the activation which comes from the gifts of grace which can attain this object.<sup>36</sup>

Following the advice of St. Augustine to go within oneself, the Seraphic Doctor teaches that the ascent of the soul-image to its God demands a turning aside from the shadows or traces of God in the material world to the interior reflection of God which is the divine image in the soul and ultimately to the contemplation of God in himself.<sup>37</sup> Among the great scholastics the teaching of the Franciscan Doctor is a pre-eminent development of the teaching of St. Augustine, and in some key concepts of the doctrine of the image he has anticipated the teaching of St. Thomas. As an example of the latter we can cite the Seraphic

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Doctor's view of the natural image as an "aptitudinal" or "potential" image with the correlative view of the supernatural image as an "actual" image. The same view of the natural and supernatural images appears in the writings of St. Thomas, and, indeed, in those very terms. Undoubtedly, the teaching of St. Bonaventure about the divine image has influenced the thought of St. Thomas.

The thought of St. Albert the Great is a stage in the adoption of aristotelianism as an intellectual instrument for the expression and understanding of the truths of the Christian faith. To a larger extent than St. Thomas he remains faithful to the traditional "Augustinianism" of the period. In his *Commentary on the Book of Sentences* St. Albert has occasion to treat of the two trinitarian images therein reported from the teaching of Augustine. Much of his effort is devoted to the problem of the relation between these two trinities, and to the relation between the objects of the image.<sup>38</sup> In his unfinished *Summa Theologiae* Albert seems to opt for a perfect correspondence between the members of the first two augustinian trinitarian images; at any rate he associates the *mens* with *memoria*, *notitia* with *intelligentia*, and *amor* with *voluntas*.<sup>39</sup> With respect to the objects of the activity of the image Albert considers God to be the object of the "actual" imitation of the divine by man, while self is an object only in relation to a "potential" imitation of the divine.<sup>40</sup>

The teaching of the Universal Doctor is of interest here primarily because of the influence on St. Thomas Aquinas. Unlike other pupils of St. Albert, the Angelic Doctor will fully develop the aristotelian aspect of his master's thought, particularly in his mature analysis of the image of God in man.

## ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Having completed the survey of the augustinian doctrine of the trinitarian image in man as it appears in the writings of the western theologians up to the time of St. Thomas, we now turn



our attention to the development of this teaching in the works of the Angelic Doctor. It should not be necessary to recall to mind the fact that St. Thomas does not always display the same scientific order, the same abstract and formal considerations, the same grasp of synthesis in all of his works. Unquestionably the teaching of Aquinas about the trinitarian image in large measure depends on the original insights of Augustine though it appears that the initial contact of the Dominican Doctor with this augustinian theme was made possible by the summary found in the work of Lombard. The thomistic teaching about the image of the Trinity in man is augustinian in its roots, this is abundantly clear, but what of the full flower of this teaching as found in Thomas's mature thought, in the *Summa Theologiae*? What does Thomas do with the augustinian theme?

From the outset the general answer to this question is easily given: the genius of St. Thomas will place the augustinian teaching on more sure, more secure scientific and aristotelian foundations. But this is not the work of a moment, it is not the work of a young and inexperienced mind, nor was it a work accomplished by the Angelic Doctor himself in his earliest writings. Rather it was the fruit of repeated examinations of the augustinian deposit and of the greater assimilation and use of the aristotelian instrument. As a consequence our discussion of the teaching of St. Thomas must give due prominence to the chronological development of this doctrine in the works of Aquinas.

The purpose of our discussion of the thomistic doctrine of the image will be best served if the same general ordering of subject matter is used as was applied to the teaching of Augustine. This will entail a discussion of the image of the divine nature in man first, which will be followed by the treatment of the trinitarian aspect of the image. It should be observed here that the general order applied to the teaching of Augustine in the first part of the study is based on an order devised by Thomas himself, which is by no means one of the lesser contributions

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which the Angelic Doctor makes for the development of the doctrine of the image. Within this general framework of the order of the doctrine chronological elements, when significant, are emphasized. Such chronological accents should enable us to recognize the permanent influence of Augustine, and to perceive more clearly the thomistic contribution to the doctrine of the image. The discussion of the thomistic doctrine will be concluded by a brief investigation of the augustinian influence on two elements related to the doctrine of the image in the thought of Aquinas: man's freedom and the indwelling of the Trinity.

### THE IMAGE OF THE DIVINE NATURE

The thomistic doctrine about the image of the divine nature in man will be treated under four major headings: the concept of image, the theological reasoning for the divine image, the subject of the image, that is the concept of the *mens*, and finally the three-fold image assigned to man by Aquinas, that is the image of creation, the image of re-creation, and the image of glory. Within each of these sections the development of the thomistic doctrine is stressed by attending to the chronological order of the works of Thomas in which this doctrine appears.

It is the view of St. Thomas that there is an imperfect image of the divine nature in the intellectual creature, and the fundamental certification for this opinion is the basic image text from Genesis.<sup>41</sup> At first sight, this conclusion is practically equivalent to the teaching of Augustine, but a closer look at some of the concepts involved reveals significant differences. Clearly the fundamental notion here is the concept of image, and so we begin with a consideration of this notion.

### THE CONCEPT OF IMAGE

The notion of image is analyzed by Thomas in several of his major works, in the *Commentary on the Book of Sentences* and in the *Summa Theologiae*, and the analysis of the later work is not completely identical with that of the earlier.<sup>42</sup> The lack of absolute identity is, perhaps, only a matter of stress

accorded one or other of the elements allied with the notion of image, yet this stress given one element of the later concept, the element of origin from the exemplar, is an entirely new emphasis, and it is apparently the result of the influence of the augustinian notion of image.

In the *Commentary* St. Thomas does not appeal to the authority of St. Augustine when analyzing the concept of image, but rather to a descriptive definition of an image from the writings of St. Hilary of Poitiers.<sup>43</sup> For Thomas the basic notion of an image consists in imitation, and so he will distinguish between the objects involved in the imitation and the form itself which is imitated. From the viewpoint of the form imitated there are three elements to be considered: likeness, equality of some sort, and the form concerned, which must be the express and proximate sign of the species of the exemplar.

The nature of an image consists in imitation, from which its name is also taken. . . . Two things are to be considered about the nature of an imitation; that in which there is imitation and those things which imitate each other. But that in regard to which there is imitation is some quality, or a form understood in the manner of a quality. Whence likeness is of the nature of an image. Nor does this suffice, but it is necessary that there be some equivalence in that quality, either according to quality or according to proportion. . . . It is also required that this quality be the express and proximate sign of its nature and species. . . .<sup>44</sup>

From the viewpoint of the objects concerned in the imitation there are two elements to be noted: "a relation of equality and likeness which is based on that element in which they imitate one another; and also an order, for that which is made to the likeness of the other is posterior and called the image, while that to whose likeness it is made is prior and called the exemplar."<sup>45</sup> The equality here mentioned is to be understood in the sense previously explained, that is proportional equality is sufficient.

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The element of likeness then is included in the concept of image, but what of the terms of "image and likeness" used in the text from Genesis? Here Thomas encounters difficulty, for many of the Fathers have distinguished between these two terms; in addition a text practically identical with one we have already seen from St. Bernard appears in the work of the Lombard, and makes many tentative distinctions between the two terms. In this early work it is the view of Thomas that if likeness is distinguished from image, then likeness must be taken in a special sense insofar as it is a deficient representation in comparison with an image.

Since an image implies an imitation in those things which pertain to the demonstration of the species, it is necessary that likeness be taken in that which is not sufficient for the demonstration of a specific nature. But this happens in two ways: either because it is prior to and more common than the nature of the species, as properties consequent on the nature of the genus; or because it is posterior to those things which demonstrate the species, as accidents consequent upon the individual principles.<sup>46</sup>

With the benefit of this distinction Thomas ingeniously reconciles the different views of image and likeness offered by the summary of the Lombard.

Brief consideration is given also by the younger Thomas to the relation between an image and a "vestige," a term originally augustinian but having taken on added significance for the scholastics. The notion of vestige is not related by Thomas to the fuller concept of image as presented above, but to the initial simple view he had of an image when the term first appears in the *Commentary*. The vestige is a confused and imperfect likeness of the exemplar, while the image represents the exemplar more determinately and according to all of its parts. As a result something of the interior nature of the exemplar can be gathered by knowledge of the image.<sup>47</sup>



When we arrive at the mature thought of Aquinas, as found in the *Summa Theologiae*, development is apparent in the concept of image. Here the notion is again discussed in several places, but the analysis remains simple.<sup>48</sup> When the concept of image appears in the discussion of the divine image in man, it is gradually refined. The older Thomas finds two necessary notes in his first and more general notion of image: likeness to the exemplar, and origin or expression from the exemplar.<sup>49</sup> The note is then added which will distinguish an image from a vestige: the likeness must be at least in some accident proper to the species of the exemplar.<sup>50</sup> If this last requirement is not met, then the likeness will be only a vestige and not an image. An image is defined as that which "proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign." Equality, that is perfect equality, between the image and the imaged is demanded only of a perfect image.<sup>51</sup>

Several changes can be observed here from the cumbersome concept of the *Commentary*: the requirement of origin or expression from the exemplar, at the least, is given new emphasis and appears only in the *Summa*; the notion of sign, when the concept appears in the doctrine of the image, tends to recede into the background, along with the note of equality, though neither are abandoned.<sup>52</sup> In the earlier work Thomas had stressed the notion of sign; and, to a lesser extent, the note of equality, and had passed over the element of origin from the exemplar almost without notice.<sup>53</sup> What is significant is the fact that the mature concept of Thomas is moving in the direction of Augustine's concept, and St. Thomas recognizes it in citing appropriate texts from Augustine. Augustine is appealed to when likeness is found to be necessarily related to the concept of image; Augustine is called on to confirm the view that equality is not necessary for the notion of image; and Augustine is the **only** witness to support the insight that origin from the exemplar is requisite for the notion of image.<sup>54</sup> None of these augustinian

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texts had appeared in the *Commentary*, nor in fact was the authority of Augustine invoked at all in the earlier analyses.

This is not to assert that the abstract notion of image from the mature thought of the Angelic Doctor is the same as the practical and working concept of the bishop of Hippo. To consider for the moment only the more formal analyses of the concept of image made by Augustine we can recall that he requires the notes of likeness and origin from the exemplar for an image. He eliminates equality between the image and the exemplar as a necessary note, but points out, in evident opposition to the concept of Plotinus, that there can be equality in the case of the perfect Image of the Father. When Augustine speaks of the imaging of God he postulates a nature so close or proximate to the nature of God that no other nature of nobler proportions intervene. Manifestly the augustinian concept is not entirely the same as that of Thomas. A proportional equality between the image and the exemplar will be retained by Aquinas as a necessary requirement for the notion of image. Furthermore, in his analyses there appears a demand for a specific likeness, or something approaching a specific likeness. The latter element, the specific likeness, can be seen equivalently in that element of proximity of nature required by Augustine when he speaks of the imaging of God. The African bishop does not call it a specific likeness, a term based on aristotelian categories. Thomas will continue to relate this expression to a like term in the description of an image given by St. Hilary, but it is clear that it derives from an aristotelian view of reality, not from St. Hilary alone. The thomistic concept of image is a precised, abstract, scientific concept unlike that of Augustine.

Again in the *Summa* the Dominican theologian comments on the terms of "image and likeness" from the Genesis text, and his interpretation differs from that of the earlier work. Likeness now is seen to be not only a deficient representation in comparison to an image, but also can be considered, from another point of view, as perfective of the image. "Similarly likeness is

considered as the preamble to the image insofar as it is more common than the image . . . and it is considered also as subsequent to the image insofar as it signifies a certain perfection of the image."<sup>55</sup> On the basis of this new distinction, which is related to the aristotelian view of likeness as a type of unity, Thomas is able to reconcile differing interpretations of St. Augustine, St. John Damascene, and the various elements diversely assigned to the likeness from the text we have seen in St. Bernard and in the Lombard's *Book of Sentences*. In reality this final interpretation of Thomas is in complete accord with the total understanding of the term of likeness from the writings of Augustine. In the view of the latter likeness is also necessarily included in the concept of image, and it can be considered as a deficient representation in comparison to an image or as the dynamic term of the gradual perfecting of the divine image in man. Yet the mature thomistic understanding of likeness is more dependent ultimately on aristotelian static principles than on any augustinian insight, related as the latter is to the more dynamic and plotinian view of an image.

In the *Summa* also Thomas precises the vague augustinian notion of a "vestige" and distinguishes it from the concept of image.

. . . every effect represents its cause in some way, but not in the same way. For there is the effect which represents only the causality of the cause, but not its form, as smoke represents fire: and such a representation is said to be the representation of a vestige; for the vestige shows the movement of some passing thing, but does not reveal of what sort this thing is. But there is the effect which represents the cause in regard to the likeness of its form, as generated fire [represents] generating fire and the statue of Mercury [represents] Mercury: and this is the representation of an image.<sup>56</sup>

#### THEOLOGICAL REASONING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE IMAGE

In the *Commentary* two arguments are given for the existence of a divine image in the intellectual creature.<sup>57</sup> The first of these, a very simple reason, appears again in the *De Veritate*;

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the second and more thorough argument appears in summary fashion in the *Summa*.<sup>58</sup> We will consider these arguments separately, though attending to the fuller treatment only. The first reason given in the *Commentary* for the existence of the image in man is the statement that only those creatures image God who imitate and represent him more perfectly than other creatures because of their nobility.<sup>59</sup> Only the intellectual creature attains this rank of nobility in nature. The same general reasoning, and in those same terms, can be seen in many augustinian texts.

As proposed in the *Summa*, the second argument clearly presupposes several previous conclusions: God is the exemplary as well as the efficient cause of creatures; the likeness to God in any creature is analogical only.<sup>60</sup> So all creatures bear an analogical likeness to God, and this likeness is derived from him as efficient and exemplary cause. But not all creatures are images of God. In the view of Thomas an image must bear a likeness which somehow pertains to the species of the exemplar. With respect to God obviously there can be no question of a species, for he is above all genera and species; so it will be a matter of a quasi-species only. The image of God among creatures must have a likeness pertaining to that which can be considered the quasi-species of God.

The reasoning from the *Commentary* can be summarized in the following way. Though existence, life, and intelligence are all really identified in God, nevertheless we can conceive of intellectuality as being something like the species of God in our way of understanding the divine nature. For intellectuality is the ultimate grade of being proceeding from God, and so the ultimate grade of perfection which can be known about the divine nature. Among creatures, who participate in being, intelligence, life, and existence are not identical, nor to be found in every creature. When intellectuality is found in a creature it is always found in conjunction with life and existence, and presupposes life and existence. Therefore, intellectuality is ulti-



mate, the ultimate procession of perfection from God. As ultimate it can be considered as being the specific difference of the processions of beings from God. Intellectuality then is to be considered the quasi-species of God in our way of understanding the divine nature, for it is from these creaturely perfections that we attain to some knowledge of the divine nature.<sup>61</sup>

Only the intellectual creature has a likeness which is perfectly conformed to the essential attributes of God, for in this creature there is life, existence, and intelligence.<sup>62</sup> So in the intellectual creature there is to be seen a likeness attaining to the quasi-species of God, which likeness is an image, however remote, of the nature of God.

An argument of basic similarity was used by Augustine also in reasoning to the existence of the divine image in man, as we have seen. He does not describe the likeness of man to God as being a quasi-specific likeness, but he does speak of an element similar to such a likeness which he calls the proximity of the intellectual nature to the divine nature, though Augustine's understanding of this proximity in nature is not exhausted by reference to a static hierarchy of natures. In the view of Augustine the divine nature is properly and eminently intellectual, and furthermore he conceives of this perfection as being identified with the very life and being of God.<sup>63</sup> It is true, however, that Augustine speaks most often of man imaging the one God, rather than the divine nature, though he is aware that the unity of God lies in the divine nature. It is also evident that Augustine is speaking of an analogical likeness of the creature to God, but not in those formal terms. He rejects the note of equality in his concept of image especially because of the greatness of the dissimilarity between the image in the creature and God. On the other hand he emphasizes the similarities of created analogies in man to the divine Trinity proving that in his mind there is some true likeness to be perceived here, but he brings his discussion to a close in the *De Trinitate*

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by pointing out the greater dissimilarities to be observed here.<sup>64</sup> A formal notion of analogy is not one of the intellectual achievements of the bishop of Hippo, and consequently he does not advert to the fact that the analogical likeness between the creature and God is the basis for the proportional equality between God and his created image, a point which Thomas perceives. And so it is clear that the reasoning of Thomas has a thoroughly scientific base which is lacking to the augustinian insight.

As to the question of the influence of the argument of Augustine on the thought of Thomas, no easy answer can be given. The truth is that Thomas gives substantially the same reasoning for the existence of the image in man in both the *Commentary* and in the *Summa*, but the similar argument of Augustine is not referred to in the *Commentary*, while it is invoked as an authority in the *Summa*. Since Thomas uses the same reasoning in the earlier work and without explicit appeal to the text from Augustine, it seems that the augustinian argument as appealed to in the *Summa* is simply confirmation for Thomas's own insight.

### *The intellectual creature*

It should be observed that when Thomas speaks of the intellectual creature he is referring to both men and angels, and so the divine image is to be found in the angel also. Moreover, the divine image in the angel is better than that of man, absolutely speaking, because of the better intellectual nature in the angel.<sup>65</sup> Under certain aspects, it is true, the image in the human is more representative of the divine, but these are very limited considerations. This position is a constant one in the works of Thomas, appearing in the *Summa*, the *De Veritate*, and the *Commentary*. Augustine is not ignorant of the fact that angels have a better intellectual nature than do humans, and even makes such an observation in the context of speaking about the divine image in man.<sup>66</sup> Yet it seems that in practice, he restricts his conception of the divine image to man, while

saying nothing about an image in the angel. The Dominican Doctor will defend this silence of Augustine by drawing out the full implications of some of the remarks of the African Father. The silence of Augustine would seem to be due to the silence of the Scriptures regarding the existence of such an image in the angel; he is unwilling to go beyond the Scriptural authority in this case. Thomas, on the other hand, proceeds to the logical conclusion, though seeking to confirm this view by citing a rather forced usage of a text from Scripture by St. Gregory the Great.<sup>67</sup>

*The imperfection of the image*

Man is not a perfect image of God, for the concept of a perfect image, as we have seen, demands perfect equality between the exemplar and the imaged; there is only a proportional equality between the rational or intellectual creature and God. On the basis of a progressive perfection of an image Thomas classifies images in the following three grades.

There are certain grades of the perfection of an image to be seen. For sometimes that is called an image of another in which there is to be seen something similar to that quality of the other which designates and expresses its nature, *though that nature is not found in it* [the image] . . . thus is the image of God in the creature . . . an imperfect mode of the image. But the *ratio* [of an image] is to be seen more perfectly when that quality which designates the nature of the substance is subjected *in the [same] specific nature*, as the image of a human father in his son, for he has a likeness of the figure and of the nature signified by the figure. But the most perfect *ratio* of an image exists when we find the *same numerical form and nature* in the imitator as in the one imitated; and in this way the Son is the most perfect image of the divine Father.<sup>68</sup>

The different examples which are given here by Thomas are to be seen in the writings of Augustine, and even classified in a loose way according to the realization of the element of equality between the image and imaged. In these same examples

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Thomas perceives the possibility of a more scientific classification, a classification related to the natures involved.

But if man is an image of God, even though imperfect, then how is the expression from Genesis "to the image" to be understood? Some of the Fathers, basing themselves on this scriptural expression have denied that man is fully an image of the divine, and assert that he is simply "to the image" of God. Augustine interprets the Genesis description, not as denying the divine image to man, but signifying both the lack of equality between the creature and God, and the approaching to God by man in greater and greater likeness. The same interpretation can be seen in the teaching of Thomas. "To designate the imperfection of the image in man, man is not only called an image, but 'to the image,' by which expression a certain movement of tending to perfection is designated."<sup>69</sup>

### THE SUBJECT OF THE IMAGE

The divine image is situated in the mind of the intellectual creature only. This conclusion is but the explication of the more general conclusion that the intellectual creature only is the image of God. The same texts from St. Paul which Augustine uses in confirmation of this position are also cited by St. Thomas, and the interpretation is the same in both writers.<sup>70</sup> Augustine and Thomas are in agreement again, now with regard to the site of the divine image. But what of the concept of the *mens*? Are Augustine and Thomas speaking of the same reality? They are speaking of the same reality, surely, but it is not so certain that they understand this reality in the same way. It will not be a digression then, but a necessity, to investigate the notion of the *mens* in the thought of Thomas.

#### *The concept of the mens*

Only a brief consideration is given to the concept of the *mens* in the *Commentary* of St. Thomas, but in the *De Veritate* this notion is explained in detail.<sup>71</sup> Following the aristotelian tradition in the latter work Aquinas proceeds from the nominal



understanding of the term to a definition. *Mens* is taken from the Latin term for measuring, but things are measured only by the ultimate and first principles in their genus. It is only the intellect in its act of knowing which can be said to measure things according to such ultimate principles. But the intellect is a power midway between the essence of the soul and intellectual operation, and so the term *mens* designates that power of the soul which is the intellect.<sup>72</sup>

Nevertheless the concept of the *mens* is not exhausted by reference to the power of the intellect, but it includes all those powers which, like the intellect, are wholly free from matter and material conditions in their acts.<sup>73</sup> So considered, the *mens* is taken to signify a genus of spiritual powers rather than the intellect alone.<sup>74</sup> The *mens* is not the subject of these powers properly speaking; rather it is a potestative whole comprising these spiritual powers.<sup>75</sup>

There is still another usage of the term *mens* which Thomas makes allowance for. The natures and essences of things become known to us only through their powers and activity, and so we can use the names of these powers, though only the proper and noblest powers, to designate the essences or natures of things. In the case of the human soul it can be called an intellectual soul, or just the intellect, or simply the *mens*. This is not an illegitimate usage of the term *mens* for the power signified by the term is both proper to the soul and its highest power. And so the term *mens* can designate the human soul, but only insofar as it belongs to its nature to have the intellectual powers.<sup>76</sup>

To sum up: the term *mens* can signify in a narrow sense the intellect alone; in a wider sense, *and the sense in which Thomas uses the term*, it signifies a genus of spiritual powers in the human soul; in the widest sense it signifies the essence of the soul insofar as it is naturally capable of such spiritual powers. The spiritual powers to which Thomas is referring are the powers of intellectual memory, intellect, and will.

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Something approaching the different usages of the concept of *mens* as explained by Thomas can be seen in the thought of Augustine. At times Augustine equates the *mens* with the intellect; at other times he speaks of the *mens* as the noblest part of the intellectual soul, and associates with it the terms of memory, intellect, and will; on still other occasions the African Doctor speaks of the *mens* as a "spiritual substance." In order to interpret some of the remarks of the bishop of Hippo, Thomas makes the statement that the *mens* sometimes is taken to signify the essence of the soul together with the spiritual powers.<sup>77</sup> In this fashion partial allowance is made for the tendency of Augustine to conceive of the *mens* in a concrete way, though, as we have seen, Augustine also includes in his concrete concept the various activities of the higher faculties as well as the faculties themselves.

A more apparent difference between the concept of Augustine and that of Thomas concerns the powers belonging to the *mens*. If Augustine can be considered to be speaking of the powers when he uses the terms of memory, intellect, will, then these powers must be really distinct to represent the Trinity of Persons.<sup>78</sup> In the *Commentary* Thomas makes every effort to find some distinction between the intellect and intellectual memory, but is successful only at the expense of aristotelian principles.<sup>79</sup> In the *De Veritate* and again in the *Summa* Aquinas finds no real distinction between these powers, though they do bear a relation to different functions.<sup>80</sup> As acts they are more easily distinguished.<sup>81</sup>

Insofar as we have considered the concepts of Augustine many similarities can be seen despite the abstract and formal approach Thomas applies to the concrete augustinian reality. Yet Augustine's concept of the *mens* is concrete, and he is unable to conceive of it as a whole, though he rejects only the notion of an integral whole in relation to the *mens*.<sup>82</sup> Thomas conceives of the *mens* abstractly, as a potestative whole comprising the properly spiritual powers of man, but intellectual

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memory is not to be thought of as really distinct from the intellect. When we have occasion later to describe the functioning of the image of the Trinity as Thomas explains it, then more manifest differences in their respective concepts will appear.

### *Some corollaries*

Thomas and Augustine are in whole-hearted agreement on the consequences which follow from the fact that the divine image is in the mind only of the intellectual creature. The rest of man in the view of both is only a vestige of God, and not an image, and Thomas refers to Augustine's opinion when stating his own position.<sup>83</sup> Thomas also agrees with Augustine that the body by its upright stature symbolically represents the nature of the image in the mind, and the authority of Augustine is invoked as confirmation.<sup>84</sup> The difficulty generated by words of St. Paul, which speak of the divine image in man and say nothing about the divine image in the woman, is answered in the same way by Thomas as Augustine answers. There is a common intellectual nature in both the man and the woman, so there is equally an image of the divine in man and woman with regard to the essential elements. Again Thomas refers to Augustine's interpretation as justification for his own stand in the matter.<sup>85</sup>

In all of these points the position of Thomas is identical with that of the African Father, and the citing of relevant augustinian texts can be considered as some recognition of an augustinian influence.

### THE THREEFOLD IMAGE IN MAN

In the *Commentary* Thomas makes use of a text from the *Ordinary Gloss* which speaks of different images or different facets of the divine image in man. The *Gloss* refers to an image of creation, an image of re-creation, and an image of similitude or likeness, and this three-fold distinction appears in the writings of all the greater scholastics.

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There is a three-fold image of God in man: namely, that of creation, which is reason insofar as it approaches the imitation of divine intellectuality. . . . And another image is the image of likeness [similitude], which consists in the distinction of the powers representing the Trinity of Persons. . . . And there is the image of re-creation, which consists in the habits of grace (*habitus gratuitis*), and which actually imitates God . . . and this image does not remain after sin, but it does remain in the other two modes.<sup>86</sup>

In the *Summa* Thomas interprets the text from the *Gloss* in a different way. The image of creation is to be found in every human; the image of re-creation is to be found only in those who are in the state of grace; the image of likeness or similitude is found in those who are in heaven. And so we have the image of nature, the image of grace, and the image of glory.

### *The image of creation (the natural image)*

The image of creation is a natural image bestowed on every man at the moment of the creation of the individual soul. Thomas describes this image as being basically the natural aptitude for knowing and loving God.<sup>87</sup> This natural aptitude includes not only the powers capable of knowing and loving God, but also extends to acts of knowledge and love of God insofar as these acts are possible to the natural principles of the soul, as Cajetan notes.<sup>88</sup> The aptitude consequently is referred to God *sicut in se est*, that is, to God as an object attainable by supernatural knowledge and love only, and hence acts flowing from natural principles only are considered to pertain to the potential or "aptitudinal" image. This aptitude is rooted in the nature of the human mind, and so belongs to every human, nor did original sin have any radical effect on the existence of this image.

Augustine too speaks of a natural and permanent image in man, as we have seen, though he encountered difficulty in perceiving the effects of original sin on the divine image in man for some time. The bishop also consistently relates this



fundamental image to the knowledge and love of God, but he would not refer to this image as the image of creation. In accord with his historical viewpoint the image of creation was the totality of the divine likeness granted to Adam. The natural capacity which every man has for the knowledge and love of God is considered by Augustine to be the "relic" of the original image bestowed on Adam. Then too it can be observed that the African Doctor tends to ignore the natural knowledge and especially the natural love of God, and emphasizes the need of grace for correct knowledge and true love of God. His concrete and historical approach to the matter leads him to view the natural image left to man after original sin as being only the residual base for the renewal and restoral of the image lost by Adam; yet it is the divine capacity in man.

This view naturally gives rise to the problem of the relation between the natural image and the gifts of grace, a constant theme appearing in the *Summa* of Thomas. In the view of Aquinas the soul is naturally capable of grace. "The justification of the sinner is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace." And why? The answer Thomas gives is a text from Augustine, "for from the very fact that it is made to the image of God it is capable of grace."<sup>89</sup> The soul is naturally capable of grace because it is made to the image of God. In another place Thomas will say that "the rational creatures insofar as they are made to the image of God are capable of divine beatitude."<sup>90</sup> This thought is enlarged when he says elsewhere that "man is in potency to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, and to this he is ordered as to an end: since the rational creature is capable of that knowledge insofar as he is made to the image of God."<sup>91</sup>

Man is naturally capable of grace, and of the knowledge and vision of God because he is made to the image of God: this is the constant refrain of Thomas. However, this potency of the natural divine image for the gifts of grace is of a very special nature. "The beatific vision and knowledge are to some

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extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable by nature, having been made in the image of God. . . ."92 The capacity of the soul as a natural image of the divine for grace and beatitude is an obediential potency.-

Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive potency: one in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, who can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential potency of a creature.<sup>93</sup>

Man precisely as he is a natural image of God, that is by reason of his intellectuality and its powers, is *capax Dei*, capable of knowing and loving God as he is in himself, but supernatural elevation is required for the activation of this divine capacity. On many occasions Augustine speaks of some relation between the natural image and the participation in God by grace. "For it [the *mens*] is his image by this very fact that it is capable of God and can be partaker of him, which so great a good is made possible only by being his image."<sup>94</sup> It is the consistent view of Augustine also that the natural divine image, the natural capacity which man has for knowing and loving God, renders possible the sharing in the gifts of grace and ultimately beatitude. In fact Augustine will even say that man's rational nature, the image of nature, "merits" the bestowal of grace, though the context assures us that the term "merit" is to be understood of a fittingness on the part of the rational creature for supernatural elevation.<sup>95</sup>

Both Augustine and Thomas have perceived a relationship between the order of nature and grace, between the natural image and the supernatural image, and Thomas is aware of this community of thought for he cites Augustine as his authority. It is true that this relationship is developed to a point in the thomistic system where recognition of any association with the

view of Augustine is difficult indeed. Yet the highly precised notion of the obediential potency to the supernatural order in man fundamentally is nothing more than a subjectively existing non-repugnance to elevation: this is not an insight totally strange to Augustine's thought.<sup>96</sup> What is more alien to Augustine's teaching is a consistent application of the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, a distinction of which he is well aware. In the doctrine of Thomas the image of creation is formally distinct from the image of re-creation, the image of grace. Augustine would not disagree with this statement, but his view is historical: the natural, enduring element of the divine image in man is considered to be a part, and a fundamental part, of the total renewed image of re-creation.

*The image of re-creation (the image of grace)*

This image, the supernatural image, is found only in those who are in the state of grace, and it is called the image of conformity effected by the gifts of grace in the *Summa*. The image of grace is placed by Thomas on the level of habitual or actual knowledge and love of God, contrary to the natural image which is referred to as a potential or aptitudinal image. Even when actualized the knowledge and love of God associated with this image is characterized by Thomas as being imperfect, despite the fact the acts flow from supernatural principles and refer to God *sicut in se est*.<sup>97</sup> The only remarks which Thomas devotes to the conformations effected in man by the gifts of grace when treating formally of the divine image are these: "the powers of the image are perfected by certain habits, in accord with which they are referred to God, as faith, hope, charity, wisdom, and others of this nature."<sup>98</sup> However, if we refer to the individual discussion of the gifts of grace, more insights are given.

The general view which Thomas has about the assimilation to the divine effected by grace and its gifts can be seen in the following text in which every gift of grace has some part to play in the assimilation. "From the very fact that man is

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made to the image of God it pertains to the manner and dignity of man that he be elevated to divine things. And because the divine good exceeds human capacity, man needs to be helped supernaturally in order to attain this good, which is effected by every gift of grace whatsoever."<sup>99</sup> The gifts of grace not only help man to attain to divine things, but first they make him "divine" in a limited but true sense. Nevertheless, this aspect of the gifts of grace, the assimilation to the divine, is not explicated to any great degree even in the mature thought of the Angelic Doctor. He does relate sanctifying, habitual grace and the theological virtues of faith and charity to the image of re-creation in these words,

As man participates in divine knowledge according to the intellectual faculty through the virtue of faith; and according to the power of the will participates in divine love through the virtue of charity; so also does man in the nature of his soul participate in the divine nature according to a certain likeness by re-generation or re-creation.<sup>100</sup>

Habitual, sanctifying grace then is a participation in the divine nature in virtue of which man is physically, though analogically, and specifically assimilated to God according to the intimate nature of the Godhead, and not simply as he is known to us through his effects. And so Thomas would admit that man is divinized, deified by the gifts of grace, and could even be called "god" in a limited way. "The name of God is communicable, not according to its total signification, but according to something of its signification through a certain likeness: so that those who participate in something divine through likeness are called 'gods,' as (it is said), 'I have said, that you are gods'" (Ps. 81:6).<sup>101</sup> Man is deified fundamentally through the infusion of habitual, sanctifying grace.

The natural spiritual powers of the soul are also assimilated to the divine likeness by the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but especially by the theological virtue of charity and the Gift of Wisdom. It is true that the intellect is configured



in a certain way to the "First Truth" by the virtue of faith and the will assimilated to the divine power by the virtue of hope, both of which can be referred to the divine Father; nevertheless the most perfect assimilation is that flowing from charity and wisdom.<sup>102</sup> Charity is "a certain participation of divine charity," and indeed, "of the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and the Son."<sup>103</sup> The necessary concomitant to participation is likeness or imitation, and so charity in a special way assimilates the will to divine love. On the other hand it is the Gift of Wisdom which especially assimilates the intellect to divine wisdom and to the divine Son "who is generated Wisdom."<sup>104</sup> The acts flowing from these principles clearly are a more perfect imitation of the divine than their habitual principles.

The Common Doctor also incorporates aspects of the cardinal virtues into the doctrine of the image when he makes the following distinctions,

But since it pertains to man to strive onward even to divine things as far as he can, as the Philosopher also notes, in *Ethic. X*, and as Sacred Scripture often admonishes us, as in Matthew, 5 (48): "Be you perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect," it is necessary to place certain virtues between the political virtues, which are virtues of man, and the exemplar virtues, which are divine virtues. And these [mediating] virtues differ according to the diversity of movement and term. So that some are *virtues of men who are passing to and tending toward the divine likeness*, and these are called cleansing virtues.<sup>105</sup>

Continuing, St. Thomas explains how the "cleansing virtues" (*virtutes purgatoriae*) bring about divine likeness even in this life.

This prudence despises all worldly things for the contemplation of divine things, directing all the thoughts of the soul to divine things only; and temperance, insofar as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; while fortitude effects this that the soul does not fear the withdrawal from bodily things and the rising to heavenly things; and justice brings it about that the whole soul consents to the following of the way thus proposed.<sup>106</sup>

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Such in brief is a summary of the principal elements which are to be associated with the image of re-creation in the thought of St. Thomas. A complete synthesis and integration of all the factors concerned with the image of grace can be seen in the excellent work of Matthijs.<sup>107</sup> Nevertheless, it remains true that Thomas himself has not integrated the supernatural organism of man with his doctrine of the image to any appreciable degree, despite the fact that this doctrine serves as an organizing concept of the highest rank in the *Summa*. In the thought of both Thomas and Augustine the divinization of man does not receive the emphasis which it is accorded by the eastern Fathers.

All of the elements associated with the supernatural image by Thomas are to be seen in the renewal of the image in man by the grace of Christ as developed in the thought of St. Augustine. In the latter's view man is deified by a participation in the divine nature; the proximate principles of growth in likeness to God are knowledge and love; these acts in turn are related to the virtue of faith, and especially to charity and wisdom, the special gifts of the Spirit. It would be absurd to claim complete equivalence between the teaching of Augustine and that of Aquinas because of the many similarities. The African Father does not consider these supernatural realities formally and abstractly as does Thomas, and, to cite only one prominent difference, the thomistic notion of habit, based as it is on aristotelian principles, is not the augustinian way of viewing the enduring gifts of grace. Again the historical and concrete approach of Augustine presents a formidable difference between his image of re-creation, a living reality, complex and indistinct in its richness, and the image of re-creation of the Angelic Doctor, an abstract and scientific concept.

### *The image of similitude (the image of glory)*

Thomas conceives of this perfected image as consisting in actual knowledge and love of God, but knowledge and love which is perfect because of the immediate presence of God

in the beatific vision. Only those who are in the state of heavenly beatitude possess such a full perfection of the divine image. The same teaching is to be seen in the writings of Augustine, but there is a difference of note. Both agree that faith gives way to sight, that hope is no longer necessary, and that charity remains though perfected, but Thomas adds an element which he considers necessary for the intuitive vision of the Deity. The *lumen gloriae* is required because of the infirmity of the created intellect with regard to the sight of the essence of God. This light renders a man "deiform," and able to see God as he is in himself, in his essence.

Since the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient for seeing the essence of God . . . it is necessary that the power of understanding be added from divine grace. And this increase of the intellectual power we call the illumination of the intellect. And this is that light of which the Apocalypse speaks (21:23), saying that "the clarity of God will enlighten it," namely the society of the blessed who see God. And through this light they are made *deiform*, that is like to God, according to the saying of John (1 Jn. 3:2), "When he shall appear we shall be like to him, and we shall see him as he is,"<sup>108</sup>

At the basis of this difference between the teaching of Augustine and that of Thomas are the different philosophical instruments of the great teachers. The "theory of illumination" of Augustine does not seem to demand any strengthening of the intellectual capacity in man for the immediate sight of God in beatitude.

When treating of the image of re-creation we had occasion to refer to the thomistic incorporation of elements of the cardinal virtues, the "cleansing virtues." Thomas also speaks of virtues which belong to the soul already cleansed (*virtutes iam purgati animi*) which pertain principally to the blessed in heaven, and so to the image of glory.

Besides these there are *virtues belonging to those who have already attained to the divine likeness*, and they are called virtues of the soul which is cleansed. Thus, prudence views only divine

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things; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of the passions; and justice, imitating the divine mind, is joined with it in an everlasting covenant. We call these virtues the virtues of the blessed, or virtues of those who are most perfect in this life.<sup>109</sup>

Something of the same view of the place of the cardinal virtues in the next life can be seen in the *De Trinitate* of Augustine also, though Thomas seems to depend more directly for his distinctions and insights on Plotinus (and Macrobius).<sup>110</sup>

In sum, both of the great Doctors are in fundamental agreement about the image of glory despite the difference relating to the *lumen gloriae*; both agree on the relation between grace and glory, as they agreed on the basic relation of nature to grace. Glory is but the perfect term and fruit of grace in the next life: this is the opinion of both the great teachers.

### SUMMATION

The teaching of Thomas as presented thus far shows a basic agreement with that of Augustine. The concept of image in Thomas's mature thought reveals a profound augustinian influence, which can be seen also in the application of this concept to the Divine Persons. The concept of the *mens* as proposed by Thomas manifests a definite augustinian character; it is not an aristotelian concept, though it be explained in an aristotelian way.<sup>111</sup> The positions and conclusions of Thomas cited in this section agree fundamentally with those of Augustine, and the latter's authority is invoked at every step of the way. Some of the arguments and reasons of Thomas can be found in the writings of Augustine, even when at times the authority of Augustine is not appealed to.

But there are differences. The concepts of Thomas are never completely identical with those of Augustine. There is scarcely a text to be found in the works of Thomas which would lead one to believe that the very concept of image itself bears an



immediate relation to the exemplar as the term of its activity, the dynamic and augustinian view of an image.<sup>112</sup> Nor are the argumentations and conclusions of Thomas to be totally identified with those of Augustine. In the mature thought of the Dominican these are part of a true scientific synthesis, stated in a precise way, and flowing from a different point of view. Thomas looks to the natures of things, distinguishes constantly to understand the complex reality better. Augustine views man in the concrete and existential order, distinguishes rarely, and is not detached from his subject in the calm and objective fashion of Thomas. Though Augustine has, perhaps, perceived a basic relationship between the orders of grace and nature, the lack of any continued application of the distinction between these orders results in a major difference between the presentation of his thought and that of Thomas.

There have also appeared hints of other and greater differences to come. These began to appear with respect to the powers involved in the concept of the *mens*. In this area, the area of psychology, the differences will become more pronounced when the functioning of the image of the Trinity in man is discussed in the following section.

#### THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY

This section of the treatment of the thomistic doctrine about the divine image in man will be concerned with the trinitarian aspect of this image. The doctrine can be treated under two large headings: the existence of such an aspect of the divine image, and its nature according to the view of St. Thomas. The second of these questions with regard to the trinitarian aspect of the image requires much more accent on the chronological element of the thomistic doctrine, if we are to appreciate the development of Thomas's thought. Hence, when we come to discuss the nature of the trinitarian image, or, in other words, the structure and functioning of this image, then we will treat separately of the thomistic view as it appears chrono-

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logically in the *Commentary*, in the *De Veritate*, and in the *Summa*. Clearly we shall have to restrict our exposition, for the most part, to the very elements which Thomas considers worthy of treatment in conjunction with this aspect of the divine image. Such a method is the only valid historical approach to the thought of Thomas if we wish to know what he thought about the doctrine. As we shall see, the treatment of the trinitarian image in the *Commentary on the Book of Sentences* is a rather confused, disorderly, and even incomplete discussion, despite its length. The doctrine of the trinitarian image as it appears in the *De Veritate* is a very thorough, orderly presentation, and found in conjunction with much of the thomistic "theory of knowledge." In the *Summa* the doctrine appears in very simple and concise fashion with order and brevity its main features but with the inevitable consequence of seeming oversimplification. It is necessary then to treat of this aspect of the doctrine of the image from the works of Thomas in a chronological order, and not to place statements from earlier works on the same plane with those of later works, as if equal validity were to be automatically assigned to both.

### EXISTENCE OF THE TRINITARIAN IMAGE

There is no clear-cut distinction made between the image of the divine nature and the image of the divine Persons as it appears in the earlier works, where it is taken for granted that the two facets of the image exist. This was the common teaching of the schools, and so offered no great problem to the younger Thomas. In the *Summa*, however, we find a sharp distinction between the two facets of the divine image in man, and reason employed in the support of the trinitarian facet of the image.

In the *Commentary on the Book of Sentences* Thomas takes a firm stand against those who try to demonstrate the existence of the Three Persons through the divine image in man, against the Victorines and St. Anselm. He observes that the mystery

of the divine Trinity is known only by revelation, and that even after revelation cannot be demonstrated from any effect in the creature.<sup>113</sup> The reason for this position is the thomistic principle that the divine essence is causative of the creature, not the Trinity of Persons.<sup>114</sup> Consequently only essential attributes can be perceived from any creature, including man. This position is constant in the thought of Thomas, but he will not deny that there is some similarity in the creature to the divine Trinity. In the *Summa* this point is briefly made: the processions of the divine Persons are in some manner the *ratio* and cause of the production of creatures (insofar as they include the essential attributes).<sup>115</sup> And so there are "vestiges" of the Trinity in every creature.<sup>116</sup>

Yet it seems that it is Thomas's view that similarities to the divine Trinity in creatures are ultimately reducible to the essential attributes. And so the Trinity of Persons in God remains a mystery even as to its existence after revelation, and similarly the existence of an image of the Trinity in man will depend on revelation. It is revealed, in Thomas's opinion, by the words of Genesis, "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (1:26). Hence the Angelic Doctor is following the lead of most of the Fathers who gave a trinitarian exegesis to this text, though few speak explicitly of an image of the Trinity as resulting from its fulfillment. In particular Thomas refers to Augustine's interpretation of this text, but it is not completely clear as to whether the latter had resolved the problem of how the Trinity of Persons becomes known to us.<sup>117</sup> The African bishop would not admit that reason by itself in the person of the pagan philosophers could come to the knowledge of the Three Persons, though he hesitates when it is a question of knowledge of the Father and Son only. There is no question that he speaks as if the Trinity can be known through creatures, but the rhetorical mode of expression must be considered, and faith is presupposed as a premise in his statements. Nevertheless it appears that

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it was his statements which generated the opinion of Anselm and of the Victorines, and the problem is resolved by Thomas with his insight into the limits of the created intellect.

### *The theological reasoning*

It is in the mature thought of Thomas that a reason is given to substantiate the revealed doctrine that the image of the divine in man also images the Trinity of Persons. In the *Summa* Thomas bases his position on the principle that the manner of origin of anything is in accord with the demands of its nature. So the distinction of Persons in the Trinity, which is based on the relations of origin in the divine nature, must be in accord with the divine nature. Thus the image of God in man representing the divine nature does not exclude a representation of the Persons, but rather the latter imitation is in a sense consequent upon the other.<sup>118</sup> Aquinas does not say that the reflection of the Three Persons necessarily follows the imaging of the divine nature, but, in contradistinction to being excluded by the latter imitation, that it is consonant with such an imitation and somehow follows the other.<sup>119</sup>

Augustine does not very expressly advert to the distinction of the different facets of the image of God in man, but in practice allows for such a distinction. His reasoning in support of the position that man images the one God and the Trinity of Persons is simple and compelling: the one God is the Trinity of Persons.<sup>120</sup> Basically this argument is very similar to that of the Angelic Doctor; it is the final summary reason which is given for the double aspect of the image in the *Summa*. "And therefore it must be said that there is in man an image of God both as to the divine nature and as to the Trinity of Persons; for also in God himself the one nature exists in the Three Persons."<sup>121</sup> Thomas does not appeal to any augustinian text at this precise point, but later he refers to Augustine's interpretation of the text from Genesis, and follows him in rejecting the opinion that the image is of the divine Son only.<sup>122</sup>



## Augustine and Thomas Aquinas

### STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE TRINITARIAN IMAGE

#### *The teaching of the Commentary*

Here St. Thomas comments on the augustinian trinities as appearing in the summary of the Lombard, and his treatment suffers from some of the deficiencies of the *Book of Sentences*. It will be recalled that the Lombard treats explicitly only of the two trinitarian images with self as object, though reversing the order of Augustine, and makes only a few passing remarks about God as an object of the divine image. Thomas follows this pattern, and he discusses the two augustinian trinities with self as object separately. In the terminology of Thomas the augustinian trinity of *memoria sui*, *intelligentia sui*, and *voluntas sui* becomes a trinity of powers, as the common interpretation of the Schoolmen viewed it. The second trinity of *mens*, *notitia sui*, and *amor sui* is called a trinity of consubstantial habits by the Angelic Doctor. It is only when speaking of the objects of the trinitarian image that Thomas considers God in relation to the image.

**The trinity of powers:** An image of the Trinity in man is to be seen in the trinity of spiritual powers: memory, intellect, and will.<sup>123</sup> This is the first conclusion of the younger Thomas about the image of the Trinity in man. The subject or site of the image is the *mens*, the noblest part of man which comprises those powers independent of matter, the spiritual powers of man. These powers are three and three only: intellectual memory, intellect, and will.<sup>124</sup> The trinitarian image is to be found here independently of objects, for here is mirrored the consubstantiality, the distinction, the proper order of origin of the divine Persons.

The spiritual powers of man are consubstantial, for they are properties of the intellectual soul as such, being accidents proper to the species.<sup>125</sup> They are distinct one from the other, though the power of memory has no operative act which is distinct from that of the intellect.<sup>126</sup> There can be seen here also the same order of origin as among the divine Persons: memory

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representing the Father follows immediately upon the essence of the soul; intellect representing the Son follows upon the memory; and the will representing the Spirit follows upon the intellect.<sup>127</sup> This order is an order of nature and so simultaneous in time and permanent.<sup>128</sup> Thus the co-eternity of the divine Persons is reflected here also.

**The trinity of habits:** This trinity is the first trinitarian image found by Augustine, the trinity of *mens*, *notitia sui*, and *amor sui*. Thomas considers this trinity to be less perfect than the trinity of powers.<sup>129</sup> The *mens* again is the superior part of the soul; *notitia sui* is the essence of the soul as intelligible to itself without the need of any action of the agent intellect, and so a principle of knowledge of self like a habit; *amor sui* is the essence of the soul as lovable through itself, and so it too can be called a habit.<sup>130</sup> In the terminology of Thomas this is a trinity according to the essence of the soul and its consubstantial habits.<sup>131</sup>

*Notitia sui* can be identified with *memoria sui*, and *amor sui* with *voluntas sui*, but only if memory and will are considered in the habitual state. No further identification of this trinity with the others proposed by Augustine is possible. This trinity is not as good an image as the other, for there is not so great a conformity to the divine Trinity observable in the trinity of habits.<sup>132</sup> Thomas summarily considers this trinity and then abruptly dismisses it; he is but following Peter the Lombard who too accords only brief remarks to the first augustinian trinitarian image.

**The objects and the image:** The trinity in the powers of man's soul is not completely independent of some consideration of the objects of these powers.<sup>133</sup> The image is to be perceived in some fashion with respect to any object, but more truly with respect to self as object, and most truly with respect to God as object.<sup>134</sup> The noblest objects of the powers involved in the imitation of the Trinity must be taken into account. As the basis for judging which object is the better object of the image in man Aquinas uses five criteria: two of these, consubstantiality and distinction,

are from the viewpoint of the soul itself, and these subjective criteria are to be found in the trinity of powers independently of objects, as we have just seen; the other three criteria, equality (two-fold), the proper order, and actual imitation, are related to the objects of the powers.<sup>135</sup>

The objects of the spiritual powers of man can be classified into two general groupings: those which are in the soul, God and self; those outside of the soul, temporal or corporeal things. The latter do not in any significant way meet the demands of the objective criteria. The proper order is not maintained with respect to these objects; the act of knowing corporeal things, the likeness to the Son, precedes their retention in the memory, the likeness to the Father. The actual imitation of the Trinity is not to be found here; corporeal things do not express the Trinity by their nature, being only "vestiges" of the Trinity. The equality of power to object is not preserved, for though corporeal things as known exist in the soul in an immaterial way, yet in reality they exist in a material way. The equality of power to power can be said to be maintained in a primitive way, for whatever we know, including corporeal things, is in a limited way in the will act to know this thing.<sup>136</sup>

The result with self considered as object of the spiritual powers of the image is much different. The proper order between the likeness to the Father and Son is preserved for the soul is present to itself and from this presence (*notitia sui*) proceeds knowledge of self. The equality of power to object is manifestly present, and the equality of power to power is preserved absolutely, for the soul loves itself as much as it knows itself, and so the equality of the divine Persons is represented. Furthermore the actual imitation of the Trinity is found here also, as the soul is an image of the divine leading expressly to God.<sup>137</sup> The soul then, or self, as object of the image meets all of the objective standards.

Nevertheless God is most truly the object. Actual imitation of the Trinity is clearly present when God is the object of the

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activity of the image. So too the proper order is to be observed here; God is in the soul and from this presence (*memoria Dei*) proceeds knowledge of God in some way, as the divine Son proceeds from the Father. The equality of power to power is also seen here, but the equality of power to object is not present; God is a much more noble reality than the soul, and is known in a species which is of a much lower mode of being than he who is above all modes of being. Despite the decided lack of equality between the powers of the soul and God as object, he is the truest object of the created trinity in man. The reason given by Thomas in this early work is not especially convincing: all the criteria except the equality of power to object are found with God as object, but such an equality is not of much consequence in the image.<sup>138</sup>

### Summation

In some sense Thomas has finished his treatment of the trinitarian image in the *Commentary* with the conclusion that there are four images in man. The trinity of powers is an image independently of the objects; the trinity according to the essence of the soul and its consubstantial habits is also an image, though an imperfect one. When discussing the objects of the image Thomas finds that God and self as objects of the activities of the powers are the best objects, and so the trinities with God and self as objects can be considered images also, though not completely distinct from the trinity of powers.

These trinitarian images are meant to be interpretations of the trinities proposed by Augustine, as Thomas is commenting on the summary found in the Lombard's work. But what is to be said of the thomistic interpretation of the augustinian trinities? Thomas agrees with the African bishop as to the objects of the image in general, though he is not as resolute in rejecting corporeal things as Augustine. Aquinas uses criteria in judging about the reflection of the divine Persons in the soul which are to be found in Augustine, but neither so briefly explained nor so precisely distinguished. It would appear that



Thomas read much more of the *De Trinitate* than is summarized by the Lombard. The accent on the trinity of powers, though not truly the accent of Augustine, is justified by Thomas with reference to the wishes of Augustine.<sup>139</sup> Thomas considers the activity of the image only when selecting the better objects for the image, while this is a paramount consideration for Augustine. Nevertheless the thomistic interpretation in its general outlines accords with that of the African Doctor.

But there are other differences. Thomas interprets the habitual knowledge and love of self proposed by Augustine as the essence of the soul knowable and lovable to itself naturally from its presence to itself, but at the level of habit only. This is a possible interpretation of the thought of Augustine, but clearly it is not the only one, nor, perhaps, the correct one. Augustine seems to be referring to more than this type of habitual self-knowledge and love. When Thomas interprets *memoria Dei* as being basically the presence of God to the soul, he is moving in the direction of the augustinian conception.<sup>140</sup> But again there is a difference, now with respect to the knowledge of God. Aquinas does seem to admit the existence of some knowledge of God which is perpetual, if this is taken to mean only the presence of God to the intellect in any manner whatsoever,<sup>141</sup> but God is not present *in ratione objecti*.<sup>142</sup> This is not the augustinian way of viewing this problem, and it should be recalled that Augustine emphasizes the supernatural knowledge and love of God, and, seemingly, a supernatural presence of God, that is the indwelling of the Trinity. For the most part Thomas's explicit treatment of the knowledge of God and of his presence to the soul is confined to the natural level, and there is no mention of the indwelling of the Trinity at this point in his teaching.

When Thomas comes to explain the statement from Augustine that memory, understanding, and will are "one life, one mind, one essence," he interprets this trinity as referring to the powers of faculties:

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The three powers are one mind, that is not an essential predication but a predication of a potestative whole of its parts. Wherefore the mind is predicated of the powers of the image first and more proximately, for these powers, in which the integrity of the image consists, are proper to the mind as such; less properly are they one life, which includes the powers in general that are the principles of the operations of life; and still less properly are they one essence, in which as essence the powers are not included, except in origin, because the powers in which the image is found arise from the essence.<sup>143</sup>

In our opinion, the augustinian text does not refer to the powers of the soul in any specific way; Augustine uses the terms of memory, understanding, will most often for the acts corresponding to the powers, or for habitual elements related to the faculties. Amongst the Schoolmen the common interpretation of the augustinian trinity is that they are the three spiritual powers of the soul. Thomas's interpretation affirms the real distinction of the powers from the essence of the soul against the Franciscan interpretation. The notion of potestative whole used in reference to the mind is not the concept which Augustine has of the *mens*. And it should be observed that Thomas also asserts here a real distinction of the powers one from the other, and gives short attention to the distinction through relation which Augustine delights in finding in his created trinities.<sup>144</sup>

In sum the interpretation of the augustinian trinities by Thomas even in the early stage of his intellectual development is basically an aristotelian view, yet not rigidly adhered to. He adopts concepts ("intelligere dicit nihil aliud quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo" and "omnis proprietates consequens essentiam animae secundum suam naturam, vocatur hic potentia animae, sive sit ad operandum sive non") which are calculated to preserve some concepts or terms of Augustine, and the "Philosopher's" understanding of these terms will be relegated to the background.<sup>145</sup> The general influence of Augustine is of such a

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nature in this early work that Thomas hesitates to propose the aristotelian view in a complete way.

### *The teaching of the De Veritate*

In accord with the nature of the *Quaestiones Disputatae* the treatment of the image of the Trinity is enveloped in the presentation of the aristotelian psychology, and especially its "theory of knowledge."<sup>146</sup> Man's knowledge begins in the senses, and terminates at that point where knowledge gathered through the senses must terminate.<sup>147</sup> The knowledge of man in this life is always dependent upon the phantasms produced from the knowledge of the senses. The naturalness of the union of body and soul is radical, for it is functioning even in the highest operations of the soul, those of the *mens*, and with regard to its noblest objects, God and self.<sup>148</sup> This view of the nature of man and his knowledge is the receptacle into which Augustine's teaching about the divine image is openly received in the *De Veritate*.

We can consider the doctrine of Thomas as found in the *De Veritate* from two aspects: the static structure of the augustinian trinities as interpreted by Thomas; and the operation of these trinities with relation to their objects. The inclusion of the doctrine of the trinitarian image in the thomistic "theory of knowledge" here makes it possible to investigate something of Thomas's understanding of the operations of the augustinian trinities. It is here too that the augustinian concept of the *mens* is modified considerably by aristotelian psychology.

**The structure of the image:** In general Thomas finds images of the Trinity in man on three levels: the level of powers, of habits, of acts, a simplification of the view he had when composing his *Commentary*. The best image is that trinity in which *memoria* is taken as a complex habit consisting of habitual knowledge and love; *intelligentia* is actual thought proceeding from this knowledge; *voluntas* is the actual movement of the will proceeding from actual thought.<sup>149</sup> This trinity is the best image, for only

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here do we have a mental word produced which represents the divine Word.<sup>150</sup> Radically this trinity is to be found in the corresponding powers of memory, intellect, and will.<sup>151</sup> But intellectual memory as a power is not a distinct entity from the intellect, though it can be considered separately as bearing a relation only to the retention of knowledge.<sup>152</sup>

The trinity of *mens*, *notitia*, *amor* is only an imperfect imitation of the Trinity for there is no mental word produced here.<sup>153</sup> *Notitia* can be identified with habitual knowledge (*intelligentia*), and it seems that *amor* could be identified with habitual love (*voluntas*). Both of these pertain to the *memoria* of the perfect imitation of the Trinity.<sup>154</sup> This trinity of *mens*, *notitia*, *amor* is a trinity of habits as before, but now it is directly linked with the better imitation in acts.

Thomas's preference for a trinity of parts in which a mental word is produced is supported by reference to a text from Augustine, and it is in entire agreement with the efforts of Augustine to bring *each of his various trinities to the stage of act* with the production of an inner word. The relation which Thomas assigns between the first and second augustinian trinities is also in accord with the thought of Augustine, for in the latter's platonic dialectic the second trinitarian image is but a development of the first. Thomas's identification of intellectual memory with the intellect was not the way in which Augustine conceived of these intellectual powers.

**The objects of the image:** The conclusion about the objects of the image in the *De Veritate* does not differ greatly from that of the earlier work, but it is expressed more accurately, and is based on entirely new insights. God is the primary and principal object of the activity of the image; self, especially if considered formally as an image, is the secondary object; temporal things do not pertain to the divine image in man, but rather to a "vestige" of the Trinity.<sup>155</sup> This conclusion is based on a capital distinction made by Thomas between an image of analogy or representation and an image of conformity or conformation.<sup>156</sup> In the



former type of image there is an exact representation of the exemplar, while in the latter there is an assimilation to the exemplar.

With God as the object there is an image of conformity, for the mind in knowing God is conformed to him, since every knower as such is assimilated to the object known. In reality there is not only assimilation here, but even identity in the intentional order.<sup>157</sup> With self as object there is an image of analogy, for when the mind knows itself it produces a mental word, and an act of love arises from this knowledge and mental word which proceeds from both the mind and its knowledge. This is an adequate representation of the divine Persons.<sup>158</sup> With corporeal things as objects of the mind there is neither an image of analogy nor a likeness of conformity. There is not a likeness according to analogy for these objects are extrinsic to the soul, and consequently there is deficiency in representing the consubstantiality and the proper order of origin of the divine Persons. There is not a likeness of conformity for these objects are more unlike God than the mind is itself.<sup>159</sup> Corporeal objects then are completely rejected by Thomas in this work.

God is the proper object of the image, for an image of conformity is a greater likeness than an image of analogy. This is clear from the example which Thomas gives: the power of sight is more like the color it sees (it becomes it in the intentional order) than it is like the power of the intellect to which it is analogously likened (they act similarly with respect to their own objects).<sup>160</sup> God then is the primary and principal object; self is an object in a secondary way, and then especially if viewed under the aspect of being an image of God.<sup>161</sup>

How does this agree with the thought of Augustine? The conclusion about the objects of the image is the teaching of Augustine, though the bishop is not so formal in his choice of words as the friar. But what of the reasoning involved here? Is it perhaps influenced in some way by the thought of

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Augustine? It is very probable, in our opinion, that some influence of the *De Trinitate* can be seen in the distinction between an image of analogy and an image of conformity. If between the writing of the *De Veritate* and the *Commentary* there was a re-reading of the *De Trinitate* by Thomas, as is very likely, then Thomas could have observed there the principle on which he bases his notion of an image of conformity.<sup>162</sup> The principle is enunciated in this way by Augustine, "all knowledge is like the things it knows according to species." The principle is applied to God as object in these words, "Insofar as we know him we are like him, but not to the point of equality, since we do not know him to the extent of his being."<sup>163</sup>

The other part of the thomistic distinction, the image of analogy, could have been seen in the *De Trinitate* put to extensive use. The initial purpose of Augustine was to illustrate the divine Trinity to his readers through an analogy in man, through the trinitarian image in man. This purpose is expressed repeatedly and it is precisely this aspect of the image of the Trinity in man which was able to give a large semblance of unity to the *De Trinitate* of Augustine. This can be considered as the application of the favored method of Augustine, the platonic dialectic, the dialectic of illustration and analogy. But such a procedure presupposes knowledge of what the true image of the Trinity consists in, and so Augustine will have to apply himself to this problem and here the aristotelian dialectic plays a large role in his work, the dialectic of discovery.<sup>164</sup> There is no question as to what is the object of the image in Augustine's mind: it is God and he only. But for purposes of analogy and illustration, self as object of the image is able to furnish a better representation of the divine Trinity. A final reconciliation of Augustine is able to achieve a unity of object for the image and this is effected by the position that self is an object of the image of conformity if viewed precisely as an image. Self then is only a relative object of

the image of conformity for the bishop of Hippo, while it remains the principal object of the image of analogy. This is also the view of Thomas.

Thomas could have observed all of this by a close reading of the *De Trinitate*. Since the distinction between an image of conformity and an image of analogy appears in the *De Veritate* and not in the *Commentary*, and it is likely that Aquinas re-read the *De Trinitate* in the interval between the composing of these two works, it is reasonable to suspect some influence of Augustine here. Historically speaking Thomas was able to find the elements and materials for his distinction in the *De Trinitate*; nevertheless the distinction is the fruit of the fertile mind of Aquinas.

**The operation of the image:** Some marked differences have already appeared between the teaching of Augustine and Thomas with respect to the static structure of the trinitarian image, but more profound differences appear when the actual functioning and operation of the trinities in man are compared. The differences are rooted in their diverse "theories of knowledge," though Augustine cannot justly be said to have formulated a complete theory of the operation of man's intellect and senses.

*Self as object:* In the *De Veritate memoria sui* is the presence of the mind to itself as knowable and lovable through itself, though habitually only.<sup>165</sup> Thomas describes this complex "memory" as the soul knowing and loving itself by its essence as God does, but as being very deficient in comparison for it is at the level of habit and not of act.<sup>166</sup> *Intelligentia sui*, which is actual thought or knowledge of self in which a mental word is produced, flows from the complex "memory of self," that is from habitual knowledge of self. But this habitual knowledge is not itself actualized, as the soul knows itself quidditatively only in reflection on its acts and their nature, and becomes aware of itself through its acts.<sup>167</sup> What then is the relation of actual knowledge of self to the so-called habitual knowledge of self contained in the "memory of self"? The presence of the soul to itself as

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intelligible without the activity of the agent intellect, though after the manner of a habit only which is habitual "knowledge" of self for Thomas here, renders the actual perception of self possible in its acts.<sup>168</sup> When the mind is actualized by some species, then itself can be perceived in a limited way simultaneously. In this restricted way *intelligentia sui* flows from *memoria sui*.

*Voluntas sui*, which is actual love of self, flows from actual knowledge of self, for love follows upon knowledge. But in what way does this actual love of self flow from the "memory of self," for if it does not, then it would be very deficient in representing the procession of the Spirit from the Son and the Father. It seems that since the complex *memoria sui* includes also habitual love of self, that is the soul present as a principle of love to itself, the actual love of self would have some dependence on this presence.<sup>169</sup> It can be said then that actual self-love flows both from the actual self-knowledge and from the presence of the soul to itself as lovable through itself, the partial aspect of the complex "memory" of self.

This interpretation of Thomas does not agree too well with the thought of Augustine. The African bishop refers to the habitual knowledge and love of self in that primal memory which each one has of himself. The definite impression is given that we are dealing here with true knowledge and love, for in Augustine's opinion the mind knows itself through itself and actually.<sup>170</sup> Furthermore, it seems that it is true knowledge that is at stake from the fact that it is this habitual knowledge which is itself actualized in the production of a mental word. Actual knowledge and love of self not only proceed from the augustinian memory of self, but apparently actualize this memory of self. This opinion, if truly that of Augustine, is in sharp contrast with the thought of Aquinas.

*God as object:* The functioning of the created trinity is much different with God as object, though Thomas gives little consid-



eration to supernatural knowledge and love of God here. *Memoria Dei* is not habitual knowledge and love of God as we might expect, but it is the presence of God to the soul as giving being to it, and its proper being, that is intellectuality.<sup>171</sup> It is the common presence of God which is referred to here; God present and giving the light of the intellect to the soul that it might understand.<sup>172</sup>

*Intelligentia Dei* is actual knowledge of God which does not attain to the essence of God, but rather to the *quid non est*.<sup>173</sup> God is not known through his essence either, but through his effects.<sup>174</sup> This knowledge of God does flow from the *memoria Dei* in a very limited way, as it is God's presence which gives to the soul the light of reason by which it can know him. In an equally restricted sense man can be said to know God by his essence (as causing the power to know in man), and in his essence (insofar as through his effects his essence can be said to be attained), and in the natural order.<sup>175</sup>

*Voluntas Dei* seems to be natural love of God consequent upon the natural knowledge of God, and so subject to many of its defects. This love proceeds from the "memory of God" the presence of God to the soul, in the same fashion that knowledge does. The soul loves God by his essence (God's essence as causing the power to love him), and in his essence (in the degree to which this is possible through a knowledge of his effects), and in the natural order.

There is considerable difference between the thought of Augustine and that of Aquinas when we consider God as object of the activity of the image. Augustine speaks of an intelligible presence of God to the soul which seems to be attained only by the operations of grace in any real sense. Thomas here speaks only of the natural presence of God to the soul, and this is not an intelligible presence in his view. The supernatural modifications of the image and its operations are not discussed by Thomas in the *De Veritate* when he treats of the image of the Trinity in man, so it is not possible to make

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any comparison between the peaks of the augustinian and thomistic thought.

### Summation

On the whole the teaching of the *De Veritate* about the divine image shows two marked differences from the discussion of this theme in the *Commentary*. The first difference is the greater acquaintance with the augustinian *De Trinitate* on the part of Thomas. Practically every advance he makes over his earlier teaching with regard to the structure of the image is in accord with the thought of Augustine, and urged by appropriate texts from the latter's work. Here, in the *De Veritate*, Thomas has assimilated not only a few partial insights into the teaching of Augustine, but the latter's final and total teaching about the structure of the image.

The second difference is the open and consistent use of the aristotelian psychology and "theory of knowledge" in explaining the operations of the trinities in man. Thomas's view of the process involved in the knowledge of God, the knowledge of self, and in the operation of the *mens* as a whole, is not identical with the view Augustine had of these processes. The incomplete notion which Augustine had of the process of knowledge is not that of Aquinas, and the African Doctor uses a different philosophical instrument to explain the operations of the created trinities. Yet even under the "handicap" of a consistent and complete theory of knowledge Thomas has managed to save the appearances of an augustinian insight: man does know and love himself by his essence as God does, though it be at the habitual stage only. To the augustinian insight Aquinas has added one of his own: man knows and loves God in His essence and by His essence as God knows and loves Himself, though it be in a most restricted fashion. The genius of Thomas shines through brilliantly in the face of such achievements.

However, the Angelic Doctor has not treated here in any extended way of the supernatural structure and operation of

the trinitarian image. The broad limits which Thomas lays down for knowledge of God apply generally to supernatural knowledge also, though he does admit exceptions to the rule that God cannot be seen in this life in his essence, and this point is conceded to the authority of Augustine.<sup>176</sup> It is unfortunate, from our point of view, that Aquinas has not seen fit to treat of the indwelling of the Trinity in association with its obvious augustinian parallel, *memoria Dei*, but it may have been the wiser choice not to attempt the discussion of two such complexities as the trinitarian image and the indwelling of the Trinity together.

*The teaching of the Summa*

The image of the Trinity in man appearing in the mature thought of Thomas is a simple trinity of *principium verbi, et verbum, et amor*.<sup>177</sup> Using the notion of image which we have already seen, Thomas requires some sort of representation of the species of the exemplar for an imitation of the Trinity. The divine Persons are distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Father expressing him, and by the procession of love which unites both the Father and Son. A specific representation of the divine Trinity in man will consequently consist in like processions of a mental word and love from a principle within him.<sup>178</sup>

From this conclusion it follows that the image is to be considered primarily and principally according to acts, for only by actual knowledge is the mental word produced in man.<sup>179</sup> Thomas continues to place the image secondarily in the powers of the soul and the habits, especially in the latter, and insofar as they virtually contain the acts required for the imitation of the Trinity. This conclusion preserves the permanence of the trinitarian image in man, and is nothing other than an abstract presentation of the teaching of the *De Veritate*.<sup>180</sup>

Several observations from preceding sections should be recalled here. The image of the Trinity to be found in the powers of the soul, and in the natural acts of knowledge and love of

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God flowing from the faculties, pertains to the "aptitudinal" image of the Trinity, the natural image of the Trinity in man. The image of the Trinity to be found in the habits informing the powers of the soul, the virtues of faith, hope, charity and the gift of wisdom especially, and the acts pertaining to these principles belong to the supernatural image of the Trinity, the image of grace and conformity. Grace divinizes the soul and brings with it the supernatural virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit which make possible knowledge and love of God as he is in himself. As the Word of God is born of the Father by the knowledge of himself, and love proceeds from Father and Son as they love their Godhead and each other, so by the knowledge man possesses of the Trinity through faith and the gift of wisdom, he forms an internal word of God which issues through charity in a "sigh" of love of God. Thus the supernatural acts of knowledge and love of God, and the very habitual principles themselves, though imperfectly because of the lack of the mental word and actual love, resemble and image the divine processions themselves and the Trinity.

In the *Summa*, Aquinas expresses the view that there is only one object of the image of the Trinity in man, and it is God. The reasoning employed in favor of this position is very simple: the Word and Love in the divine Trinity proceed from God's knowledge and love of himself, but different objects cause a difference of species in knowledge and love; so the trinity which will achieve the stature of an image in man must be a mental word and love proceeding from knowledge and love of God.<sup>181</sup> Again the thomistic notion of an image as attaining to a representation of the species of the exemplar has intervened to decide the answer, now with respect to the problem of the object of the image, and much of the complication of the *De Veritate* has been avoided. However, it is possible for God to be the object in two ways: immediately and directly, or mediately and indirectly. Any activity directed toward an image formally as an image terminates in the imaged, not in



the image.<sup>182</sup> Self then is only a relative object of the image. Yet man in this life cannot always be engaged in the knowledge and love of God, so Thomas phrases his conclusion about God as the object of the image in such a way as to preserve the permanence of the trinity in man: God is the object of the image insofar as the soul is turned toward him, or is naturally capable of such activity.<sup>183</sup>

### Summation

The treatment of the doctrine of the trinitarian image in the *Summa* is principally a profound simplification of Thomas's earlier teaching, though a very great advance in scientific order is observable, together with preciseness of distinction, expression, and intuition on which the former two are based. This simplification is centered around the mature thomistic concept of image from which all his conclusions flow. The opinion about acts, habits, and powers, and the reasoning employed, all can be found in the *De Veritate*, but the position of Thomas in the *Summa* is more abstract and supernatural elements are included in principle. The conclusion with regard to the objects of the image in the mature work appears to be but a more precise statement of the conclusion of the *De Veritate*, but the reasoning is related to the concept of image, and Thomas is concerned here only with the image of conformity. The primary imitation of the Trinity by man now consists in the procession of a mental word and consequent love from a principle in him. But it is not evident that the Angelic Doctor has abandoned, except for purposes of summary, all the other elements involved in the imaging of the Trinity of Persons (as analyzed in the *Commentary*), nor the complex nature of the *principium verbi* (as analyzed in the *De Veritate*). The presentation of the doctrine of the trinitarian image by Thomas in his scientific synthesis is concerned only with the bare essentials of this teaching.

Insofar as the doctrine of the *Summa* is common to the earlier works it has been compared with the thought of Augus-

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tine, and influences noted where possible. There does not seem to be any new element of Augustinian influence perceptible in the formal treatment of the trinitarian facet of the image. Rather, there is an obvious area in which the influence of Augustine seems to wane, and it is to be seen in the abandoning of the augustinian terminology for the trinities in man. The trinities in augustinian terms do not appear in any prominent part of Thomas's mature thought, but only in the objections and the answers thereto.<sup>184</sup> In particular Aquinas has rejected the term of memory used by the bishop of Hippo. This is not a completely new attitude on the part of Thomas, for in the earlier works he had tended to reject, if not the term, the complete augustinian understanding of the term. Memory (intellectual) as a power is not distinct from the intellect; as habitual in the augustinian sense it has a very complex nature requiring extended explanation and justification for such a usage; as an act it is insignificant for the operations of the image of the Trinity. Thomas then no longer yields to the personal preference of Augustine for this term and its varied meanings. Nevertheless, the augustinian understanding of *memoria Dei* and of *memoria sui* has not been without some influence on the mature thought of Aquinas, as we shall see in a moment.

### SOME RELATED DOCTRINES

There are two points of significance for the doctrine of the image which have been passed over almost completely in the foregoing discussions. The reason for such an "oversight" is the fact that St. Thomas devotes little consideration himself in the context of the divine image to either point. The doctrines at stake here are the relation of freedom to the image in man, and the relation of the doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity to the image of the Trinity. Both doctrines have come under the influence of the thought of Augustine, though in different ways.

**Freedom and the Divine Image:** We have already seen that the freewill of man assumes no importance in the doctrine of the divine image as it appears in the works of Augustine, contrary to the views of many of the eastern Fathers. In discussing the relation of freedom to the divine image in his *Commentary* Thomas gives much the same view of this aspect of man's intellectuality as one might expect from Augustine himself. "It must be said that there cannot be perfect likeness [to God] in freewill, since no distinction of powers is to be found there; then too it is not the more excellent part of the soul, for it is operative only, while the contemplative part of the soul is more noble than the operative part. [St. John] Damascene assigns the divine image there, loosely ("large") calling an image any likeness whatsoever. However, freewill does imitate God insofar as it is the first principle of its own operations which cannot be forced."<sup>185</sup> The younger Thomas is unwilling to grant much significance to the freewill of man as an element of the divine image. It is true that Thomas first rejects human freedom as a primary divine resemblance on the basis of a trinitarian view of the image; nevertheless he considers it to be only improperly designated as an image of the divine in itself, for it does not pertain to the highest and contemplative part of the soul. Freewill is something of a likeness to the divine, but, apparently, does not pertain in any primary sense to the divine image in man.

When treating of the doctrine of the image in the *Summa*, Thomas continues to give little importance to freewill as an element of the divine image, though St. John Damascene's view is mentioned several times.<sup>186</sup> But when Thomas comes to use the doctrine of the image as a synthesizing concept at the highest level of the organization of his material in the *Summa*, the element of freewill receives much more prominence.

Since, as Damascene says, (*De Fide Orthodoxa*, II, 12), man is said to be made to the image of God, insofar as the image signifies an intellectual being having freewill and power over

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itself, now that the exemplar, that is God, has been treated of, and those things which come forth from the divine power in accordance with his will, it remains for us to consider his image, that is man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his works, as having freewill and power over his works.<sup>187</sup>

When the human creature is considered as a theological subject and its "reditus" to God discussed, then freewill as a likeness to the divine receives merited stress. Yet it seems that the thomistic view of the relation of freewill to the divine image in man follows a tendency of augustinian thought, and that man's freedom is only a secondary resemblance to the divine. For Thomas, as for Augustine, the primary resemblance to God in the will of man is love, and not the element of freedom. True as the latter statement may be, it must be observed that the thomistic doctrine explaining the freewill of man does not suffer from the difficulties associated with the interpretation of the developing doctrine of St. Augustine about man's freewill.

**The Indwelling of the Trinity:** The distinction made in the *De Veritate* between an image of analogy and an image of conformity is skillfully employed by the Angelic Doctor in the *Summa*. In this great synthesis contrary to the order of the *Commentary*, the formal treatment of the image of the Trinity in man is a separate and distinct development of the image of conformity, while the doctrine about the processions within the divine Trinity makes extensive use of created analogies in the mind of man, the image of analogy.<sup>188</sup> In this employment of the created analogies from the mind of man Thomas admittedly follows the augustinian approach. "Augustine proceeds to manifest the Trinity of Persons from the procession of a word and love in our mind, which way we have followed above."<sup>189</sup> It would be aside from our purpose to pursue the thomistic development of the augustinian approach to the mystery of the divine Trinity, yet there is one theme intimately related to the doctrine of the divine Trinity and to the doctrine of the image which reveals a more



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subtle augustinian influence, and it is the doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity in the soul.

In the *Summa*, following in the steps of Augustine, Thomas uses the example of self-knowledge and self-love to describe the difference between essential and notional knowledge and love in the Trinity.

Even as there is produced in the one understanding an intellectual conception of the thing understood, when someone understands something, which we call a word; so when someone loves something, there is produced a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover, by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover, even as the thing understood is in the one who understands. And so *when someone understands and loves himself, he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the thing understood is in the one understanding, and the thing loved is in the one loving.*<sup>190</sup>

In the last statement from the citation just given Thomas in reality is making use of the augustinian *memoria sui* as analogy, but what is more interesting is the expression used by the Dominican Doctor when describing the presence of the soul to itself when actually known and loved by itself. Then the soul is present to itself, not only through physical identity, but also "as the thing understood is in the one understanding, and the thing loved is in the one loving."

The identical formula is employed by Thomas in the *Summa* when he speaks of the indwelling of the Trinity in the soul. "Above and beyond the common mode [of the presence of God], however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature, wherein God is said to be present *as the thing known is in the knower, and the thing loved is in the lover.*"<sup>191</sup> In his mature work, contrary to the description of the *Commentary*, Aquinas explains the presence of the Trinity to the souls of the just in the very same terms as he describes the presence of the soul to itself when actually known and loved.

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A parallel then exists between these two presences, and is it not the exploitation of an original parallel made by Augustine between *memoria sui* and *memoria Dei*?

When discussing the trinitarian image Augustine makes an obvious attempt to find a neat balance between the first members of his preferred trinities with self as object and God as object, between *memoria sui* and *memoria Dei*. Both seem to involve in a confused way the intelligible presence of the object which is explained after the manner of an habitual presence, at least in the instance of self, while the *memoria Dei* is related to the indwelling of the Trinity. Thomas was already aware of this analogous relation, when he wrote his *Commentary*, yet when he comes to describe *memoria Dei* as part of the trinitarian image, he restricts his explanation to the common presence of God to the soul, and the same procedure is followed in the *De Veritate*. No interpretation of what *memoria Dei* would be in the supernatural order is given in the context of the doctrine of the image. The problem does not arise in the discussion of the divine image in the *Summa*, where Thomas has abandoned the complexities of his earlier expositions, and especially the augustinian term of *memoria*.

All of this strongly suggests the conclusion that the best method for understanding the thomistic doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity in the soul is the use of the analogy of self-presence, self-knowledge, and self-love. In other words, the trinitarian image of analogy, which has self for its object, would not only be the proper analogy for the understanding of the divine Trinity in itself, but also fruitfully employed for the understanding of the presence of the divine Trinity in the souls of the just. We can only give one instance here of the profitable returns to be expected from such a method of procedure. The soul is physically present to itself always, but when it knows and loves itself, then the soul is present to itself in a new way. This new presence, an intentional presence, can be described as the presence of the soul to itself as the

thing known is in the knower and the thing loved in the lover. Or this new presence of self can be described as the presence of the soul to itself by means of a likeness or similitude of itself in the intellect, the mental word, and an impression or inclination toward itself in the will. Compare this description of the presence of the soul to itself with the differing descriptions given by Thomas of the presence of the divine Trinity to the soul in the indwelling. God too is physically and substantially present to the soul always, but through the indwelling he is present in a new way. This new presence of God can be described as the presence of God to the soul as the thing known is in the knower and the thing loved in the lover. Or this new presence can be described as the presence of God to the soul by means of a likeness or similitude (habitual) of himself in the intellect, the gift of wisdom, and an impression or inclination (habitual) toward himself in the will, the gift of charity.<sup>192</sup> Is not the latter description of the indwelling, similar to that from the *Commentary*, equivalent to the former description of the indwelling, similar to that from the *Summa*? Both descriptions given by Thomas of the indwelling, though differing outwardly, teach the same doctrine: the new presence of God to the soul in the indwelling is an intentional presence.<sup>193</sup> The use of the trinitarian image with self as object, that is the augustinian *memoria sui*, confirms this view. Such a usage Thomas himself suggests by the application of an identical formula in the *Summa* to explain both the presence of God to the soul in the indwelling and the presence of the soul to itself when known and loved.

Other fruitful possibilities could be suggested for the use of the augustinian trinity with self as object as an analogy for the understanding of the indwelling of the Trinity, but such must be postponed for another occasion. Here it can be noted that the augustinian trinities have been influential in the thomistic analysis of the indwelling. The formula used by the Angelic Doctor in the *Commentary* has more obvious augustinian

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roots, using as it does the likenesses to the Son and Spirit in the soul, the gifts of wisdom and charity, for the explanation. The formula appearing in the *Summa* is less directly augustinian, yet it seems to have been provoked by an original augustinian parallel, the association of *memoria sui* and *memoria Dei*.

Nevertheless, it is true that Thomas has not seen fit to relate the doctrine of the image, nor the concept of image, to the presence of God in such an intimate fashion as we find in the teaching of Augustine. Thomas apparently leaves unanswered the problem of the relation of the presence of the exemplar to the image, the presence of the Trinity in the indwelling to the supernatural image of the Trinity in man. If the notion of image demands the presence of the exemplar as the term of its imitation and activity, then it seems that the supernatural activation of the natural image of the Trinity in man would require the supernatural presence of the Trinity, that is, the indwelling of the Trinity in the soul. Logical as this conclusion may seem, it is not a conclusion drawn by Thomas himself.

### GENERAL CONCLUSION

Augustine is a living source for Thomas's doctrine about the image of the Trinity in man, not simply an "authority" to be cited for some dialectical purposes, much less a "text" to be used for decorative design; the teaching of Augustine has exerted a profound and permanent influence on the thought of Aquinas. The reason for such a view of the relation between the teaching of Augustine and that of Thomas can be stated simply: the only patristic source and authority of real significance for the thomistic doctrine of the trinitarian image is the teaching of Augustine, and with this teaching, at least in its fundamental points and general outlines, the doctrine of Thomas is in full agreement.

1. *Augustine is the only patristic source and authority of lasting significance for the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in the works of Thomas.* It is not to be thought that this con-



clusion follows from Thomas's lack of acquaintance with the teaching of other Fathers of the Church. In the *Commentary* Thomas cites from such Fathers in the West, in addition to Augustine, as Hilary, Ambrose, Boethius and Cassiodorus, Gregory the Great, and even from Bernard of Clairvaux, Richard of St. Victor, and Anselm of Canterbury, while such eastern Fathers as Dionysius the Areopagite and John Damascene are referred to, when the doctrine of the image is discussed. It is true that Thomas does not reveal any wide acquaintance with the works of some of these writers, yet even a wide acquaintance with their thought would have had little influence on the trinitarian facet of the divine image for Thomas, as this was the fruit of the originality of Augustine, as we have seen in a previous chapter. In the treatment of the image of the Trinity in the *De Veritate* one is hard put to find any other name than that of Augustine, though Dionysius is mentioned several times. The discussion of the doctrine of the image in the *Summa* again refers to such Fathers as Hilary, Gregory the Great, John Damascene in the bodies of the articles, while Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, Boethius, and Fulgentius (quoted as being Augustine) appear in the objections. Of all the Fathers other than Augustine only two, Hilary of Poitiers and John Damascene, could be considered to have exercised any influence of significance on the thomistic doctrine of the image, and even then it is modified by the insights of Augustine. The definition of an image by St. Hilary and the association of free will with the divine image by St. John Damascene are the two points in question. In the *Commentary* Thomas uses the definition of the image given by Hilary as the basis for his analysis of this notion, while in the *Summa* it is the analysis of Augustine which assumes singular prominence, though the definition of Hilary continues to exert some influence with regard to the requirement of specific likeness for an image. We have just seen what Thomas makes of freewill as an element in the divine image which appears in the text from John Damascene. Freewill receives

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little consideration as a factor in the divine image when the doctrine is formally discussed, though it assumes prominence when the *reditus* of the intellectual creature to its Creator is outlined, and man is considered under a theological light. Thomas brings the freedom of man as an element of divine resemblance into better balance with the doctrine of the image by the use of the text from Damascene, nevertheless, for Augustine and Thomas, love is the primary divine resemblance to be found in the will of man, and not his freedom.

2. *In its fundamental points and general outlines the doctrine of the image of the Trinity found in the works of Thomas is in full agreement with that of Augustine.* Practically the whole of this chapter is evidence for this conclusion, and so only a summarization can be expected here. Augustine's permanent influence can be seen both with regard to the imaging of the divine nature and the imaging of the divine Trinity. With respect to the imaging of the divine nature we can cite the changing stresses in the concept of the image between the writing of the *Commentary* and the writing of the *Summa*, and this is due to the augustinian notion of image. The subject of the divine image in man is the *mens* which is an augustinian concept, though Thomas will modify his understanding of it with aristotelian principles. The primary elements of divine resemblance in man are seen to be knowledge and love of God, and this is the view of both Doctors. The relation between nature and grace, and even between grace and glory, with the divine image as the foundation is viewed basically in the same way by both Thomas and Augustine. It is true that precision of distinction, accuracy of expression, and even a different point of view, in which the lines between grace and nature are clearly drawn, appear in the works of Thomas, but this is a development given to the doctrine of the image by the Angelic Doctor, and not truly disagreement with the bishop of Hippo. In fact it seems that Thomas has the same reluctance with regard to the use of the term "divinization"

as had Augustine, and in this they differ together from the eastern Fathers, and much the same has already been observed with regard to man's freedom as an element of the divine image.

With respect to the imaging of the Trinity of Persons it should not be forgotten that the doctrine of Thomas as found in the *Commentary* is textually dependent on a summary of augustinian teaching, often in the very words of Augustine, made by Peter the Lombard. This contact with the thought of the bishop of Hippo, and possibly a personal acquaintance with texts from the *De Trinitate*, gave Thomas a well-defined approach to the trinitarian facet of the divine image, to say nothing of the intermediate influences of the scholastic interpretations of this doctrine prevalent at Paris. At this stage of his intellectual development, the Dominican friar is a scrupulously faithful disciple of the African Father, even to the point of relegating aristotelian concepts to a non-influential role. Thomas does display some freedom in his interpretation of the augustinian trinities, but here he is following in the steps of the Lombard and the scholastic commentators, though it could also have been occasioned by his lack of wide-spread acquaintance with this theme of the augustinian deposit.

When we come to the teaching of the *De Veritate* there is manifest development in the teaching of Thomas, and a more profound augustinian influence can be seen in the matter of the trinitarian image. The development given to this doctrine by Thomas here is in perfect accord with the final thoughts of Augustine, fortified by appropriate augustinian texts, and apparently based on a close reading of the *De Trinitate*. Equally evident is the consistent use of aristotelian psychology, as the augustinian trinities are given a full aristotelian interpretation. Yet the difference between an aristotelian interpretation of the trinities in man and Augustine's own view is not to be overemphasized; there are notable points in which the two views are not irreconcilable.

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The perfection of science and synthesis appears in the *Summa*, and it is apparent in the doctrine of the image. All of Thomas's major conclusions are the result of his mature notion of image, which had undergone an impressive augustinian influence. No longer does Thomas use augustinian terminology to any great degree for his simplified and abstract trinities, yet the original insights of Augustine remain at the basis of his teaching. Then too, the impact of the psychological trinities on the thomistic exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be overestimated. A more subtle influence of Augustine can be seen with respect to the explanation given by Thomas to the doctrine of the indwelling of the Trinity; at least the augustinian trinities and associations were provocative of the insights of Thomas.

In sum, we can echo Gardeil's judgment here, cited with approval by Maritain. "The positions on which they differ may be counted; it is impossible to number those in which they agree."<sup>194</sup> Almost all of the elements of the thomistic teaching about the image of the divine Trinity in man are to be seen in the writings of Augustine, though in varying degrees of precision, perfection, and analysis, and based on rather unsteady philosophical foundations. In the *De Trinitate* of Augustine, Thomas found the dialectical preview to a truly scientific treatment of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity. He read and re-read this great work and finally assimilated its contents into his original theological synthesis. And this process is but another instance of where "the dumb Ox of Aquin has devoured the spiritual substance of the Eagle of Hippo."



## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Dionysius Areopagit., *De Divinis Nominibus*, IX, 6 (PG 3:913 f).

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, II, 4 (PG 3:641 f), where different analogies are used to illustrate different aspects of the divine Trinity. The analogies used are (1) light from different lamps in one house; (2) the participation of the center point of a circle by lines circumscribed; (3) different impressions participating the one form of the same seal from which they take their form.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Boethius, *De Trinitate*, Proem. (PL 64:1249).

<sup>4</sup>Cassiodorus, *Expositio in Psalmos*, L, 15 (PL 69:367).

<sup>5</sup>St. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, XI, I (PL 82:399), "Mens autem vocata, quod emineat in anima, vel quod meminit; unde et immemores amentes. Quapropter non anima, sed quod excellit in anima mens vocatur, tamquam caput eius, vel oculus. Unde et ipse homo secundum mentem imago Dei dicitur. Ita autem haec omnia adjuncta sunt animae, ut una res sit. Pro efficientiis enim causarum diversa nomina sortita est anima. Nam et memoria mens est, unde et immemores amentes; dum ergo vivificat corpus anima est; dum vult animus est; dum scit, mens est; dum recolit, memoria est. . . ." Cf. also *Lib. Different.*, II, XXIX (PL 83:84).

<sup>6</sup>The augustinian trinitarian analogy appears in the 15th and 16th councils of Toledo; see J. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, XII, 11 A and 67 B.

<sup>7</sup>Venerable Bede, *Hexameron*, I, in Gen. 1:26 (PL 91:28-9), "Cum autem dicitur 'faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram' unitas Sanctae Trinitatis aperte commendatur . . . 'faciamus,' una ostenditur trium personarum operatio; in eo quod sequitur, 'ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram,' una et aequalis substantia ejusdem Trinitatis indicatur." The same interpretation appears in the *Liber De Sex Dierum Creatione*, de die sexta (PL 93:216), and the image of God is placed primarily in the mind and intellect.

<sup>8</sup>Cf. Alcuin, *De Fide S. Trinitatis*, (PL 101:12).

<sup>9</sup>Cf. *idem*, *De Anima Ratione*, 6 (PL 101:641); *ibid.*, 7 (PL 101:642).

<sup>10</sup>Erigena, *De Divisione Naturae*, 2, 23 (PL 122:569).

<sup>11</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*

<sup>12</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 2, 31 (PL 122:603 f).

<sup>13</sup>St. Anselm, *Monologium*, 67 (PL 158:213). See also *ibid.*, 31-33 (PL 158:158-187), where many of the augustinian insights into the trinitarian analogies from the human spirit are reproduced.

<sup>14</sup>*Idem*, *Liber Medit. et Orat.*, I, 1 (PL 158:710).

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Abelard, *Theologia Christiana*, I, 4 (PL 178:1130), and *Introductio ad Theologiam*, I, 1, 11 (PL 178:996).

<sup>16</sup>Cf. *idem*, *Introd. ad Theol.*, I, 1, 13 (PL 178:999). In the view of Abelard it is only the male of the species who is made to the image of the Trinity; the female is made to the image of man, and after the likeness of God. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 1, 9 (PL 178:991).

<sup>17</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, 1, 9 (PL 178:989), "At vero Spiritus Sancti vocabulo ipsa ejus charitas seu benignitas exprimitur."

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<sup>18</sup>St. Bernard, *Sermones de Diversis*, XLV, 1 (PL 183:607 f), "Beata illa et sempiterna trinitas, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, unus Deus scilicet, summa potentia, summa sapientia, summa benignitas, creavit quamdam trinitatem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, animam videlicet rationalem: quae in eo praeferit vestigium quoddam illius summae Trinitatis, quod ex memoria, ratione et voluntate consistit."

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 6 (PL 183:608), "Dicamus ergo: est Trinitas creatrix, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ex qua cecidit creata trinitas, memoria, ratio et voluntas. Et est trinitas per quam cecidit, videlicet per suggestionem, delectationem, consensum. Et est trinitas in quam cecidit, videlicet impotentia, caecitas, immunditia. Rursus trinitas quae cecidit, id est, memoria, ratio, voluntas. Singulae cujusque tripartitus existit casus. Memoria cecidit in tres species cogitationum, affectuosas, onerosas, otiosas. Ratio in triplicem ignorantiam: boni et mali, veri et falsi, commodi et incommodi. Voluntas in concupiscentiam carnis, concupiscentiam oculorum, et ambitionem saeculi. Est trinitas per quam resurgit, scilicet fides, spes, charitas. Quae trimembres habent subdivisionem. Est enim fides praeceptorum, signorum, promissorum; est et spes veniae, gratiae, gloriae; et est charitas de corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta."

<sup>20</sup>See E. Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard* (Sheed and Ward, London: 1955), 46, and cf. in Bernard, *Tract. de Gratia et Lib. Arbit.*, IX (PL 182:1018 f). The work of Gilson can also be consulted for a fuller treatment of the doctrine of the image, 33-59.

<sup>21</sup>St. Bernard, *Instructio Sacerdotis*, I, 1 (PL 184:773-4), "Creavit te ad imaginem et similitudinem suam: ad imaginem conferens tibi naturalia; ad similitudinem largiens gratuita: ut mente excelleres, et omnia irrationalia alia ratione vinceret . . . ut semper respiciens sursum. Creatorem tuum in mente haberes, et originem suam incessanter ad animum revocares. Fecit enim te . . . ad imaginem suam et similitudinem Deum: ad imaginem ut haberes *memoriam, intellectum, discretionem*, et caetera naturalia: ad similitudinem ut haberes innocentiam, justitiam, et alia gratuita; ad imaginem, in cognitione veritatis; ad similitudinem, in amore virtutis. Vel certe factus es ad imaginem Dei collatis tibi omnibus istis; ad similitudinem secundum essentiam Deitatis factus es immortalis et indivisibilis." According to F. Cayre, *Manual of Patrology and History of Theology*, II, 430, note (3), the whole of volume 184 of Migne is falsely attributed to Bernard.

A text which is found in the *Book of Sentences* of Peter Lombard bears remarkable similarity to the text above from St. Bernard, but what is even more noteworthy is the difference: "dilectio" appears in the place of "discretio." This change in the text, as it appears in the *Book of Sentences* permits the augustinian trinitarian image to be seen here. Cf. *Lib. Sent.*, II, d. XVI, "Factus est ergo homo ad imaginem Dei secundum *memoriam, intelligentiam, et dilectionem*; ad similitudinem secundum innocentiam et justitiam, quae in mente rationali naturaliter sunt. Vel imago consideratur in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in amore virtutis. Vel imago in aliis omnibus, similitudo in essentia; quia immortalis et indivisibilis est."

<sup>22</sup>Cf. William of St. Thierry, *De Nat. et Dignit. Amoris*, II, 3 (PL 184:382) and *In Cant.*, I, (PL 180:503). For a comparison of the influence of the augustinian trinitarian image on St. Bernard and William of St. Thierry, see E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, Appendix V, 202 f. Further augustinian influence can be seen on a contemporary of Bernard and William; cf. Isaac of Stella, *De Anima* (PL 194:1877).

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<sup>23</sup>Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, I, 1, p. III, c. 20 f (PL 176:225 f) and *De Unione Corp. et Spiritus* (PL 177:289).

<sup>24</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, cc. 19-31 (PL 176), and F. Cayre, *Manual of Patrology and History of Theology*, II, 446.

<sup>25</sup>Cf. Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, I, 5 (PL 196:892).

<sup>26</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 11 (PL 196:922 f), and F. Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, II, 179 (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1950).

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Peter Lombard, *Lib. Sent.*, I, d. III (PL 192:530 f).

<sup>28</sup>Cf. *ibid.* (PL 192:532 f).

<sup>29</sup>Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.*, v. II, 414, sol. (ad Claras Aquas). It is more probable that the teaching represented in this citation from the Alexandrian teaching is that of John de la Rochelle, and others. See E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 327 (Random House, New York: 1954). References to much the same teaching about the trinitarian image in the works of John de la Rochelle can be found in E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 683-4, note (3).

<sup>30</sup>See E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 329.

<sup>31</sup>See F. Cayre, *op. cit.*, II, 509.

<sup>32</sup>St. Bonaventure, *Solil.*, I, s. 2, 3 (*St. Bonaventurae, Opera Omnia*, VIII, 30) "Primo considera, quam generose formata sis per naturam. Generositas tua naturalis consistit in hoc ut existimo, quia tibi naturaliter ad tui decorem impressa est imago beatissimae Trinitatis. Unde Anselmus in Proslogio, 'Fateor, Domine, et gratias ago, quia me creasti ad tuam imaginem, ut tui memor sim, te cogitem, te diligam.' Bernardus in Meditationibus: 'Secundum interiorem hominem tria in me invenio, per quae Deum recolo, conspicio, et concupisco. Haec tria sunt memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas. Cum enim Dei reminiscor, in ipso delector. . . . Intelligentia ipsum intueor, quantum in se incomprehensibilis, quia principium est et finis; quantum in Angelis desiderabilis, quia desiderant in eum prospicere; quantum in Sanctis omnibus delectabilis, quia in eo assidue laetantur; quantum in creaturis omnibus admirabilis, quia omnia potenter creat, sapienter gubernat, benigne dispensat.' Cum haec intueor, ipsum concupisco, 'Cum Deum per voluntatem diligo, me ipsum in eum transformo.'"

<sup>33</sup>Cf. Bonaventure, *In Hex.*, II, 14, t. V, 386. Reference is to volume V of the Quaracchi edition of Bonaventure's works, the same edition as in the previous note. For the development of the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, see J. Hartnett, *Doctrina Sancti Bonaventurae De Deiformitate* (St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein, Ill.: 1936); also useful is F. Copleston, *op. cit.*, II, 243 f.

<sup>34</sup>Cf. *idem*, *Comm. in Lib. Sent.*, I, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, concl., t. I, 83; *ibid.*, II, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, f. 1, t. II, 559. See J. Hartnett, *op. cit.*, 16 f.

<sup>35</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, III, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, concl., t. III, 592. See J. Hartnett, *op. cit.*, 38 f.

<sup>36</sup>Cf. *Breviloquium*, p. 2, c. 9, t. V, 227. See J. Hartnett, *op. cit.*, 32-33.

<sup>37</sup>Cf. *Itinerarium mentis ad Deum*, *passim*, t. V.

<sup>38</sup>Cf. St. Albert, *Comm. in Lib. Sent.*, I, d. 3, a. 22 (*Opera Beati Alberti Magni*: 1661) t. XIV, 73-74. The entire treatment of the trinitarian image by Albert extends from aa. 18-38 (incl.), 69-92.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. *idem*, *Summa Theologiae*, p. II, tract. XII, q. 71, *edit. cit.*, t. XVIII, 354-357.

<sup>40</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*



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<sup>41</sup>Cf. St. Thomas, *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1; *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 5; *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 2. Unless otherwise noted the following footnotes in this chapter will be to works of St. Thomas.

<sup>42</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1; *ibid.*, d. 28, q. 2, a. 1; *Summa*, I, q. 35, a. 1; *ibid.*, q. 93, aa. 1-2. A very brief description of the notion of image also appears in the *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 5.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 2, a. 1, where the definition of St. Hilary appears, "imago est species indifferens ejus rei ad quam imaginatur."

<sup>44</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Respondeo dicendum, quod ratio imaginis consistit in imitatione: unde et nomun sumitur. Dicitur enim imago quasi imitago. De ratione autem imitationis duo consideranda sunt; scilicet illud in quo est imitatio, et illa quae se imitantur. Illud autem respectu cuius est imitatio, est aliqua qualitas, vel forma per modum qualitatis significata. Unde de ratione imaginis est similitudo. Nec hoc sufficit, sed oportet quod sit aliqua adaequatio in illa qualitate vel secundum qualitatem vel secundum proportionem. . . . Exigitur etiam quod illa qualitas sit expressum et proximum signum naturae et speciei ipsius. . . ."

<sup>45</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Ex parte autem imitantium duo sunt consideranda; scilicet relatio aequalitatis et similitudinis quae fundatur in illo uno in quo se imitantur; et adhuc ulterius ordo: quia illud quod est posterius ad similitudinem alterius factum, dicitur imago; sed illud quod est prius, ad cuius similitudinem fit alterum, vocatur exemplar. . . ."

<sup>46</sup>*II Sent.*, d. 16, a. 4, "Cum ergo imago importet imitationem in his quae pertinent ad speciem demonstrandam, oportet quod similitudo accipiat in eo quod deficit a demonstratione specialis naturae. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: aut quia est prius et communius quam sit natura speciei, sicut proprietates consequentes naturam generis: aut quia est posterius his quae speciem demonstrant, ut accidentia consequentia principia individui."

<sup>47</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1.

<sup>48</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 35, a. 1; *ibid.*, q. 45, a. 7; *ibid.*, q. 93, aa. 1-2.

<sup>49</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 93, a. 1, "Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis et quod imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum: imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius . . . Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis. . . ."

<sup>50</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 93, a. 2, "non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, sufficit ad rationem imaginis . . . requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem . . . vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei. . . ."

<sup>51</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, "Est [aequalitas] tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis: nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est."

<sup>52</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, q. 35, a. 1, "Ad hoc ergo quod vere aliquid sit imago, requiritur quod ex alio procedat simile ei in specie, vel saltem in signo speciei." For the note of equality, cf. *ibid.*, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3, "Cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quandam; et sic est unitas vel convenientia creaturae ad Deum. Quod autem dicit 'rei ad rem coaequandani' pertinet ad rationem perfectae imaginis."

<sup>53</sup>The only implicit reference to origin as a requirement for the concept of image in the *Commentary* is to be seen in the words of St. Thomas



cited in note (45) of this chapter where in explaining the difference between the image and the exemplar he refers to the order between the two.

<sup>54</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 1.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, a. 9, "Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago . . . consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat, quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte representat ipsum."

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 45, a. 7, ". . . omnis effectus aliquoliter repraesentat suam causam, sed diversimode. Nam aliquis effectus repraesentat solam causalitatem causae, non autem formam eius, sicut fumus repraesentat ignem: et talis representatio dicitur esse representatio vestigii; vestigium enim demonstrat motum alicuius transeuntis, sed non qualis sit. Aliquis autem effectus representat causam quantum ad similitudinem formae eius, sicut ignis generatus ignem generantem, et statua Mercurii Mercurium: et haec est representatio imaginis."

<sup>57</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1; *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>58</sup>Cf. *Summa* I, q. 93, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 5.

<sup>59</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, "In illis tantum creaturis dicitur esse imago Dei quae propter sui nobilitatem ipsum perfectius imitantur et repraesentant. . . ."

<sup>60</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 44, a. 4; *ibid.*, q. 13, a. 5, and note (52) of this chapter.

<sup>61</sup>Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, "illa imitatio rationem imaginis constituit quae est in aliquo ad speciem pertinente. Ex primo autem et communi nihil sortitur speciem, sed ex ultimo et proprio, sicut est differentia constitutiva. Consideratis autem divinae bonitatis processibus in creaturis, quibus naturae creaturae constituuntur in similitudinem naturae increatae, ultima invenitur intellectualis dignitatis participatio, et quae omnes alias praesupponat: et ideo intellectualis natura attingit ad imitationem divinam, in qua quoddammodo consistit species naturae ejus. . . ."

<sup>62</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 5, "vivere addit supra esse, et intelligere supra vivere. Ad hoc autem quod imago Dei in aliquo inveniat, oportet quod ad ultimum genus perfectionis perveniat quo creatura tendere potest; unde si habeat esse tantum . . . vel esse et vivere . . . non salvatur in hoc ratio imaginis; sed oportet ad perfectam imaginis rationem, ut creatura sit, vivat, et intelligat. In hoc enim perfectissime secundum genus conformatur essentialibus attributis."

<sup>63</sup>Cf. Augustine *De Trinit.*, XV, 13, 22 (BAC 5:882), "Quae autem scientia Dei est, ipsa et sapientia; et quae sapientia, ipsa essentia sive substantia. Quia in illius naturae simplicitate mirabili, non est aliud sapere, aliud esse; sed quod est sapere, hoc est et esse. . . ."

<sup>64</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, c. 11 f, *passim*, and notes (92) and (93) of chapter one.

<sup>65</sup>Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 16, a. 1, a. 3; *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 3.

<sup>66</sup>Cf. Augustine *Sermo* 9 (PL 38:82).

<sup>67</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 3, *Sed Contra*, "Est quod dicit Gregorius in quadam homilia (34 in Evang.) quod angelus dicitur signaculum similitudinis (Ezeck. 38:12), quia in eo similitudo divinae imaginis magis insinuat expressa."

<sup>68</sup>*I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3. "Invenitur tamen quidam gradus perfectionis imaginis. Dicitur enim quandoque imago alterius in quo invenitur aliquid simile qualitati alterius, quae designat et exprimit naturam

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ipsius; quamvis illa in ea non inveniatur . . . et sic imago Dei est in creatura . . . et sic est imperfectus modus imaginis. Sed perfectior ratio invenitur quando illi qualitati quae designat naturam substantiae, subest natura in specie. . . . Sed perfectissima ratio imaginis est quando eandem numero formam et naturam invenimus in imitante cum eo quem imitatur; et sic est Filius perfectissima imago Patris. . . ." Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 35, a. 2, ad 3.

<sup>69</sup>*Summa*, I, q. 35, a. 2, ad 3. Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 16, Expositio textus.

<sup>70</sup>St. Thomas unites two favored texts of St. Augustine from Ephesians (4:23-24) and Colossians (3:10) to prove that the divine image is only in the mind; cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 6, *Sed contra*.

<sup>71</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2.

<sup>72</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 1, "nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum. Res autem uniuscuiusque generis mensuratur per id quod est minimum, et principium primum in genere suo . . . et ideo nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus mensurando eas quasi ad sua principia. Intellectus autem, cum dicatur per respectum ad actum, potentiam animae designat: virtus enim, sive potentia, est medium inter essentiam et operationem. . . ."

<sup>73</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2, "Et ideo mens potest comprehendere voluntatem et intellectum, absque eo quod sit animae essentiae; inquantum, scilicet, nominat quoddam genus potentialium animae, ut sub mente intelligantur comprehendendi omnes illae potentiae quae in suis actibus omnino a materia et conditionibus materiae recedunt." Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, and ad 1.

<sup>74</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 7, "ita etiam mens non est una quaedam potentia praeter memoriam, intelligentiam, et voluntatem; sed est quoddam totum potentiale comprehendens haec tria. . . ." Cf. references to the *Commentary* given in note (73) of this chapter.

<sup>75</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 8, "mens non comparatur ad intelligentiam et voluntatem sicut subjectum, sed magis sicut totum ad partes, prout mens potentiam ipsam nominat."

<sup>76</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, "Sed anima human pertingit ad altissimum gradum qui est inter potentias animae, et ex hoc denominatur; unde dicitur intellectiva, et quandoque etiam intellectus, et similiter mens, inquantum scilicet ex ipsa nata est effluere talis potentia, quia est sibi proprium prae aliis animabus."

<sup>77</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1, "Vel potest dici quod mens accipitur ab Augustino secundum quod significat essentiam animae simul cum tali potentia."

<sup>78</sup>Cf. C. Boyer, "L'Image de la Trinité Synthèse. . . .", 184 f.

<sup>79</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, and ad 3.

<sup>80</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, aa. 2-3; *Summa*, I, q. 79, aa. 6-7.

<sup>81</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 2.

<sup>82</sup>Cf. note (101) of chapter three.

<sup>83</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 9.

<sup>84</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 6, ad 3.

<sup>85</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.

<sup>86</sup>*I Sent.*, d. 3, Exposit. secundae partis textus, "Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Glossa . . . triplex est imago Dei in homine, scilicet creationis, quae est ratio, inquantum appropinquit ad imitationem divinae intellectualitatis; et dicitur imago per modum quo truncus in corporalibus potest dici imago. Item alia est imago similitudinis, quae consistit in

distinctione potentiarum representantium Trinitatem personarum; et haec assimilatur imagini in corporalibus, secundum quod distincta est per rationes partium. Item est imago recreationis, quae consistit in habitibus gratuitis, et actu imitatur Deum . . . et sic dicta imago non remanet post peccata, sed aliis duobus modis." The *Glossa Ordinaria Strabi* reads here, "Imago creationis, ratio, recreationis, gratia, similitudinis, tota Trinitas," cited in Vives edition of the *Omnia Opera S. Thomae Aquinatis*, VII, 67.

<sup>87</sup>Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 93, a. 4, "Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deum seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum: et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat: et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte: et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gloriae. Unde . . . Glossa distinguit triplicem imaginem: scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis."

<sup>88</sup>See Cajetan, *Commentaria in I*, q. 93, a. 4.

<sup>89</sup>*Summa*, I, II, q. 113, a. 10, "Et quantum ad hoc, justificatio impii non est miraculosa: quia naturaliter anima est capax gratiae; eo enim ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit."

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*, III, q. 23, a. 1, "ex qua contingit quod ad participationem bonorum suas creaturas admittit; et praecipue rationales creaturas, quae, inquantum sunt ad imaginem Dei factae, sunt capaces beatitudinis divinae."

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 9, a. 2, "Homo autem in potentia ad scientiam beatorum, quae in visione Dei consistit, et ad eam ordinatur sicut ad finem: est enim creatura rationalis capax illius beatae cognitionis, inquantum est ad imaginem Dei."

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, ad 3, "visio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis: inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad eam pervenire non potest. Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius: inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius, prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est. . . ."

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 11, a. 1, "Est autem considerandum quod in anima humana, sicut in quaelibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva: una quidem per comparisonem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparisonem ad agens primum, qui potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiore, in quem non reducitur per agens naturale; et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creaturae."

<sup>94</sup>Cf. Augustine, *De Trinit.*, XIV, 8, 11 (BAC 5:788), "Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque particeps esse potest; quod tam magnum bonum, nisi per hoc quod imago eius est, non potest." See also chapter two of this study.

<sup>95</sup>Cf. text cited in note (56) of chapter two.

<sup>96</sup>See R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *The One God* (St. Louis, Herder: 1954), 360.

<sup>97</sup>Cf. text cited in note (87) of this chapter.

<sup>98</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 7, ad 8, "potentiae imaginis aliquibus habitibus perficiuntur, secundum quod comparantur ad Deum, sicut fide, spe, caritate, et sapientia, et aliis huiusmodi."



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<sup>99</sup>*Summa*, II, II, q. 175, a. 1, ad 2, "Ad modum et dignitatem hominis pertinet quod ad divina elevatur, ex hoc ipso quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei. Et quia bonum divinum infinitum excedit humanam facultatem, indiget homo supernaturaliter ad illud bonum capessendum adjuvetur: quod fit per quodcumque beneficium gratiae."

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, I, II, q. 110, a. 4, "Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei; et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat, secundum quandam similitudinem, naturam divinam, per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem."

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, I, q. 13, a. 9, "Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non secundum totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per quandam similitudinem: ut dii dicantur qui participant aliquid divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, 'Ego dixi, dii estis' (Ps. 81, 6)."

<sup>102</sup>Cf. *In Boeth. De Trinit.*, q. 3, a. 1, and P. Matthijs, *De Imagine Dei in Homine*, II, 36-39, 42.

<sup>103</sup>Cf. *Summa*, II, II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1, "ita etiam caritas qua formaliter diligimus proximum est quaedam participatio divinae caritatis." Cf. *ibid.*, II, II, q. 24, a. 2, "Unde caritas . . . nobis inesse . . . per infusionem Spiritus Sancti, qui est amor Patris et Filii cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata. . . ."

<sup>104</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, q. 45, a. 6. Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, "In reductione rationalis creaturae in Deum intelligitur processio divinae personae, quae et missio dicitur, in quantum propria relatio ipsius personae divinae representatur in anima per similitudinem aliquam receptam quae est exemplata et originata ab ipsa proprietate relationis aeternae: sicut proprius modus quo Spiritus Sanctus refertur ad Patrem est amor, et proprius modus referendi Filium in Patrem est, quia est verbum ipsius manifestans ipsum. Unde sicut Spiritus Sanctus invisibiliter procedit in mentem per donum amoris, ita Filius per donum sapientiae, in quo est manifestatio ipsius Patris, qui est ultimum ad quod recurrimus." Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2, "anima per gratiam conformatur Deo. Unde ad hoc quod aliqua Persona divina mittatur ad aliquem per gratiam, oportet quod fiat assimilatio illius ad divinam Personam quae mittitur per aliquod donum gratiae. Et quia Spiritus Sanctus est Amor per donum caritatis anima assimilatur Spiritui Sancto; unde secundum donum caritatis attenditur missio Spiritus Sancti: Filius autem est Verbum, non quaecumque, sed spirans Amorem . . . Non igitur secundum quamlibet perfectionem intellectus Filius mittitur; sed secundum talem instructionem intellectus qua praeorumpat in affectum amoris . . . Et haec proprie dicitur sapientia. . . ."

<sup>105</sup>*Ibid.*, I, II, q. 61, a. 5, "Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matt., 5: 'Estote perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est,' necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium: et haec vocantur virtutes purgatoriae."

<sup>106</sup>*Loc. cit.*, "Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, in quantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit: fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter



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excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam."

<sup>107</sup>See P. Matthijs, *op. cit.*, II, *passim*; also Robertus A. Sancta Teresia a Jesu Infante, *De Habitibus Animam Trinitati Assimilantibus et Unientibus* (Rome: 1958).

<sup>108</sup>*Summa*, I, q. 12, a. 5, "Cum igitur virtus naturalis intellectus creati non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet quod ex divina gratia superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc augmentum virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus vocamus; sicut et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et istud est lumen de quo dicitur Apoc., quod 'claritas Dei illuminat eam' (21:23), scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium. Et *secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiiformes*, id est similes Deo; secundum illud 1 Joan., 3 (2), 'Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti est.'"

<sup>109</sup>*Ibid.*, I, II, q. 61, a. 5, "Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium *divinam similitudinem*: quae vocatur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum."

<sup>110</sup>See Augustine, *De Trinit.*, XIV, 9, 12 (BAC: 794).

<sup>111</sup>See A. Squire, "The Doctrine of the Image in the De Veritate of St. Thomas," *Dominican Studies*, IV (1951), 169-174. See also M. D. Chenu, *Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin*, (Libr. Phil. J. Vrin, Paris: 1954), 12th edit., 84-86.

<sup>112</sup>Such a relation is not evident in the mature analysis Thomas gives of the concept of image, and the only remotely similar element to be found in the earlier and more comprehensive analysis of this concept in the *Commentary* is the element of order which Thomas finds between the exemplar and image; cf. text cited in note (45) of this chapter. However, this element of order more proximately pertains to the order of origin from the exemplar. There are scattered hints which would lead one to believe that the concept of image for Thomas may bear a relation to the exemplar in the order of finality, but they are not integrated with his analysis of the concept. Cf. e.g., *Summa*, I, q. 35, a. 1, *sed contra*, where Thomas cites Augustine in favor of understanding the term of image as a relative term, "Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, 'Quid est absurdius quam imaginem ad se dicit?' Ergo Imago in divinis relative dicitur." But Thomas seems to interpret this relation as the relation of origin only, while Augustine means that the Son is not only *a Patre* but also *ad Patrem*. St. Thomas often refers to an expression from Aristotle, "idem est motus in imaginem in quantum est imago, et in rem," which implies that an image is essentially a relative thing in the order of representation; cf. *ibid.*, II, II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 3; q. 103, a. 3, and ad 3; III, q. 25 a. 3.

It is true that Thomas relates to his doctrine of the image the tendency of the image among creatures toward perfection, that is toward further and further assimilation to the exemplar which is God. But this interpretation appears when he is interpreting the *ad imaginem* of Scripture, and does not seem to belong to the abstract concept of image; cf. references cited in note (69) of this chapter.

<sup>113</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4.

<sup>114</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 13.

<sup>115</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 45, a. 6.

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<sup>116</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7.

<sup>117</sup>Cf. note (16) of chapter three.

<sup>118</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 5, "modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae. . . . Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum Personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium Personarum, sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur."

<sup>119</sup>See P. Matthijs, *De Imagine Dei in Homine*, I, 43.

<sup>120</sup>Cf. text cited in note (3) of chapter four.

<sup>121</sup>*Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 5, "Sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad Trinitatem Personarum: nam et ipso Deo in tribus Personis una exsistit natura."

<sup>122</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4.

<sup>123</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 4, ad 1.

<sup>124</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1.

<sup>125</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 2, "intellectus, voluntas et huiusmodi . . . sunt accidentia . . . sicut propria accidentia, quae consequuntur speciem, originata ex principiis ipsius: simul tamen sunt de integritate ipsius animae, inquantum est totum potentiale, habens quamdam perfectionem potentiae, quae conficitur ex diversibus viribus." Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1.

<sup>126</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, ad 3, "Philosophi accipiebant potentias illas tantum quae ordinantur ad aliquem actum. Proprietates autem retentiva ipsius animae non habet aliquem actum; sed loco actus habet ipsum quod est tenere; et ideo de memoria sic dicta non fecerunt mentionem inter potentias animae." Cf. *ibid.*, q. 5, ad 5.

<sup>127</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, "Cum igitur natura animae sit receptibilis inquantum habet aliquid de possibilitate . . . et non sit impressa organo corporali, cum habeat operationem absolutam a corpore, scilicet intelligere; consequitur ipsam quaedam proprietas, ut impressa retineat . . . . Ista ergo virtus retinendi dicitur hic potentia *memoriae*. Ulterius, quia anima est immunis a materia, et omnis talis natura est intellectualis, consequitur ut id quod in ipsa teneatur ab ea intelligatur et ita post memoriam sequitur *intelligentia*. Item, quia id quod intelligitur accipitur ut conveniens intelligenti, ideo consequitur *voluntas*, quae tendit in ipsum conveniens: nec potest ultra procedere; quia voluntas est respectu finis. . . . Et *secundum hoc sunt tres potentiae distinctae ab invicem*, memoriam, intelligentiam, et voluntas."

<sup>128</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 3, ad 1.

<sup>129</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, q. 5.

<sup>130</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1, "unde si aliqua species esset quae in se haberet lumen, illud haberet rationem habitus, quantum ad id quod esset principium actus. Ita dico, quod ab anima cognoscitur aliquid quod est in ipsa non per sui similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam, ipsa essentia rei cognitae est loco habitus. Unde dico, quod ipsa essentia animae, prout est mota a seipsa, habet rationem habitus. Et sumendum hic notitia materialiter pro re nota; et similiter est dicendum de amore."

<sup>131</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, "et ita haec assignatio sumitur secundum essentiam et habitus consubstantiales. . . ."

<sup>132</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Unde in ista non est tanta conformitas sicut in praedicta, nec ita propria assignatio: *propter quod etiam ultimo ponitur.*" It is placed last by the Lombard, whereas this trinity of *mens*, *notitia sui*, et *amor sui* appears *first* in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine.

<sup>133</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, q. 4, a. 4, ad 1.

<sup>134</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 4, "Unde dico, quo imago quoddammodo attenditur respectu quorumlibet objectorum, verius autem respectu suiipsius, et verissime respectu hujus objecti, quod est Deus. . ."

<sup>135</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Quorum duo se tenent ex parte ipsius animae, scilicet consubstantialitas et distinctio potentiarum, et ideo se habent indifferenter respectu quorumlibet objectorum; alia vero tria, scilicet aequalitas, et ordo, et actualis imitatio respiciunt objecta, unde se habent diversimode diversorum objectorum. . ."

<sup>136</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "In illis enim quae per habitum acquisitum discuntur, non servatur ordo . . . quia intelligendi actus praecedit actum memorandi; et ideo non est ibi actualis representatio ipsius Trinitatis, secundum quod intendit illis objectis quae non exprimunt Trinitatem. Servatur autem ibi aequalitas quaedam, scilicet potentiae ad potentiam: quia quaecumque comprehendunt una potentia, comprehenduntur alia; non quod quidquid intelligimus, simpliciter velimus; sed aliquo modo in voluntate sunt, inquantum volumus nos ea intelligere: sed non servatur aequalitas potentiae ad objectum: quia res corporales sunt in anima nobiliori modo quam in seipsis, cum anima sit nobilior eis. . ."

<sup>137</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Si autem considerentur istae potentiae respectu hujus objecti quod est anima, sic salvatur ordo, cum ipsa anima naturaliter sit sibi praesens; unde ex notitia procedere intelligere, et non e converso. Servatur etiam aequalitas potentiae ad potentiam simpliciter: quia quantum se intelligit, tantum se vult et diligit. . . Servatur etiam ibi aequalitas potentiae ad objectum. Servatur etiam ibi actualis imitatio Trinitatis ipsius, inquantum scilicet ipsa anima est imago expresse ducens in Deum."

<sup>138</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Si autem considerentur respectu hujus objecti quod est Deus, tunc servatur ibi actualis imitatio. Maxime autem servatur ordo, quia ex memoria procedit intelligentia, eo quod ipse est per essentiam in anima et tenetur ab ipsa non per acquisitionem. Servatur etiam aequalitas potentiae ad potentiam simpliciter, sed non potentiae ad objectum: quia Deus est altior quam sit anima. Unde dico quod imago . . . attenditur . . . verissime hujus objecti quod est Deus; nisi tantum quod deest aequalitas potentiae ad objectum, quae etiam non multum facit ad imaginem."

<sup>139</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 4, ad 2.

<sup>140</sup>The same observation can be made with respect to *memoria sui*: it also is interpreted by Thomas basically as the presence of the soul to itself; cf. notes (137) and (138) of this chapter.

<sup>141</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, "Sed secundum quod intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo, sic anima semper intelligit se et Deum indeterminate, et consequitur quidam amor indeterminatus."

<sup>142</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Dico ergo, quod anima non semper cogitat et discernit de Deo, nec de se, quia . . . ad talem enim cognitionem non sufficit praesentia rei quolibet modo; sed oportet ut sit ibi in ratione objecti. . ."

<sup>143</sup>*I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1.

<sup>144</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, *Expos. secundae p. text.*, "Dicendum quod quamvis non dicatur ad eam sub nomine voluntatis [memorial], tamen refertur ad eam inquantum voluntas est memorabilis. Vel dicendum quod referuntur ad invicem secundum relationem originis, inquantum una habet naturalem ordinem ad aliam. . . ." Here Thomas is explaining a text from Augustine concerning the distinction through relation of memory, understanding,



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will, "Ea vero tria sunt quae ad se invicem referuntur," which was repeated by the Lombard. And so it appears that Thomas reduces this augustinian relative distinction to the relation of origin arising among the spiritual powers of the soul, or to a relation which each power bears to the other as object of its activity. In any event the augustinian distinction through relation has no prominence in the thomistic view.

<sup>145</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1; *ibid.*, ad 1, 2, 3; *ibid.*, a. 5, and ad 2.

<sup>146</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, aa. 2-6 especially: a. 2 considers intellectual memory; a. 3 finds that it is not distinct from the intellect; a. 4 treats of the knowledge of material things; a. 5 discusses the knowledge of singulars; a. 6 discusses the dependence of our knowledge upon the senses; aa. 8 and 11 treat of the knowledge of self and God respectively.

<sup>147</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 13.

<sup>148</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 2, ad 7, "Et ideo sicut intellectus noster secundum statum viae indiget phantasmatis ad actu considerandum antequam accipiat habitum, ita et postquam acceperit. Secus videtur de angelis quorum intellectus objectum non est phantasma."

<sup>149</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 3, "Unde secundum hunc modum perfectae imitationis assignat Augustinus imaginem in his tribus memoria, intelligentia, voluntate; prout memoria importat habitualem notitiam, intelligentia vero actualem cogitationem ex illa notitia procedentem, voluntas vero actualem voluntatis motum ex cogitatione procedentem."

<sup>150</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Anima enim perfecte imitatur Trinitatem secundum quod meminit actu, intelligit actu, et vult actu. Quod ideo est, quia in illa Trinitate increata media in Trinitate persona est Verbum. Verbum autem sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest."

<sup>151</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Sed quia actus sunt in potentiis radicaliter sicut effectus in causis, ideo perfectio imitatio, quae est secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem actualem, potest originaliter inveniri in potentiis."  
...

<sup>152</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 3, ad 1, "Quamvis memoria prout est in mente non sit alia potentia ab intellectu possibili distincta, tamen inter intellectum possibilem et memoriam invenitur distinctio secundum habitudinem ad diversa. . . ."

<sup>153</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 3.

<sup>154</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Et sic secundum hanc assignationem haec duo, quae sunt notitia et amor, habitualiter accepta, ad memoriam tantum pertinent."  
...

<sup>155</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 7, "In consideratione vero rerum temporalium non invenitur imago, sed similitudo quaedam Trinitatis, quae magis potest ad vestigium pertinere. . . ."

<sup>156</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.* A distinction similar to the distinction between an image of analogy and an image of conformity can be seen in the *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 9, "alio modo secundum eandem rationem operationis; et sic repraesentatur in creatura rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem sui producere, et haec dicitur similitudo naturalis imaginis: ea enim imaginem aliorum gerunt quae similem speciem praeferunt. Tercio modo per unitatem objecti, in quantum creatura rationalis intelligit et amat Deum; et haec est quaedam unionis conformitas, quae in solis sanctis invenitur qui idem intelligunt et amant quod Deus."

<sup>157</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Sed in cognitione ipsa qua mens ipsum Deum cognoscit mens ipsa Deo conformatur, sicut omne cognoscens, in quantum huiusmodi, assimilatur cognito." Cf. P. Matthijs, *De Imagine Dei in Homine*, I, 41-42.



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<sup>158</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Sed in cognitione qua mens nostra cognoscit seipsam, est repraesentatio Trinitas increatae secundum analogiam, in quantum hoc modo mens cognoscit seipsam verbum sui gignit, et ex utroque procedit amor. Sic Pater seipsum dicens, Verbum suum genuit ab aeterno, et ab utroque procedit Spiritus sanctus." Cf. *Contra Gentes*, IV, c. 26.

<sup>159</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "In illa cognitione qua mens temporalia cognoscit, non invenitur expressa similitudo Trinitatis increatae neque secundum conformitatem, quia res materiales sunt magis Deo dissimiles quam ipsa mens, unde per hoc quod mens earum scientia informatur, non efficitur Deo magis conformes; similiter neque secundum analogiam, eo quod res temporalia, quae sui notitiam parit in anima, vel intelligentiam actualem, non est ejusdem substantiae cum mente, sed extraneum a natura ejus; et sic non potest per hoc increatae Trinitatis consubstantialitas representari."

<sup>160</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Major autem est similitudo quae est per conformitatem, ut visus ad colorem, quam quae est per analogiam, ut visus ad intellectum, qui similiter ad sua objecta comparatur."

<sup>161</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Et ideo proprie imago Trinitatis in mente est secundum quod cognoscit Deum primo et principaliter: sed quodam modo secundario est secundum quod cognoscit seipsam et praecipue prout seipsam considerat ut est imago Dei: ut sic consideratio non sistat in se, sed procedat usque ad Deum."

<sup>162</sup>It is the opinion of M. Chenu, *Introduction a L'Etude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin*, 47, that Thomas read or reread the *De Trinitate* between the time of the writing of the *Commentary* and that of the composition of the *De Veritate*. In view of the wide acquaintance shown with the trinitarian work of Augustine by Thomas in the *De Veritate*, the opinion is very probable, since the same wide acquaintance is not evident in the *Commentary*.

<sup>163</sup>Augustine, *De Trinit.*, IX, 11, 16, (BAC 5:564), "Omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit . . . Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus: sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia nec tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse se."

<sup>164</sup>See Dom D. Hayden, "Aristotelian Dialectic," *The Thomist*, XX (1957), 390-396.

<sup>165</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 5; *ibid.*, a. 8, ad 1; *ibid.*, a. 3.

<sup>166</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 8, ad 9, "Unde nihil prohibet quin aliquid cognoscatur seipso sicut Deus seipso seipsum cognoscit; et sic anima seipsam quodammodo cognoscit per essentiam suam."

<sup>167</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 8, corpus.

<sup>168</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1 in contrarium, "Mens seipsam per seipsam cognoscit, quod ex ipsa mente est ei unde possit in actum prodire, quo se actualiter cognoscit percipiendo se esse; sicut et ex specie habitualiter in mente recepta est in mente ut possit actualiter rem illam considerare."

<sup>169</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 3. This is not explicit in Thomas's words, but can be inferred from the parallel existing between habitual knowledge and love of self, and their respective acts.

<sup>170</sup>Cf. note (111) of chapter four.

<sup>171</sup>Cf. *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 11, ad 8.

<sup>172</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7, ad 2, "Ipse enim Deus . . . cujus praesentia in mente ipsius memoria est in mente . . . ex cujus praesentia mens intellectuale lumen percipit, ut intelligere possit."

<sup>173</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 11, ad 4.

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<sup>174</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 6.

<sup>175</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, ad 5.

<sup>176</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, q. 10, "Et si aliquis hoc miraculose concedatur, ut Deus per essentiam videant, nondum anima a carne mortali totaliter separata; non tamen sunt totaliter in statu viae, ex quo actibus sensuum carent, quibus in statu mortalis vitae utimur." In the answer to the first objection Thomas notes that Augustine concedes this type of rapture to Moses and St. Paul, in which position Thomas apparently follows Augustine. Cf. augustinian text cited in note (97) of chapter one.

<sup>177</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 6; *ibid.*, I, q. 45, a. 7.

<sup>178</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7.

<sup>179</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Divinae autem Personae distinguuntur secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et Amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest. . . . Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus."

<sup>180</sup>Cf. *loc. cit.*, "Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio: secundario, et quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt." Cf. also *ibid.*, ad 4.

<sup>181</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, a. 8, "Oportet quod imago divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod representat divinas Personas representatione speciei, sicut est possibile creaturae. Distinguuntur autem divinae Personae . . . secundum processionem Verbi a dicente, et Amoris ab utroque. Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et Amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem quod diversitas objectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris. . . . Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum."

<sup>182</sup>See the numerous references to this aristotelian formula cited in note (112) of this chapter.

<sup>183</sup>Cf. *Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 8, "Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid dupliciter: uno modo, directe et immediate, alio modo, indirecte et mediate. . . ."

<sup>184</sup>See the objections and the answers thereto from articles 6, 7, 8 of q. 93 in the *Summa*, Prima Pars.

<sup>185</sup>*I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. unic. "Dicendum quod in libero arbitrio non potest esse perfecta similitudo, cum non inveniatur ibi aliqua distinctio potentialium; nec etiam est excellentior pars animae, cum sit tantum operativa, et pars contemplativa nobilior est parte operativa. Sed Damascenus assignat ibi imaginem, large vocans imaginem quamcumque similitudinem. Imitatur autem Deum liberum arbitrium in quantum est primum principium suorum operum non potens cogi."

<sup>186</sup>*Summa*, I, q. 93, a. 9, and a. 5, ad 2.

<sup>187</sup>*ibid.*, I, II, Prol. "Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius

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imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem."

<sup>188</sup>See M. de Beauecueil, "L'Homme image de Dieu selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Etudes et Recherches, Cahiers de Théol. et de Phil.*, VIII (1952), 83-110; IX (1955), 37-96.

<sup>189</sup>*Summa*, I, 32, a. 1, obj. 1.

<sup>190</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 37, a. 1, "Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquar, rei amatae in affectu amantis secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligente. Ita quod, cum aliquis seipsum intelligit et amat, est in seipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam ut intellectum in intelligente, et amatum in amante."

<sup>191</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 43, a. 3, "Super istum autem communem, est unus specialis, qui convenit creaturae rationali, in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante." Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 8, a. 4.

<sup>192</sup>Cf. *I Sent.*, d. 15, q. 4, a. 1.

<sup>193</sup>See F. L. B. Cunningham, *The Indwelling of the Holy Trinity*, 322 f.

<sup>194</sup>See A. Gardeil, *La Structure de L'Ame et L'Expérience Mystique*, I, xxix-xxx, and J. Maritain, "St. Augustine and St. Thomas," *A Monument to Saint Augustine*, 219.

## EPILOGUE:

# THE TRINITARIAN IMAGE AFTER ST. THOMAS

Already, only fifty years after the death of St. Thomas—by the time of his canonization by Pope John XXII in the year 1323—Christendom was beginning to suffer from the failure of the theologians to rally to his thought, especially to the synthesis achieved between faith and reason. It is not the system and spirit of St. Thomas that dominate the fourteenth and even the fifteenth centuries, but the agnostic and sceptical spirit of Ockham expressing itself fully in what came to be known as the *via moderna*. The trend away from the thomistic synthesis can already be seen in the thought of Duns Scotus, but it was Ockham who brought about a complete divorce between faith and reason.<sup>195</sup> The *Book of Sentences* of the Lombard, it is true, remains the basic text for theological studies in the universities, and the augustinian doctrine forms the core of this work. Yet Nominalism will tend to divert this teaching of any real meaning, though the outer shell remains. It is only with the return of St. Thomas and his thought to the schools that mental balance begins to be regained. The first sign of this coming event is the substitution of the *Summa Theologiae* for *The Book of Sentences* as the theological text by the Dominican masters at the University of Pavia in 1480, a move sanctioned by the Dominican General Chapter at Cologne in 1483.



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In the meantime, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we see a development of "mystical" theology so vigorous that it constitutes the most splendid feature of the age. Yet this development will eventually find itself in reaction to the decadent scholasticism of the schools and the point will be reached when it is completely separated from intellectual activity, from objective theology and reason. During the golden scholastic period men of the schools and universities had tried to create a unified theology, bent, not only on the knowledge of God, but also on the procession of him in love. When the Dominicans and Franciscans attained to the professorial chairs, they had achieved such a synthesis as may be seen in the works of both St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Mysticism still preserved this theological character at the beginning of the fourteenth century; it preserved the vision of the universe and of man as the image of God which was bequeathed by the *Summa*, and it never suggested that desire for knowledge was vain, and that contemplation and love were all sufficient.

The impulse toward mysticism, colored visibly by the teaching of Dionysius the Areopagite, and deriving in part from the "augustinianism" of St. Albert the Great rather than the aristotelianism of St. Thomas, appears first among the Dominicans at Strasbourg. The great figure of the beginnings of this movement was the Dominican Master Eckhart, who for a time had taught theology at the University of Paris during the tenure of Scotus there. The great Rhenish mystical theologians of the age follow in the path of the Master, though avoiding the excesses of Eckhart. Chief among them were the Dominicans John Tauler and Blessed Henry Suso, and the great Dutch mystic Blessed Jan van Ruysbroek, who is commonly allied with this school of "speculative" German mystics. This quartet of mystical and speculative theologians is largely responsible for the outburst of "mysticism" in Germany and the Low Countries, and its effects are felt directly in England.

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The authors of this school explain mystical union by the dionysian (and augustinian) theory of the return of the soul to divine unity, and especially by means of the image and resemblance with God, as can be seen most easily in Ruysbroek's *The Mirror of Eternal Salvation*.<sup>196</sup> And it is here where the augustinian doctrine of the image of the divine Trinity in man appears, though the German mystics stray from both St. Augustine and St. Thomas in their understanding of this doctrine. John Tauler, perhaps, has expressed it most clearly in the following words,

We should learn to find the Trinity in ourselves, and realize how we are in a real way formed according to its image. The soul, even its natural state, bears this divine image actually, truly, and distinctly, though the image falls far short of the reality. Now, our progress consists in recognizing this blessed image in ourselves above all things, for it is something so precious and so much our own. It is impossible to express adequately the nobility of this image, for God is in this image and indeed is the image, while yet being imageless. Theologians discuss this image a great deal, and seek in various ways to discover its nature and essence. They all assert that it belongs properly to the superior faculties of the soul, the memory, understanding, and will. By these faculties we are capable of receiving and enjoying the Blessed Trinity. This is true, but it is only the lowest degree of the truth; for this is but a repetition of the natural image.<sup>197</sup>

Continuing his discussion, Tauler now speaks of another divine image, or another depth and level of the one image in man, and here the beginnings of a divergence from the thought of Thomas and Augustine appear.

St. Thomas said that the perfection of the image consists in its being active, in the use of the faculties; that is to say, in the active recollection, active understanding, and active love. And that is all he has to say on the subject. [!] However, other theologians give it as their opinion—and here we have something incomparably more sublime—that the image of the Trinity lies in the most intimate regions of the soul, in its most secret

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and intimate depths, where God is present essentially, actually, and substantially. Here God acts, and makes his home, and it would be as impossible to separate God from this inmost depth of the soul as it would be to separate him from himself . . . There, in the depths of the soul, the soul possesses by grace all that God has by nature. So far, and only so far, as a man abandons himself and turns to this secret depth of his soul, can grace fructify in him in the highest way.<sup>198</sup>

The German Dominican, and others of this school, do find an image of the Trinity in the three faculties of the soul, but they add a deeper, more significant image in the substance of the soul. They all teach that the mystical union which constitutes the return to divine unity takes place in the essence of the soul and not through the faculties. Mystical union can take place, in their view, only where God has placed his image in the fullest sense, that is in the depths of the soul where creatures cannot penetrate. The union does not take place ultimately through the activity of the faculties of the soul, the basic augustinian-thomistic trinitarian image, for here remains the images which created objects have imprinted on them.<sup>199</sup>

Something of the latter view appears also in the writings of Ruysbroek, in *The Book of Supreme Truth*.

And therefore, too, such enlightened men are, with a free spirit, lifted up above reason into a bare and imageless vision, wherein lives the eternal indrawing summons of the Divine Unity; and with an *imageless and bare understanding*, they pass through all works, and all exercises, and all things, until they reach the summit of their spirits. There, their bare understanding is drenched by the Eternal Brightness, even as the air is drenched through by the sunshine. And the *bare, uplifted will* is transformed and drenched through by abysmal love, even as iron is by fire. And the *bare, uplifted memory* feels itself enwrapped and established in an abysmal absence of image. And thereby the created image is united above reason in a threefold way with its Eternal Image, which is the origin of its being and life; and this origin is preserved and possessed,

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essentially and eternally, through a simple seeing in an imageless void; and so man is lifted up above reason in a threefold manner into the Unity, and in a onefold manner into the Trinity.<sup>200</sup>

There is little need to point out the difference between this view of the divine image and that of St. Thomas and St. Augustine alike. Both of the great doctors teach that the principles of the perfection of the image in man, and the principles of mystical union, are the activities of knowledge and love, flowing basically from the faculties. It is precisely through the graced operations of the trinitarian image in man that divine union and transformation takes place to the degree that it is possible in this life. From the tendency toward neo-platonic "self-simplification" evident among the "speculative" mystics of the fourteenth century it is not too long a step to "annihilation" of the faculties and thence to the aberrations of the Quietists.

During this same century several English writers appear who are associated with the development of later medieval mysticism, and they are the unknown author of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, Walter Hilton and Mother Juliana of Norwich. Ascribed to the same author who was responsible for *The Cloud of Unknowing* is a small treatise which speaks of how man's soul is made to the image of the Trinity. This little tract owes much to the thought of St. Augustine.

For all mankind was defaced by the sin of the first man; so that man, who was made to the image and likeness of God in the beginning of this world, lost the likeness, while only the image remained with him. For in this that the soul is three, that is to say, mind, reason, and will . . . it is made to the image of God. . . . But then it is made to the likeness of God, when these three powers be imprinted with virtues. . . . Be reformed, then, with virtues, the mind with belief, the reason with hope, and the will with charity. And so you are like to the Holy Trinity.<sup>201</sup>

The main theme of Hilton's *Scale of Perfection* is the restoration of the image of God in man by grace. Here appears a great



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deal of the augustinian teaching about the image of the Trinity in the three powers of the soul, but the insistence is on the re-forming of this likeness to the Trinity through the image of Jesus. Much of the same thought and emphasis can be seen in the *Revelations* of Mother Juliana also.<sup>282</sup> Here is how Hilton describes the trinitarian image,

The soul of man is a life with three powers—memory, understanding, and will—made in the image and likeness of the Blessed Trinity, whole, perfect, and righteous. The memory has the likeness of the Father inasmuch as it was given power to retain His image, neither forgetting it nor being distracted by creatures. The understanding was made bright without error or darkness, as perfect as it might be in a body not glorified; and so it has the likeness of the Son, who is eternal Wisdom. The will was made pure, springing up to God without love of the flesh or of creatures, by the sovereign goodness of the Holy Ghost, and so it has the likeness of the Holy Ghost, who is divine love. So man's soul, which may be called a created trinity, was perfected in the memory, sight, and love of the uncreated Blessed Trinity, which is God. This is the dignity and nobility which belongs to man's soul naturally at its creation. You possessed this state in Adam before man's first sin . . . And though we can never recover it entirely here, we should desire to recover a semblance of that dignity; that our soul may be restored by grace, as it were, to a shadow of that image of the Trinity, which it originally possessed and which it will have in its fullness in heaven.<sup>203</sup>

From the same century we have strong echoes of the augustinian-thomistic trinitarian image to be seen in the writings of the great Italian mystic, St. Catherine of Siena. The following excerpt is taken from her Prayers, but the same teaching can be seen in *The Dialogue*.<sup>284</sup>

O Deity, Deity, ineffable Deity, O Supreme Goodness, who has made us in thy image and likeness, and wholly through love! But in creating man You said, "let us make man in our image and likeness." You did will, O Ineffable Love, that all the Trinity should consent to his creation in order to communicate

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the form itself of the Trinity, O Deity eternal, to the powers of the soul. Thou, O Eternal Father, who contains and upholds all things in thyself, in order to impress Your image on man, has given him memory in order to retain and preserve all that the understanding hears, sees, and knows of Thee, O Infinite Goodness. The understanding shares through this knowledge in the wisdom of thy divine Son. The gentle clemency of the Holy Spirit is communicated to it by the will, that will which raises itself to Thee, wholly filled with love of Thee, and clasping, as with the hand, all that the understanding perceives of thy ineffable goodness. . . .<sup>205</sup>

Mention should be made here of a reaction taking place towards the end of the fourteenth century against the "speculative" school of German mystics, against its learned spirituality and excesses. This movement had its beginnings in the Low Countries and has been labelled the *devotio moderna*. The pioneer in the movement was Gerard Groote who was attracted to the mystical life by the greatest of the Flemish mystics, Blessed Jan van Ruysbroek. Beyond the common interest in the spiritual life, there is little else in the writings of Groote to suggest that he was a disciple of Ruysbroek. The *devotio moderna* can be said to begin with him, for he not only decries the abuses of learning, but gives strong support to the idea that learning has no role to play in the interior life.<sup>286</sup> Something of the same tendency can be seen in *The Imitation of Christ*, the chief work of the movement. Despite the well-known virtues of this work, it can hardly be denied that its author continually suggests an opposition between advance in the spiritual life and devotion to learning, even sacred learning or theology.

More to our purpose is the fact—unusual among the writers we have considered—that nothing of the augustinian doctrine about the trinitarian image in man appears in the *Imitation*.<sup>207</sup> Even Jean Gerson, the chief luminary of the University of Paris at this time, and also opposed to the excesses of the

German school, will relate his understanding of the spiritual life and mystical union to the perfecting of the resemblance to the divine Trinity in man.<sup>208</sup> Such a theory finds no place in the *Imitation*, despite other noteworthy augustinian characteristics of this work—such as the inward piety of the bishop of Hippo. The absence of any reference to the divine image in man, except for two fleeting remarks, in the *Imitation of Christ*, may have been deliberate on the part of the author, and, perhaps, forms part of the general reaction to the excesses in this area on the part of the German school of mystics. In any event it was mainly through the *Imitation* that the *devotio moderna* will shape the belief of the future, a more inward kind of piety accentuating asceticism and somewhat unrelated to objective theology, which begins to assert itself with vigor around the time of the Council of Trent.

During the first generations of the fifteenth century there arose in Italy another movement, universally known as the Renaissance, which took on the added note of a revolt against scholasticism. The Humanist side of this movement, though it remains largely Christian in name, knows little or nothing of the medieval concept of man as the image of God. The natural, the reasonable man is overexalted to the degree that man's dignity is sought and found independently of his fundamental relation to God as an image of the divine. Following quickly on the heels of the Renaissance was the revolt of the first "Reformers" against traditional Christianity. There is certainly no element of humanism in Luther's approach to Christianity, and, in a way, even less in the view of Calvin. The Renaissance may have exalted man to a point where the natural divine image loses its necessary and basic relation to the heavenly Exemplar, but the "great Reformers" lower the dignity of man to the depth where any reference to the divine image is meaningless.<sup>209</sup> The relation of man to God, in this view, is purely arbitrary, founded neither in "corrupt" human nature, nor really

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restored or renewed by the cloak of "extrinsic" grace. Both the Renaissance man and the Reformation man, and the latter more irrevocably than the former, are divorced from every stream of Christian tradition, patristic, scholastic, and mystic.

The Church's answer to the Reformation was fully and forcibly expressed at the important Council of Trent, and here it was that the *Summa* of St. Thomas received universal recognition. Scholastic theology was not to be repudiated, but to be reformed according to the norms of the great synthesis of Aquinas. In answer to the Reformation's attempt to appropriate St. Augustine as their own, the decrees of the Council appeal to his authority and especially in the decree on justification. Even before this time, toward the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century, a revival of thomistic studies had taken place, and the great commentaries on the works of the Angelic Doctor begin to appear. This revival of the thomistic synthesis, impregnated as it was with augustinian doctrine, could not but be reflected in the learned comments of the speculative theologians, and in particular in their conception of man as the image of the Trinity. This renewal of attachment to St. Thomas was greatly reinforced also by the advent of the Society of Jesus which, in the main, followed the teaching of Aquinas.

Interesting to observe also are what may be called the "ascetical" manuals of the period like the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius and the *Spiritual Combat*. In the meditations for the first week St. Ignatius gives his celebrated method of prayer according to the three powers of the soul, the powers of memory, understanding, and will. Without doubt St. Ignatius was aware that here he is referring to the augustinian trinitarian image, which for centuries had been a commonplace of the theologians and spiritual writers. Yet, to our knowledge, no reference to this relation between the three powers of the soul and the divine image in man appears in the *Spiritual Exercises*.<sup>210</sup>



Does this not suggest—which was far from the intention of Ignatius, but later to occur—the possibility of a separation of “asceticism” from “mysticism,” and to be seen appearing precisely within the domain of the trinitarian image in man? Of the outstanding spiritual works after the time of St. Thomas in the Middle Ages, the *Imitation of Christ* tends to ignore the doctrine of the image in relation to the spiritual life and its progress. By the time we reach the Ignatian manual, which is dependent to some degree on the *Imitation*, we find the repetition of an augustinian trinity with no indication that this is a trinitarian image in the view of all the great Doctors and even of the contemporary “mystics.” Soon the stage will be reached when the conception of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas, the concept of the spiritual life unified in the doctrine of the image, (and, we might add, also the view of the Greek Fathers like Origen, St. Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius the Areopagite), will be lost to the sight in the manuals of some of the later writers on the spiritual and moral life.

Among the Spanish “mystics” of the sixteenth century the theme of the divine image in man is a commonplace. Fray Louis of Leon, an Augustinian, is one of the masters of spirituality from this era, and in his writings we find a clear emphasis on union with Christ and imitation of him as the principal means at arriving at perfection. Unlike the earlier *Imitation of Christ*, which was known to our author, the theme of the divine image in man and the perfect Image of God in Christ is a fundamental doctrine in the thought of the Augustinian. In his *Names of Christ* Fray Louis betrays an intimate acquaintance with the scholastic developments of this doctrine. In the following text we see an echo of the trinitarian image of St. Augustine:

As the evil spirit formerly permeated man's body and soul, the good spirit penetrates man completely; and as the evil spirit brought disorder and would condemn man to eternal death, the good spirit orders all things and will bring man

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to a glorious and everlasting life. The good spirit is light in the *mind*, godliness in the *memory*, justice in the *will*, temperance in the passions, custody of the senses, fruitfulness and merit in works, and life and peace for the whole man. It is the true image of God which makes men His sons. Speaking of this spirit, its good results, and its efficacy and power, Scripture says many things in many different places, but the words of St. Paul will suffice for our purposes . . . "Lie not to one another; stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him who created him" (Col. 3:9-10).<sup>210a</sup>

Representative of the Franciscan school among the Spanish mystics of this period is Fray John of the Angels, and again we see a distinct accent on the doctrine of the divine image as fundamental to the doctrine of the spiritual life. Fray John understands the image of the Trinity in man after the fashion of the "speculative mystics" of the fourteenth century with whose writings he was well acquainted: the more profound image of God lies in the hidden depths of the soul:

Few there are who discover this hidden treasure and few there are who realize that there is such a treasure in us. Blossius, Ruysbroeck, Tauler and others say that this center of the soul is loftier than the faculties of the soul because it is the origin of all. It is completely simple and the faculties of the soul are united in it. It is the highest point in the spiritual life and is sealed with the image of God. Some saints called it the center, others the depth, others peaks of the spirit, and others mind. St. Augustine called it depth, because it is the most interior and secret place of all, where there are no images of created things, but only that of the Creator alone. Here there is the utmost silence, because no figure of any created thing ever reaches this center and by it we become so divine or so similar to God that we are called gods. This depth rises above all created things and above all the senses and faculties of the soul, beyond time and place, to remain in perpetual union with God. When, illumined by the eternal and uncreated light, this depth is manifest and revealed to man, he becomes fond of it and tends toward it, as did

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the man who found the treasure. O noble and divine temple from which God never withdraws, where the Most Holy Trinity abides and eternity is enjoyed!<sup>210b</sup>

The great "mystics" of the period also echo something of the augustinian-thomistic doctrine about man as the image of the Trinity, and particularly those of the Carmelite school. St. Theresa of Avila may be brief in the following statement about this doctrine, but the theme of the trinitarian image is basic to her spiritual teaching.

On St. Augustine's Day, I had just communicated, when I was enabled to learn, and almost to see—in what way I cannot tell, unless it was by an intellectual vision which passed quickly—how the Three Persons of the Most Holy Trinity, Whom I bear engraven on my soul, are One. This truth I was enabled to learn by means of so remarkable a picture, and so clear a light, that it has worked upon me very differently than if I had merely known it by faith. Since that time I have been unable to think of any One of the Three Divine Persons without realizing that They are Three. . . .<sup>211</sup>

The image of the Trinity in man appears in great evidence in the works of St. John of the Cross, who describes the mystical union and transformation in terms of the trinitarian image in man.

And in the transformation which the soul experiences in this life, this same breathing of God into the soul, and of the soul into God, is very frequent, and brings the most sublime delight of love to the soul, albeit not in a degree revealed and manifest, as in the next life. And there is no need to consider it impossible that the soul should be capable of something so high as to breathe in God as God breathes in her after a mode of participation. For since God grants her the favor of uniting her in the Most Holy Trinity, wherein she becomes deiform and God by participation, how is it a thing incredible that she should also perform her work of understanding, knowledge, and love—or rather should have it performed in the Trinity together with It, like the Trinity itself. This, however, comes to pass by a mode of communication and participation, which God effects

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in the soul herself; for this is to be transformed in the Three Persons, in power and wisdom and love, and herein is the soul like to God, for it was to the end that she might come to this that He created her in His image and likeness.<sup>212</sup>

Something of the same view appears in the writings of other spiritual writers and mystics like Louis of Granada, St. Mary Magdalen dei Pazzi, and St. Francis de Sales, though undoubtedly the accents vary.<sup>213</sup>

Meanwhile, among the speculative theologians, the revival of thomism is producing unrivalled commentaries on the works of the Angelic Doctor. The beginnings here are to be seen in the learned comments of theologians like Cardinal Cajetan and Francis Sylvius, both of whom add their insights to each of the articles of the question devoted by the Common Doctor to the image of the Trinity in the *Prima Pars*.<sup>214</sup> Other thomistic theologians like Gonet in his *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* give ample space and discussion to the trinitarian image in man, and when we reach commentators like John of St. Thomas and especially those of the Carmelite school, the Complutenses and the Salmanticenses, the results assume staggering proportions.<sup>215</sup> This almost encyclopedic erudition will not leave many problems unexplored, and later theologians often refer to these theological commentaries when considering the perennial difficulties.

Despite deep differences with the traditional thomistic school over the question of grace and free will, the Jesuits number among their members some very influential theologians during this period. Writers so diverse as St. Robert Bellarmine, Francis Suarez, and Denis Petavius all reproduce something of the augustinian-thomistic doctrine about the image of the Trinity in man. St. Robert's *Scalae Ascensionis in Deum* is modelled after the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* of St. Bonaventure and the doctrine of the image in man is a basic theme.<sup>216</sup> The concept of man as the image of the Trinity appears in the *Scalae Ascensionis* when St. Robert considers the rational soul,



the eighth grade in the scale.<sup>217</sup> The same doctrine appears in the works of Suarez when he treats of the creation of man in his treatise *De Opere Sex Dierum*.<sup>218</sup> Important for the beginnings of a specifically positive theology was the work of Petavius, and the doctrine of the image as found in many of the Fathers, including Augustine, is summarized in this valuable work.<sup>219</sup> Accentuation of the positive and patristic side of theology is common to all of the Jesuit theologians mentioned here.

During the seventeenth century a Protestantizing element arises within the Church, called Jansenism. The same misuse of augustinian doctrine which is characteristic of the great Reformers is also peculiar to Jansenism, which has been appropriately described as "Augustine seen through the spectacles of Calvin." Much discredit has been heaped on the great name of Augustine because of the attempted misappropriation of his words by the leaders of the Reformation and of Jansenism. Reaction to the rigorism and the religion of fear characteristic of the Jansenists led to the religion of pure love of the Quietists, and here the doctrine of the image, albeit distorted, is to the fore, as it was among the fourteenth-century Rhenish and Flemish mystics.<sup>220</sup> First the false rigorism and asceticism of the Jansenists, then the false mysticism of the Quietists were condemned by the Church, though the former lived on in various guises for years.

At the end of the sixteenth century moral theology, in the narrower and modern sense, begins to appear in treatises separated from dogma and doctrinal theology, following the general trend toward specialization. Consequently, more stress was given to casuistry with a full-blown theological quarrel ensuing when the latter joined hands with the rigorism of Jansenism. Various "moral systems" appeared with the extreme positions being condemned by the Church, and it is only with St. Alphonsus Ligouri that sane moral principles begin to dominate late in the eighteenth century. At the same time,

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during the age of the Enlightenment, the doctrinal teaching began to be compromised; mysteries fundamental to the very nature of Christianity were passed over almost in silence.<sup>221</sup> Obviously the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in man suffered in like fashion when the manualists are forced to accommodate their doctrine to the spirit of their generation, as can be seen, for example, in the work of Contenson. Little or nothing is said of man and his greatest dignity, the dignity of imaging the Three Divine Persons.<sup>222</sup> The decline of theology continues into the early years of the nineteenth century, when the theories of Descartes and Kant were preferred to the thought of St. Thomas and St. Augustine.

Later in the nineteenth century, and especially after the Vatican Council and the condemnation of Modernism, the quality of theological writing improved, and the doctrine of the trinitarian image in man finds new and powerful exponents. In the field of positive and patristic theology we can cite the thorough work of de Regnon on the dogma of the Trinity, where much of the augustinian doctrine about the trinity in man appears.<sup>223</sup> C. Boyer, patrologist and augustinian scholar, devoted several articles to the same theme which he has synthesized from the augustinian doctrine.<sup>224</sup> The augustinian-thomistic doctrine about the trinitarian image also appears among the scriptural scholars, notably in the classic *Scripturae Sacrae Cursus Completus* of the early nineteenth century, but those from nearer our own period do not find the Trinity of Persons expressly indicated in the image text from Genesis.<sup>225</sup> A very thorough and profound work in the field of mystical theology is the contribution of A. Gardeil, *La Structure de L'Ame et L'Experience Mystique*, which relates spiritual theology in an intimate fashion to the augustinian and thomistic doctrine about the image of the Trinity in man, while much the same observation should be made of *La Contemplation Augustinienne*, the work of the noted augustinian scholar F. Cayre.<sup>226</sup> Some prominent dogmatic theologians devote adequate space and comment

to the doctrine of the image in our own time, but worthy of mention is the monograph of Matthijs, which synthesizes the doctrine of the image from the many scattered remarks of the Angelic Doctor.<sup>227</sup> The situation among the moral theologians does not present so happy a picture. A few writers like Ramirez, it is true, are clear about the place of the doctrine of the image; he flatly declares that the most perfect and profound definition of moral theology is the consideration of man the wayfarer insofar as he is the image of God.<sup>228</sup> Yet most moderns are still busily searching for any approach that will place moral theology in a distinctly Christian frame of reference, or unite it somehow to dogmatic or scriptural formulas.<sup>229</sup> Is not the augustinian-thomistic doctrine of man as the image of the Trinity just such a reference, intimately related as it is to both scriptural and traditional formulas?

The unifying character of the doctrine of the image, perhaps, is more evident in its totality in the thought of the great African Father, where the affective character and the practical side of the doctrine never yields to theory. Because of the speculative nature of the great synthesis of the Angelic Doctor, and the fact that the doctrine is not integrated to any noteworthy degree with the more practical teaching of the *Summa*, the position of the doctrine of the image there may leave the impression that its function is sheerly that of a speculative character. Nothing could be stranger to the thought and intention of St. Thomas than such a one-sided view. The doctrine of the image for Aquinas is not a device rigged for the purpose of synthesizing and organizing the teachings of the faith, but emphatically a notion relating man to God in reality and pervading the whole of his spiritual life and progress. The thorough-going unity of theology, scriptural and patristic, speculative and practical, dogmatic and moral, mystical and ascetical, centers around the concept of man as the image of the divine, and this is the view of the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church alike.

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Interesting to observe are the comments about the image of God in man by Protestant theologians who are influential in our times.<sup>230</sup> Paul Tillich can be considered as representative of modern Protestant theology, and the following remarks appear in his *Systematic Theology*.

Man as creature has been called the "image of God." This biblical phrase is interpreted as differently as the Christian doctrine of man. The discussion is complicated by the fact that the biblical report uses two terms for this idea, which were translated as *imago* and *similitudo*. These were distinguished in their meaning (Irenaeus). *Imago* was supposed to point to the natural equipment of man; *similitudo*, to the special divine gift, the *donum superadditum*, which gave Adam the power of adhering to God. Protestantism, denying the ontological dualism between nature and supernature, rejected the *donum superadditum* and with it the distinction between *imago* and *similitudo*. Man in his pure nature is not only the image of God; he also has the power of communion with God and therefore of righteousness towards other creatures and himself (*justitia originalis*). With the fall this power has been lost. Man is separated from God, and has no power of return. For the Roman Catholic doctrine the power of communion with God is only weakened, and some freedom of turning toward God remains.<sup>231</sup>

Tillich rightly observes that the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism here is basically a difference in the interpretation of grace. Continuing he exposes what is, in his view, the "exact meaning of the image of God."

. . . the first problem demands avoidance of a confusion between image of God and relation to God. Certainly man can have communion with God only because he is made in his image, but this does not mean that the image can be defined by communion with God. Man is the image of God in that in which he differs from all other creatures, namely, his rational structure. Of course, the term "rational" is subject to many misinterpretations. Rational can be defined as technical reason in the sense of arguing and calculating. Then the Aristotelian definition of man as *animal rationale* is as wrong as the descrip-



tion of the image of God in terms of his rational nature. But reason is the structure of freedom, and it implies potential infinity. Man is the image of God because in him the ontological elements are complete and united on a creaturely basis, just as they are complete and united in God as the creative ground. Man is the image of God because his *logos* is analogous to the divine *logos*, so that the divine *logos* can appear as man without destroying the humanity of man.<sup>232</sup>

This is not the place to criticize the doctrine of the image as proposed by the Protestant Tillich, but the Lutheran notion of man's "corrupt" human nature remains at its basis, despite the circumlocutions. Tillich passes over in complete ignorance a whole set of distinctions precised by the scholastics, but appearing fundamentally among the Fathers and especially in the thought of Augustine. After the fall man remains *capax Dei*, he retains the capacity for "communion with God," because he always retains the fundamental natural image of God in his rational soul: this is the view of Augustine and Thomas. This "power of communion with God" is not lost nor radically affected, but if we understand "communion with God" in the fully supernatural sense, then it is but an obediential potency, a passive power, and not a "power" in the ordinary and active sense of that term. Actual communion with God, in the sense above, belongs only to the supernatural image of grace, but the natural image is the *punctum insertionis* for the whole order of supernature and grace. "Ontological dualism" is more characteristic of Tillich's doctrine, than of Catholic teaching if dualism implies opposition and not only distinction, for he retains no basis in human nature for "power of communion with God."

Tillich says that "man is the image of God in . . . his rational structure," and then states that a wrong description of the image is one which describes "the image of God in terms of his rational nature." It seems that Tillich objects to the latter description mainly on the grounds of its supposed aristotelian antecedents.<sup>233</sup> Yet, in the final words of the last

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text, there is a faint echo of the augustinian image of the Trinity in man, when it is said that "man is the image of God because his *logos* is analogous to the divine *logos*." In sum, one cannot but feel that Tillich is consistent only in his conformity with the attitude of the first "Reformers" toward the medieval Church and its scholastic theology, flavored as the latter was by an aristotelian ingredient.

\* \* \*

The core of Christian anthropology is the notion of man as the image of God. Philosophically speaking man is defined as a rational animal, but theologically speaking man is defined as the image of God. The two definitions, as the two disciplines, differ *toto coelo*, but they are not in opposition one to the other; man's rational nature makes him an image of the divine fundamentally and basically. This is the view of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and it was the genius of Augustine and of Thomas which developed this theme to its present imposing height. All of the streams of Catholic thought, despite differences of accent and interpretation, have preserved the doctrine of the image together with the augustinian and thomistic insights.<sup>234</sup> True as this observation is, one cannot calmly look back at the last three centuries or so of the history of the doctrine of the image and, in larger perspective, the history of theology itself. The steady proliferation and even disintegration of theology during the recent centuries tends to relegate the doctrine of the image to spiritual theology. Such an unfortunate accident of history, if truly the present situation, can hardly lay claim to any patristic or scholastic precedents. The popes themselves, who are the chief teachers of the Church, know nothing of such a restricted view of the doctrine of the image. Pius XII conceives the work of the Church in the context of the divine image in man.

The goal and object of the Church is man; man naturally good, penetrated, ennobled and strengthened by the truth and grace of Christ. The Church wishes to produce men who

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are firmly established in their inviolable integrity as the images of God; men proud of their personal dignity and their wholesome liberty; men justly jealous of that equality which they have with their fellow humans in everything that concerns the most intimate depths of human dignity. . . .<sup>235</sup>

Leo XIII, on the other hand, is even more explicit about the theme of the divine image and its place in the life of man. "To contemplate God, and to tend to him, is *the supreme law of the life of man who is made to the divine image and likeness*, and by his very nature vehemently impelled to the enjoyment of him. But it is not by bodily motions or effort that man tends to God, but by acts of the soul, that is by knowledge and love."<sup>236</sup> In these words Leo XIII repeats the teaching, if not the very words, of St. Augustine and St. Thomas for whom "man's greatest honor is the image and likeness of God."

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>195</sup>Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, Liber Primus, Dist. Tertia. The second part of this distinction is devoted to the "vestige" of the Trinity, and the third part to the image of the Trinity; *Ioannis Duns Scoti, Opera Omnia* (Vaticana: 1954), III, 173-200; 201-357. The discussion is very extended, but the principal part is taken up with the rejection of views differing from his.

<sup>196</sup>See P. Pourrat, *Christian Spirituality*, II, 225 (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1953).

<sup>197</sup>John Tauler, Sermon XXIX, Second Sermon for the Feast of the Most Holy Trinity, *Spiritual Conferences* (B. Herder, St. Louis: 1961), 141, transl. and edit. by E. Colledge and Sr. M. Jane, O.P.

<sup>198</sup>*Ibid.*, 141-2. The same explicit treatment about the trinitarian image appears in Sermon I for the Nativity, *op. cit.*, 155-6, and in fact the theme of the divine image in man is common to all of the sermons and conferences of Tauler.

<sup>199</sup>See P. Pourrat, *op. cit.*, II, 240-245. The deeper image in the depths of the soul derives undoubtedly from neo-platonism, and particularly from the teaching of Dionysius, where there can be seen "a strong tendency to go behind, as it were, the distinction of Persons to a super-transcendent undifferentiated Unity," F. Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, II, 97.

<sup>200</sup>Jan van Ruysbroeck, *Book of Supreme Truth*, XII appearing in *John Of Ruysbroeck* (Dent and Sons, London: 1916), 243-244, transl. by C. A. Wynschenck Dom. References to the trinitarian image in the writings of Blessed Jan, as in the case of Tauler, are too numerous for citation, but *The Adornment of The Spiritual Marriage* especially repeatedly refers to this theme.

<sup>201</sup>A. Baker, *The Cloud of Unknowing and other Treatises* (Burns, Oates and Washburn, London: 1936), 245-6.

<sup>202</sup>Cf. Juliana of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love*, cc. 10, 44, 67 (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1952), 20, 79, 139, edited by Dom Roger Hudleston, 2nd edit. See C. Pepler, "Man in Medieval Thought," *The Thomist*, XII (1949), 151-152.

<sup>203</sup>Walter Hilton, *The Scale of Perfection*, I, 43, and 45 (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1953), 63-64 and 70, transl. by Dom Gerard Sitwell.

<sup>204</sup>Cf. *The Dialogue of St. Catherine of Siena* (Burns, Oates and Washburn, London: 1925), A Treatise of Discretion, c. XIII, 30-31, translated by A. Thorold. The text reads, ". . . and I adjure thee that thou do this by thy uncreated love which moved thee thyself to create man in thy image and similitude, saying, 'Let us make man in our own image,' and this thou didst, O Eternal Trinity, that man might participate in everything belonging to thee, the most high and eternal Trinity. Wherefore thou gavest him memory in order to receive thy benefits, by which he participates in the power of the Eternal Father; and intellect that he might know, seeing thy goodness, and so might participate in the wisdom of thine only-begotten Son; and will, that he might love that which his intellect has seen and known of thy truth, thus participating in the clemency of thy Holy Spirit."



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<sup>205</sup>St. Catherine of Siena, Prayers, I, as cited in M. Pourrat, *op. cit.*, II, 210.

<sup>206</sup>See P. Hughes, *A History of the Church*, III, 220 f (Sheed and Ward, New York: 1947).

<sup>207</sup>Cf. *The Imitation of Christ*, III, the last line of c. 54 and the first line of c. 55 (Harper, New York: 1941), 202-203, edited by E. Klein. These are the only direct references to the divine image in man and actually are but one reference. No reference is made to any trinitarian image, though Christ as the model and source for the reformation of the divine image in man is the major theme of the work.

<sup>208</sup>See P. Pourrat, *op. cit.*, II, 280-1.

<sup>209</sup>In one of his more Christian moments even Erasmus will repeat something of the doctrine of the image, "Shall we not reckon and account with our mind, of how noble a Craftsman we were made, in how excellent estate we are set, with how exceedingly great pride we are bought, unto how great felicity we are called, and that man is that gentle and noble creature for whose sake God hath forged the marvelous building of the world; that he is of the company of the angels, the son of God, the heir of immortality, a member of Christ, a member of the Church, that our bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit, our minds the images and also the secret habitations of the Deity." From Erasmus's *Manual of the Christian Knight*, cited by T. P. Neill, *Religion and Culture* (Milwaukee: 1951), 16-17.

Manifestly the leading lights of the Reformation speak of the divine image in man, as can be seen, for example, in the *Treatise of Christian Liberty* of Luther, and the *Institutes of the Christian Religion* of Calvin, though the concept is not prominent. An interesting analysis of both the Lutheran and Calvinistic concept of the divine image appears in the Protestant R. Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: 1949). He observes that Luther's interpretations of the divine image "are coloured by his eagerness to prove that, whatever the image is, it is now lost" (160), and then notes that it was Luther's opinion that the image of God "is something more than the powers of the soul, memory and mind, or intellect and will" (161). The latter is, of course, the augustinian-thomistic trinitarian image. Niebuhr concludes about the Lutheran notion, "Luther's extravagant descriptions of the state of perfection before the Fall are so obviously prompted by the desire to accentuate man's present state of sin, misery and death, and they are, compared with both Augustine and Calvin [!], so inexact that his thought is not very helpful in interpreting the real import of the Christian conception of the image of God." (161). The views of Calvin about the image of God in man are more palatable to Niebuhr (158-9).

<sup>210</sup>Cf. *The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius*, n. 235, Second Point, where the dignity of man as the image of God is referred to, but no mention of any relation between the three powers of the soul and the trinitarian aspect of this image appears (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1954), 102, transl. by L. Puhl.

<sup>210a</sup>Louis of Leon, *The Names of Christ* (Herder, St. Louis: 1955), 94, translated by E. J. Schuster. An explicit use of the trinitarian analogy in man to explain the divine processions appears on page 229. This section, entitled The Son of God, reproduces much of the image doctrine of St. Augustine and the scholastics.

<sup>210b</sup>John of the Angels, *Conquest of the Kingdom of God* (Herder, St. Louis: 1957) First Dialogue, 14, translated by C. J. Crowley. See also page 17 of this translation.

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<sup>211</sup>St. Theresa of Avila, *Spiritual Relations*, XLVII, appearing in *The Complete Works of Saint Theresa of Jesus*, edited by E. Peers, I, 359 (Sheed and Ward, New York: 1946). Cf. Father Teresius, "Image of God, Presence of God," *Spiritual Life*, v. 8 (1962), 242-248.

<sup>212</sup>St. John of the Cross, *Spiritual Canticle*, Stanza XXXIX, 4, appearing in *The Works of St. John of the Cross*, II, 176, edited by E. Peers (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1949). Cf. Father Bruno, "On Perfecting the Image of God In Our Souls: Virtue," *Spiritual Life*, v. 8 (1962), 251-260.

<sup>213</sup>For St. Francis de Sales, cf. *Treatise on the Love of God*, I, XV, translated by H. Mackey, 54-55 (Newman, Westminster, Md.: 1942); for Louis of Granada, cf. *Summa of the Christian Life*, I, 102 and 207 f, translated by J. Aumann (B. Herder, St. Louis: 1954); for St. Mary Magdalen dei Pazzi, see M. Pourrat, *op. cit.*, III, 248, footnote (3).

<sup>214</sup>For Cajetan, cf. *Commentaria in Summam Theologicam*, Primam Partem, q. 93 (Leonine edition of the Opera Omnia St. Thomae Aquinatis, Romae: 1888-1906). For Sylvius, cf. *Commentarius in Totam Primam Partem S. Thomae Aquinatis*, t. I, q. 93, aa. 1-9 (Venetiis: 1726).

<sup>215</sup>Cf. J. B. Gonet, *Clypeus Theologicae Thomisticae*, Pars Ia, Tractatus Octavus, De Homine, Variisque Statibus Naturae Humanae, Disp. I, aa. 3-8 incl. (Parisiis: 1875).

The Salmanticenses in their *Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus* (Paris: 1877 f) do not speak of the image of God in man, for they consider that nothing can be added to the remarks of their brethren, the Complutenses, to which work they refer the reader, I, Proemium, s. 4. Unfortunately the *De Anima* of the Complutenses has not been available to us. With regard to John of St. Thomas, his work on the gifts of the Holy Ghost is the classic commentary on this doctrine as found in St. Thomas. In noting the general characteristics of the gifts the following observation appears, "these gifts are given so that a man may operate with a certain connaturality toward divine things. . . . Now no one can be rendered connatural to divine things—*no one can be in a measure spiritualized and deified*—unless he is properly disposed by a permanent and habitual inclination." *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost* (Sheed and Ward, New York: 1951), II, 46, transl. by D. Hughes.

<sup>216</sup>St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Ascensione Mentis in Deum*, Praefatio (*Roberti Cardinalis Bellarmini Opera Omnia*, Neapoli: 1862), VI, 210.

<sup>217</sup>*Ibid.*, Gradus Octavus, Ex consideratione animae rationalis, VI, 238 f.

<sup>218</sup>Francis Suarez, *Tractatus Primus—De Opere Sex Dierum*, Lib. III, c. VIII (*Suarez Opera Omnia*, Parisiis: 1856), III, 227-228.

<sup>219</sup>D. Petavius, *Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus*, III, De Opificio Sex Dierum, II, cc. 2-4 (Venetiis: 1721), 156-166; also, II, *De Trinitate*, VI, cc. 5-7, 323-337.

<sup>220</sup>See M. Pourrat, *Christian Spirituality*, IV, 133 f, 194 f. This is not to say that orthodox writers about the spiritual life are unconcerned about the divine image in man, but to note that the Prequietists and Quietists have been influenced to some degree by statements of the Rhenish and Flemish mystical school.

<sup>221</sup>See *ibid.*, 416, where Pourrat makes the following observations, "The Catholic clergy itself was affected by this rationalism; and, sorry to say, doctrinal teaching was compromised. In this age of Aufklärung, Christianity became 'a kind of superior morality, almost independent of dogma.' The Incarnation, the Redemption, original sin, mysteries fundamental to the very nature of Christianity, were passed over almost in

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silence. Men claimed that such 'doctrines are wrong on two counts: they are beyond the rational activities of the mind; and even more, they have provoked theological disputes between the various Christian confessions.'"

Anticipating a bit the century of the Enlightenment, yet clearly opting for the "divine right" of kings is the following statement made at the assembly of the Bishops of France in 1614, ". . . kings are ordained of God, and not only this, but they themselves are Gods . . . Yet it follows that those who are called Gods are Gods not by essence but by participation; not by nature, but by grace; not forever, but for a certain time, as being the true lieutenants of God Almighty who, by imitation of His Divine Majesty, represent His image here below." Cited in L. Sturzo, *Church and State* (Notre Dame: 1962), II, 260-261. The Christian sensibilities of the French bishops were offended by these remarks of their spokesmen and this exaggerated attitude was modified by the assembly.

<sup>222</sup>It is, perhaps, unfair to single out Contenson's work for special attention; nevertheless this manual, as others, gives very little space to the image of God in man. Cf. V. Contenson, *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* (Taurinonisis: 1768), 4 vols., 1st edit. In vol. I, Book IV, Diss. V, the nature of man is discussed in connection with the six-day account of creation, and little or nothing is said of the image in man, 376-391.

Cf. also C. R. Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, Hodiernis Academiarum Moribus Accomodata, Tract. de Opere Sex Dierum, Diss. III, a. 5 (Atrebat: 1867), II, 116 where the trinitarian image is discussed, "Petes utrum in homine sit imago Dei non solum quantum ad naturam divinam sed etiam quantum ad Trinitatem Personarum. Resp. affirmative: quia homo non solum imitatur naturam divinam quatenus se intelligit et diligit sed etiam quatenus se intelligendo producit verbum et se diligendo amorem: homo similiter cognoscendo Deum producit verbum, et ipsum diligendo producit amorem, sicque in eo reperitur principium verbi, verbum, et amor, quibus in Deo constituitur Trinitas personarum."

The substance of the trinitarian image is here, especially if considered together with the preceding remarks of the same article, but such a brief analysis could only have the unhappy effect of minimizing the significance of the doctrine for the student.

<sup>223</sup>Cf. T. de Regnon, *Etudes de Théologie Positive sur la S. Trinité*, (Paris: 1898 f), I, XX, 467-566.

<sup>224</sup>Cf. C. Boyer, "L'Image de la Trinité synthèse de la pensée augustinienne," *Gregorianum*, 5 (1946), 173-199; 333-352. Every writer who attempts to present something of the whole of augustinian thought will have to refer to the various trinities found by Augustine, but what is considered the "classic" treatment is the work of M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus* (Munster in Wesph.: 1927), which has not been available to us.

<sup>225</sup>Cf. *Scripturae Sacrae Cursus Completus*, V, 182-191 (Parisiis: 1837), where the image text from Genesis (1:26) is given an extensive commentary by Jesuit scholars. On page 187 of this volume we see repeated the trinitarian image as proposed by Augustine and Thomas.

Nearer our own times the interpretation of the plural forms from Genesis 1:26 does not see the Trinity of Persons expressly indicated by the writer, and so an express indication of an image of the Trinity should not be expected here. This interpretation of the text is the common interpretation today, beginning with such noted scholars as Lagrange, fortified by the patristic study of Lebreton, continued by Bea and all



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the scriptural scholars. See P. F. Ceuppens, *De Historia Primaeva* (Romae: 1934), 31-38. However, even this modification by the moderns of the older interpretation of the image text does not rule out every indication of the Trinity of Persons, nor does it place the primary resemblance to God in man in anything other than the intellect and will. Cf. Ceuppens, *ibid.*, 37. See also *La Sainte Bible* (editions du Cerf, Paris: 1956), note (h), 9 and note (a), 10.

<sup>226</sup>Cf. A. Gardeil, *La Structure de L'Ame et L'Experience Mystique* (Paris: 1927), 2 vols., *passim*, but especially I, 50-130, and II, 281-312. Other writers about the spiritual life also have occasion to refer to the trinitarian image in man, e.g. Arinterro, *The Mystical Evolution* and R. Carrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ages of the Interior Life*, but none develop the point to the degree found in Gardeil's work. An exception, as noted, is F. Cayre's, *La Contemplation Augustinienne* (Paris: 1954), 2nd. edit. rev., 95-134, where the spiritual implications of the augustinian doctrine appear.

<sup>227</sup>Cf. P. Matthijs, *De Imagine Dei in Homine* (Romae: 1955), 2 vols., *passim*. There are many articles devoted to aspects of the trinitarian image in man, but they are too numerous to warrant citation here, and many of them appear in the bibliography of this study. It should also be observed that the dogmatic manuals of our time do give a treatment of the trinitarian image in man, though it is brief enough. One can also consult Taymans d'Eypernon, *Le mystère primordial. La Trinité dans sa vivante image* (Brussels: 1945).

<sup>228</sup>Cf. M. Ramirez, *De Beatitudine Hominis* (Salmanticae: 1942), I, 65.

<sup>229</sup>Cf. e.g. John C. Ford and Gerald Kelly, *Contemporary Moral Theology* (Westminster, Md.: 1958), 43-79, and T. J. Cunningham, *Moral Theology and the Concept of Man as the Image of God* (Pro Manuscripto, Washington: 1959), 1-4, 76-81.

The objection may arise that the doctrine of the image of the Trinity in man is not "Christocentric," and consequently could not easily be ordered in the synthesis of St. Thomas. Père Congar, it seems to us, answers this difficulty easily, "In truth, the whole of the *Secunda Pars*, the whole of the theological and moral life that is the new life borne Godwards, is the life of Christ in us. The plan and the scientific process of analysis followed by St. Thomas in the *Summa* and the *Compendium Theologiae* is not exactly adapted to manifest this truth inevitably and this is undoubtedly a weakness in a plan otherwise finely conceived and vigorously applied. But there is no shadow of doubt that, for St. Thomas, the supernatural life in its entirety, theological and moral, is in use intimately as something 'Christic' and sacramental and, when examined closely, there are several indications in the very structure of the *Summa* which force it to give up this secret. Let us examine just one, which seems to have outstanding importance. In the anthropological treatise which is part of the *Prima Pars*, *De Deo et de processu creaturarum a Deo*, St. Thomas contemplates man precisely as made in the image and likeness of God. It is of such a man—man carrying about with him and realizing the image of God—that St. Thomas speaks as a theologian. Man bearing and realizing it, I have said, for this image is not some sort of mere statically possessed and imposed imprint; it involves a dynamic tendency toward the Object to which we are thereby likened, and it only realizes itself truly in action and movement, and the more so in proportion as the action and movement are true and perfect. That is why, in question 93, article 4, of the *Prima Pars*, St. Thomas distinguishes three degrees according to which the image of God may be realized in



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us. . . . The whole movement of the *Secunda Pars*, the entire *reditus creaturae rationis in Deum*, is a realization of the *transire in imaginem* of which the medieval mystics speak . . . Moreover—and here is what I am trying to lead up to—the three degrees which St. Thomas, at the end of the *Prima Pars*, distinguished within the process of realization of the image of God, and of the growth in likeness to God, find their exact counterparts in the degrees of belonging to Christ, and likening unto Christ which St. Thomas analyzed in an article of the *Tertia Pars*, *Utrum Christus sit caput omnium hominum*. I think one would hardly depart from the thought of St. Thomas in saying that the degrees of realization of the image of God, the analysis of whose richness and manifold phases is the work of the *Secunda Pars*, are correlatively degrees of incorporation into Christ, degrees also of conformity, of likening and assimilation to Christ: for He is emphatically, in the terms of the prologue to the *Tertia Pars*, *Viam per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus*, and He is this in virtue of all the things *quae per ipsum sunt acta et passa* . . . These are the things whereby He is set up as our exemplar and pattern to be contemplated as the measure and standard of our own fashioning, becoming like unto Him in movement of our return towards God, the return analyzed in the *Secunda Pars*, and filled in and completed by the *Tertia Pars*, in those elements which explain the birth and growth of the Church, the new creation that is in Christ Jesus." *The Mystery of the Church* (Helicon Press: Baltimore, 1960), 106-108.

<sup>230</sup>Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York: 1949), I, 150-166, where a rather complete treatment of the notion is given. Here Niebuhr recounts something of the augustinian notion of image, though he is reserved about some rationalistic and mystic tendencies of Augustine (153-158). Then he gives a short historical summary of Protestant notions: Calvin (159); Luther (160-161); finally Max Scheler with side references to Heidegger and Kierkegaard (162-164). The teaching of St. Thomas, completely misunderstood, appears in a long footnote (4) pp. 153-154. It is difficult to find a clear statement by Niebuhr as to what his understanding of the image of God in man might be, though it appears that the idea of transcendence and self-determination are essential notes.

If there is difficulty in understanding the position of Niebuhr with regard to the doctrine of the image, it is almost impossible to find out what Karl Barth's opinion is from the works available to us, as for example *Dogmatics in Outline*, and *The Word of God and the Word of Man*. His conception of God as "Wholly Other" and his rejection of the doctrine of analogy would lead one to believe that the term "image of God" for him would be wholly emptied of any content and meaning. In lieu of a more direct estimate of Barth's teaching we can refer to Niebuhr's comment with regard to Barth's finding "Augustine's definitions of the image of God in man very inconvenient and criticizes them severely," Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, 158, note (14). Niebuhr is referring to Barth's *Doctrine of the Word of God*, which has not been available to us.

<sup>231</sup>Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (University of Chicago: 1959), I, 258.

<sup>232</sup>*Ibid.*, 259.

<sup>233</sup>The same observation can be made about Niebuhr; cf. *op. cit.*, 153, note (4).

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<sup>234</sup>On the occasion of the fifteen-hundredth anniversary of the death of Augustine Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical about the profound and enduring influence of the bishop of Hippo on all of western thought. The augustinian teaching about the trinitarian image and analogy in man is referred to by the pope in this encyclical. Cf. *Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on "Saint Augustine"* (transl. by NCWC: 1930), 24.

Unfortunately the United Nations, on October 12, 1948, refused to admit the phrase "man created to the image and likeness of God" in its documents because of the opposition from eastern Europe. The proposal of the Christian view of man was introduced by the Brazilian delegate at the Social Commission for the Rights of Man and supported by all of the Latin American republics, Canada, and many others, but not by the United States.

<sup>235</sup>Pius XII, "Allocutiones," *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XLVII (1955), 675.

<sup>236</sup>Leo XIII, "Sapientiae Christianae," *Acta Sanctae Sedis*, XXII (1889-90), 385.

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